Brokers, Bureaucrats, and the Quality of Government: Understanding Development and Decay in Afghanistan and Beyond by Nadiri, Khalid Homayun
Brokers, Bureaucrats, and the Quality of Government:
Understanding Development and Decay
in Afghanistan and Beyond
by
Khalid Homayun Nadiri
A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Baltimore, Maryland
January 2017
c⃝2017 – Khalid H. Nadiri
All rights reserved
Abstract
Why do public institutions decay or break down? And why are they often so difficult to put back
together? These questions have been the subject of a large body of academic literature in the social
sciences, but we still do not have a good theoretical and empirical understanding of contemporary
institutional development in countries with limited human capital, material resources, and the
rule of law. External or internal conflicts often do not motivate governments to develop more
robust institutional structures. Ethnic differences do not necessarily given rise to institutional
dysfunction or conflict. And ideology frequently does not influence whether a government is
able to design and implement policies that benefit the public at large, predictably enforce laws
and property rights, or develop a monopoly of control over the national territory.
In order to gain deeper insight into the processes by which contemporary institutions may
develop or decay, this research closely examines a longitudinal case of initial institutional im-
provement and subsequent failure that is not consistent with existing explanations: Afghanistan.
In this puzzling case, I show that government institutions became progressively more institution-
alized during the early and middle periods of the 20th century but ultimately failed to consolidate
these gains, developing a recurrently unstable political system and an unproductive economy.
To make sense of these outcomes, this research proposes an explanation that centers on orga-
nizational capital and external coherence. When institutions are insulated from elite polarization
and embedded in society, they are more likely to recruit and promote officials on the basis of
merit, to coordinate information more effectively, and to formulate and implement mutually
agreeable policies at the grass roots level. Moreover, when external support is aligned between
political and development objectives, and coordinated among donor organizations, institutional
upgrading in recipient countries is more likely to take place because the costs of programming,
monitoring, and objectively evaluating such assistance are lower.
Together, organizational capital and external support help to make sense of the haphazard
path of institutional development in Afghanistan. In general, when Afghan elites have been
cohesive, as was the case during middle 20th century, they have been able to develop increas-
ingly merit-oriented and productive institutions of government. When elite cooperation began
to break down, as happened during the late monarchy, the communist period, and the post-
Bonn governments, both the army and bureaucracy became vulnerable to politicization, setting
the stage for coups, insurgencies, and institutional dysfunction. External donors have also con-
tributed to institutional outcomes in Afghanistan through the alignment and coordination of
ii
their assistance. Alignment between security and development objectives and relative coordi-
nation of foreign aid provided for institutional upgrading of both the army and bureaucracy
during the middle 20th century. However, the rise of US-Soviet geopolitical competition in
Afghanistan decreased aid effectiveness and produced politicization in government institutions in
the final decades of the monarchy, providing the conditions for the republican and communist
coups d’état of 1973 and 1978, respectively. The subsequent Soviet and post-2001 interventions
in Afghanistan did not resolve this problem of divergent security and development objectives,
which impeded the development of government institutions over time.
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1 Introduction
Why do public institutions decay or break down? And why are they often so difficult to put
back together? These questions have been the subject of a large body of academic literature in
the social sciences. Various studies of government institutions in both developing and developed
economies have provided a useful set of insights into the causes of institutional development
over time. We know that centuries of war-making in Europe and China contributed to the
development of relatively strong government institutions in these areas today.1 We also now
understand that urban class conflict gave rise to relatively powerful states in Southeast Asia,
whereas episodic rural violence did not.2 We know that different ideas,3 skills,4 geographies,5 and
colonial practices6 have either enabled or otherwise constrained institutional consolidation in
different contexts, generating a rich set of explanations for why we see such diverse institutional
outcomes in the world today.
Despite these important contributions, we still do not have a good theoretical and empirical
understanding of contemporary institutional development. In several contemporary cases, gov-
ernment institutions have not responded to various causal factors that had strengthened states
in other geographic areas and periods of time. External conflicts involving Iraq and Iran, India
and Pakistan, and Armenia and Azerbaijan have apparently done little to augment institutional
capabilities in these countries. Popular protests in Cairo, Bangkok, Karachi, and other urban
centers have not dramatically changed the quality of their respective government institutions.
Governments characterized by ethnic cooperation and moderate worldviews have often not been





6Mamdani 1996; Lange 2009; Mahoney 2010.
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able to build up institutions capable of enforcing laws, collecting taxes, and enhancing economic
development.
Furthermore, the conditions under which various causes of institutional development had
worked in the past may no longer hold. Extremely violent and protracted war-making between
states is less common than in the past, in part because political geography and norms have made
external conflict more costly,7 while technology has made it more efficient.8 Revolutionary and
counter-revolutionary ideologies, while perhaps on the rise once again, are not as prevalent as
they were during the Cold War. And the expansion of international commerce and democratic
procedures and ideas have limited the extremely violent tactics that centralizing rulers had used
in earlier periods of time.
There is little disagreement about the bundle of characteristics that tend to describe capable
institutions, even if these features are difficult to measure. Strong institutions tend to have merito-
cratic recruitment and retention procedures, make and implement policies that benefit the public
at large, predictably enforce laws and property rights, and possess a monopoly of control over the
national territory. There is also little question that institutions matter for important economic
and political outcomes. While the magnitude of the impact of institutional quality on economic
prosperity remains a matter of debate,9 there is extensive evidence that government institutions
play an important role in long run processes of economic growth,10 political stability,11 and levels
of public goods provision.12
What is not well understood are the specific processes by which countries acquire or drift
away from characteristics of institutional strength in contemporary settings. This research explic-
itly studies these processes by examining a longitudinal case of initial institutional improvement
and subsequent failure: Afghanistan. This case is important not simply because Afghanistan is a
paradigmatic example of a weak state. More importantly, it is useful because it exhibits varying
outcomes over time. Afghanistan offers a case of a government that became progressively more
7Fazal 2011.
8Bennett and Stam 1996.
9One study finds that governance may not be straightforwardly associated with growth outcomes. See Kurtz and
Schrank 2007.
10Acemoglu, Johnson, and J. A. Robinson 2001; For more detailed historical evidence linking institutional reform
with growth, see, for example, Wade 1990.
11Walter 2014.
12Dell and Parsa 2016.
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institutionalized during the early and middle periods of the 20th century but ultimately failed
to consolidate these gains, developing a recurrently unstable political system and an extremely
unproductive economy, as shown in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1. Changes in Institutional Quality by Time Period, Afghanistan
Time Period Regime Capabilities Reach Effects
1929-1953 Monarchy (early) Moderate expansion Large expansion Increasing stability
1953-1963 Monarchy (middle) Large expansion Moderate expansion Increasing stability
1963-1978 Monarchy + Republic (late) Minimal expansion Moderate expansion Decreasing stability
1978-1986 PDPA (Taraki, Amin, Karmal) Large contraction Large contraction Decreasing stability
1986-1992 PDPA (Najibullah) Large contraction Moderate contraction Increasing stability
2001-2008 Post-Bonn (early) Moderate expansion Moderate expansion Increasing stability
2009-2014 Post-Bonn (late) Minimal contraction Moderate contraction Decreasing stability
Note: Positive changes in dimensions of institutional quality are bolded.
The early and middle periods of the monarchy made large gains in institutional capabilities, reach,
and effects (for more details about these terms, see Section 2.3.3) through the expansion of the
army and provincial administration throughout the territory, as well as the promotion of in-
creasingly capable economic planners and technical specialists into the bureaucracy. These gains
continued into the late period of monarchy, but soon gave way to increasing conflict over the
composition and objectives of government institutions in Afghanistan, culminating in the coups
of 1973 and 1978. The subsequent PDPA-led administration experienced an almost immediate
decline in institutional capabilities as the April 1978 revolution gave way to widespread antigov-
ernment violence, human capital flight, military desertion, and the collapse of the agricultural
economy. The ascendance of Dr. Najibullah did not reverse institutional decline, but temporar-
ily averted the collapse of the government through the selective allocation of Soviet-supplied
patronage. The post-2001 experience saw an initial expansion in institutional capabilities and ter-
ritorial reach, but these gains were hamstrung by personalist forms of recruitment, retention, and
promotion practices. While personalist institutions led to increasing stability in the years imme-
diately followed the international intervention (2001-2006), it created the conditions for growing
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instability in later years, as government corruption or incompetence contributed to instability at
the national and local levels.















Sources: Fry 1974; United Nations Statistical Division 2014; The Maddison-Project 2013; author’s
calculations.
Note: GDP per capita figures were computed using the real GDP time series from Fry (1974) for
1935 to 1973, and the real GDP time series from the UN Statistical Division (2014) for 1974 to
2013. Given the high level of measurement error in the UN real GDP estimates during much of
the PDPA and civil-war periods, I estimate changes in real GDP (from the UN time series) by
smoothing out real output changes from 1981 to 1994.
This institutional variation has had important implications for standards of living in Afghanistan
relative to other South Asian countries, as seen in Figure 1.1. The populations of colonial India
and Afghanistan were equally poor in 1935, and both populations experienced a similar decline
in per capita output as a result of World War II. Afghanistan and the post-colonial successor states
of India and Pakistan recovered in similar ways after the conclusion of the war and experienced
comparable increases in standards of living during the 1950s and 1960s. When we extend the
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time period into the final decades of the 20th century, as shown in Figure 1.2, the divergence in
economic outcomes becomes clearer. India, while still a country with significant economic and
political problems, has continued and accelerated the growth process since the adoption of vari-
ous economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s; Pakistan has not experienced a sustained pickup in
growth in part because of the inability of government institutions to address sources of domestic
conflict throughout the country. And Afghanistan has experienced large swings in its economic
fortunes in ways that clearly correlate with political stability. The gradual consolidation and
spread of government institutions and planning in Afghanistan during the middle-20th century
corresponded with a modest rate of growth in per capita income, particularly in the cities and
adjoining rural areas where development activity was concentrated. The rapid decline in the capa-
bilities, reach, and effects of government institutions that followed the PDPA coup of April 1978
produced a long-lasting contraction of the economy that gave way to further declines with the
collapse of the communist regime in 1992 and extended into a period of civil war. This changed
after the international intervention in 2001, which generated large levels of aid expenditure in
physical and human capital, and with it, gains in standards of living. But the post-2001 period did
not produce durable and merit-oriented institutions of government or development planning in
Afghanistan, putting the current economy at serious risk of long-term contraction as foreign aid
expenditure declines.
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Sources: Fry 1974; United Nations Statistical Division 2014; The Maddison-Project 2013; Author’s
calculations.
Note: Vertical red lines demarcate the Daoud coup in July 1973, the PDPA coup in April 1978,
and the fall of the PDPA regime in 1992. GDP per capita figures were computed using the real
GDP time series from Fry (1974) for 1935 to 1973, and the real GDP time series from the UN
Statistical Division (2014) for 1974 to 2013. Given the high level of measurement error in the UN
real GDP estimates during much of the PDPA and civil-war periods, I estimate changes in real
GDP (from the UN time series) by smoothing out real output changes from 1981 to 1994.
The variation in institutional outcomes in Afghanistan and its implications for political sta-
bility and economic prosperity open up a series of research questions that this dissertation will
address. Each of these questions are specific to different government regimes in Afghanistan, but
together they help to shed light on the larger question of why durable institutions of government
have been so elusive in this country. They also can help us to understand the institutional trajec-
tories of other countries facing similar constraints—limited human and material capital, a weak
or non-existent rule of law, and a high level of social diversity.
1. Why did government institutions grow more capable during much of the monarchical
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period and why did they ultimately decay, culminating in the coups of 1973 and 1978?
2. Why is it that government institutions disintegrated so rapidly after the PDPA took power,
and why was the PDPA regime able to survive despite seemingly insurmountable problems
of widespread antigovernment violence, human capital flight, military desertion, and the
collapse of the agricultural economy?
3. How do we explain the haphazard trajectory of institutional development in Afghanistan
after 2001? Why is it that, despite an unprecedented level of domestic and foreign partici-
pation in Afghan institutions, the government has made institutional gains in some areas,
but less in other important areas—notably the security sector?
This dissertation proposes a common set of answers to these questions: organizational capital and
external coherence. In each of the time periods covered by this dissertation, institutional develop-
ment has depended on the extent to which these institutions can organize elites and information
in service of achieving government priorities. It has also been influenced by the alignment of
donor political and economic objectives and the coordination of their efforts. A brief introduc-
tion of these variables and how they explain institutional trajectories is presented below.
1.1 Summary of Argument and Methods
Why do some institutions decay under conditions of limited accountability and human and mate-
rial capital, while others become more capable? In the following chapters, I propose and evaluate
the argument that institutional development depends on the organizational capital available to
government institutions and the external coherence of donor countries and organizations that
support them. Organizational capital describes how government institutions relate to two key
constituencies: elites and local social communities. First, institutions depend on the degree of
elite cooperation. Whether the result of robust party building or common social and political
experiences, elite cooperation insulates institutions from politicization and enable them to coor-
dinate information more effectively. When elites cooperate, they are more likely to tolerate or
actively develop institutions that pursue compatible agendas and that recruit and evaluate cadres
on the basis of merit. By contrast, when elites are highly polarized, then government institutions
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are highly politicized and tend to hire personnel based on loyalty or factional identification. This
type of elite organization also tends to produce institutions that do not frequently share infor-
mation and, in more extreme circumstances, actively undermine one another. Second, the social
embdeddedness of bureaucratic and military personnel determines the ability of these institutions
to implement policies and programs. When government institutions are rooted in surrounding
society, they are more capable of formulating and carrying out policies suitable for the areas to
which they are applied. Embedded institutions possess personnel that are relatively informed,
responsive, and locally accepted, allowing them to effectively carry out simple and complex de-
velopment interventions and cultivate information about potential threats. Unembedded institu-
tions, by contrast, are unable to collect basic information about the areas in which they operate
and are treated with suspicion, impeding development programming and implementation as well
as the establishment of security. These two dimensions of organizational capital give rise to four
categories of institutions shown in Figure 2.5.















Embedded Peak Coalitional Encompassing
Unembedded Atomized Elitist
For each combination of elite cooperation and social embeddedness, we have a different pre-
diction about the type of institutions that will prevail. Encompassing institutions are relatively
meritocratic, informed, and administratively competent, and are capable of performing compli-
cated development and military interventions inside of the national territory. Elitist institutions
are relatively meritocratic but lack information and relationships with local social communities.
As a result, they can selectively accomplish temporary, large scale economic and security inter-
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ventions, but are unable to prevent, resolve, and follow through on routine development and
military challenges. Peak coalitional institutions are capable of collecting information and effec-
tively administering programs in local areas, but are often vulnerable to politicization and grid-
lock stemming from elite conflict. Finally, atomized institutions are highly politicized structures
that lack the capacity to understand and respond to basic development and security challenges.
While organizational capital provides a domestic source of institutional development, the
coherence of foreign support, often but not exclusively in the form of economic assistance, can
serve as an important external driver of institutional capabilities. I argue that two types of charac-
teristics of external support matter. First, the level of resource alignment determines whether the
economic and institutional development goals of donors countries and organizations are consis-
tent with the political objectives that they may possess in a recipient country. This characteristic
describes whether donors design and carry out development assistance in a way that is compat-
ible with the political objectives in the recipient country. In general, when donors align their
development and political objectives in a recipient country, these objectives and the strategy be-
hind them can be unambiguously evaluated, consequently making aid more effective. In these
circumstances, donors can readily identify their end goals and evaluate whether the inputs and
processes that underlie them are working. When donor development and political objectives are
not aligned, then the ultimate objectives and strategies of their development assistance are un-
clear. Second, the level of donor coordination describes whether donors can jointly orchestrate
individual aid programs so as to prevent or mitigate duplication, aid siphoning, and conflicting
development priorities and strategies. If aid is coordinated among major donors, then donors
are more able to track one another’s aid programming and expenditure, making costly duplica-
tion, patronage, and incompatible aid programming less likely at the aggregate level. If external
support, however, is poorly coordinated, then the resulting absence of information about the
formulation and allocation of development assistance at the aggregate level makes duplication,
patronage, and incompatible development assistance more likely. These two dimensions of exter-
nal support give rise to four types of development assistance shown in Figure 2.6.
If major donors possess aligned development and political objectives and coordinate their
assistance programs, then external support is developmental. Developmental aid is expected to
increase the institutional capabilities of the recipient country. If donors have aligned development
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and political objectives but do not coordinate their aid, then external support is stove-piped. In
this situation, donors have an identifiable and coherent set of objectives, but their assistance
programs are exposed to corruption and redundancy. If donor objectives are not aligned but aid
programs are coordinated, then external support is directionless. While donors can efficiently
deploy assistance in this situation to accomplish short-term development objectives, they are
unable to solve the larger problem of specifying an achievable end state and charting a path to it.
Finally, when donors’ development and political objectives are not aligned and their assistance
programs are not coordinated, as is the case in contemporary Afghanistan, then external support
is detrimental, with external support oriented toward short-term objectives and vulnerable to
duplication and corruption.
External coherence interacts with organizational capital. While external assistance cannot
develop institutions without organizational capital, different types of external support can rein-
force the impact of organizational strengthening or decay. Misaligned external support and donor
fragmentation can accentuate the negative impact of declining organizational capital by increas-
ing opportunities for corruption and concealing poor individual and departmental performance
from close scrutiny. Likewise, aligned and coordinated donors can augment the positive effect of
increasing organizational capital by prioritizing the institutional objectives that have the great-
est possibility and rewarding the individuals and departments that are most able to carry them
out. External support, however, is unlikely to be able to reverse the effects of organizational
consolidation or decay. Where organizational capital is minimal, no degree of donor alignment
and coordination is going to be able to significantly improve the quality of the bureaucracy and
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military. And where organizational capital is quite high, misaligned and uncoordinated exter-
nal support will remain manageable because domestic institutions in these cases can bundle and
allocate aid toward high development objectives.
To test this theory, I use two empirical strategies. First, I carry out a deeply researched set
of case studies from Afghanistan. These case studies are primarily intended to gain theoretical
depth. As discussed above, these historical episodes provide favorable conditions—unexplained
variation in institutional quality and exogenous turnover of ruling coalitions—for ruling out
existing explanations and developing new ones. More specifically, the cases will try to answer
why the monarchy led by Nadir Khan and his relatives became incrementally more capable
over the course of the 20th century, but became increasingly exposed to urban conflict; why
the institutional capabilities inherited by the PDPA regime declined so rapidly, and why the
regime stayed in power longer than most observers expected; and why reconstructed government
institutions in post-2001 Afghanistan failed to develop independent institutional capabilities in
the military and economic fields, despite receiving extraordinary levels of assistance and diverse
participation from the international community. Together, answering these puzzles helps to
calibrate the theory presented in this chapter.
Second, I conduct a series of cross-country statistical tests of the argument outline above.
These tests attempt to separately identify the effects of organizational capital and external align-
ment on institutional quality. These statistical analyses test the theory developed and evaluated
in the case studies on a set of country-level panel data between 1975 and 2014. Specifically, I
conduct two sets of tests, each separately centered on the organizational capital and external co-
herence variables. Because both of these explanatory factors are highly endogenous, each set of
tests attempts to identify the exogenous variation in the explanatory factor. I first estimate the
long run impact of organizational capital on institutions drawing on a cross-section and a panel
dataset of developing countries from 1975 to 2014. I then attempt to identify the effect of aid
fragmentation (as a measure of external coherence) on institutional development conditional on
the preceding level of organizational capital, drawing on an instrumental variables two-stage least
squares (IV 2SLS) strategy.
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1.2 Contributions to Theories of Institutions and Studies of Afghanistan
As suggested earlier, existing understandings of institutional development are often situated in
specific historical and geographic settings. In much of the existing comparative politics and polit-
ical economy literatures, institutions were born out distinct initial conditions and historical expe-
riences of warmaking, internal conflict, or colonialism. This research does not attempt to revisit
these findings. Rather, it evaluates whether these theories can be used to explain an important
contemporary case, Afghanistan, and addresses their shortcomings by specifying an understud-
ied set of internal and external characteristics that can cause institutions to become more capable
over time. In doing so, it makes five types of contributions to the existing study of institutions
and of Afghanistan.
First, this research suggests that conventional explanations of institutional development need
to be more critically examined when evaluating institutional performance in contemporary de-
veloping countries. In particular, it shows that the conditions that supply institutions are just
as important for institutional development as those that generate demand for them. The case
studies demonstrate that shocks of various kinds—external threats, internal insecurity, economic
malaise—do not necessarily generate tax mobilization, elite cooperation, or other forms of self-
help behavior that the existing body of literature expects. In Afghanistan, only those govern-
ments with organizational capital have been able to develop institutions for sustained periods
of time, and as soon as this source of institutional strength eroded, so did government institu-
tions with it. At the same time, when external powers have adopted a consistent set of political
and economic objectives that are coordinated with one another, as was the case during the mid-
dle 20th century, then foreign assistance has significantly improved government institutions in
Afghanistan. When these external conditions have not been in place, such as during the late
monarchy or post-2001 period, foreign aid has either been ineffective or even undermined insti-
tutional development. As shown in Chapter 6, these inferences may carry over to a wider set
of cases, suggesting that demand-side explanations of institutional development such as external
or internal crises need to be adapted to take into account the conditions that make institutional
development less costly in the first place.
Second, this research suggests that ethnic diversity might not necessarily be a barrier to insti-
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tutional upgrading. While Afghanistan has experienced ethnically-motived conflict, particularly
during the civil-war era, a close look at the empirical record shows that institutions have exhibited
inter-ethnic diversity and cooperation in most (but not all) areas of government activity during
periods of both institutional consolidation and decline. This finding is important because much
of the literature continues to emphasize ethnic fractionalization as an important determinant of
institutional outcomes, even when contemporary evidence indicates that homogenous popula-
tions do not provide for political order. This can be clearly seen in Egypt, Libya, and other areas
of the Middle East, where conflict and relatively ethnically homogenous populations have not
produced highly effective institutions.
Third, it shows that conceptual models of institutional development associated with Max We-
ber’s ideal type of bureaucracy have somewhat limited descriptive and explanatory value in many
developing contexts. In the case of Afghanistan, interpersonal relationships and foreign aid have
at times been used to initially enhance institutional capacity and promote greater meritocratiza-
tion, despite eventually generating problems of political instability and poor tax mobilization.
While these non-Weberian sources of institutional development clearly do not provide the basis
for institutional upgrading in the long run—as seen in Chapter 3—interpersonal relationships
have provided organizational capital in Afghanistan, and foreign aid has contributed to partial
economic development in the urban and peri-urban areas of the country. These non-Weberian
sources of institutional strength may apply to other contexts. In the case of China, Yuen Yuen
Ang shows that personal connections provided the initial basis for the development of the bu-
reaucracy and, later, the integration of China into international markets.13 David Kana shows
that specific forms of crony capitalism contributed to the growth of the South Korean economy
by reducing transaction costs and making long-term agreements more efficient, even as these
arrangements concentrated wealth in the hands of leading business families.14 Together, these re-
sults suggest that there are multiple paths to greater institutionalization, even if these paths are
not necessarily sustainable or ethical.
Fourth, this research adds to the study of Afghanistan by examining this important case in




the domain of historians, anthropologists, and area specialists. While these perspectives have
greatly improved our understanding of the history and society of Afghanistan, they have not
identified how this case fits into existing explanations of institutional development.15 This has
not only restricted our understanding of what has mattered more or less in the specific case of
Afghanistan—it has also limited what comparativist perspectives can learn from this country. As
we will see in the case studies, a common set of political and economic variables helps to account
for institutional development and, more often, decay across monarchical, communist, and post-
2001 governments. Institutional development has so often foundered in Afghanistan because
political coalitions have either failed to organize around specific ideas of governance or create
the rules for such a system to take root, and because foreign assistance has often been motivated
by incoherent political and development objectives. The fall of the monarchy and subsequent
republican regime, for example, was attributable to the absence of institutional mechanisms that
could resolve elite conflicts, which in turn emerged as a result of a growing prevalence of the
educated classes in the bureaucracy and military. This problem has persisted into the PDPA and
post-2001 periods, systematically obstructing government stability and performance.
Fifth and finally, this study informs the literature on international intervention. It is well
known that many coalition interventions, and to a lesser extent, UN interventions in the devel-
oping world have not been successful.16 But it is not clearly understood why some interventions
are relatively successful while many are not. Existing explanations tend to explain the dearth
of successful interventions in terms of culture: intervening states or organizations do not know
enough about the country in which they get involved.17 Specifically, foreign countries or orga-
nizations do not understand indigenous institutions, customs, and historical legacies, and, as a
consequence, they often devise or implement policies in ways that further destabilize the target
country. This study suggests that this line of reasoning has very little validity in the case of
Afghanistan. The Soviet Union and United States, for example, had little knowledge about the
details of Afghan society and politics. In both instances, however, decision-makers understood
the critical causes of intervention failure to be problems as they materialized, yet temporarily
15For an important exception, see Shahrani 2002.
16For a comprehensive perspective of these interventions see Dobbins, S. G. Jones, et al. 2005; Dobbins, McGinn,
et al. 2003.
17For example, see Stewart and Knaus 2011.
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ignored them until they had become insurmountable. This does not mean that intervention can
necessarily work in the future. But, as will be demonstrated in the case studies, it implies that
when intervening powers enter a target country without identifying a minimal set of ending
conditions and a strategy of getting there, the outcome is usually failure. When intervening or-
ganizations have adopted discrete objectives and devised a realistic strategy of obtaining them, as
has typically been the case with UN-led campaigns, intervention has usually resulted in relative
stabilization and reconstruction of the target country.18
1.3 Contributions to Practice
This dissertation is also relevant to practices of international intervention and development. It
generates three separate sets of implications. First, this study suggests that effective external
institution building depends on the reconciliation of security and development interests that
major donors, especially the United States, possess in the recipient country. This is clearly visible
in Afghanistan, where each of the Soviet Union and the United States did not identify an end
state for Afghanistan before or immediately after intervening in the country. As a consequence,
both powers pursued security and development aims that were fundamentally incompatible with
one another. Moscow pursued a peacetime economic strategy in Afghanistan while engaging in
a heavily coercive war and supporting a party at war with itself. A decade after the fall of the
PDPA regime, Washington would pursue a selective counter-terrorism mission in Afghanistan
while ignoring the development of indigenous institutional capabilities and long-term economic
priorities in the initial years of the post-Bonn period. The major implication of all of this is that
any intervention should be preceded by the identification of an end goal and the external and
internal impediments to achieving donor objectives. External interveners improvise more than
is commonly appreciated, and when they improvise they tend to fail.
Second, this study shows that external sponsors can be most effective when they proactively
support the development or continuation of political alignments that cut across ethnicity, region,
or political affiliation. These alignments are usually possible for only limited windows of time.
Under conditions of partial meritocratization in 1950s and 1960s Afghanistan, the decision to
18Dobbins, S. G. Jones, et al. 2005.
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forestall the formation of political parties backfired because it obstructed the regulation of elite
competition and identification of critical national objectives. Five decades later, limited interna-
tional engagement in the years that immediately followed the ouster of the Taliban contributed
to AIA chairman Karzai’s decision to pursue personalist governance over a more programmatic
set of policies. In both of these instances, the observed outcomes were not inevitable, and inter-
national engagement in proactively shaping and promoting programmatic coalitions or policies
would likely have increased the probability of such an outcome.
Finally, the study generates insight into the mechanisms by which foreign aid can be more
or less effective for developing recipient country institutions. This research shows that the costs
of politically motivated, uncoordinated aid can come at the expense of recipient country in-
stitutions, especially in aid recipients that are least likely to possess capable institutions. On
the one hand, politically motivated and fragmented assistance correlates with greater resources,
which may provide real benefits in the form of increased household consumption, government
spending, and the transfer of skills. But it also limits the effectiveness of aid, while also increasing
opportunities for corruption where the rule of law is already limited. The implication of this find-
ing is, therefore, that donor cooperation in programming, monitoring, and evaluating aid would
exhibit extremely high institutional returns in the most weakly institutionalized countries. The
precise contours of such an arrangement are clearly beyond the scope of this dissertation. But
cooperation among donor organizations would provide for greater donor credibility when work-
ing with poorly performing recipients, for improved donor learning, and for the minimization
of common costs across donors.
1.4 Plan of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 lays out existing explanations of institutional trajectories and identifies the shortcom-
ings of these explanations. It then outlines a prospective argument that highlights organizational
capital and external coherence as important but understudied determinants of contemporary insti-
tutional development. Finally, it proposes a research design that can measure these key variables
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and evaluate their prospective impact on institutional outcomes.
Chapter 3 presents the first case study covering the monarchical period of 1929 to 1973 and the
republican regime that briefly followed it from 1973 to 1978. This case study shows that the
competencies, territorial presence, and control of government institutions expanded significantly
during the early and middle monarchical period. However, even as the competencies and terri-
torial presence of Afghan institutions expanded over time, political control over institutions of
government began to decline after the 1950s. It then examines changes in elite networks and pat-
terns of foreign assistance to evaluate the main argument of this dissertation. Finally, the chapter
includes an assessment of alternative explanations of external warmaking, internal conflict, and
ethnicity.
Chapter 4 introduces the second case study of the communist period of 1978 to 1992. This
chapter shows that the performance of the PDPA-led bureaucracy and army declined almost im-
mediately after the April 1978 coup d’état. The administration of Dr. Najibullah did not reverse
this institutional decline, but temporarily stabilized the political system through the employ-
ment of Soviet-supplied patronage. To explain these outcomes, the chapter examines intra-PDPA
relations and the role of Soviet resourcing of Afghan civilian and military institutions. It also
evaluates alternative arguments of state policy and ideology.
Chapter 5 presents the third and final case study covering the post-Bonn period from 2001 to
2014. This chapter shows that newly reconstructed bureaucratic and security institutions grew in
territorial reach and (to a lesser extent) capability during the post-2001 period, but these institu-
tions were were almost immediately hamstrung by personalist forms of recruitment, retention,
and promotion practices. It then shows how the post-Bonn coalition politics and the organi-
zation of international assistance explain this outcome. Alternative explanations of domestic
culture, foreign ignorance, foreign occupation, and political exclusion do not account for institu-
tional outcomes after 2001.
Chapter 6 widens the aperture of this study by quantitatively examining institutional quality
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across countries and time, measured using an indicator of public corruption collected by the Va-
rieties of Democracy project. This chapter presents the results of two sets of statistical tests, each
separately focused on the organizational capital and external coherence variables. One set of tests
examines the impact of organizational capital on institutional quality using cross-sectional and
panel data. A second test estimates the impact of donor fragmentation conditional on organiza-
tional capital.
Chapter 7 concludes the study. This chapter reviews the dissertation’s main findings and dis-
cusses future avenues of research. It also presents the implications that these findings hold for the
future of Afghanistan and for the involvement of the US and the international community in the
country. It also discusses broader implications for the future of international intervention and
the practice of foreign aid.
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2 Understanding Contemporary Institutional
Development
The study of institutions is vast. The question of why societies produce government structures
more or less capable of making rules, regulating behavior, and enabling economic development
has generated a large and complex body of social science research. Along the way, a series of re-
lated terms—state formation, political development, political order, governance—have originated,
all of them effectively concerned with the quality of government institutions. A variety of
schools of thought have also developed around this problem, sometimes imperfectly organized
into structural-functionalist, rationalist, culturalist, and institutionalist approaches to institutional
change. Numerous explanations of institutional development and decline have also been intro-
duced, covering much of human history and geography. As a consequence, the present state
of knowledge about the causes of contemporary institutional performance across regions and
countries is both insightful and bewildering.
This chapter attempts to reduce this complex literature into a much more wieldy set of prox-
imate explanations of institutional development and identify how existing understandings can be
improved. It identifies the shortcomings of these explanations and motivates a prospective argu-
ment that identifies organizational capital and external coherence as important but understudied
determinants of institutional development in contemporary countries with limited human and
material resources. It then outlines a research design that can measure these key variables and
evaluate their prospective impact on institutional outcomes.
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2.1 Explanations of Institutional Development
This section introduces and evaluates leading explanations of institution building in the com-
parative politics and political economy literatures. These literatures provide a promising set of
answers. However, most of the explanations that they offer are generally limited because they
emphasize the demand for institutions—the conditions under which governments are motivated
to build capable and efficient military and bureaucratic institutions. However, we largely lack
a good theoretical and empirical understanding of the factors that makes institution building
less costly and therefore more likely to succeed. This is particularly relevant for contemporary
countries that possess limited material and human capital, in which historical causes of institu-
tional strengthening—external warfare or colonialism, for example—no longer occur at the same
intensity, while other causes—internal conflict, ideology, ethnicity—do not have the same effects
everywhere and at any time. To better understand the possibilities and limitations of the current
literature, this section briefly reviews existing explanations of institutional development.
It is important to note that many of these explanations do not fit neatly or exclusively into
one or another category. Some studies acknowledge and even emphasize the importance of very
different sets of causal factors. But almost all of them privilege some explanations over others.
The purpose of this review is to differentiate these explanations from one another while remain-
ing attentive to the various nuances that bring them together.
External Warfare. A prominent body of literature identifies warfare as a leading cause of insti-
tution building. This line of research is perhaps most associated with Charles Tilly, who made
the argument that external warfare gave rise to the formation of national states in Europe. Tilly
showed that warfare motivated medieval European rulers to accumulate greater coercion and
capital, producing powerful and enduring military and bureaucratic institutions.19 A number of
other scholars modified Tilly’s thesis or extended his analysis to other contexts. These studies
found that the impact of military competition on institutional development was contingent on
prevailing conditions, including the establishment of university education and constitutionalist
practices in medieval Europe,20 as well as differing strategies of interstate competition adopted by
19Tilly 1990; Also see Strayer [1970] 2005.
20Ertman 1997.
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European and Chinese rulers.21
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Source: Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; author’s calculations.
While external warfare has been shown to be a powerful determinant of institutional con-
solidation in some of the most capable contemporary states—China and the European nation-
states—its applicability in many contemporary low- and middle-income countries is much more
limited. In large expanses of Latin America and Africa, external conflict has either been rela-
tively infrequent or has been associated with institutional decay because it has been accompanied
21Hui 2005.
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by destructive internal conflict, external intervention, or unfavorable geography.22 As seen in
Figure 2.1, interstate conflicts have become much less common and deadly over time. Since
2001, only two major interstate wars—India-Pakistan and Ethiopia-Eritrea—have occurred. In
neither of these cases does it appear that warfare has improved institutional outcomes. In fact,
the India-Pakistan conflict has likely made both countries worse off, and in different ways: in
India, by diverting attention and resources away from significant development challenges, and in
Pakistan, by servicing a military that has made alliances with domestic and external extremist
groups, undermining internal security.23
Noting the deficit of recurring warfare in large expanses of the developing world, some “bel-
licist” perspectives have amended the external warfare hypothesis by suggesting that the threat
of interstate war can effectively catalyze state revenue extraction.24 However, threat explanations
fail to make sense of contemporary countries that face high levels of internal conflict and are
situated in “bad neighborhoods.” This is clearly the case in Afghanistan, where successive politi-
cal regimes have faced external or internationalized threats, yet government institutions have not
responded favorably by increasing the tax effort, controlling corruption, or prioritizing merit
over patronage in government appointments. In fact, cross-national data suggest that interstate
rivalry can attenuate state power in the face of civil war. For instance, Thies’ findings indicate
that, conditional on the prevalence of a civil war, external threats are associated with lower tax
ratios.25
Internal Threats. Another set of explanations identify internal threats as a determinant of in-
stitutional development. These arguments make different predictions about the responses of elites
to internal threats. David Waldner argues that the timing of vertical linkages established between
political elites and populations is critical. In this account, elite conflicts over the relationship of
the state to the economy motivate some sections of the elite to mobilize popular support in fa-
vor of their political programs. When state transformation coincided with this process of popular
mobilization, as it did in the Middle East, the result was a set of relatively distributive institutions;
when state transformation occurred before the need to mobilize popular support, as in East Asia,
22Centeno 2003; Herbst 2000.
23Nadiri 2014.
24Thies 2005, 2007.
25Thies 2005, p. 461.
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institutions of government became productive.26 Dan Slater adapts this approach in arguing that
the incidence and timing of horizontal linkages among elites determines subsequent institutional
trajectories. Drawing on cases from Southeast Asia, Slater argues that the development of urban
class conflict before the formation of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes motivated elites to form
“protections pacts” that strengthen both regime and government institutions.27 This resulted in
very different institutional trajectories in Southeast Asia. Urban class conflict in 1960s Kuala
Lampur, for example, led the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) government to
simultaneously consolidate power in state and party institutions, creating durable authoritarian
rule; in the Philippines, by contrast, rural rebellions did not directly threaten Manila-based elites,
making it easier for “provincial economic elites to handle unrest through local mechanisms of
social control—rather than a strengthened central state.”28
While both of these internal threat accounts make compelling sense of the cases that they aim
to explain, they do not specify why elite cooperation emerges in the first place or changes over
time, and whether external factors can encourage or constrain elite cooperation. Furthermore,
these accounts cannot make sense of cases like Afghanistan, where political elites did not fully
pursue popular sector mobilization in response to intra-elite conflict (as in Waldner’s account) and
where broad and resilient protection pacts did not form (as in Slater’s explanation) in response to
increasing urban disorder during the turbulent 1960s, when communist and Islamist ideological
currents took hold among the university students and other educated classes of Kabul. Internal
conflict arguments also do not appear to make much sense of institutional outcomes in contem-
porary countries with high levels of political violence, as shown in Figure 2.2. Most of these
conflicts involved international powers, potentially constraining the ability of elites to cooperate
with one another. In internationalized conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, external patronage has shaped the domestic political incentives of elites in
ways that have (further) obstructed the possibility of protection pacts. In many cases that have
not involved substantial international participation, political violence has destroyed substantially
all formal institutions of government (Liberia, Somalia), making credible and comprehensive elite
bargains extremely difficult. And in other cases, longstanding, deep seated conflicts over identity
26Waldner 1999.
27Slater 2010.
28Slater 2005, p. 100.
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and territory (Sri Lanka, Israel, Myanmar/Burma) may be so intractable that internal conflict
arguments may not be relevant.













































































































































































































Source: Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; author’s calculations.
Ideology. Many social scientists explicitly or implicitly cite ideology, or shared beliefs about
politics, society, and economy, as a causal determinant of institutional performance.29 These ac-
counts argue that ideology can either provide a set of rules that can regulate the behavior of
government agents or otherwise provide a set of common ideas that bind together government
agents. Ideological explanations identify different types of beliefs—religious, nationalist, class—as
important sources of institutional performance. For instance, Philip Gorski argues that Protes-
tant Calvinist beliefs encouraged institutional development by establishing self-discipline within
individual believers and enabling institutions of surveillance through which the wider population
could be monitored and controlled.30
There are a number of problems with the ideology explanation. First, there is some evidence
that ideology does not matter in high risk circumstances, when we should expect it to matter
29See, for example, Remington 1988; Mann 2012.
30Gorski 2003.
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more. Shils and Janowitz, in their well known study of the Wehrmacht in World War II, found
that “the fighting effectiveness of the vast majority of soldiers in combat depends only to a small
extent on their preoccupation with the major political values which might be affected by the out-
come of the war.31 Second, it is not clear how shared ideas, by themselves, influence institutional
performance in the more mundane or technical areas of government activity that are critically
important to administering territory and formulating effective public policy.32 Finally, ideology
is probably endogenous to the (positive or negative) reactions it generates in society. One can
readily see this in Afghanistan, where the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the People’s Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was incrementally watered down in response to the violent resis-
tance that it generated.
State Policy. State policy explanations emphasize the choices and behavior of state institutions.
According to these explanations, states can formulate or implement policies that can alternatively
transform social relations and identities33 or generate violent backlash.34 Eugen Weber vividly
demonstrates how state policy can work by showing how the Third Republic reshaped a series
of autonomous and heterogenous communities into “Frenchmen” through schooling, road con-
struction, and military service.35 Other state policy arguments highlight a darker side of state
actions. Jeff Goodwin, for instance, shows how states can leave “no other way out” than violent
resistance when they engage in arbitrary repression or sponsor unpopular social, economic, and
cultural institutions.36
Although there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that governments can choose policies
that advance or obstruct greater security and economic prosperity, state policy arguments are
probably underdetermined. This is because the outcomes of these decisions partly depend on
their capacity to implement them. While policy choices are clearly endogenous, similar policies
can exhibit different outcomes within and across countries. Land reform is a good example of
this. Redistributive land reforms in Taiwan and South Korea during the 1940s and 1950s were
31Shils and Janowitz 1948, p. 284.
32A good example of this is census administration. One empirical study shows that institutional quality can be
measured by the the accuracy of national population censuses, see M. Lee and Zhang 2013.
33Miguel 2004.




relatively successful, whereas repeated efforts to redistribute land ownership in the Philippines
have been regarded as failures.37 Farther afield, in Afghanistan, the attempt to redistribute land
holdings in Afghanistan produced a violent backlash not only from interests that stood to lose
from the reform (landlords), but also from those in a position to benefit (landless peasantry). The
more important question (and the subject of this dissertation), then, is which conditions increase
the capacity to carry out substantial reforms.
Ethnicity. Yet another set of explanations identify ethnic composition or polarization as an
important predictor of institutional development. These arguments cite the well established
negative cross-sectional association between ethnic diversity or polarization, on the one hand,
and institutional quality38 and interpersonal trust, on the other.39 By restricting cooperation
and, at times, directly contributing to conflict, ethnic diversity is thought to limit cooperation
within political institutions.
While there is some evidence to suggest that ethnic diversity correlates with weak institu-
tions and limited interpersonal trust across countries, a closer look at this relationship suggests
that it is neither precisely measured nor deterministic. Quantitative studies of ethnicity often use
time-invariant fractionalization or polarization indices as measures of ethnic difference. These
measures are not only of questionable cross-sectional value because of inadequate measurement,
but more importantly they fail to capture the many ways in which ethnicity may change in
salience across time. This is problematic because there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that
ethnic salience is an outcome, not a cause, of the quality of government. William Easterly, for
example, finds that ethnic diversity does not correlate with poor growth or economic policies
at relatively high levels of institutional quality40. Others have shown that cross-ethnic coalition
building can correlate with increased public expenditure in poorly institutionalized settings.41
Existing measure of ethnic diversity are even more problematic if ethnic identities are themselves
endogenous to institutional quality: more autonomous, impersonal, and competent government
institutions can change the definition of different ethnic identities over time. For example, An-
37You 2014.
38Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Alesina and Ferrara 2005.
39Habyarimana et al. 2009.
40Easterly 2001.
41Gibson and Hoffman 2013.
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dreas Wimmer finds that ethnic diversity is spuriously correlated with public good provision
across countries; both contemporary ethnic heterogeneity and low public goods provision are the
historical legacy of weakly developed institutions inherited from the past.42 Likewise, Weber’s
study of the Third Republic also shows that institution building eroded localist ethnic identities
in France over time.43
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 provide suggestive evidence that the relationship between ethnicity and
institutional quality is relatively tenuous. We can see in Figure 2.3 that ethnic diversity is not
a good predictor of ethnic violence: countries with high levels of ethnic diversity frequently
do not exhibit violence, whereas in some countries with relatively low levels of ethnic diversity
but changes in ethnic polarization across time (for example, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Sri Lanka),
governments have either engaged in ethnic violence or have been unable to contain it.
One can also see in Figure 2.3 that institutional quality confounds the relationship between ethnic
diversity and violence: almost all cases of ethnic violence have taken place in low-income coun-
tries with poor institutions. A closer look at countries that have not experienced ethnic violence
indicates, moreover, that the relationship between ethnic diversity and institutional quality is not
deterministic. Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of countries, rank-ordered by ethnic diversity,
that have not experienced ethnic violence. One can see, here, that while ethnic heterogeneity
appears to coincide with poor government, ethnically diverse countries can and often do exhibit
high levels of institutional quality.
Colonialism and Geography. Yet another set explanations highlight the long-run impact of
colonial legacies and geography on institutions. Studies of the impact of colonialism often find
different results across colonizing powers and colonies. Some of these studies find that foreign
control undermined the capacity of post-independence states (particularly in Africa),44 while
others studies show that colonialism enhanced the institutional capabilities of successor states
42Wimmer 2015; On a related issue, the impact of democracy on ethnic salience, see Reynal-Querol 2002.
43Weber 1976.
44Mamdani 1996; Young 1994.
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(especially in East Asia).45 Yet other studies of colonialism highlight the variable effects of for-
eign control. Where colonial powers established administrative structures that were extractive,
mercantilist, or controlled through intermediaries, they created the conditions for patrimonial
successor states; where external powers put in place institutions that were developmental, directly
administered, or that exhibited limited mercantilist penetration, relatively accountable and bu-
reaucratic states emerged.46 Geography arguments take a somewhat similar approach to colonial
legacy explanations in their emphasis on long run, cross-sectional effects. These studies explain
institutional expansion in terms of the costs of physically regulating territory that is inaccessi-
ble and sparsely populated—mountainous terrain, desert regions, and marshlands, for example.
When most of the national territory is characterized by inhospitable geographic conditions, gov-
ernments are less likely develop far-reaching physical and administrative infrastructure.47
Both of the colonialism and geography arguments offer plausible explanations for static differ-
ences in institutional quality across countries, or for the pace of institutional development over
time. Negative colonial legacies and bad geography can effectively constrain countries from tak-
ing off or lock them into cycles of political instability and economic underdevelopment. But these
explanations clearly cannot explain how institutions develop from one decade to the next—across
different government administrations and local and international economic environments. While
difficult geography and colonial rule have undoubtedly influenced successor states in durable
ways, both of these time-invariant factors are unable to fully account for temporal changes in
institutional development after colonialism and geography are taken into account.
2.2 Developing Institutions: Organizational Capital and External
Alignment
A number of recent and prominent studies have sought to explain why some government in-
stitutions generate prosperity over the long run, while others do not. One study by Douglass
North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry Weingast (NWW), distinguishes between “natural states,”
45Kohli 2004; Yang 2004.
46See Acemoglu, Johnson, and J. A. Robinson 2001; Lange 2009; Lange, Mahoney, and Vom Hau 2006; Mahoney
2010.
47Carneiro 1970; Herbst 2000.
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in which a dominant coalition of elites restricts access to valuable resources and activities, and
“open access orders,” where resources are generally available to all citizens.48 Open access orders
tend to be more prosperous because they consistently provide for peaceful political and economic
competition in the face of shocks of various kinds—relative prices, demographics, growth, and
technology, for example. In another recent work, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (AR)
make a distinction between “extractive” and “inclusive” states.49 In a somewhat similar vain to
NWW, AR make the argument that inclusive economic and political institutions provide incen-
tives and opportunities for growth through broad participation and public goods. Both of these
descriptive accounts are useful because they identify which kinds of institutions are expected to
generate growth and the broad historical forces that have tended to produce these institutions.
However, as Francis Fukuyama observes, they do not indicate which specific components of in-
stitutions matter more or less, and how these components might be able to influence economic
and political outcomes.50 As a consequence, we do not have a clear idea of which specific kinds
of developments (changes in the rule of law, political participation, for instance) among which
constituencies (political elites or the middle classes, for example) should matter for improving
institutional performance.
If these explanations do not make sense of much of the empirical record of contemporary
institution building, or otherwise do not identify specific institutional outcomes (or determi-
nants) that we can observe and measure, then which factors can explain contemporary changes
in institutional quality? Before doing so, it is useful to identify two basic reasons why developing
minimally effective government institutions in contemporary developing contexts is so difficult.
One reason is that governments have lower capacity in some geographical and issue areas than
others, as suggested above. In some territories, usually those that are sparsely populated and far
from urban centers, governments have less information and resources available to establish secu-
rity or carry out development programs. This is especially the case for issue areas that involve a
great deal of information and effort.
Second, and perhaps more problematically, the political elites that manage and operate gov-
48North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009.
49Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson 2012\footcite , 2006.
50Francis Fukuyama, Acemoglu and Robinson on Why Nations Fail, The American In-
terest, accessed on January 18, 2016.http://www.the-american-interest.com/2012/03/26/
acemoglu-and-robinson-on-why-nations-fail.
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ernment institutions are faced with the dilemma of self-regulation, particularly when the rule of
law is limited or non-existent. As John Padgett observes, “[t]he contradiction, in state building
or in any organization, is between judge and boss: founders cannot be both at once.”51 While
political elites are occasionally able to develop institutions that can carry out complex security
or development interventions, they are much less frequently capable of managing themselves.
Political leaderships have strong incentives to undermine or suppress rival elites, often through
the politicization of government institutions, through the recruitment and retention of loyalists,
and the distribution of preferential public goods and policies to allies.
How, then, can we understand the conditions under which institutions can become more
capable in the absence of the rule of law, and when faced with limited human and material
resources, uneven territorial control, and strong incentives to distribute offices, contracts, and
services to political allies? I argue that institutional development depends on the organizational
capital available to government institutions and the external coherence of the donor countries
and organizations that support them. The ability of government institutions to manage elites
and information has a significant impact on the performance of institutions. When institutions
are insulated from elite polarization and embedded in society, they are more likely to recruit
and promote officials on the basis of merit, to coordinate information more effectively, and to
formulate and implement mutually agreeable policies at the grass roots level. Organizational
capital, in turn, interacts with external support to determine whether resources can upgrade
institutions over time. When external assistance is allocated in service of an achievable end state
in the aid receiving country, and when it is coordinated among different external sponsors, there
is a greater probability that political elites will commit these resources to stated goals and that
this assistance can be monitored for effectiveness by external sponsors. Below, I separately explain
why and how organizational capital and external alignment affect institutional development.
2.2.1 Organizational Capital
The characteristics of interpersonal networks are a key determinant of many different social, po-
litical, and economic outcomes. Social or political networks, for example, have shaped whether
51See Padgett and Ansell 1993, p. 1260.
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individuals participate in “high risk” activism,52 whether insurgent groups stick together or fall
apart,53 and whether welfare states contract or expand.54 In the economic realm, interpersonal
networks matter for finding employment, for transmitting peer effects in education,55 and for
encouraging spillover development effects on neighboring geographical areas.56 A growing body
of literature has found that the characteristics of political networks have also been important for
processes of institutional development. Atul Kohli found that the internal structure of state par-
ties was an important determinant of their effectiveness in reducing poverty,57 and Gerald Easter
showed that close interpersonal relationships were an important determinant of state building
efforts during the early Soviet era.58
While we know that network features matter for institutions, we do not know which spe-
cific features are relatively important for institutional outcomes, and how they influence these
outcomes. This section outlines a key variable, which I call organizational capital, defined as
the ability of government institutions to organize elites and information in service of achieving
government priorities.59 As will become clear, organizational capital describes the relationships
between government institutions and two key political constituencies: political elites and local
social communities. These relationships correspond closely with the “autonomy” and “embed-
dedness” characteristics that David Evans cites as important predictors of institutional perfor-
mance.60 Organizational capital can emerge and evolve through mechanisms such as party orga-
nizations, military campaigns, and even kinship and friendships. These mechanisms do not fit
neatly into the Weberian ideal type of development, but they can establish the basis for capable
institutions by minimizing costly efforts to gather information and make decisions across large




55Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou 2009.
56Acemoglu, Garc/’ia-Jimeno, and J. A. Robinson 2015.
57Kohli 1989.
58Easter 2007.
59As this definition suggests, organizational capital is not the same concept as social capital. While definitions of
social capital vary, they share in common an emphasis on connections between individuals, not necessarily between
government structures and political constituencies. Robert Putnam, in his well known work on social capital in
modern Italy, defines the concept as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.” Francis Fukuyama takes a similar approach:
“social capital is an instantiated informal norm that promotes co-operation between two or more individuals.” See
Fukuyama 2001, p. 7; Putnam 1994, p. 167.
60See Evans 1995.
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at multiple levels of the government. While the origins of organizational capital can vary across
countries, it is ultimately a necessary determinant of institutional development in settings of
limited rule of law and human and material resources. This is because governments with or-
ganizational capital can coordinate information and reduce the necessity to distribute political
positions and targeted economic policies to allies.
How can one compare the degree of organizational capital across countries? I argue that
organizational capital varies mainly along two dimensions. First, elite cooperation insulates in-
stitutions from politicization and enables them to to coordinate information more effectively.
When elites cooperate with one another—whether because of robust party building, common
social and political experiences, or other mechanisms of consultation—they are more likely to
tolerate or actively develop institutions that pursue compatible agendas and that recruit and eval-
uate cadres on the basis of merit. By contrast, when elites are highly polarized, then government
institutions are incapable of arriving at decisions and tend to hire personnel based on loyalty or
factional identification. This type of elite organization also tends to produce rival government in-
stitutions that do not frequently share information and, in more extreme circumstances, actively
undermine one another.
Second, the social embdeddedness of bureaucratic and military personnel determines the abil-
ity of these institutions to implement policies and programs. When government institutions are
rooted in surrounding society, they are more capable of formulating appropriate policies and
of collecting information about the constraints to implementing such policies. Embedded insti-
tutions tend to possess personnel that are relatively informed, responsive, and locally accepted,
allowing them to carry out simple and complex development interventions effectively and cul-
tivate information about potential threats. Unembedded institutions, by contrast, are unable to
collect basic information about the areas in which they operate and are treated with suspicion,
impeding development programming and implementation as well as the establishment of security.
These two dimensions of organizational capital give rise to four categories of institutions
shown in Figure 2.5. For each combination of elite cooperation and social embeddedness, we have
a different prediction about the type of institutions that will prevail. When political elites tend
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to cooperate with one another and government personnel are embedded in society, then institu-
tions are encompassing. In countries with encompassing institutions, elite cooperation provides
for relatively meritocratic and autonomous institutions, and embedded government personnel
enable institutions to be more informed, responsive, and administratively competent. In these
cases, civilian institutions are able to perform complicated development interventions and armies
monopolize the use of force. If political elites tend to work together through institutional or non-
institutional mechanisms, but government bureaucrats and military personnel possess relatively
weak ties with society, institutions are elitist. In cases with elitist institutions, elite cooperation
enables increasingly meritocratic institutions, but government officials lack information and rela-
tionships with local social communities. These institutions are capable of selectively accomplish-
ing temporary, large scale economic interventions or overcoming major military challenges, but
lack the ability to proactively prevent, resolve, and follow through on routine development and
military challenges. If political elites consistently fail to cooperate with one another but civilian
and military personnel are deeply rooted in society, then institutions are peak coalitional. Peak
coalitional institutions are capable of collecting information and effectively administering pro-
grams in local areas, but are often vulnerable to politicization and gridlock stemming from elite
conflict. Finally, when elite relations are contentious and the bureaucracy and military do not
possess strong roots in society, then institutions are atomized. Atomized institutions are highly
politicized structures that lack the capacity to understand and respond to basic development and
security challenges.
If organizational capital matters, then it has to explain changes in institutional quality across
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time. How, then, does organizational capital evolve? The sources of organizational change are
clearly rooted in histories that are idiosyncratic across developing countries. Varying combina-
tions of endogenous factors (colonial legacies, geography, capital accumulation, mass education,
political leadership, learning, etc.) as well as exogenous shocks (military conflict, economic crises,
natural disasters) provide for different historical legacies, and it is therefore very difficult to make
any generalizations about the sources of organizational capital across countries. However, we
will see that organizational capital in Afghanistan, when it has emerged, has developed through
political brokerage using familial and other interpersonal ties. In most other contexts, however,
it is often political parties that can organize different interests into coherent political programs,
reducing the costly effort of coordinating information and placing loyalists in political offices.
Nonetheless, as the subsequent chapters show, one dynamic that is likely to be common across
multiple contexts has been the emergence of young, newly empowered elite into the political
system. The problem of how to incorporate new generations of elites is one that confronts fa-
milial networks, political parties, and other organizations, presenting a new set of organizational
possibilities for government institutions.
2.2.2 External Coherence
While organizational capital provides a domestic source of institutional development, external
support, often but not exclusively in the form of economic assistance, can serve as an important
outside driver of institutional capabilities. In South Korea, perhaps the most impressive example
of aid effectiveness, external assistance accelerated rapid institutional and economic gains made
in the 1960s. In more recent examples, including postwar Mozambique and El Salvador, aid has
exerted a positive albeit less exceptional impact on development outcomes. However, in several
other countries that received relatively high levels of foreign assistance, including Afghanistan,
South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, aid expenditure has often been wasteful
(whether because of poor aid programming or limited human and physical capital) or has pro-
vided opportunities for patronage or corruption (primarily because of limited mechanisms of
accountability).61
A number of studies try to resolve these divergent outcomes by conditioning aid on the poli-
61See for example, Hemmer and Grinstead 2015, UPI “EU Questions Aid Effectiveness for DRC,” October 1, 2013.
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cies and institutions of aid receiving countries.62 The problem with these studies is that they treat
recipient country institutions or policies as an exogenous factor in the process that links aid and
growth. In doing so, they ignore the potential effects of aid on recipient country government
institutions themselves. A small but growing section of the aid literature takes a different ap-
proach by explicitly making recipient institutional quality endogenous. These studies examine
the effect of foreign aid on various dimensions of institutional performance or related outcomes
such as civil conflict, but taken together the findings raise more questions than answers. In some
of this research, aid correlates with less corruption,63 improved governance,64 and a lower in-
cidence of civil conflict,65 although some these effects appear to be short-lived and depend on
the initial conditions of the aid recipient. In other studies, aid attenuates the quality of govern-
ment institutions66 and in specific circumtances can increase the incidence of conflict.67 These
divergent results are not due to a differential allocation of aid across countries with varying insti-
tutional quality: countries with corrupt governments do not receive less foreign aid than those
with relatively strong institutions.68
One line of research attempts to resolve these contradictory findings by explicitly condition-
ing aid on the motivations and practices of donors (usually based on donor motivations during
or after the Cold War),69 the quality of government institutions of recipients, and the type of
aid expenditure.70 Simone Dietrich, for example, finds that donors differentially bypass recipient
governments in favor of nongovernmental organizations, multilateral organizations, and private
development contractors,71 potentially improving immediate development outcomes while cre-
62For notable examples, see Denizer, Kaufmann, and Kraay Forthcoming; Rajan and Subramanian 2007; Burnside
and Dollar 2000; For a useful overview of the aid-growth literature, see Mekasha and Tarp 2013; Arndt, S. Jones, and
Tarp 2010.
63Tavares 2003; Busse and Gröning 2009; Okada and Samreth 2012.
64Aronow, Sovey Carnegie, and Marinov 2012; S. Jones and Tarp 2016, Jones and Tarp are more concerned with
“institutional inputs or rules of the game (e.g., democracy, rule of law)...than “institutional outputs such as bureau-
cratic efficiency, regulatory capacity and corruption.” The outcome variable in this study is consequently not the
capabilities of bureaucratic or other government institutions, but rather levels of democracy, the number of veto
players over political decisions, executive constraints, political terror, and judicial independence.
65Nielsen et al. 2011; Savun and Tirone 2012.
66See, for example, Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Knack 2001.
67Nunn and Qian Forthcoming.
68Alesina and Weder 2002.
69Several studies find that the effect of aid on growth and democratization increased substantially after the conclu-
sion of the Cold War, likely because bilateral donors could more credibly threaten to reduce their assistance if recipient
countries did not pursue economic and political reform. See Bearce and Tirone 2010; Dunning 2004.
70For a useful review, see J. Wright and Winters 2010.
71Dietrich Forthcoming.
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ating parallel aid delivery structures. Similarly, Stephen Knack and his co-authors demonstrate
that bilateral and multilateral donors vary dramatically in terms of their level of recipient special-
ization, alignment with recipients’ national development strategies, selectivity of aid recipients,
their use of ineffective channels (tied aid, food aid, and technical assistance), and other character-
istics that have implications for aid effectiveness.72 Among recipients, aid effectiveness also varies
widely. In developing democracies, the impact of aid on public goods provision varies with re-
cipient characteristics, including the degree of personalism in executive institutions73 and natural
resource wealth.74 Notably, there is evidence that aid effectiveness does not depend on regime
type. In both autocracies75 and developing democracies76 foreign aid has been associated with
greater patronage provision, indicating that external assistance can be used to extend leadership
or government survival. Yet it is not clear which factor or combination of factors makes some
recipients, whether autocratic or democratic, more or less likely to use foreign aid as patronage.
While the foreign aid literature offers useful insights into the factors that make development
assistance more or less effective, there is clearly a great deal that we do not know about the
specific donor and recipient conditions under which aid is expected to positive or negatively
affect government institutions. We also do not have much information about the specific mech-
anisms that connect aid to outcomes. As Francois Bourguignon and Mark Sundberg argue, the
“causality chain [linking aid flows to development outcomes] has been largely ignored and as a
consequence the relationship between aid and development has been handled mostly as a kind of
‘black box.”’77 Given what we already know about one potential recipient-related cause of insti-
tutional performance, organizational capital, how then can we systematically think about what
donor-related factors matter for aid effectiveness? I argue that two types of donor characteristics
matter.
First, the level of resource alignment indicates whether the economic and development goals
of donors countries and organizations are consistent with the political and security objectives
that they may possess in a recipient country. This characteristic describes whether donors design
72Knack, Rogers, and Eubank 2011; Also see Easterly and Pfutze 2008.
73J. Wright 2010.
74Girod 2011; This line of research relates to the larger literature on “rentier states.” See Beblawi and Luciani 1987.
75Ahmed 2010.
76Briggs 2014.
77Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007, p. 316.
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and carry out development assistance in a way that is compatible with the political objectives in
the recipient country. In general, when donors align their development and political objectives
in a recipient country, these objectives and the strategy behind them can be readily reconciled,
consequently making aid more effective. In these circumstances, donors can identify their end
goals and evaluate whether the inputs and processes that underlie them are working. When donor
development and political objectives are not aligned, then the ultimate objectives and strategies
of their development assistance may be working at cross purposes, and therefore cannot be easily
resolved.
Second, the level of donor coordination describes whether donors can jointly orchestrate in-
dividual aid programs so as to prevent or mitigate duplication, aid siphoning, and conflicting
development priorities and strategies. If aid is coordinated among major donors, then donors
are more able to track one another’s aid programming and expenditure, making costly duplica-
tion, patronage, and incompatible aid programming less likely at the aggregate level. If external
support, however, is poorly coordinated, then the resulting absence of information about the
formulation and allocation of development assistance at the aggregate level makes duplication,
patronage, and incompatible development assistance more likely. These two dimensions of exter-
nal support give rise to four types of development assistance shown in Figure 2.6.



















If major donors possess aligned development and political objectives and coordinate their
assistance programs, then external support is developmental. Developmental aid is expected to
increase the institutional capabilities of the recipient country. If donors have aligned development
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and political objectives but do not coordinate their aid, then external support is stove-piped. In
this situation, donors have an identifiable and coherent set of objectives, but their assistance
programs are exposed to corruption and redundancy. If donor objectives are not aligned but aid
programs are coordinated, then external support is directionless. While donors can efficiently
deploy assistance in this situation to accomplish short-term development objectives, they are
unable to solve the larger problem of specifying an achievable end state and charting a path to it.
Finally, when donors’ development and political objectives are not aligned and their assistance
programs are not coordinated, as is the case in contemporary Afghanistan, then external support
is detrimental, with external support oriented toward short-term objectives and vulnerable to
duplication and corruption.
Given these different forms of external support, how do external resources interact with or-
ganizational capital? Organization is an indispensable source of institutional development, and
no form of external support can develop institutions without it. However, different types of
external support can reinforce the impact of organizational strengthening or decay. Politically-
motivated and fragmented external support can accentuate the negative impact of declining or-
ganizational capital by increasing opportunities for corruption and concealing poor individual
and departmental performance from close scrutiny. Likewise, development-oriented and coordi-
nated donors can augment the positive effect of increasing organizational capital by prioritizing
the institutional objectives that have the greatest possibility and rewarding the individuals and
departments that are most able to carry them out. External support, however, is unlikely to be
able to reverse the effects of organizational consolidation or decay. Where organizational capital
is minimal, no degree of donor alignment and coordination is going to be able to significantly
improve the quality of the bureaucracy and military. And where organizational capital is quite
high, misaligned and uncoordinated external support will remain manageable because domestic
institutions in these cases can bundle and allocate aid toward high development objectives.
2.3 Case Selection, Methods, and Data
This dissertation evaluates the impact of organizational capital and external coherence on in-
stitutional quality. Like almost all correlates of institutional quality, organizational capital and
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external alignment are highly endogenous—the processes by which they develop are likely cor-
related with other causal factors (observed and unobserved), and may also be shaped by prior
realizations of the outcome variable, institutional quality. This is problematic because it makes
it difficult to disentangle the independent effect of any causal factor from other relationships in-
volved in the process by which these data are generated. This is especially the case when analyzing
the “big structures, large processes, huge comparisons” that underlie institutional change. Insti-
tutions are influenced by initial conditions, feedback effects, and exogenous shocks of various
kinds.78 To more reliably evaluate the effects of organizational capital and external coherence,
this dissertation triangulates between two methodological strategies, one focused on gaining the-
oretical depth and the other on empirical breadth. First, the dissertation will draw on a series
of historical episodes from single country, Afghanistan, in order to develop and closely evaluate
the proposed argument developed above along with alternative explanations of institutional de-
velopment. Second, it tests the theory on a wider set of observations, drawing on country-level
quantitative data between 1975 and 2014.
2.3.1 Case Selection, or Why Afghanistan?
It is important to first explain why Afghanistan, instead of other cases, is the primary country of
study for this project. In many ways, Afghanistan is not typical of other weakly institutionalized
developing countries. Unlike many contemporary developing states, Afghanistan is a former
imperial country that increasingly lost territory over time, eventually developing into a buffer
state located between the Russian and British empires during the 20th century. It has experienced
one of the longest series of internationalized conflicts in modern history, involving both great
powers and regional states. And over the past century, it has been ruled by a particularly wide
variety of regimes, including a traditional monarchy, a revolutionary socialist regime, an Islamist
movement, and the present day dispensation of former royalists, mujahideen leaders, and PDPA
figures, as well as a series of expatriate technocrats.
Nonetheless, there are at least three strong reasons to study Afghanistan. First, Afghanistan
has experienced significant changes in the quality of its institutions, even if the upper bounds of
its institutional development never reached the level of a contemporary middle-income country.
78Tilly 1984.
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Sources: Fry 1974; United Nations Statistical Division 2014; author’s calculations.
Note: Vertical red lines (approximately) demarcate Daoud coup in July 1973, the PDPA coup in
April 1978, and the fall of the PDPA regime in 1992. GDP per capita figures were computed using
the real GDP time series from Fry (1974) for 1935 to 1973, and the real GDP time series from
the UN Statistical Division (2014) for 1974 to 2013. Given the high level of measurement error in
the UN real GDP estimates during the PDPA period, I estimate changes in real GDP (from the
UN time series) by smoothing out the amount of real output destroyed under PDPA rule for the
period of 1981 to 1994.
One can see this in the long run trend of per capita income in Afghanistan, which serves as an
imperfect but informative proxy for its institutional development. As shown in Figure 2.7, per
capita income in Afghanistan advanced incrementally throughout the 20th century, but rapidly
reversed in response to the internal and external political shocks that came to fruition in the
middle 1970s. After the coup of April 1978, income rapidly declined to a relative low during the
collapse of the state apparatus in 1992 and ensuing civil war. And after the fall of the Taliban
regime in 2001, political institutions in Afghanistan made some initial gains, largely because of
high aid expenditure, but did not produce durable and merit-oriented institutions of government
or development planning in Afghanistan. Today, the state of the government and economy are
highly dependent on the quality and quantity of foreign aid.
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As will be seen in the case studies, the time variation in per capita income in Afghanistan
generally coincides with changes in the quality of its institutions, as summarized in Table 2.1.
Under monarchical rule, the upper echelons of the bureaucracy became increasingly capable
and the military would ultimately establish a monopoly over the use of force over the national
territory. However, as Afghan government institutions increased in capability and reach, their
capacity to plan and implement development programs, manage personnel, and contain urban
conflicts declined. After the Saur coup of April 1978 brought to power the Soviet-aligned People’s
Democratic Power of Afghanistan (PDPA), the incremental institutional gains of the prior cen-
tury rapidly eroded. Faced with declining security, the exodus of much of the intelligentsia, and
intra-PDPA infighting, Afghan institutions would undergo a severe contraction in capability and
reach, while generating instability in urban and rural society through unpopular redistributive
policies and highly indiscriminate forms of coercion. And after 2001, reconstituted bureaucratic
and military institutions expanded substantially in capabilities and territorial reach, but were
hamstrung by personalist forms of recruitment, retention, and promotion practices. This de-
velopment created the conditions for growing instability after 2006, when increasing patronage
appointments began to generate a pronounced level of government corruption and incompetence.
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Table 2.1. Changes in Institutional Quality by Time Period, Afghanistan
Potential Explanations Institutional Outcomes







1929-1953 Moderate expansion Large expansion Increasing stability
1953-1963 Large expansion Moderate expansion Increasing stability
1963-1978 Minimal expansion Moderate expansion Decreasing stability
1978-1986 Large contraction Large contraction Decreasing stability
1986-1992 Large contraction Moderate contraction Temporary stability
2001-2006 Moderate expansion Moderate expansion Increasing stability
2007-2014 Minimal contraction Moderate contraction Decreasing stability
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Second, as seen in Table 2.1, existing explanations do not make sense of institutional devel-
opment in Afghanistan, suggesting that it constitutes a deviant case. As will be shown in the
following chapters, warfare, internal conflict, ideology, state policy, and ethnicity did not make
sense of the trajectory of Afghan institutions. This absence of satisfactory explanations provides
the opportunity for theory development. As Jason Seawright and John Gerring emphasize, de-
viant cases can be used to develop “probe for new—but as yet unspecified—explanations”79 and
“discover new information about causal pathways connecting the main independent with the
main dependent variable.”80
Third, each of the regimes studied in this dissertation began with sudden, plausibly exoge-
nous shocks, reducing the problem of reverse causality. Because each of these regimes rapidly
formed with new or reshuffled political actors and external sponsors, the subsequent develop-
ment of government institutions can be attributed to the two causal factors of interest here. This
an advantageous set of historical circumstances because it does not need to rely on the identi-
fying assumption that organizational capital and external alignment strongly depended on prior
institutional development.
2.3.2 Research Design
The research design of this dissertation consists of two components. First, it includes a deeply
researched set of case studies from Afghanistan. These case studies are primarily intended to gain
theoretical depth. As discussed above, these historical episodes provide favorable conditions—
unexplained variation in institutional quality and exogenous turnover of ruling coalitions—for
ruling out existing explanations and developing new ones. More specifically, the cases will try
to answer why the monarchy led by Nader Khan and his relatives became more capable over
the course of the 20th century at the same time as they became more exposed to urban conflict;
why the institutional capabilities inherited by the PDPA regime declined so rapidly, and why the
regime stayed in power longer than most observers expected; and why reconstructed government
institutions in post-2001 Afghanistan failed to develop independent institutional capabilities in
the military and economic fields, despite receiving extraordinary levels of assistance and diverse
79Seawright and Gerring 2008, p. 302.
80Seawright 2016, p. 504.
45
participation from the international community. Together, answering these puzzles helps to
calibrate the theory presented in this chapter.
The case studies follow a similar format. First, I describe the trajectory of government insti-
tutions that perform two general sets of functions: security provision and development planning.
In doing so, I focus on three features of institutional quality that are described in greater detail
below: the human and material capabilities of security and development institutions, the territo-
rial reach of these institutions, and the stabilizing or destabilizing effects of these institutions on
the societal communities with which they interact. Next, I evaluate the two hypothesized de-
terminants of institutional quality outlined above, organizational capital and external coherence.
Finally, I assess whether the more plausible alternative explanations described in this chapter can
make sense of the institutional trajectories taken in Afghanistan during each of the time periods
covered in the case studies.
Second, the research design includes a series of cross-country statistical analyses of the effects
of organizational capital and external alignment on institutional quality. These statistical analyses
test the theory calibrated in the case studies on a set of country-level panel data between 1975
and 2014. Specifically, I conduct two sets of tests, each separately centered on the organizational
capital and donor fragmentation variables. Because both of these explanatory factors are highly
endogenous, each set of tests attempts to identify the exogenous variation in the explanatory
factor. I first estimate the long run impact of organizational capital on institutions drawing on
a cross-section and a panel dataset of developing countries from 1975 to 2014. I then attempt
to identify the effect of donor fragmentation on institutional development conditional on the
preceding level of organizational capital, drawing on an instrumental variables two-stage least
squares (IV 2SLS) strategy.
2.3.3 Measurements
In this section, I define how the key variables are measured and identify the sources of data for
these variables and other information that appears in the dissertation. I pay special attention to
defining the outcome variable, institutional quality, which has been used in a variety of contexts
and has consequently come to suggest a number of different characteristics. I then proceed to
outline how I measure organizational capital and external support.
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Institutional Quality. Institutional quality has been measured in many different ways. So-
cial scientists have measured institutional capacity in terms of bureaucratic quality,81 taxation,82
extent of direct rule,83 property rights protection,84 economic freedom,85 and political instabil-
ity.86 One reason for these discrepant approaches is that institutions are inherently multifaceted.87
Government institutions are complicated organizations that follow different procedures, draw on
different capabilities, and generate many types of output. For most contemporary countries, gov-
ernment institutions are present in almost every aspect of modern life, so it is not surprising that
social scientists think about and measure them in different ways.
It is nonetheless important to identify a common set of criteria that will allow us distin-
guish more from less capable institutions. As a starting point, I define institutional capacity
following Michael Mann’s concept of infrastructural power: “the capacity of the state actually to
penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.”88
Importantly, this definition is strictly concerned with the ability of government institutions to
execute programs and policies, not the degree to which these institutions are accountable to
society—what Mann calls despotic power.89 This dissertation is therefore not concerned with ex-
plaining the expansion of political participation, or another important correlate of institutional
development—the rule of law. Both of these outcomes of democracy and rule of law are clearly
related to institutional development. The quality of government frequently coevolves with and
responds to political participation and legal accountability, making it difficult to disentangle the
effects of these correlates from that of the causal factors studied here—organizational capital and
foreign aid. Democratization, for example, can influence the quality of government in negative
or positive ways. Greater political participation can undercut the autonomy of government in-
stitutions when politicians place demands on the staffing decisions of government agencies and
81Rauch and Evans 2000.
82Thies 2004.
83Lange 2009; Lange and Balian 2008.




88Mann 1984, p. 113; Fukuyama uses a similar definition when he defines institutional capacity as the “government’s
ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not.
Fukuyama 2013, p. 350.
89Specifically, despotic power is the “range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine,
institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups.” Mann 1984, p. 113.
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beneficiaries of government programs. Alternatively, greater political participation could poten-
tially improve channels of accountability, compelling government institutions to address causes
of underperformance. Greater adherence to the rule of law can also clearly influence the perfor-
mance of institutions, for example by inhibiting government corruption or expropriation.
While this research is strictly concerned with explaining the development of institutional
capabilities, it nonetheless considers the impact of greater political participation and legal ac-
countability where these factors intersect with organizational capital in particular. The role of
political participation is especially relevant for the monarchical and post-2001 periods. We will
see that the development of informal political parties under monarchy presented a unique chal-
lenge to the capacity of the Afghan leadership (royal and otherwise) to rationalize and regulate
differences among political elites, particularly those of moderate orientation. We will also see
that democracy interacts with organizational capital in the reconstruction of government insti-
tutions after 2001. Specifically, the design of the electoral system generated incentives to organize
politics around politicians, especially AIA chairman (later president) Hamid Karzai, instead of
around shared objectives. This had a perverse downstream impact on institutional development
(and the rule of law), as personal connections came to dominate merit in staffing security and
development institutions at both the central and provincial levels.
How, then, do we go about measuring infrastructural power? Hillel Soifer provides a useful
description of three different dimensions of infrastructural power: capabilities, reach, and effects.90
The capabilities approach describes the fiscal or military resources available to central institutions
for implementing development and military interventions in society, while the reach approach
measures the presence and activity of government institutions across the national territory. The
effects approach is less straightforward. Under this approach, government actions that influence
the behavior or even identities of societal actors provide evidence of institutional capacity. This
includes intentional government efforts to influence society—examples include the impact of Tan-
zanian educational institutions on the formation of national identity in Tanzania91 or the effects
of rural roads on the technology adoption behavior of farming households.92 Just as importantly,





Table 2.2. Case Study Measurements
Dimension Observable Implications
Institutional Capabilities • Quantity and quality of revenue raising, administrative,
and military capabilities
• Importance of merit in recruitment, retention, and
performance evaluation
Institutional Reach • Presence and quality of government personnel and
services across key provincial centers
• Political and military authority of government
institutions in rural territories of key provinces and
border areas
Institutional Effects • Intended effects of institutions on the behavior of
societal actors
• Unintended impacts of institutions on society and
economy
etal actors. Some institutions, for example, may be able to carry out large and effective military
and economic interventions, but if they are unable to contain intense conflicts within major
urban centers, then they are clearly less skillful than these interventions by themselves might
suggest. For other, more dysfunctional institutions, corrupt or discriminatory practices can gen-
erate large-scale rebellions that may drain these institutions of the people and economic resources
that they require. These unintentional effects are especially relevant in countries with less visible
sources of institutional weakness.
I qualitatively measure institutional quality using each of the capabilities, reach, and effects ap-
proaches. These measurements, shown in Table 2.2, are relatively straightforward. With respect
to institutional capabilities, I evaluate the quantity and quality of key government functions such
as taxation, administration, and military activities. To measure institutional reach, I assess the
performance of civilian and military institutions across territory. And when evaluating institu-
tional effects, I study the intentional and unintentional impacts of institutional developments or
actions on society and the economy. This entails qualitatively examining the intentional effects of
government institutions on the perceptions and behavior of societal actors and on economic per-
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formance. It also includes studying the unintended consequences of government institutions—for
example, rural rebellions against the government, urban conflicts within the educated classes, in-
effective development interventions, and other unanticipated (and largely negative) outcomes of
government actions.
Organizational Capital. As defined in Section 2.2, organizational capital is defined by two
dimensions: elite cooperation and social embeddedness. These are inherently difficult character-
istics to observe and evaluate. Interactions between political elites tend to take place behind closed
doors and often become observable only during crises. Meanwhile, embeddedness is difficult to
reliably observe—a partial reading of the evidence might indicate that government institutions
are more or less connected with societal actors or communities than exists in reality. Both of
these problems would result in measurement error of organizational capital, potentially biasing
the assessment of its relationship with institutional development toward zero.93
This suggests that any assessment of organizational capital ought to be treated carefully. The
research design minimizes the measurement error problem by comparing sources carefully se-
lected for their attention to historical evidence. It compares assessments of elite relations and so-
cial embeddedness by a wide variety of primary and secondary sources, detailed in Section 2.3.4,
that take differing perspectives toward the historical record in Afghanistan. To measure elite co-
operation, I examine relationships between elites in the social (marriages, school co-attendance,
friendships, cultural associations), political (informal political relationships and formal ties in-
cluding parties and movements), and economic (business relationships) arenas. To evaluate social
embeddedness, I examine the geographic distribution of government offices and physical facili-
ties, and the intensity of interaction between officials and citizens. I also rely on assessments of
government-society relations by contemporary observers.
External Coherence. External coherence is relatively observable: foreign political and eco-
nomic assistance is extensively documented in aid databases, news accounts, and accounts from
foreign and domestic observers in the recipient country. External coherence varies on the basis
of political-economic alignment and donor coordination. To measure alignment, I examine the
93For a classic statement of this “errors in variables” problem, see Griliches 1974.
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degree of convergence between the political and security activities of major donors and their de-
velopment assistance programs. Regarding coordination, I quantitatively examine the number
and concentration of donors and projects in Afghanistan at the aggregate and sectoral levels.94
Qualitatively, I evaluate the the degree to which bilateral and multilateral donors as well as ma-
jor nongovernmental organizational formulate and coordinate across security and development
sectors.
2.3.4 Data Sources
This dissertation makes use of a variety of primary sources. Original information comes from
three types of materials described below.
1. Archival sources and other primary sources: For the case studies covering the monarchical
and communist periods, I consulted archival materials from repositories inside and outside
of Afghanistan. The National Archives (Arshif-e Melli) of Afghanistan included useful de-
scriptions of major initiatives and biographies of high-level political appointments, as well
as various Survey of Progress statistical handbooks prepared by the Ministry of Planning
between the 1950s and 1980s. The collection of the Foreign Relations of the United States
(FRUS) offered documentation of the strategic assessments and the diplomatic and develop-
ment objectives of American policymakers covering Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Strate-
gic Intelligence volumes provided a similar set of materials for the British view, which was
especially useful for the early years of the Naderi monarchy. And primary source materials
documenting the observations of key Soviet participants came from the Cold War History
Project. These materials, including accounts by Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy (Rus-
sian military historian Deputy Director of the USSR Defense Ministry working group in
Afghanistan under General Valentin Varennikov from 1987 to 1989) and Vasili Mitrokhin
(former KGB archivist), covered the years prior to and during the PDPA regime. Other pri-
mary sources include Annual Yearbook of Afghanistan (Salnamah-e Afghanistan in Farsi,
Da Afghanistan Kalanay in Pashto), the Anis and Kabul Times periodicals, development
project reports, and a number of memoirs by Afghan and international diplomats, politi-
94For more detail, see Chapter 6.
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cal elites, aid workers, and government officials.
2. Interviews: Each of the case studies, primarily the post-Bonn case study, draws on informa-
tion collected from interviews with decision-makers and observers involved in key events
or issue areas that affected institutional outcomes. The monarchy and PDPA cases draw
on semi-structured 6 and 4 interviews, respectively, with former government officials (or
their close relatives) involved in the diplomatic, development, and security arenas. The
post Bonn case study draws on over 25 semi-structured interviews with Afghan, Ameri-
can, and European decision-makers involved in institution building efforts since 2001. In
order to encourage the exchange of information, the interviews were conducted by the au-
thor on the basis of anonymity. All of these interviews were cross-referenced with public
statements and a variety of secondary sources.
3. Quantitative datasets: In Chapter 6, I draw on a series of existing quantitative datasets to
evaluate the theory across a wider set of observations. Three repositories provided the key
indicators for this analysis. First, I use data on the range of elite consultation, political
party branches, and political corruption as respective indicators of elite cooperation, social
embeddedness, and institutional quality from the Varieties of Democracy project.95 Second,
I gathered development assistance data from the AidData repository, an aid database that
includes project-level information from members of the Development Assistance Com-
mittee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and non-OECD
donor countries such as Brazil, South Africa, and China.96 Third, I collect a range of addi-
tional data on country-level economic and political characteristics from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators, the Maddison Project database, and other sources. For more
details, see Chapter 6.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the problem that motivates this dissertation and the theory that stemmed
from it. It also described the methods that will be used to evaluate the theory. In the following
95Coppedge et al. 2016.
96Tierney et al. 2011.
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chapters, the goal will be to evaluate the theory in three in-depth case studies from Afghanistan.
These chapters will closely scrutinize the trajectory of government functions within and across
the monarchical, communist, and post-2001 time periods in Afghanistan, and explicitly evaluate
plausible explanations for observed institutional outcomes. Next, a series of cross-country statis-
tical tests evaluate the effects of organizational capital and external coherence on a wider universe
of cases.
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3 The Rise and Fall of the Naderi Monarchy,
1929-1978
[T]he Royal Family can lay down the burden of a generation and let the Afghan ed-
ucated class run the government.
Zahir Shah, King of Afghanistan (r. 1933-1973)97
On October 13, 1929, Nader Khan and his brothers assumed power in Kabul under con-
ditions of political uncertainty. Assisted by the British Indian government and tribal levies re-
cruited from areas on both sides of the Durand Line,98 Nader Khan and his family captured
Kabul from Habibullah Kalakani,99 a Kohistani Tajik who had risen to power in January 1929
and had quickly become the object of opposition by displaced political elites, including the Nader
Khan family. After a brief but intensely violent period of internal war, the public treasury was
depleted100 and government buildings as well as private property had been subject to unautho-
rized and extensive looting by the same tribesmen recruited to take the capital.101External trade
97L. Dupree 1963.
98The Durand Line was a territorial demarcation agreed to in 1893 by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, foreign sec-
retary of British India, and amir of Afghanistan Abdul Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901). This agreement indicated the
respective spheres of influence of Kabul and New Delhi and remains a de facto border between Afghanistan and the
successor state of Pakistan today. However, its legal status has remained a point of controversy, and current Afghan
governments do not officially recognize the Durand Line as an international border.
99The scope and extent of British Indian government support for Nader Khan remains a matter of historical dispute.
While it is clear that the British Raj allowed Nader Khan and his brothers to organize a military campaign against the
Kalakani government from British Indian territory, the type and level of British assistance provided to them remains
unknown. See Gregorian 1969.
100See ibid., p. 280.
101The Waziri tribesmen that captured Kabul looted several embassies, especially that of the French mission, as well
as private homes in the days leading up to Nader’s arrival in the city. This episode followed an earlier round of
looting by Kalakani’s forces after they took Kabul. Over the course of 1929, much of Kabul’s intellectual and cultural
infrastructure, including “[l]aboratories, libraries, palaces, and the royal museum” were seized by Kalakani partisans.
See ibid., pp. 275, 285-286.
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had dried up and two sets of currencies were in circulation, both of which retained little value.102
Much of eastern and northern Afghanistan had received large numbers of arms and munition
in the mobilizations against the prewar administration of Amanullah Khan and, subsequently,
against the Kalakani government.103 Most importantly, the ascendant brothers that took Kabul
did not possess a standing army or intact bureaucratic structure with which to govern core urban
areas and outlying regions.
How did Nader Khan and his newly installed government attempt to consolidate authority
in Afghanistan over the following decades, and to what degree were they successful? How did the
level, form, and territorial extent of this authority change during the Naderi period of rule?104
How did Afghan institutions of government evolve over the course of the Naderi regime, and
why? And why did the system unravel in the 1970s? In this chapter, I show that that the capa-
bilities, reach, and effects of government institutions increased substantially during the Naderi
period. In order to explain this pattern of institutional development, I demonstrate that the
expansion of institutional strength under the monarchy originated in (1) kinship and other per-
sonal ties centered around the royal court and (2) the employment of external assistance by the
government to enhance human capital and develop integrated lines of production in key export
areas. Personal relationships grew dramatically around the royal court over the course of early
20th century, extending to include increasingly distant members of the royal clan and eventu-
ally, the urban intelligentsia and other social groups originating in communities outside of the
royal lineages. The expansion of the monarchical network provided the organizational basis for
institutional upgrading by incrementally incorporating capable figures into senior administrative
positions without threatening the familial cohesion that underpinned monarchical rule. At the
same time, monarchical governments increasingly drew on foreign aid to enhance the capabilities
of the bureaucracy and army. This allowed the government to extend its administrative reach to
new territorial and functional areas in Afghanistan. Together, the expansion of the monarchical
network and foreign aid contributed significantly to the increase in institutional capabilities.
102The prewar paper currency and coinage issued by the administration of Amanullah Khan were replaced in 1929
with overprinted notes and newly struck coins by the Kalakani government. See H. Hamidi and M. Hamidi 1967,
p. 2.
103See, for example, Gregorian 1969, pp. 264-265.
104Many accounts use the descriptor “musahiban” to refer to Nader Khan and his brothers. I do not use this term
because most sources in Afghanistan make no reference to it. I instead use “Naderi” or “Yahyakhel” to describe the
extended family of Nader Khan and his brothers.
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However, even as the competencies and territorial presence of Afghan institutions expanded
over time, political control over institutions of government began to decline after the 1950s. The
growing number of commoner figures incorporated into government institutions—most with
meritocratic paths to higher government—and the expansion of the government’s presence and
basic capabilities made the patrimonial nature of the monarchy untenable. This contradiction
between familial rule and increasingly meritocratic government became acute by the 1960s and
1970s, resulting in persistent instability within the educated classes that constituted the politi-
cal elite. At the same time, geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union gave way to growing politicization of the army and bureaucracy, and increasingly political
considerations in allocating and programming assistance, causing a decline in aid effectiveness.
Together, declining organizational capital and resource competition established the conditions
for the military coups of 1973 and 1978.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section charts the historical antecedents to
Naderi rule, beginning with the assumption of power by Abdul Rahman in 1880. Section 3.2 doc-
uments the changes in institutional development across four periods of Naderi rule, and Section
3.3 evaluates the validity of the hypothesized causal factors, organizational capital and external
resources. Section 3.4 evaluates alternative explanations for institutional development under the
monarchy. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.1 Lineages of the Mohammadzai Monarchy
This section briefly describes the initial development of government institutions in Afghanistan
under Mohammadzai rule,105 from the emergence of centralized absolutism under Abdul Rah-
man to the tumultuous civil war of 1929. The events of the 19th century and early 20th century
had a lasting impact on the organization of government and its relationship with society. In par-
ticular, the century prior to Naderi rule saw the incremental rise of distinct patterns of centraliza-
tion and modernization, forces that increasingly grated against the traditionalist-patrimonial rule
that characterized much of prior Afghan political history. The brief historical account presented
below are, by necessity, incomplete. The main objective in this section is to briefly describe the
105The Mohammadzai are a branch of the Abdali (later renamed Durrani), a tribe originally from the Kandahar area.
Various Mohammadzai leaders ruled Afghanistan between 1826 and 1978.
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key features of government institutions and practices leading up to Naderi rule.
Abdul Rahman and the Inauguration of Centralized Absolutism. Prior to the late 19th
century, government in Afghanistan was primarily a family affair. A ruling monarch distributed
government offices to close kin, and political survival depended on his ability to fend off bids
for power from competing relatives or families. In this recurrent pattern of dynastic competi-
tion, rival families mobilized kinsmen and resources to capture political power from the ruling
lineage.106 While this type of politics generated a series of powerful, expansive empires based in
Afghanistan, it also obstructed the development of basic institutional capabilities. Ruling houses
could assemble large expeditionary armies through sufficient charisma and patronage, but lacked
governing organizations that could transfer power to successors, regulate the distribution of re-
sponsibilities among kin, and function effectively without the personal effort and capabilities of
the ruling monarch. When a ruling family was unseated by a competing lineage, most occupants
of government offices (and the characteristics that they possessed) went with it. In the decades
leading up to Amir Abdul Rahman’s reign (r. 1880–1901), Afghan politics proceeded in incre-
mental steps from this traditionalist-patrimonial system of dynastic rule to a more bureaucratic
administration in which the autonomy of political kin was partially contained. Beginning with
the reign of Abdul Rahman’s grandfather, Dost Mohammad Khan (r. 1826–1839, 1842–1863) and
continuing under the rule of his half-uncle, Sher Ali Khan (r. 1863–1866, 1868–1879), govern-
ment administration became increasingly specialized while provincial offices were increasingly
extended to non-kin.107
Abdul Rahman’s rise to power conspicuously advanced this trend of administrative central-
ization.108 As amir, Abdul Rahman pursued a project of “internal imperialism,”109 that extended
106For political histories of Afghanistan prior the 19th century, see L. Dupree [1973] 2002; Farhang 1988; Noelle
1997.
107See M. H. Kakar 2006.
108Abdul Rahman’s ascent was far from direct. His respective father and uncle, Mohammad Afzal Khan and Mo-
hammad Azam Khan, had been rivals of his half-uncle Sher Ali Khan for succession to the Afghan throne. After
Sher Ali Khan succeeded Amir Dost Mohammad Khan as heir apparent, Abdul Rahman along with his father and
uncle successfully deposed Sher Ali and briefly ruled Kabul. Sher Ali Khan’s forces eventually took back the throne
in September 1868 and Abdul Rahman fled to Samarqand, where he lived on a Russian pension for almost eleven
years. When Sher Ali Khan passed away in February 1879 during the events of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, Abdul
Rahman amassed a large military force in northern Afghanistan and captured Kabul with both Russian support and
British Indian arms and capital. While the origins of Abdul Rahman’s centralizing tendencies remain somewhat unre-
solved, his familiarity with the negative consequences of dynastic conflict and colonial intervention could explain his
governing behavior. For more information, see Adamec 1975; M. H. Kakar 2006.
109L. Dupree 1977.
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government authority over all autonomous territories designated as areas of Afghan influence un-
der arrangements settled with Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary of British India, in
1893.110 As a consequence of these developments, the pattern of “political fusion and fission”111
that characterized much of preceding Afghan history largely came to an end by the 19th century.
Abdul Rahman’s administration departed from those of his predecessors in several important
respects. First, his administration employed the use of regimented military force to expand and
maintain direct control over autonomous communities. Drawing on an officer class that consisted
of non-kin Pashtun military notables and a diverse conscript force, Abdul Rahman mobilized
large and highly coercive military expeditions into the Ghilzai-populated areas immediately south
of Kabul, the northern region of Afghan Turkestan, the central highlands of Hazarajat, and the
geographically remote, polytheistic area of eastern Afghanistan known by non-inhabitants as
Kafiristan.112 While the circumstances of Abdul Rahman’s numerous military conquests differed
from one another, all of them served to expand and centralize the administrative power of the
Amir and, by extension, the government.
Second, Abdul Rahman employed exclusive Islamic legitimation to consecrate his authority
and therefore justify the expansion of government power. While prior Afghan amirs had defined
their rule in terms of Islam,113 Abdul Rahman expanded its role by making decrees that explicitly
appealed to divine recognition as the basis for his authority,114 bringing the ulama-controlled
awqaf (religious trusts) under the control of the central government, and enlisting or otherwise
subjugating the clergy in the process.115
110This settlement came to be known as the Durand Agreement. For more detail, see M. H. Kakar 2006, Ch. 10;
Gregorian 1969, pp. 158-160.
111L. Dupree 1977, p. 152.
112As part of Abdul Rahman’s campaign, inhabitants of the region were converted to Islam under varying levels of
coercion. However, Islamic belief was not fully imbued in the Kafiristan region until the reign of Abdul Rahman’s
son, Habibullah Khan. This region was given the name of Nuristan (“land of light”) by Kabul to mark its accession of
Islam. See Nuristani 1994.
113Amir Dost Mohammad, Abdul Rahman’s grandfather, adopted the title of amir al-mu minin, or “commander of
the faithful” in his confrontation with the the Sikh Empire of Ranjit Singh. More generally, however, the title imbued
his reign with an encompassing form of religious legitimacy that was not possible under lineage-based competition,
while differentiating his administration from the secular title of shah used by the discredited Saddozai ruler Shah Shuja.
114Abdul Rahman’s administration, for example, distributed pamphlets invoking divine right as the basis for his rule.
See, for example, H. K. Kakar 1979.
115Much of the ulama in Afghanistan possessed significant influence over the political choices of their communities,
and consequently served as both potential symbolic and political obstacles to state rule. For example, Abdul Rahman
gradually sidelined the prominent mullah Sayyid Mahmud Pacha, whose influence was centered in the Kunar valley,
and compelled him to channel revenue to Kabul. When the mullah launched a rebellion against Kabul, Abdul Rahman
defeated him and sent him into exile in India. See Adamec 1997, p. 273.
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Third, Abdul Rahman elevated the practice of bureaucratic specialization in his administra-
tion, particularly in military and judicial affairs. This involved the development of a centralized
system of police courts (kotwali) and internal espionage,116 the introduction of an elite cadre of
bonded court servants (ghulam bachagan, or “slave boys”),117 as well as the diminished practice of
distributing important offices to kinsmen. While the Kabul Mohammadzais remained a critical
base of the Amir’s rule, particularly after the uprising of Ghilzai Pashtuns in 1886, his adminis-
tration had scaled back the manorial tradition of government that ruling lineages had practiced
in previous decades.
Finally, Abdul Rahman transferred large sections of the population, political enemies and
allies alike, in order to strengthen his domestic position and reinforce the border territories
claimed by Kabul. The Ghilzai Pashtun communities that had rebelled against Abdul Rah-
man were forcibly resettled in predominantly non-Pashtun areas and provided substantial tracts
of farmland, diminishing their territorial influence and instilling in them greater dependence
on a Pashtun-led state. At the same time, the Amir opened up unsettled areas of northwest
Afghanistan to Durrani nomad (maldar) families of Farah, Herat, and Kandahar.118 While these
resettlements successfully degraded the autonomy of the southern tribes, it paved the way for
economic and political conflicts between resettled Pashtun and indigenous non-Pashtun commu-
nities for years to come.
Habibullah and the Politics of Consensus. The death of Amir Abdul Rahman in 1901 gave
way to the royal accession of his son and the heir-in-waiting (wali’ahd) Habibullah, marking the
first peaceful transfer of power in Afghanistan since 1772.119 Habibullah’s reign marked a pe-
116See Tarzi 2003.
117See L. Dupree and Albert 1974, Kakar observes that Abdul Rahman “introduced the system of ghulam bacha
in Afghanistan to create a group of civil and military officials loyal to his dynasty and the state rather than to the
tribes and regions. They were recruited not only from among the slaves in Chitral, Badakhshan, and Kafiristan (now
Nuristan) but also from among the sons of senior officials and some influential Muslim, mainly non Pushtun, families.
They were trained in public affairs and the jihad and, after acquiring some practical training in the durbar, they were
given high civil and military posts. For the first time in its history, the court was supplying the state with trained
personnel. During the reign of Amir Habibullah, the ghulam bachagan were among the first to take keen interest in
social and political problems, to read foreign journals that were received in the durbar, and to get in close touch with
democratic circles outside the durbar.”
118See Tapper 1973.
119Like most amirs in Afghanistan up until that period, Amir Abdul Rahman had many consorts. One of them,
Asal, was the daughter of Jahandar Shah, an ethnic Uzbek and former ruler of Badakhshan who had become an ally
of Abdul Rahman’s father. Asal was married to Abdul Rahman during his exile in Samarkand and later gave birth to
Habibullah.
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riod of gradual but significant change. Among them were the consensual, less absolutist content
and style of Habibullah’s reign, and the expansion of close personal and marital ties between the
royal family and diverse elements of Afghanistan’s social and political elite. Habibullah chose to
establish closer ties with elite constituencies that his father had sidelined, including groups that
represented opposite ends of the Afghan political elite. The Amir developed close personal ties
with Mahmud Beg Tarzi, the patriarch of a prominent Mohammadzai lineage and a leading advo-
cate of social and political reform in Afghanistan. Educated in exile in India and Damascus, Tarzi
became a major proponent of modernization, Afghan nationalism, and social liberalization dur-
ing the subsequent rule of Habibullah’s son, Amanullah. The Amir also established strong ties
with conservative members of the clergy or ulama, and the familial representatives of the Naqsh-
bandi and Qadiriyyah Sufi networks in Afghanistan, sometimes known as the mashayekh. The
latter group included Fidai Masum Mojadidi, representative of the leading Naqshbandi Sufi lin-
eage in Afghanistan, and Sayyid Hasan Gailani, the Baghdad-born descendent of the Qadiriyyah
Sufi founding lineage. The Gailani and Mojadidi families later became instrumental in bringing
down the project of political modernization formulated by Mahmud Tarzi and carried out by
Habibullah’s son and successor, Amanullah.
Another important development was Habibullah’s introduction of systematic educational
and professional instruction for the children of elite families.120 Under the Habibullah administra-
tion, foreign professionals were invited from Europe (particularly the United Kingdom), British
India, and the Ottoman Empire to build up Kabul’s administrative and military capabilities.121
Some time between 1904 and 1906, Habibullah’s administration established the Royal Military
College (madrasa-ye harbi-ye serajiya), directed (as of 1907) by the Turkish colonel Mahmud Sami,
to develop a regular and professional officer class.122 The student body, composed predominantly
of the sons of Durrani Pashtun notables, was introduced to a curriculum of “study of the Quran;
courses in arithmetic, mensuration, geometry, and military logistics; and gymnastics and drill,”
in addition to “the Persian and English languages, general and Afghan history, and geography.”123
120This was not entirely new. Prior, ad-hoc efforts to educate court-based children in administration and mili-
tary affairs had been undertaken under the administration Habibullah’s father, Abdul Rahman. See Gregorian 1969,
pp. 150-151, 184.
121Adamec 1974, p. 12.
122Azimi 2000.
123Gregorian 1969, p. 184.
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Habibullah’s government also established the first secondary school institution in Afghanistan,
Habibia College, in 1904. Drawing on a predominantly Indian Muslim faculty and a diverse cur-
riculum of arts, sciences, and Perso-Islamic subjects, Habibia quickly became the training ground
for the royal court and government administrators.
A third development concerned Afghanistan’s external relations. With the inception of
World War I, Afghanistan’s internal politics increasingly came into tension with British Indian
control over its external relations. While prior Anglo-Afghan agreements obliged Afghanistan to
remain neutral in World War I, the conflict was seen by many Afghan elites as an opportunity
for aligning with the Ottoman Empire, then the center of Islamic power, and achieving full inde-
pendence from British control. Among both elite and popular sections of Afghan society, there
was significant pressure to permanently separate Afghanistan from the British Raj. Nonetheless,
despite briefly entertaining the possibility of a foreign policy realignment, Habibullah decided
by early 1916 that Kabul would stay out of the war, with the expectation that this decision would
be rewarded with British recognition of Afghanistan’s independence. This move created opposi-
tion among the “war party” at the royal court, which included his son Amanullah and brother
Nasrullah,124 especially after British recognition was not forthcoming. The decision to remain
neutral had fateful consequences three years later. During a hunting expedition in Laghman in
February 1919, Habibullah was shot dead in his sleep, in what was widely interpreted to be a
palace coup.125
The Rise and Fall of Amani Reform. The assassination of Amir Habibullah opened up a brief
period of political uncertainty, in which his son, Amanullah, and his brother, Nasrullah, were
the leading contenders for the throne. Rumors circulated widely that Amanullah or Nasrullah
had a hand in the Amir’s death, given their political differences with his foreign policy and their
proximity to the throne. Nader Khan, one of the elder brothers of the Yahyakhel family, was also
a suspect because he had been responsible for the Amir’s personal security. Because Amanullah
initially enjoyed support in the Afghan Army and, as governor of Kabul province, was located
near the royal palace during the assassination, he was able to take control over the throne and
the public treasury. Nasrullah was subsequently imprisoned under Amanullah’s order, and was
124L. Dupree 1988, p. 146.
125See Adamec 1974, pp. 42-46.
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later mysteriously killed while still in prison, while Nader was detained for a brief period before
being released and invited to rejoin the Army leadership. Amanullah was proclaimed Amir in
late February 1919.
The Amani period has been the subject of an extensive body of historical research,126 in
part because it deviated significantly from the prevailing pattern of incremental political develop-
ment preferred by Habibullah Khan. In particular, two major characteristics of the Amanullah
administration distinguish it from preceding periods. First, Amanullah sought to achieve full
independence from British paramountcy, an objective his father had sought and failed to obtain.
Shortly after Amanullah assumed power, his administration demanded the withdrawal of British
Indian control over Afghanistan’s foreign relations, which was rejected. This development gave
rise the Third Anglo-Afghan War in May 1919, a brief conflict that was concluded in a ceasefire
less than a month after it began when it became clear that Kabul lacked the military capacity to
wage an extended war and that the British commitment to holding Afghanistan had dissipated.
By August 1919, negotiations between Kabul and British India resulted in full Afghan indepen-
dence,127 boosting Amanullah’s domestic and international standing, particularly in the Islamic
world.
Second, Amanullah along with Mahmud Tarzi (Amanullah was married to Tarzi’s daughter
Soraya) pursued a project of national reform rooted in the currents of secular modernization and
nationalist anti-colonialism then beginning to emerge in the Third World. Amanullah sought to
reproduce in Afghanistan the capabilities and practices of Western states by advancing a series of
sweeping economic, political, and social reforms. Amanullah’s administration expanded military
conscription, established telegraphy and telephone communication, upgraded the urban educa-
tion system, promulgated the country’s first constitution, and rationalized customs and property
taxation.128 Under Amani rule, the central government also advocated the unveiling of women
and established greater control over the clerical establishment. These reforms were seen with
hostility by more traditional elements of Afghan society. In clerical circles and among the tra-
ditional communities east and north of Kabul, Amanullah was viewed as an apostate ruler who
126See, for example, Gregorian 1967; Nawid 1999; L. B. Poullada 1973; Ruttig 2011.
127The Anglo-Afghan negotiations, however, also resulted in the removal of the British subsidy to Kabul and Aman-
ullah’s acceptance of the Indo-Afghan frontier as recognized by his father.
128Gregorian 1969, pp. 252-254; Guha 1967; L. B. Poullada 1969, pp. 126-129.
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threatened to change their social and economic ways of life.129 The Amani reforms contributed
to or precipitated two major episodes of rebellion, one unsuccessful attempt carried out by the
Mangal and Jaji tribes of the Khost area (March 1924-January 1925), and a second bid initiated
by Shinwari tribesmen (November 1928-January 1929) that ultimately resulted in the downfall
of the Amanullah administration. Initially limited to the Jalalabad area, the Shinwari received
support from clerical circles and expanded to include other Pashtun tribes and the Tajik areas
north of Kabul, eventually overtaking Amanullah’s army.
In the end, the predominantly Tajik forces based in the northern areas of Kohistan and Ko-
hdaman chose this moment to attack the capital, briefly placing Habibullah Kalakani in power
until the Naderi lineage took control in 1929. While the causes of the downfall of the Amanullah
administration were complex, the Amani period offered a straightforward lesson for subsequent
rulers in Afghanistan: that rapid reform without political and military preparation would ulti-
mately backfire. Perhaps nobody recognized this lesson more than Nader Khan and his brothers.
The Origins of the Naderi Dynasty. The emergence of the Yahyakhel family as the dominant
lineage in Afghanistan was a relatively recent phenomenon. The family belonged to the extended
lineage of Dost Mohammad Khan,130 placing it at the highest levels of the social hierarchy in
Kabul, but it was one of many families that belonged to the royal elite. The beginnings of the
Yahyakhel family as an independent clan can be identified in the life and circumstances of sardar
Mohammad Yahya, a well known notable and nephew of Dost Mohammad Khan.
Yahya was born in the early 1820s and raised in Peshawar, where his father served as Amir
Dost Mohammad Khan’s governor while the city and its region were still under Afghan rule.
Yahya’s political prospects were, however, less bright during the successive reign of his cousin,
Sher Ali Khan. His relationship with Sher Ali was acrimonious, in large part because of the close
personal and political ties to the Amir’s rival and eldest son, Mohammad Yaqub Khan.131 Yahya
left Afghanistan for Kashmir in 1876, returning after the death of Sher Ali and the beginning
of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). His prospects in Kabul were now much more
promising. Yahya’s ally and son-in-law, Yaqub Khan, had become the new amir of Afghanistan.
129Notably, the communities that initiated the rebellions against Amanullah had very little contact with his mod-
ernization program. See L. B. Poullada 1969, pp. 112-113.
130Yahya’s father, sardar Sultan Mohammad Khan, was an elder brother of Dost Mohammad Khan.
131Yahya’s daughter was married to Yaqub. Adamec 1975, pp. 264-265.
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Soon Yahya would become the governor of Kabul and a key advisor to the new amir.
However, the accession of Yaqub, and by extension Yahya, was fraught with risk. Yaqub
had risen to the Afghan throne as British Indian troops were occupying key military forts and
urban centers, including Jalalabad and Kandahar. Under British Indian pressure, Yaqub signed the
Treaty of Gandamak, which relinquished Afghan foreign affairs to British India, agreed to receive
a permanent British envoy in Kabul, and allowed British Indian forces to control the main passes
into Afghanistan from the south.132 However, in the political tumult that followed, a series of
Afghan army regiments mutinied against the British Indian mission to Kabul in September 1879,
massacring almost all of its personnel residing in the Bala Hissar. As British Indian troops made
their way to Kabul in response to the massacre, Yaqub abdicated the throne, agreeing to a life of
exile in British India.133 The British Indian authorities suspected Yahya of having been involved
in the attack on the Bala Hissar, and eventually sent him to Ajmer, Rajasthan, as a political
prisoner. After some time, Yahya and his family joined the former amir in the Indian city of
Dehradun. The Yahya family would quietly spend the next 19 years in Dehradun, socially and
politically estranged from Afghanistan, and under surveillance by the Raj.
It was in Dehradun that the future political leadership of Afghanistan spent their formative
years. Nader and his younger brothers, including Shah Wali, Hashem, Shah Mahmud, and Aziz
were born and raised in exile, situated in a region geographically and culturally remote from their
country of familial origin. In Dehradun, Yahya’s son grew up in a relatively closed household,
where they primarily interacted with family and private tutors, as well as the occasional visitor
from Afghanistan. The fate of the family, however, changed rather abruptly in 1900, when Abdul
Rahman (one year before his death) invited Yahya and other Afghan exiles to come back to Kabul.
Accepting the offer, Mohammad Yusuf and Mohammad Asef brought the extended family back
to Afghanistan and settled in the capital city. In Kabul, Yahya quickly reconstituted the family
as a key participant in elite circles. Mohammad Yusuf and Mohammad Asef were appointed
Privy Councillors (musahiban-e khas) to Abdul Rahman’s son and royal heir, Habibullah, who
ascended to the throne in 1901. This role came to be associated with Yahya’s lineage, leading
132Adamec 2011.
133Yaqub’s forces did nothing to prevent the massacre at the Bala Hissar. Most historians of this period believe that
Yaqub had hoped the English would be motivated to leave Afghanistan after the massacre.
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some observers to call it the “musahiban” family.134
Nader Khan and his brothers were now well situated. Because of their relative competence
and good relations with the amir, they rose quickly in government. Amir Habibullah appointed
Nader a brigadier general in 1906. He accompanied the amir on diplomatic tours to India and
domestic visits to Herat, and commanded forces that defeated a Mangal uprising in 1912. He
eventually rose to the position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces (sepah salar) in 1914
and, after the accession of Amir Amanullah, became Minister of War, during which time he
became the primary figure in charge of managing the frontier provinces of Afghanistan. Nader’s
brothers experienced similar career trajectories. Shah Mahmud and Shah Wali rose in the ranks
of the military. Hashem Khan, who quickly developed a reputation of cruelty, was appointed to
a number of increasingly important military and governorship positions. Nader and his brothers
also became deeply involved in the social circles of the court. Shah Wali and Shah Mahmud
married daughters of Amir Habibullah, placing them in the upper echelon of the political elite.
The Yahyakhel family, however, had developed differences with Amanullah over his modern-
ization program.135 Nader and his brothers believed that the pace and substance of Amanullah’s
reforms were becoming increasingly destabilizing. Conservative mullahs and Pashtun tribes-
men were denouncing the Amani reforms as contradictory to shariat. Notables from eastern
Afghanistan also disapproved of his efforts to institute greater government authority over mili-
tary conscription and administrative affairs at the local level. Nader’s opposition to the Amani
reforms resulted in his demotion and exile to France, where he served as Afghan Ambassador
from 1924 to 1926. Because of poor health and continued disagreements with Amanullah, Nader
resigned from his post in 1926 and retire to Grasse, where he was joined by two of his broth-
ers, Hashem Khan and Shah Wali Khan. After the downfall of Amanullah and accession of the
Habibullah Kalakani government in January 1929, the brothers decided in Grasse to take Kabul
and build a new government. By February 22, 1929, the Yahyakhel brothers had arrived in Bom-
bay and made their way toward Peshawar. The brothers entered Afghanistan via Kurram on
March 7, and after reuniting with brother Shah Mahmud in Khost, began their campaign against
the Habibullah government.
134I do not use this term because most historical or contemporary sources in Afghanistan do not themselves make
reference to it.
135See Gregorian 1969, p. 282.
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3.2 Mapping the Dependent Variable
As Section 3.1 showed, by the time Nader Khan and his brothers had assumed power in Kabul,
three distinct traditions of rule had emerged in Afghanistan—Abdul Rahman’s absolutism, Habibul-
lah’s consensualism, and Amanullah’s reformism. Each of these legacies represented very differ-
ent trajectories of political development. Given these legacies of the past, how did institution
building proceed during the Naderi era? This section charts the ways in which government insti-
tutions evolved after the inauguration of Naderi rule in 1929. Focusing on institutional capabil-
ities, reach, and effects, this section attempts to document how civilian and military institutions
changed over the course of the early and middle 20th century.
3.2.1 Resource Accumulation in the Early Naderi Period
For Nader Khan and his brothers, achieving administrative and military control over Kabul and
other key areas of Afghanistan was not assured. In the capital city and Kandahar, a small but
influential network of Amanullah loyalists posed a challenge to Nader’s claim to the throne, while
in the outlying areas of Kohistan and Kohdaman, the deposed Habibullah Kalakani maintained
pockets of popular support. Political conditions in the regional centers had stabilized but also
remained highly uncertain. Notables, civil servants, and religious elites carefully observed how
the nascent government had begun to form in the regional centers and their outlying localities.
Meanwhile, areas of the east were largely autonomous from the central government, and had
been militarily mobilized as result of the short but divisive civil war of 1929.
The territorial expansion of the the nascent regime proceeded sequentially, and depended
critically on the interaction of its foreign and domestic political relationships. The Naderi ad-
ministration capitalized on political recognition by British India and the Soviets, early shows
of force, and the establishment of a modus vivendi with conservatives and uncommitted elites
to incrementally consolidate control over the capital and its environs before establishing direct
authority over the major regional centers of political and economic power—Herat, Jalalabad,
Kandahar, and Mazar-e Sharif. The Naderi brothers concentrated their initial efforts on assum-
ing control over Kabul and its surrounding territories, particularly the strategically important
areas of Maidan Wardak, Ghazni, and Kohistan, in addition to Kandahar and Jalalabad.
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This process was particularly contentious in Kohistan and Kohdaman, not only because of
the political and military weaknesses of the nascent regime but also because of the fresh politi-
cal wounds generated by the fighting of 1929. Located north of Kabul, these areas had backed
Habibullah Kalakani during the war but had largely withdrawn support for his rule when it
became clear that he could no longer maintain his hold on power without wider bloodshed.136
Months after the Naderi brothers assumed power, a sizeable insurrection had commenced in Ko-
histan and Kohdaman areas, originating in grievances by the predominantly Tajik population
against their treatment by the new government. Unable to suppress the insurrection through the
regular armed forces, the Naderi government enlisted the support of the eastern tribal forces who
had participated in the civil war. These irregular forces violently suppressed the rebellion, seizing
property and, in some instances, women from Kohistani and Kohdamani villages.
The Naderi government also dispatched senior figures to assume control over the largely
autonomous regions of Afghan Turkestan and Herat. In the northern provinces, establishing
external sovereignty was particularly important for the Naderi government. Since 1917, northern
Afghanistan had served as a base of operations for the anti-Soviet Turkestani resistance originating
in the former khanate territories of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand, and quietly supported by
both the Amanullah and Habibullah Kalakani administrations. Adopting the name of beklar
hareketi but called basmachi by the Soviets,137 the Turkestani resistance movement had reached its
greatest intensity during the late 1910s and early 1920s. By the late Amanullah period, however,
Soviet consolidation in Turkestan had significantly weakened the resistance movement, pushing
remaining cadres into northern Afghanistan. Endorsed by the exiled Emir of Bukhara, who
had fled to Afghanistan in 1921, and organized by the Uzbek Lokai military leader Ibrahim
Beg, Turkestani fighters carried out cross-border raids from sanctuaries in northern Afghanistan
into Garm, Ferghana, and other Soviet Turkestani political centers. By June 1930, these cross-
border attacks had prompted the Soviet Army to enter northern Afghanistan in hot pursuit of
a Turkestani raiding force.138 The Soviet incursion, in turn, led Nader Khan to dispatch Shah
Mahmud Khan, his brother and the provisionally appointed Minister of Defense, to oversee a
successful expeditionary Afghan Army operation to eject Ibrahim Beg and take control over
136See Adamec 1974, p. 172.
137The term basmachi comes from the Turkish verb basmak (to plunder). See Olcott 1981.
138See Ritter 1985; Adamec 1974.
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Afghan Turkestan in December 1930.139
In the west, Herat presented a politically distant zone that was endowed with rich cultural,
material, and human resources. During the chaotic events of 1929, the region of Herat had come
under the political control of Abdul Rahim, a former general in the armies of Amanullah and
Habibullah Kalakani. A Kohdamani Safi and brigadier general (ghund mishar) in the Afghan
Army under Amanullah, Abdul Rahim defected to Habibullah Kalakani’s administration after
Amanullah abdicated the throne.140 In May of 1929, Abdul Rahim captured Herat on behalf of
Habibullah Kalakani, although his personal loyalty to Kalakani was, from the start, question-
able.141 By the time the Yahyakhel sardars had assumed control of Kabul, Abdul Rahim had de-
veloped a firmly ensconced political base in Herat, establishing a quasi-republican administration
that drew on progressive and conservative strata of Herati society.142 The Yahyakhel brothers
was consequently unable to immediately dislodge him from his position, nor were they able to
readily secure his public support. Only after successfully completing the Mazar-e-Sharif expe-
dition of 1931 was the central government able to secure Abdul Rahim’s public allegiance. The
province remained under Abdul Rahim’s stewardship for over three years, when Nader Khan and
his brothers were able to bring him to the capital as the Minister of Public Works. In Kabul, he
was progressively reassigned to less prominent political offices, including the Office of the First
Deputy Prime Minister and, subsequently, that of Second Deputy Prime Minister. Abdul Rahim
was thrown in jail in 1946 on suspicion of subversion against the government of Mohammad
Hashem.143
After this initial period of territorial expansion, Nader Khan and his brothers focused their
efforts on consolidating control over urban centers and strategic territories. For the Yahyakhel
brothers, the chaotic circumstances of Kabul and Afghanistan at the end of 1929 underscored
the importance of building a regular army capable of securing greater Kabul and garrisoning the
provincial centers. The construction of a conscript mass military was, however, an uncertain
and expensive process. Conscription was a highly contentious issue, while the availability of
basic skills, training, and equipment among recruits was extremely limited. The Yahyakhel sar-
139L. Dupree [1973] 2002, pp. 460-461.
140During the civil war, Abdul Rahim had captured Mazar-e-Sharif, Maimana, and Herat on behalf of Kalakani.
141Adamec 1974.
142See Boyko 2010.
143Adamec 1997, p. 13.
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dars abandoned the policy of lottery-based military recruitment established by Amanullah Khan,
having seen the opposition it had generated just a few years earlier.144 Instead, the Naderi govern-
ment reinstated the pre-existing hasht nafari system of military conscription through community
elders.145 Drawing on this less stringent recruitment practice and incorporating the soldiers who
had served in Amanullah’s army, the regular personnel of the Afghan Army, at approximately
12,000 in 1929, increased to between 60,000 and 70,000 soldiers by the mid-1930s (see Figure
3.1). The growth in the regular armed forces continued, albeit at a lower rate, over the next
decade. By 1940, the government of Hashem Khan had reinstated a universal draft,146 but this
move was not fully enforced given limited government authority in rural areas. By 1948, Afghan
Army manpower is estimated to have reached a size of between 75,000 and 90,000. These troops
were organized into army corps (qul-e urdu) and garrisoned in regional centers and strategic en-
claves, including Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Matun (the primary district of the frontier province
Khost), Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif.147 The Naderi government also positioned military detach-
ments in other border areas, including the Badakhshi provincial center of Faizabad and the fort
village of Dakka, situated northwest of the Khyber Pass.
While the Afghan Army served as Kabul’s primary instrument of territorial expansion (see
Section 3.2.1), civilian police and paramilitary forces carried out the day-to-day tasks of ensur-
ing security. Poorly equipped and often untrained civilian police units were stationed in district
centers, where they were charged with intervening in only major disturbances. In the border
provinces, a gendarmerie force was responsible for countering cross-border and internal threats,
as well as securing major transportation routes and interdicting contraband. Organized as a
paramilitary service, the gendarmerie was comprised of mobile borderland units capable of chal-
lenging collective threats of minor or medium salience. A separate, but important, component
of Kabul’s security apparatus was its intelligence service, Riasat-e Zabt-e Ahwalat (Department of
144In 1924, Amanullah Khan altered the conscription system from one in which community elders selected one out
of eight of all able-bodied males between the ages of twenty-two and twenty-seven for military service (hasht nafari) to
a modified version in which conscripts were selected by secret lottery. See L. B. Poullada 1969, p. 138.
145For a discussion of this policy change, see Gregorian 1969, p. 371.
146Grassmuck, Adamec, and Irwin 1969.
147Adamec 1997, p. 58.
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Figure 3.1. Afghan Army Manpower, 1929–1978




























Sources: Gregorian 1969, pp. 296-298, 370-374; Ghobar 1967, p. 62; A. A. Jalali 2002, p. 77;
Adamec 1997, p. 59; Sykes 1940, p. 162; ASI Volume 4, 5/40/416/M.A., p. 4; Central Statistics
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p. 151; L. Dupree 1986.
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the Record of Information).148 Reporting directly to the Office of the Prime Minister,149 Zabt-e
Ahwalat was charged with countering internal threats against state authority, particularly those
originating from urban-based elites or political interests affiliated with neighboring powers.
Nonetheless, while the quantitative and spatial growth of the armed forces increased substan-
tially, improvements in the quality and equipment of the Afghan military was comparatively
slow-going. The royal workshops of Kabul that had manufactured arms and equipment since the
19th century had fallen into disrepair under Habibullah Kalakani’s short period of rule. With
military materiel extremely difficult to obtain domestically, the Naderi regime procured modest
shipments of arms and military vehicles from abroad, although persistent shortages of spare parts
and fuel limited the durability and efficient usage of mechanized assets. In its first two years of
power, the Naderi monarchy acquired at least 36,000 rifles of varying make, quality, and vintage
from British India, France, and Germany. In subsequent years, the Naderi government received
arms shipments from additional sources, including Italy and the Czechoslovak Republic.150 In
1937, the fledgling Afghan Air Force purchased 8 Hawker bomber aircraft from the British Raj
and 24 reconnaissance and trainer aircraft from Italy (although all of these aircraft ceased to func-
tion by the mid-1940s). The next year, it acquired additional Hawker bombers from Britain, and
took delivery of 12 Avro Anson bombers in 1947.151 The Afghan Army also added a number
of tank and military transportation units to its materiel. Still, arms, equipment, and other mili-
tary materiel were in short supply during the early Naderi period, and access to future supplies
depended on access to Pakistani ports:
[T]here is a shortage of modern arms and equipment in provincial formations, sup-
ply, transport, and medical services are inadequate, there are no factories in Afghanistan
for the production of war material, and almost everything, including motor vehi-
cles, arms, and equipment, medical stores, ammunition, and S.A.A. and petrol, etc.
have to be imported from abroad through Pakistan. Unless the Afghan Government
opens up new supply routes through Russia or Persia, the Afghan army could not
148Zabt-e Ahwalat was established under the rule of Abdul Rahman Khan, although it did not become a formal,
permanent government organization until the Naderi period, under the government of Hashem Khan. The intelli-
gence service was later renamed Masuniyat-e-Milli (Department of National Security), during Dr. Mohammad Yusuf’s
brief tenure as Prime Minister (1963-1965). Masuniyat-e-Milli subsequently become a powerful instrument of political
control during Daoud’s republican government (1973-78).
149And after the establishment of Daoud’s republican government, to the Office of the President
150Gregorian 1969, p. 371; Grassmuck, Adamec, and Irwin 1969, p. 274.
151ASI Volume 4, 5/40/416/M.A., p. 4
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remain in the field for more than a very short period.152
At the same time, solidarity and specialization in the officer corps and the rank and file of
the armed forces remained limited. Many of the military specialists remaining in Afghanistan at
the inception of the Naderi monarchy held varying degrees of solidarity with multiple parties to
the civil war of 1929. Some had served as major generals (firqa mishar), brigadier generals (ghund
mishar), and battalion commanders (kandak mishar) in the Afghan Army under Amir Habibullah
and Amir Amanullah, and demonstrated significant commitment to the preservation of the royal
line under Amanullah. Other commanders had defected to the side of Habibullah Kalakani dur-
ing the events of 1929. The Naderi regime arrested or exiled those commanders perceived to be
personally or politically close to Amanullah and Kalakani, and sidelined the less committed. The
remaining cohort of senior military officers was, by consequence, numerically small, comprised
of trusted but inexperienced members of the extended Mohammadzai clan, military allies from
Nader Khan’s campaign against Habibullah Kalakani, and a small assemblage of relatively apolit-
ical professional military officers. Junior military officials, by contrast, had not been as involved
in the events of 1929. Belonging almost exclusively to the Mohammadzai lineage, these officers
lacked military experience but possessed strong familial and marriage solidarities with the royal
family. To make up for their limited military competency, junior officers and non-commissioned
officers (khurdzabitan) were sent to British India or Turkey for general and specialized weapons,
transport, and medical training, or received instruction in Afghanistan from foreign military
officer in technical subjects including signals work.153 Many of the officers trained abroad were
subsequently appointed as staff officers or instructors at the Military Academy and other military
schools in Kabul.154
Among the conscript rank and file, basic skills and equipment were extremely scarce. The
continuous need for conscript manpower under the hasht nafari system, combined with limited
resources available for training, supplying, and compensating conscripts, produced a disadvan-
taged and incapable rank and file force. While conscript soldiers in the Kabul garrison began to
enjoy new clothing and improved barracks and messing facilities by 1948, the rank and file force
152ASI Volume 4, B/22/4/48, p. 9
153ASI Volume 4, B/22/4/48, p. 9
154ASI Volume 4, B/22/23/48/Annexure A, p. 18
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received extremely low compensation. Afghan Army conscripts received a monthly salary and
allowance of 30 Rupees and 48 pounds of flour, respectively, a level of compensation well below
the cost of subsistence.
Capital Concentration and the Economic Disembedding of Kabul. In the economic sphere,
Kabul exhibited a similar pattern of resource accumulation. Critical to this process of economic
concentration was the Afghan Joint Stock Company (Sherkat-e Sahami-e Afghan) established in
1932 by the leading trader Abdul Majid Zabuli and chartered as a commercial bank under the
name of the National Bank (Bank-e Melli) in 1934. Established as a public-private partnership, the
Afghan Joint Stock Company and its successor organization, Bank-e Melli, served as an invest-
ment and export promotion vehicle for key agricultural products. The company was founded
with a capital base of 2.5 million afghanis—of which 68% was government-subscribed—which it
used to sponsor and operate regional monopolies in areas of ready export potential, including
wool and karakul lambskin processing, cotton ginning, oil extraction, textiles, dried fruit, and
sugar. Poullada illustrates the scope of the Bank-e Melli’s operations:
There were educational, health, welfare, and other social components to [Abdul Ma-
jid Zabuli’s] projects. For example, the northern cotton growing areas were provided
with small but modern hospital facilities—theretofore unknown in Afghanistan. Schools
and roads were built which benefitted not only the shirkat employees, but the pop-
ulation of the entire region, and served as an example for the government to extend
these services nationwide.155
By the late 1940s, the Bank-e Melli commanded much of the country’s domestic capital, generated
most of the business income in the kingdom, and “controlled about 80 percent of the export-
import trade.156 The bank had opened domestic branches in Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-e Sharif,
Khanabad, Jalalabad. It had also established offices or correspondents across the Durand Line
in Quetta and Peshawar and farther afield in Karachi, Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, London, Paris,
and Berlin.157 In 1947, the bank held a portfolio of 50 large companies or sherkats—notably, the
Jabal-ul Seraj Textile Company in 1937, the Baghlan Sugar Factory in 1938, the Kunduz Oil
Exploration Company in 1939, and the Kandahar Electric Factory in 1943.158 In what could
155L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995, pp. 165-166.
156Brant 1974, p. 93.
157Gregorian 1969, p. 314.
158Interviews with former Bank-e Melli (March 2014) and Ministry of National Economy officials (April 2014).
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be called Afghanistan’s first complex development intervention, the Bank-e Melli, in cooperation
with the Governor of Qataghan and Badakhshan Sher Khan Nasher and major trader Abdul Aziz
“Londoni,”159 played an important role in the settlement, draining, irrigation, and cultivation of
the sparsely populated malarial swamps that covered the Kunduz river valley.160 The ecological
transformation of the Kunduz area made it one of the most productive agricultural areas in
subsequent decades. Poullada and Poullada report the overall impact of Bank-e Melli operations
in the Kunduz area:
The shirkat system controlled by the Banki Milli developed a flourishing integrated
cotton industry in northern Afghanistan. Land was cleared; swamps drained; malaria
stamped out; modern textile machinery and oil presses were imported; cotton-seed
oil, soap and other by-products were processed; foreign grading experts and other
technicians were hired; while young Afghans were sent for training abroad. Germany
and Britain provided the Bank with credits for the purchase of machinery, and the
profits began to flow in.161
The expansion of development activity in Afghanistan could also be seen in the development
of roads and communications. Capital intensive physical infrastructure—roads and telecommuni-
cation lines—incrementally linked Kabul with the urban administrative centers of the provinces.
In the years following the ascent of the Naderi regime, the Kabul-Khyber Pass road was resurfaced
and the conditions of the Kabul-Kandahar road were improved.162 In 1933, the central govern-
ment also completed construction of a northern route linking Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif via the
Shibar Pass.163 By 1946, the road system had doubled in size, spanning 5,536 kilometers of mo-
torable road that connected Kandahar, Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, Maimana, Herat, and Farah in a
semi-circular route, and extended east from Kabul to Jalalabad (see Figure 3.2a). New telegraph
and telephone lines were established to replace the communications network destroyed during
the 1929 war, connecting Kabul with the cities of Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Kandahar, and the
159Abdul Aziz was a major trader largely responsible for developing Afghanistan’s karakul industry during the early
1920s. Descending from a trading family of Kashmiri descent, Abdul Aziz began trading karakul skins in regional
markets and, eventually, in London, after which he became known as “Londoni.” L. Dupree [1973] 2002.
160Most of the farmers that were settled in Kunduz (some voluntarily, others by force) were ethnic Pashtuns from
southern and eastern Afghanistan, as well as Tajik and Uzbek refugees from the Soviet Union. The demographic
changes brought about by these resettlements would later become problematic during and after the communist period,
when ethnic differences in the Kunduz area became highly politicized. ibid., pp. 472-474.
161L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995.
162Gregorian 1969, p. 312.
163Grassmuck, Adamec, and Irwin 1969, p. 273.
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cross-border trading centers of Peshawar and Termez.164 The Kabul communications network
was later expanded with the addition of several thousand telephone lines in the early 1950s (also
see Figure 3.2b).165 These early steps provided for the expansion of telephones, numbering only
50 in 1932, to a size of 2,382 by 1951. In 1937, the construction of Marconi transmitters in Kabul,
Khanabad, Khost, and Maimana led to the first cross-provincial government broadcasts by Radio
Afghanistan two years later.
164Gregorian 1969, p. 312.
165Ministry of Communication & Information Technology 2013.
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Figure 3.2. Transportation and Communications Infrastructure, 1928–1978
(a) Motorable Roads, 1929–1978
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Source: Fry 1974, p. 15.
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In spite of Kabul’s early military and economic gains, the presence of the government was
limited in a number of other areas. Human capital in the administrative, medical, and technical
fields was relatively scarce. In 1950, there were 378 state primary and secondary schools (up from
an extremely low base of 22 schools in 1930) in Afghanistan with a total student body of 94,000
(see Figure 3.3a), covering a very small section of Afghan society. University education, concen-
trated exclusively in the faculties of Kabul University, was much less visible. In 1955, no more
than 800 students were in attendance of Kabul University, as shown in Figure 3.4. University
students were typically fully funded by the government, and almost exclusively joined a govern-
ment agency after graduation. Of these early faculties, including those of Medicine (1932), Law
and Political Science (1938), the Natural Sciences (1941), and Literature (1944), educators in the
medical field made a noticeable, if incremental, impact on urban society by introducing new and
relatively modern health services to the Kabul population.
Still, early investments in human capital tended to pay off. By 1950, recent medical grad-
uates typically worked in one of the 50 government-administered hospital facilities and clinics
located in the cities and towns, supplementing their modest salaries with fees earned from private
practice.166 Having been sponsored by the government, graduates of the medical faculty were
obligated to provide any medical service that may be requested by the Ministry of Health for
a period 10 years.167 With financing and technical assistance from the World Health Organiza-
tion, the Ministry of Health and its cohort of medical doctors carried out a number of successful
anti-disease interventions in the 1950s. These included a campaign against malaria, one of the
most prevalent diseases in Afghanistan. By 1948, malaria was endemic in many provinces—the
proportion of children with enlarged spleens and with malaria parasites in their blood films were
as high as 76% and 24%, respectively, in some provinces. These levels of endemicity presented
not only significant health risks, but also economic costs. In Pul-e Khumri, for example, a malar-
ial outbreak had been causing high levels of absenteeism among workers in the textile factory.
To combat the disease, the WHO and Ministry of Health officials established a Central Malaria
Institute in Kabul that trained Afghan entomologists, laboratory workers, and technicians that
were eventually deployed to three regional headquarters and 23 offices in endemic areas. In a
166Cutler 1950.
167P. Robinson 1956, p. 18.
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Figure 3.3. Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Enrollment, 1929–1978
(a) Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Enrollment, 1929–1978
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Source: Fry 1974, p. 14; Rubin 1991, p. 79.
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multi-province campaign of eradication and consolidation, anti-malaria squads were deployed to
endemic areas, where they identified parasite reservoirs in households (after some initial difficulty
in obtaining permission to enter people’s homes) and applied DDT over an extended period of
time.
Table 3.1. Malaria Outcomes, Pre- and Post-Malaria Campaign (1948-1953)
Spleen rate (%) Parasite rate (%)












Pul-e Khumri 76.0 1948 11.0 14.2 1948 0.55
Baghlan 74.7 1951 24.7 23.5 1951 3.3
Khanabad 47.6 1950 20.5 9.9 1951 1.7
Taloqan 60.3 1951 14.6 8.1 1951 0.0
Laghman 76.2 1949 9.0 18.5 1949 0.0
Kandahar 46.0 1952 22.0 13.1 1952 9.3
Khost 65.6 1952 19.5 ? 1952 3.1
Kabul 21.0 1951 10.0 13.4 1951 0.55
Sarobi 58.0 1951 10.0 22.5 1951 1.6
Source: Fischer 1968, p. 101.
Note: “Campaign year” column shows the year in which the malaria treatment was carried out. All post-treatment
indicators are from 1953.
As shown in Table 3.1, the anti-malaria intervention was generally successful. Spleen and
parasite rates declined substantially between pre- and post-campaign, including extremely large
reductions in the endemic areas of Pul-e Khumri and Laghman. In 1962, fourteen years after the
campaign had been started, German tropical physician Rudolph Fischer observed that “the total
number of malaria cases reported in the country was 661. . .In 1965, 33 [cases] of malaria were
recorded. . .and at the time of my last visit to Afghanistan in the autumn of 1964, malaria appeared
to have died out in all the endemic areas I saw—as for example in Sarobi, Laghman, Kunar, Pol-
e Khumri, and in the Heri-Rud valley, but particularly in the formerly highly infected area of
Kunduz.”168 Successful health interventions were not limited to the anti-malaria campaign. The
WHO and Afghan government were successful in greatly reducing outbreaks of other serious
diseases, including, typhus and cholera, in large part because of the “development of the health
service and the medical profession, as well as the establishment of institutes and the university
168Fischer 1968, p. 101.
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[medical faculty].”169
The reach of government institutions was nonetheless quite limited in rural areas. Small con-
tingents of provincial bureaucrats were stationed in urban centers and semi-urban towns, where
they periodically oversaw conscription, modest taxation, and the adjudication of major commu-
nal conflicts.170 Beyond these periodic supervisory and extractive tasks, the government was a
relatively marginal participant in the administration of rural life. At the village level, political le-
gitimacy and regulatory capacity were primarily vested in traditional, informal, and autonomous
sources of authority—elders, notables, landowners—who typically sought to insulate their re-
spective communities from the government.171 While Kabul maintained a system of formally
recognized village intermediaries, carrying titles that varied across region—arbab, beg, malek—
these positions were powerful solely because they offered instrumental access to the government.
It was only when influential notables occupied state offices that there was there an alignment of
symbolic resources and governmental power in peripheral areas. As Andreas Wilde notes in a
study of political networks in northern Afghanistan, rural notables who also held government
positions tended to use government resources for protecting the communities they represented
while also growing their personal reputations.172
Furthermore, the revenue raising capabilities of the government remained very limited in
rural areas. The share of revenue raised from the rural sector, through taxation on land and
livestock, was already extremely small during the early Naderi period. In 1948, taxes on land
and livestock constituted only 26 per cent of domestic revenue.173 To pass budgets, the Naderi
regime needed the formal and informal consent of the parliament, which was largely comprised
of landlords and rural notables. As a consequence, it consistently declined to increase or vigor-
ously enforce taxation on land and livestock. Kabul also lacked reliable tax assessments, capable
provincial revenue collectors, and a common set of de facto revenue raising rules across provinces.
One contemporary assessment observed:
Each of the 28 provinces has its own out-dated system for the enforcement and col-
lection of revenues. The system is based on past practices and custom without regard
169Fischer 1968, 130. Emphasis in the original.
170See Barfield 1981, pp. 162-164.
171L. Dupree 1974.
172Wilde 2013.
173United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 1952, p. 65.
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Figure 3.4. Revenue and Expenses, 1955–1978


























Source: Fry 1974, p. 14.
to present day needs and existing legislation. Knowledge of the provisions of law is
practIcally non-existent. This applies equally to land, income or business taxes.174
The primary sources of domestic revenue were located in the foreign trade sector and the mer-
chant banking activities of the Bank-e Melli. These sources of domestic revenue were lucrative and
relatively inexpensive to tax. Import duties on valuable essential and non-essential goods were
relatively large, ranging from 22% to 40%. Earnings for most export types were also subject to
substantial foreign exchange controls, in which the government raised revenue by keeping the
difference between the free market rate of exchange and a government-fixed rate of exchange.175
These exports in cotton, karakul, and wool were a primary driver of growth in the urban sector
and generated the majority of government revenue.
While the presence of government institutions in much of Afghanistan was territorially
uneven, it would be a mistake to assume that government influence was non-existent in the
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increasingly seen as an influential and intimidating organization that was able to attract, dissuade,
or coerce provincial populations and elites skeptical or antagonistic of the government. Institu-
tions of government did not enjoy widespread popular affection, but they were nonetheless able
to secure consent on the part of the Afghan population because of a perception of both basic
legitimacy and a monopoly of power in Afghanistan. In spite of the significant material and non-
material deficiencies of the Afghan government in peripheral locales, Kabul was able to crush or
deter political threats in such areas.
Confronted with distinct sources of political opposition—Amanullah partisans, eastern Pash-
tun communities opposed to government influence, and non-Pashtun communities that resented
heavy-handed treatment by government functionaries. As seen in Figure 3.5, the monarchy faced
eight separate rural-based insurrections in its first five years of existence, including those arising
from Kohdaman (November 1929–June 1930), Shinwari territory (February 1930), the North-
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ern Province, from where Ibrahim Beg and the “basmachi”176 staged operations against areas of
Soviet Tajikistan (November 1930–April 1931), the Ghilzai regions of the south (1931), Darre
Khel territory (November 1932), and several others. Rural opposition to government influence
remained substantial in the following half-decade, during which another eight insurrections took
place, notably among the Sulaimankhel followers of the Shami Pir in 1937 and partisans of the
Faqir of Ipi. On occasion, Kabul organized political actions meant to demonstrate and extend
the influence of the government. This included, for example, “shows of accountability” that
the regime undertook in order to control corrupt or unpopular provincial officials. In one in-
stance in Parwan province, for example, an especially unpopular district governor was arrested
and marched in public to the provincial capital, summarily ending his career.
3.2.2 The Rise of Daoud and the Expansion of Government Institutions
While the avuncular period exhibited incremental growth in institutional reach and capabilities,
the following two decades of Naderi institution building involved an unprecedented enhancement
in government capacity, although it also produced new divisions over how these institutions
were to be used. This new phase of institutional development began with the decade-long prime
ministership of Mohammad Daoud Khan (1953–1963).
The tenure of Daoud as prime minister marked an important generational shift in power,
confirming the rise of the second generation of the Naderi lineage.177 Along with Daoud, a num-
ber of other second-generation Mohammadzai sardars, including Mohammad Naim (Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Daoud’s brother), Mohammad Aref (Minister of Defense), Sayyid Abdullah
(Minister of Justice), and Abdul Ahad Malikyar (Minister of Interior) were promoted to senior
positions in the Afghan government. A number of well-regarded commoner figures were also ap-
pointed to senior cabinet positions, most notably Dr. Abdul Zahir and Dr. Yusuf—both future
prime ministers. This period was also marked a significant expansion in the capabilities and reach
of government institutions, although these gains were attended by the beginnings of polarization
within the elite. During Daoud’s tenure, Kabul’s resources and territorial presence increased sub-
176A term derived from the Turkish verb basmak (to oppress or violate), and used by the Soviets to describe the
anti-Soviet Turkestani movement.
177The only remaining member of the Naderi “old guard” in the Daoud cabinet was Ali Mohammad, a Badkhshani
who was appointed Deputy Prime Minister after having served as Foreign Minister for 13 years.
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stantially. The Afghan Army began to emerge as the most powerful source of organized military
power in Afghanistan. Drawing heavily on Soviet assistance, the military acquired sophisticated
heavy assets, including anti-aircraft weapons, weapons repair facilities, and armored vehicles.178
The armed forces also developed greater competency in military weaponry and strategy, with in-
creasing numbers of Army and Air Force officers receiving military training in the Soviet Union
and United States. Trained to handle new techniques and equipment, the officer class began to
evolve into a more regimented and specialized professional group.179 At the same time as the gov-
ernment’s military capabilities expanded, the reach of government personnel, communications,
and transportation assets also increased. Kabul established new provinces and transferred bureau-
crats to provincial administrative centers, with the objective of increasing the (extremely limited)
concentration of government personnel in the provinces while dividing larger regional commu-
nities such as Hazarajat or Afghan Turkestan into smaller parts.180 During Daoud’s premiership,
the first asphalt and concrete roads were constructed. Moreover, the size of the telecommuni-
cations and postal systems began to accelerate by the late 1950s. Transport construction during
this period had far-reaching economic and political effects. Highways connected all major urban
centers by a day’s drive, producing a sharp reduction in transportation costs between the 1950s
and 1960s. During this period, import prices fell by 40 per cent while export prices rose by 15
per cent.181 As observed by economist Maxwell Fry, the “resulting 80 per cent improvement in
the commodity terms of trade was due in considerable part to the fall in transport costs though
these are still high,” while the United Nations estimated that the improvement in income terms
of trade during the 1960s added approximately one per cent annually to real national income.182
The number of telephones, present almost exclusively in Kabul and other major cities, doubled
between 1956 and 1961, while the postal system expanded by nearly 25% during the same pe-
riod. Louis Dupree illustrates how these technological improvements enhanced Kabul’s capacity
to counter rebellions:
178Central File: Decimal File 789.00, Internal Political And National Defense Affairs., Afghanistan, Political Affairs
And Conditions. Elections. Political Parties And Groups. Political Refugees. Defectors. Amnesty. Revolutions,
Riots, Disturbances. Civil War., January 2, 1963 - January 31, 1963.
179Whereas military officers were almost exclusively defined by familial or service ties with the royal family during
the avuncular period, military elites increasingly took on an additional identity of technical competence and access to
sophisticated military machinery under the Daoud government. See Roy 1988, p. 48.
180See Cervin 1952, pp. 406-408.
181Fry 1974, p. 57.
182Nations 1971, p. 38.
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When I first went to Afghanistan, in 1949, the Safi Pathans north of Jalalabad were in
revolt. Owing to lack of communications the government in Kabul did not realize
that a revolt was taking place until the Safi had practically invested the old fort at
Jalalabad. But when in 1959 two small revolts occurred—one in the Mangal country
and one in Kandahar—the Russian trained and equipped Afghan army arrived on the
scene within twenty four hours and smashed these revolts, which otherwise might
have developed into a large-scale disaster. Today any small official in the provinces can
pick up the telephone and immediately call the capital, Kabul, to request assistance
if he needs it. Roads, too, have improved, and most can support tanks and lorries.183
The Daoud government sought to increase its control over economic capital. Under Daoud,
the government sought to displace private capital by restricting the investment activities of the
Bank-e Melli and the private merchant community more generally. Motivated by an étatist per-
spective of economic development and a concern that the Bank-e Melli was not investing enough
in the Pashtun-majority southern areas, the new government removed or offset many of the priv-
ileges extended to the bank in previous decades. The central government obligated Bank-e Melli
to reduce its majority ownership in several portfolio companies, including the Northern Cotton
company and the General Electric Company, set price floors for inputs purchased by Bank-e Melli
corporations, and extended foreign exchange controls to proceeds from signature Bank-e Melli
products, including karakul, wool, and cotton.184 These new measures brought a large share of
Afghanistan’s industrial production under the control of the government, effectively crowding
out private investment activity. The impact of government intervention was almost immediatelt
felt:
The impact on business volume and public opinion was such that Banke Millie shares,
once scarce at 1,000 afghanis, were now available at 500 afghanis. Moreover, the Bank
could no longer obtain ready cash from its shareholders to defray the local cost of the
Gulbahar textile plant, thus delaying the plant’s completion. The bank’s dividends
were reduced to 5 percent in 1954, and prospects for 1955 seem dark.185
While Kabul’s capabilities and reach grew sharply during the Daoud period, it was unable
to contain increasing forms of urban opposition to the government. During the late 1940s and
1950s, new, informal political parties began to take shape among the educated class. One of them
was the Awakened Youth (Wekh Zalmayan). Founded in 1946, the Wekh Zalmayan was at its
183L. Dupree 1965, p. 22.
184See Franck 1956, pp. 47-49.
185Ibid., p. 49.
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founding an ethnically diverse group of intellectuals that sought incremental reforms in Afghan
society and economy. As the organization became more overtly political, however, many of its
Pashtun nationalist leaders began to adopt an agenda increasingly concerned with the political ex-
pression of ethnic identity. This section of the Wekh Zalmayan leadership advocated for greater
usage of Pashto in government offices and the establishment of an independent Pashtunistan
comprising the territories of Afghanistan and the Pashtun areas of northwest Pakistan. As a con-
sequence, many of the Persian-speaking intellectuals that initially affiliated with Wekh Zalmayan
formed new literary and political outlets, most notably the Hezb-e Khalq and Hezb-e Watan orga-
nizations. These parties drew on educated figures dissatisfied with the illiberal nature and narrow
composition of the monarchical state.186 Other early political opposition groups took a more
radical approach to politics. The Kabul University student union served as the locus of youth
activism on the campus of Kabul University and included multiple future PDPA leaders. At the
student union, an emerging radical youth developed relationships “with political circles, the free
press, and the leftist faction of the parliament.”187 Other political formations combined commu-
nal and religious politics with social democracy. The Secret Unity Party (Hezb-e Seri Ittehad),
drawing primarily but not exclusively on Shia figures,188 sought to overthrow the monarchy and
establish a republican government that guaranteed political rights and economic opportunity for
ethnic and religious minorities.189 Yet another group was formed in 1957 around political Islam.
At the Faculty of Shari’at, Ghulam Mohammad Niazi, the dean of the Shari’at Faculty at Kabul
University, along with professors Borhanuddin Rabbani, Ghulam Rasul (later known as Abdul
Rab Sayyaf), and Sayyid Musa Tawana organized a group of scholars and students inspired by the
Islamist ideology of the international Muslim Brotherhood.191 In its early years, this group held
relatively small and intermittent meetings in the Kabul area but, like all of the political currents
described above, it expanded in size and influence during the subsequent constitutional period in
186For more information, see Section 3.3.
187Ghobar 1967, p. 215.
188Adamec 1975; Bezhan 2012.
189While Hezb-e Seri Ittehad drew primarily on Shia Hazara and Qizilbash members, like many networks in
Afghanistan it was not socially uniform. The party was led by Sayyid Ismael Balkhi, a well-traveled Shi’a cleric from
Balkh,190 and Khwaja Mohammad Naim, a Sunni Kabuli and the kotwal (police commander) of Kabul. Moreover, the
Shi’a membership of the Hezb-e Seri Ittehad was diverse, drawing on both religious figures and secular notables. See
Bezhan 2012.
191Other figures close to the Sazman included Abdul Ahad Ashrati (who became a senior advisor in Ministry of
Justice during the New Democracy period), Wafiullah Sami (a future Minister of Justice in the final years of the
Daoud republic), and Abdul Hadi Hidayat.
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Afghanistan.
3.2.3 Pluralism and Conflict in the New Democracy Period
After nearly ten years of running the government, Daoud had been credited with greatly enhanc-
ing the capabilities and reach central government institutions. Under Daoud’s tenure, the gov-
ernment had acquired the capacity to selectively and discretely intervene against rural rebellions
and oversee large development projects. Nonetheless, members of the royal family were increas-
ingly dissatisfied with the economic and political dislocation caused by Daoud’s Pashtunistan
policy, which had resulted in the sustained closure of the border ports between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and had brought Afghanistan closer to the Soviet Union (for more information, see
Section 3.4). At the same time, King Zahir Shah and a growing number of royal and commoner
figures close to him sought a more substantive role in the governance of the country. In March
1963, King Zahir accepted Daoud’s resignation from the government,192 opening up a new phase
of politics in Afghanistan. This period became known as “demukrasi-ye naw” (New Democracy),
marking the second attempt to install democratic reforms after the initial experiment in demo-
cratic change (“demukrasi-ye awwal” or First Democracy) under the liberal parliament of 1949
to 1952. After accepting Daoud’s resignation, the King established an interim administration
(March 1963 - October 1965) led by Dr. Yusuf that was charged with drafting a new constitution
and establishing a new elected legislative body.
This period began with a great deal of hope. The 1964 Constitution declared Afghanistan to
be a constitutional monarchy and laid out rights of citizenship, including free expression, peaceful
assembly, and due process. It also barred the royal family from participation in political parties,
cabinet portfolios, parliament, or the Supreme Court. Notably, the definition of the royal family
included Daoud, and therefore excluded him from participating in politics.193 Nevertheless, in
most quarters of the government and society, the opening up of the political system was expected
to bring political participation and economic prosperity to urban and rural Afghanistan alike.
Government ministries were now managed by experienced administrators without patrimonial
192Whether or not Daoud voluntarily resigned from the government remains a subject of debate. For more infor-
mation, see B. Jalali 2006, p. 171.
193The royal family was defined as “the sons, the daughters, the brothers and the sisters of the King and their
husbands, wives, sons and daughters; and the paternal uncles and the sons of the paternal uncles of the King.’ Assasi
Qanun, 1343.
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ties to the royal family and operated by growing numbers of doctors, accountants, engineers,
and other specialists. However, the hopeful expectations of the New Democracy period almost
immediately gave way to urban conflict, economic malaise, and more complicated dynamics of
Cold War and internal politics in Afghanistan.
The New Democracy period saw an acceleration in the the reach and capabilities of gov-
ernment institutions. The number of specialists in the areas of health, communications, and
transportation increased more rapidly than in previous years, financed by extremely high levels
of Soviet and American development assistance. The Faculty of Medicine at Kabul University
trained expanding cohorts of physician candidates, reaching an annual class size of over 200 stu-
dents by the early 1970s, while Nangarhar University established its own medical faculty in 1963.
New hospital facilities were constructed in Kabul, Lashkar Gah, Kunduz, Logar, and Paktia,
staffed by physicians employed by the Ministry of Health (see Figure 3.6).194 While few Afghan
physicians were able or willing to develop their careers outside of urban centers, the spatial ex-
pansion of medical doctors in the provincial towns nonetheless brought health services much
closer than before to the neediest communities.195 Kabul University underwent a consolidation
and expansion that located previously dispersed faculties onto a single campus and added new
classrooms, laboratories, and dormitories for the growing student body.196 The state telecommu-
nication network grew by 22% each year, while the number of letters delivered by the postal
service increased by 6% per annum. Kabul added approximately 1,900 kilometers of paved road
between 1956 and 1971—including the Soviet sponsored Karez-e Khushk-Herat-Qandahar high-
way and the American constructed Kabul-Kandahar-Spin Boldak road, the largest single US aid
project in Afghanistan in 1962, as seen in Figure 3.7.197—and increased the unpaved road network
by 140% over the same period.
As Dupree observed, “development of an infrastructure (roads, airfields, river ports) made it
194See Fischer 1968, pp. 88-89.
195Very few physicians practiced medicine in rural areas, both because they preferred the dense social interaction of
urban life and because private practice, which was necessary for most physicians to earn a subsistence income, was
only feasible in the towns. See Goodman 1966.
196Edwards 2002, p. 201.
197Central File: Decimal File 789.00, Internal Political And National Defense Affairs., Afghanistan, Political Affairs
And Conditions. Elections. Political Parties And Groups. Political Refugees. Defectors. Amnesty. Revolutions,
Riots, Disturbances. Civil War., January 2, 1963 - January 31, 1963.
88
Figure 3.6. Public Health Infrastructure and Capabilities, 1930–1970
(a) Hospital Facilities and Beds





























(b) Hospital Facilities and Medical Doctors, 1930–1970































Source: Fry 1974, p. 14.
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Figure 3.7. American and Soviet Road Building in Afghanistan, 1960
Source: L. Dupree 1960, p. 19.
possible for the government to penetrate all zones in Afghanistan except those of geographic
extremes in the high mountains and low deserts, and there are still many of these.”198
The equipment and training of the Afghan Army also continued to improve. The Soviet
Union remained the primary external supplier of equipment and hardware of the Afghan Army
and Air Force. Over the course of the 1960s, the Afghan armed forces took delivery of a fresh
tranche of military orders, including armored personnel carriers, short range air-to-air missiles,
surface-to-air missiles, and combat, transport, and reconnaissance aircraft.199 Meanwhile, hun-
dreds of Army and Air Force officers were dispatched to the Soviet Union and United States for
military training. Afghan Army officers were sent to Fort Leavenworth in Kansas for advanced
military education, while Afghan Air Force officers received airpower training at Air University
198L. Dupree 1977, p. 165.
199Stockholm n.d.
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in Alabama.200 The social composition of the Afghan Army officer corps also became somewhat
more diverse during the New Democracy period. Whereas the ranks of the officer class had al-
most exclusively comprised of Pashtuns of elite lineages in previous decades, the upper echelons
of the armed forces began to include non-Pashtuns in the constitutional period. Poullada and
Poullada, for example, cite a US military report indicating that a non-trivial share of senior gen-
erals, approximately 20%, were of non-Pashtun background. They also found that approximately
half of the senior Pashtun officers did not belong to elite Mohammadzai and Popalzai lineages.201
Clearly, the composition of the Afghan Army leadership remained overweighted toward Mo-
hammadzais in particular and Pashtuns in general (because no reliable census has been completed
in Afghanistan, by how much is unknown), but it had become more diverse than it had been
in previous decades, when the officer class was almost exclusively comprised of Mohammadzai
Pashtuns.
Even as the reach and capabilities of government institutions expanded, the capacity of in-
stitutions to plan and implement development programs, manage personnel, and contain urban
conflicts declined. There were five different governments during the ten year period of New
Democracy, including the interim administration led by Dr. Yusuf. These governments differed
from one another in terms of ministerial composition, leadership, and the specific conditions
that they faced, but they shared a common inability to resolve or even manage tensions with the
legislative branch or between the left- and right-wing groups so active in politics at that time.
Successive New Democracy governments were unable to carry out commitments identified in
previous national development plans: increases in fixed government salaries to attract better tal-
ent at the central and provincial levels, the establishment or reorganization of banks that could
provide credit and advisory services to agriculture at the provincial level, the encouragement of
private industry and increased efficiency of state owned enterprises, and increased resource mo-
bilization from agriculture. These problems persisted despite a serious drought and rising food
prices between 1970 and 1972. A 1969 World Bank report observed that the Afghan govern-
ment had been unable “to prepare suitable projects and provide some assurance that these form
part of a coherent development program.”202 Two years later, the World Bank reported that the
200L. Dupree 1988, p. 149.
201L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995, p. 151.
202International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1969, p. 4.
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government was unable “to provide sound economic management or to devise and follow a strat-
egy of development. . .[s]pecifically the government finds it exceedingly difficult to identify and
prepare high priority investment projects and to manage their efficient execution.”203 Without
attention to the agricultural sector and other production areas, the revenue raising capabilities
of the Afghan government became even more heavily weighted toward the urban sector. The
government abolished the livestock tax in in 1966 and unsuccessfully attempted to extract more
revenue from landholding through a higher marginal land tax rate. As a consequence, revenue
from land and livestock declined in absolute value during the 1960s while taxes on foreign trade
became an even more important component of domestic revenue. By 1972, the contribution
of land and livestock tax revenue to total domestic revenue had declined to 1% from 26% two
decades earlier.204
Unable to identify and address the key constraints to economic development in Afghanistan,
the New Democracy government allocated most of its development budget, a majority of which
was financed through foreign aid, to infrastructure projects of variable quality. These projects
were politically expedient because they generated domestic and (for donor countries) external
prestige and did not require the type of cross-sectoral planning that was increasingly untenable
during the New Democracy period. As a result, large, “white elephant” development projects
recurrently received greater priority than those that had the highest potential for generating em-
ployment and increasing productivity in Afghanistan’s smallholder agrarian economy. Without
a consistent and coherent means of planning for development, standalone power and airport
projects usually took priority over projects that required long-term intra-governmental planning.
These projects were usually selected based on political criteria. The construction of the Kandahar
International Airport, for example, provided prestige and employment for an important politi-
cal constituency in Afghanistan, but was not justified by international or domestic demand for
air travel to or from southern Afghanistan. The Mahipar power project, designed to supply 66
megawatts of power, lacked the personnel to keep it fully operational—as a result, it sat idle for
much of the year, and when it was operational, it produced a maximum of 44 megawatts for six
months of the year. And many of the New Democracy projects experienced large cost overruns.
203International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1971, p. i.
204Fry 1974.
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Approximately 57 percent of public investment during the Third Plan (1967-1972) period paid
for costs of incomplete projects carried over from the Second Plan (1962-1967).205
The capacity of government institutions to manage emerging urban conflicts was also in-
adequate. Indeed, the earliest events of the New Democracy period were emblematic of this
dynamic. On October 25, 1965, the newly inaugurated government of Dr. Mohammad Yusuf
became embroiled in a serious crisis when Afghan Army soldiers fired on a student-led demon-
stration in front of the prime minister’s residence. This event would become known by sewwum
aqrab, the third day of the solar Hijri calendar month aqrab on which it occurred.206 The initially
peaceful demonstration was organized in opposition to the parliament’s decision to hold a closed
confirmation session for the first permanent cabinet of the New Democracy period. Encour-
aged by a small but vocal leftist parliamentary faction—including future Parcham leaders Babrak
Karmal and Dr. Nahid Anahita Ratebzad—a small core of highly politicized students descended
on the parliament building and refused appeals to leave. Over the course of the day, this initial
group of leftist student groups expanded to include 1,000 to 2,000 additional students and civil
servants that eventually relocated to the prime minister’s residence.207 After clashes broke out
and some of the protestors began throwing stones at the police, reportedly killing at least two
police officials, the army was mobilized primarily under the direction of chief of Central Forces
Abdul Wali. In the resulting confrontation, the soldiers opened fire on the demonstrators, killing
or injuring scores of students.208
The events of sewwum aqrab portended a more intense period of urban agitation over the
ends and means by which government institutions were to be used. Student protests and worker
strikes became increasingly common features of political life in Kabul and other urban centers in
Afghanistan. Over the course of 1968, for example, more than 30 worker or student strikes took
place across Afghanistan, including in the areas of Kabul, Baghlan, Parwan, Kandahar, Kunduz,
Paktia, and Shibirghan.209 While workers and university students represented an extremely small
205International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1969.
206For accounts of the sewwum aqrab crisis, see L. Dupree 1966; Reardon 1969.
207Dupree notes that the maximum number of participants in the sewwum aqrab demonstrations, 2,000 individuals,
represented a small proportion of Kabul’s 20,000 student population. See L. Dupree 1966, p. 6.
208The precise number of casualties on sewwum aqrab is unknown. Government figures indicate that three individ-




proportion of the population, their capacity to collectively disrupt the political status quo was
considerable. Describing patterns of student protest in the 1960s, Baqui Yousefzai observes that:
For a decade preceding the recent coup d’état (July 17, 1973) the serenity of Kabul
streets and bazaars was disturbed by the protesting youth of Kabul University. A
month did not go by without a demonstration of one kind or another initiated or
supported by students. Students have disrupted the normal flow of traffic, frightened
the shopkeepers about the safety of their merchandise, bewildered the man on the
street, puzzled the police, frightened the rich, antagonized the government, infuri-
ated the royal family, and tried the patience of the king. Their behavior became the
subject of great concern to everyone in Afghanistan.210
Urban protest was not restricted to leftist groups. Conservative mullahs and university students
in urban centers regularly engaged in public demonstrations, primarily in opposition to leftist po-
litical interests. A prominent example of rightist protest began in April 1970, when the Parcham
newspaper (published by the PDPA faction that would become known as “Parcham”) published
a poem written by its editor, Bareq Shafi, hailing Lenin with the invocation dorud, a eulogistic
salutation customarily reserved for the Prophet Mohammad. The poem sparked a month-long
organized protest that brought together several hundred conservative Kabuli mullahs and their
provincial counterparts at the Pul-e Kheshti mosque of central Kabul. Initially organized by
Kabuli ulama211 demanding that the government arrest Shafi and take other measures against the
leftist parties, the demonstration quickly took on additional demands: “banning of alcohol, com-
pulsory return of the chadari (veil), punishment of women wearing the miniskirt, abolition of
secular education, and total acceptance of religious instead of secular laws.”212 The protest quickly
expanded in size and included a larger proportion of provincial mullahs, bringing together the
urban and rural clergy: “[m]en of the cloth continued to gather at the mosque, and both in
the mosque and the streets, to attack the government bitterly. . .During this period, reports of
religiously-inspired disorders in the provinces were numerous, and the flow of mullahs and vil-
lagers from the provinces into the capital, a movement which had begun in late April, increased
210Yousefzai 1974, p. 167.
211Most notably, Sebghatullah Mojadiddi and other members of the Mojaddidi family. Mojadiddi made speeches
denouncing Parcham at the Pul-e Kheshti mosque and Parliament during the early days of the protest; he also actively
organized his extensive network of Kabuli mullahs. See NA / RG 59 / SN 70-73 / Pol 23-8 AFG. Also involved in
the protests were future mujahideen leaders Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi and Mohammad Yunus Khalis. See Rubin
2002, pp. 210, 212 214.
212H. Kakar 1978, p. 204; See also L. Dupree 1971.
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rapidly.”213 When the protests emboldened the more antagonistic mullahs to drop the name of
the king from the Friday khutba, the government ordered the army to physically remove the
mullahs (or any bystander resembling a mullah) from Kabul and did not permit them to reenter
the city for several days.214
The urban protests at Pul-e Kheshti mosque set off smaller disturbances in the provinces,
including in Jalalabad, where “a mullah-led mob sacked a number of collective buildings,” and
“in several other provincial centers, notably Laghman and Ghazni.” One of the very few instances
of genuinely rural collective action during the constitutional decade also stemmed, in part, from
the Pul-e Kheshti demonstrations. In May and June 1970, sections of the Shinwari tribe southeast
of Jalalabad initiated a relatively small revolt against the government over land reclaimed by the
Soviet-assisted Nangarhar Valley Authority. This protest was carried out in conjunction with
the prevailing anti-communist protests at the Pul-e Kheshti mosque. The uprising, however,
was quickly and decisively subdued by the military in a matter of days. The Shinwari incident
underscored just how ineffectual one-off rural uprisings had become. Rural rebellion, when it
did occur, was easily suppressed by the government.
Another strand of religious mobilization emerged out of the intensely ideological environ-
ment of Kabul University. At the Faculty of Shari’at, professors Ghulam Mohammad Niazi,
Borhanddin Rabbani, and Musa Tawana organized a political Islamic student group inspired by
the ideology of the of the international Muslim Brotherhood. This group became known as the
Organization of Muslim Youth (Sazman-e Jawanan-e Musulman). These faculty and university
students evolved from a Quranic reading group to a mobilized organization by 1965.215 By the
early 1970s, Muslim Youth members regularly clashed with both Sho’la-yi Jawed (a Maoist group
and Parcham. Conservative mullahs and university students also engaged in violent attacks on
women who chose not to observe purdah (female seclusion), including shootings and acid at-
tacks.216 These and other incidents of violence touched off separate demonstrations in April and
October of 1970 by relatively large numbers of urban female students and professionals, involving
as many as five thousand participants.
213See NA / RG 59 / SN 70-73 / Pol 23-8 AFG.
214H. Kakar 1978, p. 204.
215Edwards 2002, p. 203.
216L. Dupree [1973] 2002, p. 665; N. H. Dupree 1984, pp. 309-310; H. Kakar 1978, p. 203; N. H. Dupree 1984.
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3.2.4 The 1973 Coup and the End of Monarchy
On July 17, 1973, Daoud led a coup that abolished the constitutional monarchy. Carried out
with limited resistance,217 the coup substantially reorganized the structure and composition of
government in Afghanistan. One day after the coup, a Central Committee of the Republic of
Afghanistan assumed power, dissolved the constitutional monarchy, and declared Afghanistan
a republic. The Central Committee elected Daoud to multiple portfolios in the republican
government—the Presidency, Prime Ministry, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. By the end of July, Daoud had declared a state of emergency, abrogated the 1964 consti-
tution, and disbanded the parliament; no parliament was in existence between 1973 and 1977.
The republican government annulled and transferred the authority of the Supreme Court to a
Council of Justice chaired by the Minister of Justice.
Scores of senior government officials serving in the New Democracy governments were de-
moted, either placed in inferior positions or stripped of substantive responsibilities and told to
await instructions that would never arrive. In their place, a coalition of Daoud loyalists and
Parcham leaders took control over the government. Close associates of Daoud assumed control
over a series of important cabinet portfolios, including Sayyid Abdulellah as Minister of Finance,
Abdul Majid as Minister of Justice, and Wahid Abdullah as Deputy Foreign Minister. Senior
members of Parcham also assumed senior positions in the republican government. The military
officers who carried out the coup on behalf of Daoud were primarily Parcham partisans or sym-
pathizers,218 but also included a number of Khalq supporters.219 At least half of the republican
cabinet portfolios were held by Parcham supporters, although most of these portfolios were rel-
atively unimportant. Perhaps more significantly, the Parcham military officers who had a role in
the coup were promoted to sensitive positions in the security forces, while hundreds of Parcham
partisans were appointed to bureaucratic offices at the central ministries.220
217The standard portrayal of the 1973 coup was that it was unequivocally bloodless. However, in a meeting one
week after the coup, Daoud had informed US Ambassador Neumann that “in the brief fighting only three gendarmes
and four-five soldiers had been killed.” See NA / AF00090 / “Meeting with President Daoud, July 22” / July 23, 1973.
218These included Colonel Abdul Qader and Brigadier Pacha Gul Wafadar of the Air Force, and Faiz Mohammad,
Colonel Ghulam Sarwar Yuresh, and Abdul Hamid Mohtat of the Army. Nematullah Pazhwak, the Minister of
Interior under the New Democracy government of Musa Shafiq, was a Parchami sympathizer who had participated in
the coup.
219Several Khalqi Army officers, including Captain Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, Sher Jan Mazdooryar, and NCO
Sayyid Mohammad Gulabzoy, also participated in the coup.
220Saikal 2006, p. 175.
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Despite the upheaval at the highest levels of the government, the government bureaucracy
and army exhibited higher performance in the years following the coup. Army recruitment
picked up. Output in key agricultural exports grew rapidly, aided in large measure by a series
of good harvests and ample rainfall between 1972 and 1976. Revenue extraction improved by
approximately 18% between 1973 and 1977.221 Government agencies were able to instill greater
discipline in state owned enterprises (SOEs), increasing their operating efficiency.222 And system-
atic development planning became a key feature of Daoud’s cabinet. The government placed a
priority on key constraints to development, including prospective efforts to increase agricultural
productivity such as the training of semi-skilled agriculturalists and the development of minor-
scale irrigation and an initiative to educate skilled industrial and production managers. Notwith-
standing these institutional improvements, the Afghan government was increasingly unable to
regulate conflict within the new regime. One of the more dramatic episodes of intra-regime con-
flict occurred in its earliest months. After returning to Kabul from a trip abroad, former Prime
Minister Maiwandwal (1965-1967) was arrested on charges of plotting a counter-coup against the
republican government. Along with Maiwandwal, the former Minister of Defense General Khan
Mohammad and more than 40 other military officers and former government officials were de-
tained in connection with the counter-coup charges. Maiwandwal and many of the other accused
mysteriously died while in prison. It is not known with certainty whether the charges were true
or what happened to Maiwandwal and the other detained officials in prison. However, most ana-
lysts believe that Parcham or Soviet operatives framed and assassinated Maiwandwal and the other
detainees because of their generally anti-communist views.223 Another high-profile assassination
occurred several years later. In November 1977, Minister of Planning Ali Ahmad Khorram, a
close confidante of Daoud, was assassinated outside of his office by a figure, Muhammad Marjan,
of unknown affiliation but widely believed to be a PDPA member. Most accounts attribute the
assassination to Daoud’s foreign policy shift away from the Soviet orbit toward the West. As
planning minister, Khorram intended to implement this policy by shifting the balance of foreign
221See Kavalsky et al. 1977, pp. 30-31.
222Ibid.
223Most of the detained figures and especially Maiwandwal enjoyed close personal relationships with Daoud and
Naim. Early in his career, Maiwandwal was considered to be a protégé of Naim, who he worked with closely while
the latter was the Ambassador to the United States. Saikal 2006; The individuals most frequently implicated in the
torture and killing of Maiwandwal were police official Abdul Samad Azhar and Minister of Interior Faiz Mohammad,
both Parcham members and, according to Mitrokhin, Soviet agents. Mitrokhin 2002, pp. 23,148; M. H. Kakar 1997.
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assistance from the USSR to the US and allied donor countries. His assassination was reputedly
carried out at the behest of the Soviet Union.224
Both the Khorram and Maiwandwal killings suggested a struggle within the new government
for influence over domestic and foreign policy. Naim indirectly referenced this possibility in a
meeting with US Ambassador Theodore Eliot, as reported by Ambassador Eliot in a cable to
Washington. Naim remarked that:
‘There are however, people, young people in particular, in Afghanistan who are im-
bued with leftist ideas and who in order to promote themselves attempt to stir up
difficulties between Afghanistan and the US.’ (Comment: This was one of the clear-
est admissions I have had that Daoud and Naim have not yet brought the young
firebrands in their regime fully under control.) He [Naim] said that these people do
this even though the Soviets have made clear to the GOA that they want harmony
and stability in this region. Naim said that he hoped I would take the problem of
these people into consideration in judging the actions of the GOA.225
In private, Daoud indicated he did not intend for Parcham to be a full partner in governing major
internal and external matters. In a meeting with US Ambassador Neumann shortly after the 1973
coup, Daoud described himself as a “nationalist” and disavowed communism as an international-
ist ideology.226 The new republic actively sought the assistance of both the Soviet Union and the
United States to “help us [Afghanistan] yes; but never to accept dictation.”227 Internally, Daoud
ultimately sought to construct an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian political system. As stated
to Ambassador Neumann, Daoud expected the establishment of a one-party state and, eventually,
a parliament “perhaps under two-party system which he [Daoud] added must be controlled.”228
It soon became clear that Daoud had (temporarily) come out on top of the power struggle
emerging within the republican regime. By 1975, Daoud had begun to purge scores of middle-
level Parchamis from the security forces, particularly the Ministry of Interior, and the civilian
agencies, while demoting others or shifting them to provincial posts. Several Parchami cabinet
officials were reappointed to less important portfolios and sub-cabinet roles. Senior Parcham-
affiliated military officers were handled more carefully. Daoud quietly and incrementally fired
224Adamec 1997, p. 255; M. H. Kakar 1997.
225FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume E-8, Documents on South Asia, eds. Paul J. Hibbeln and Peter A. Kraemer (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 11. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1969-76ve08/d11 [accessed November 8, 2014]]
226NA / AF00090 / “Meeting with President Daoud, July 22” / July 23, 1973.
227NA / AF00090 / “Meeting with President Daoud, July 22” / July 23, 1973.
228NA / AF00090 / “Meeting with President Daoud, July 22” / July 23, 1973.
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or demoted these officers for missteps, while transferring others to embassies abroad. A small
core of Parcham-affiliated officers remained, including Watanjar, Gulabzoy, and Mazdooryar—
incidentally, all of these officers would participate in the April 1978 coup that brought down
the republican regime. In the international arena, Daoud redirected Kabul’s foreign relations
away from the Soviet Union and toward the United States and allied countries as well as regional
powers. Daoud’s government pursued a policy of engagement with Islamabad, particularly after
Pakistan hosted and trained many of the early members of the Organization of Islamic Youth,
who unsuccessfully sought to overthrow the republican government in a 1975 rebellion across
multiple provinces. Daoud also increased the number of military officers sent abroad for ad-
vanced training to India, Egypt, and the United States, and negotiated a new training program
for air force officers with Turkey.229 In the diplomatic arena, Kabul turned to Western-allied
countries for development assistance. In October 1974, Kabul and Tehran reached an agree-
ment under which Iranian assistance would finance industrial and transportation projects valued
at $2 billion, mainly to build a railroad linking the northeastern Iranian city of Mashhad and
the seaport of Bandar Abbas with Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, and Herat.230 Daoud concluded
a $500 million assistance package with Saudi Arabia for hydroelectric development, as well as
other aid agreements with China, Kuwait, OPEC, and the Islamic Bank for Development.231
By 1976, Daoud and his close aides were quietly requesting assistance from the United States on
intelligence matters. Daoud was concerned about threats of internal and external subversion,
and asked US Secretary of State Kissinger for help in identifying these threats before they mate-
rialized. Kissinger responded affirmatively, agreeing to provide “what we know about possible
military positions on your borders and what we know about any possible internal threats to your
security.”232
However, Daoud’s efforts to steer the Afghan government out of the Soviet orbit were too
late. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, the Parcham and Khalq factions of the People’s
229Cordovez and Harrison 1995, p. 21.
230The Shah of Iran later walked back the size of the Iranian pledge. The ultimate contours of the aid agreement
would never be seen because the Daoud government would be overthrown before a final agreement could be con-
cluded. Bradsher 1985, p. 62; Rubin 2002, pp. 74-75.
231Cordovez and Harrison 1995, p. 21; Bradsher 1985, p. 62.
232FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume E-8, Documents on South Asia, eds. Paul J. Hibbeln and Peter A. Kraemer (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 27. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1969-76ve08/d27 [accessed November 8, 2014]]
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Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) would carry out a coup in April 1978, bringing down
the Naderi dynasty and Mohammadzai rule. While the success of the PDPA coup in April 1978
was not guaranteed, it had become much more plausible than in previous years. Government
institutions had undergone significant gains in capabilities and territorial reach over the prior
decades: an army that had established a monopoly of force across the territory, and civilian
agencies that had achieved selective successes in organizing large-scale development interventions.
But these institutions were also unable to contain an unintended but threatening development in
Kabul and other Afghan cities—the mobilization and advance of radical movements within the
educated classes. They were also unable to effectively grow and tax the agricultural economy.
Institutions of government had grown increasingly politicized, and they were now unable to
contain or resolve conflict emerging within them, giving way to the April 1978 coup.
3.3 Organizational Capital and Aid in the Naderi Monarchy
How does one make sense of the rise and subsequent decline of Naderi-era government institu-
tions? The argument proposed here emphasizes two causes of initial institutional development.
First, the cohesion of the monarchical network in the early Naderi period served to enhance the
capabilities and reach of government institutions by organizing the government around trusted
family and personal relations while also incorporating capable figures into senior administrative
positions without threatening familial cohesion. Second, foreign aid during this time enhanced
government institutions because it was not motivated by high-stakes geopolitical competition.
This section also explains the subsequent destabilization of government institutions in terms
of organizational capital and foreign aid. Beginning in the 1950s, significant elite divisions devel-
oped over the composition and objectives of government institutions, resulting in greater levels
of urban conflict and institutional dysfunction in development planning. At the same time,
geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union gave way to growing
politicization of the army and bureaucracy, and the emergence of political considerations in allo-
cating and programming assistance, causing a decline in aid effectiveness. In short, the mixed sys-
tem of patrimonial and meritocratic rule that characterized mid-century Afghanistan was poorly
equipped to contain conflict within the middle and upper classes, and to absorb geopolitical com-
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petition between the United States and Soviet Union.
3.3.1 The Rise and Fall of Organizational Capital
The early years of the Naderi regime presented a distinct political challenge for the Yahyakhel
family. Nader Khan and his brothers were confronted with a small but divided group of elite con-
stituencies. Partisans of Amir Amanullah Khan saw Nader Khan and his brothers as usurpers of
the throne who had risen to power by cooperating with the British and appeasing conservative el-
ements of Afghan society, including the ulama and eastern Pashtun tribal groups that had helped
them to seize Kabul. And the conservative constituencies sought to reap the rewards of their
support for Nader Khan: a rollback of Amanullah’s social reforms and his efforts to rationalize
and strengthen government in Afghanistan.
Supporters of Amanullah were among the more educated figures in Kabul and could be found
in the ranks of the bureaucracy and elite schools. Much of the early opposition to Nader Khan
revolved around the Charkhi household, a prominent family from Charkh in the province of
Logar.233 The Charkhi brothers Ghulam Nabi and Ghulam Jilani were ardent supporters of
Amanullah Khan,234 and were targeted soon after returning to Afghanistan from diplomatic
posts abroad. Nader Khan executed both of them for unspecified subversive activities and im-
prisoned their families,235 inflaming the opposition of the Amanullah partisans. In June 1933,
Sayyid Kemal, an Amanullah supporter and graduate of the Nejat secondary school, assassinated
Mohammad Aziz, the Ambassador to Germany and one of Nadir Khan’s brothers (and father of
Daoud), in Nazi Berlin. Although Kemal did not have any known links to the Charkhi family, he
claimed that the act was a “protest against the predominance of British influence in Afghanistan
and against the betrayal of the frontier tribes by the Afghan government.”236 Not long after, in
September 1933, another Nejat student Mohammad Azim attempted to assassinate the British
Ambassador in Kabul. And most notably, in November 1933, the son of a Charkhi family ser-
233Earlier generations of the Charkhi family had served in the governments of Abdul Rahman Khan and Habibullah
Khan.
234Ghulam Nabi had been Ambassador to Turkey at the time of Amanullah’s abdication, and Ghulam Jilani was the
Ambassador to the USSR at that time. In the weeks leading up to Amanullah’s resignation, Nabi led a force of Afghan
cadets who had been studying in Turkey into northern Afghanistan in support of the Amani government. Nabi’s
force eventually occupied Mazar-e Sharif, but gave up the effort after learning of Amanullah’s abdication. Adamec
1975, pp. 147-148,149-150.
235“Charkhi” 2010, For a first-hand account of the imprisonment from a member of the Charkhi family, see.
236Gregorian 1969, p. 339.
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vant and another Nejat student, Abdul Khaleq, assassinated Nader Khan himself at a graduation
ceremony for the Kabul secondary schools in the garden of the royal palace.
The royal family addressed these and other pressures, in part, through plain coercion. They
arrested or executed members of the Khaleq families, for example, as well as the principal of the
Nejat secondary school, a pro-Amanullah mainstay. Later, other critical intellectuals (including,
most notably Ghobar and Khalili) were jailed or sent into internal exile for many years. Nonethe-
less, despite their impact on intellectual currents in Afghanistan, the early educated opposition
represented a relatively small section of urban society at this point in time. For other members of
political elite, the Yahyakhel family employed personal relationships to incorporate political sup-
port or skills. In more technically-oriented ministries and at the level of the deputy minister or
below, the Yahyakhel family appointed Amanullah relatives and supporters with whom it shared
close relations. Ali Mohammad, a relative by marriage with Amanullah’s family and Minister of
Commerce during his reign, became the Deputy Prime Minister and later the Minister of Foreign
Affairs. Ghulam Yahya Tarzi, a nephew of Mahmud Tarzi who had served in the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs under Amanullah, became a senior official in the foreign office and, later, Minister of
Public Health. The Naderi government also included figures close to the religious establishment.
The Ministry of Justice became a domain of the Mojaddidi family. Ghulam Faruq Osman, a
brother-in-law of the Mojaddidi family and husband of Daoud’s sister, became a Deputy Minister
of Interior (later Minister of Interior) and governor of several border provinces. By way of his
extensive family connections to the royal and Mojadidi families, Osman had developed ties with
several provincial leaders in Afghanistan.237
The new government sought to secure control over the capital before establishing direct con-
trol over the major regional centers of political and economic power—Herat, Mazar, Jalalabad,
and Kandahar. In order to consolidate political and military control over Kabul, Nader Khan
drew on the participation of a dense network of individuals with familial and service ties to the
Yahyakhel family and other Mohammadzai clans. Most critical to the consolidation of power
during the early Naderi rule was the core familial network of brothers and first cousins, who
typically occupied state security offices and diplomatic posts. Mohammad Hashem, Nader’s
237Interestingly, one of Osman’s sons (by way of a Hazara woman from Mazar-e Sharif, the writer and intellectual
Akram Osman, became a prominent critic of monarchical government in later years.
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half-brother, became Prime Minister (as well as, for a brief period, Interior Minister), while his
youngest full brother, Shah Mahmud, was in charge of the Ministry of Defense. Faiz Mohammad
Zikria, a member of the Naderi familial core, headed up the Foreign Ministry, while two addi-
tional brothers, Shah Wali and Aziz, were posted abroad as envoys to Afghanistan’s key European
donors, the United Kingdom and Germany, respectively. Patrimonial relations extended to the
next generation of the royal family, which was groomed for higher political appointments in sub-
sequent years. Zahir Shah, Nader’s son and the crown prince (wali’ahd), was appointed Deputy
Minister of Defense in 1933, while Mohammad Daoud, the King’s nephew, became the com-
manding general of the Nangarhar qul-e-urdu, or garrison. Mohammad Naim, another nephew
and brother to Daoud, was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs under Faiz Mohammad
Zikria. Other close relatives with prior diplomatic experience in the Amanullah administration,
including Sultan Ahmad Sherzoy and Ahmad Ali Sulaiman, took up positions in the foreign
ministry.
Trusted contacts helped the new regime establish control over the provinces. One of these
aides, Mohammad Ghaus, served under the brothers Hashem Khan, Shah Wali Khan, and Shah
Mahmud Khan as a member of the royal bodyguard during the tenure of Amir Habibullah,
and later served under Nader Khan during the Khost rebellion of 1925. The Yahyakhel family
relied on their personal history with Ghaus and his military skills in defeating the Kohdaman
revolt of July and August 1930 and the military operations to expel Ibrahim Beg from northern
Afghanistan. The second generation of the Yahyakhel family later employed Ghaus’ son, Rasul
Jan, in another important security position. Under the Daoud prime ministry, Rasul Jan would
be appointed the chief of Riasat-e Zabt-e Ahwalat.
Candidates for positions in the key security ministries were vetted by the Department of the
Record of Information (Riasat-e Zabt-e-Ahwalat), the domestic intelligence agency (established by
Amir Abdal Rahman Khan) and a critically important instrument of regime durability. Con-
trolled directly by the Office of the Prime Minister, the intelligence service was charged with
countering internal threats against state authority, particularly those originating from political
elites or interests affiliated with neighboring powers. An important aspect of this mission was re-
viewing the personal and familial records of low- and middle-level candidates for security institu-
tions (upper-level candidates were typically members of the core royal family). These background
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investigations centered on the perceived loyalty, integrity, and reputation of the candidate’s fam-
ily, especially the patrilineal line of descent. In the context of the small pool of candidates from
which the government recruited, this line of inquiry could convey an extraordinary level of in-
formation about the reliability of a relatively unknown candidate, even if the recruitment pool
was biased toward prominent families.
In less politically sensitive middle-level positions, the Yahyakhel family enlisted educated but
inexperienced kin descending from the set of elite lineages that maintained ties with the royal
family, as well as Kabul-born professionals and bureaucrats. These officials could be found in var-
ious departments in the central ministries, particularly in the diplomatic, economic, and technical
areas, where they developed the experience and relationships necessary to attain higher positions
in the government. In revenue raising and commercial matters, the Yahyakhel family relied on
ties to prominent merchant families and relatives who could act as brokers between the govern-
ment and economic elites. One of these brokers was Mirza Mohammad Yaftali, a Badakhshani
and brother-in-law of Amir Abdal Rahman, Amir Habibullah, and close Yahyakhel family confi-
dante Ali Mohammad. Yaftali had a long professional record of establishing trade links between
Afghanistan and markets in Russia, Europe, and the United States on behalf of the Afghan gov-
ernment. On the basis of his close ties to the Yahyakhel family and experience in commercial
matters, Yaftali was appointed Minister of Trade in 1930, followed by concurrent appointments
as Minister of Finance in 1933 and Minister of Commerce in 1936. In 1932, Yaftali oversaw the
construction of the first northern road through Darra-e Shikari, linking Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif,
and was one of the leading figures, along with Zabuli and Londoni, behind the formation of the
predecessor company to the Bank-e Melli, the Afghan Joint Stock Company. With the assistance
of Yaftali and other economic brokers, Nader Khan and his brothers established a council com-
prised of wealthy merchant families, known as the National Council for Assisting Reconstruction
(majles-e emdadiya-ye melli),238 to reconstruct the damage to the capital city infrastructure caused
by the 1929 civil war. These families also made contributions to the reorganization of the Afghan
Army.239 By the 1930s, members of the royal clan were among the primary private shareholders
in Bank-e Melli. The investments in the Bank-e Melli portfolio brought the political elite into close
238Islah, November 11, 1929.
239Gregorian 1969, p. 297.
104
contact with Zabuli, Londoni, and the Herati and Kabuli merchant families that had invested in
the early operations of the Afghan Joint Stock Company.240
The relationships at the core of the early Naderi governments began to expand during the
middle 20th century to include younger, educated cohorts. In general, these graduates were
recruited on the basis of merit.241 The establishment of the Kabul University faculties in the
early 20th century and the elite high schools of Kabul had, by the 1940s and 1950s, generated an
educated cohort with training in specialized fields of study.242 The vast majority of this cohort—
many of whom were members of elite Mohammadzai families—entered government service, sig-
nificantly increasing the capabilities of public institutions.243 Graduates of the well-reputed Fac-
ulty of Medicine at Kabul University (established in 1932 with the support of Turkish, and later,
French medical professors) entered the Ministry of Public Health or staff one of the state-owned
hospital facilities in Kabul and other urban centers; alumni of the Faculty of Law and Political
Science (created in 1938) were usually found at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Fi-
nance, or Ministry of National Economy; degree holders of the Faculty of Engineering (founded
in 1956 with USAID assistance) usually joined the the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry
of Communications, the Ministry of Mines and Industries. University graduates with degrees in
economics or engineering often took up jobs at one of the public-private banks244 or industrial
monopolies. The most talented high school graduates were sent abroad to receive higher educa-
tion. First established by Amanullah, this program was reinstated during the Naderi period, first
as a private initative sponsored by Abdul Majid Zabuli and later as a government program. The
four or five high school graduates with the highest average marks would be sent to European and
American universities to gain knowledge in fields that could be useful to the government. The
240Ghobar 1967; L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995.
241It should be noted that meritocratic norms were not a new phenomenon in Afghan cities and towns. While
professional occupations were often transferred inter-generationally within families, the practice of apprenticeship and
the presence of competitors contributed to the importance of merit in urban labor markets. Afghan political rulers had
long relied on professional treasurers (mustaufi), administrative secretaries (munshi), market inspectors (muhtaseb), and
judges (qazi) to fulfill the everyday functions of city and town government. In Afghan society, specialized professions
were also well established. In urban and peri-urban areas, young men trained to become artisans (carpenters, potters,
later iron-workers), musicians, and merchants (bazaaris) through apprenticeships and specialized education, even if
such opportunities were largely made available through familial networks. In rural areas, specialization was for the
most part limited to the ulama
242The elite high schools include Habibia College (founded in 1903), Lycée Istiqlal and Najat School (1923), and
Lycée Ghazi (1926).
243Roy 1988.
244Notably Bank-e Milli that effectively served as a de facto central bank until the establishment of the publicly
owned Da Afghanistan Bank in 1938.
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award of these scholarships was, in general, merit-based, and therefore the majority of scholar-
ship winners were individuals of commoner backgrounds, including Tajik and Hazara Kabulis.245
Poullada describes the impact of this program: “One of Majid’s most successful undertakings was
the program he instituted of sending bright, promising young men abroad to study, principally to
Germany, on scholarships. An influential group of Afghans received training in management, fi-
nance, and banking, as well as technical skills through this program. Eventually, the government
felt compelled to initiate a foreign scholarship program of its own. Most of Afghanistan’s modern
intellectuals are the product of these programs.”246 By the 1950s and 1960s, this new generation
of civil servants had entered the social, economic, diplomatic agencies of the monarchical state.
The Afghan government, in the words of one analyst, had become a “moderate meritocracy” that
recruited and promoted individuals on the basis of merit, but still took into account their loyalty
to the monarchy and, later, the republican regime.247
In the early Naderi period, trusted relatives often headed technical government agencies for
which they did not have specialized education and experience.248 This began to change by the
1940s, when the first cohorts of graduates from Kabul University and graduate programs abroad
began to enter the government. By the 1950s, Dr. Abdul Majid (a Ph.D. in bacteriology from the
University of California at Berkeley, who had been Rector of Kabul University) was leading the
Ministry of Health and, later, Education.249 Ahmad Ali Popal, who held a Ph.D. in psychology
from a German university, entered the government as the Director of Teachers Training College
in the 1940s, eventually leading the education ministry in the 1957. Akbar Reza, the Minister of
Agriculture in 1963, was an MIT-educated civil engineer with who had authored the first inven-
tory of water resources in Afghanistan. Hussain Messa, a petroleum engineer with an education
from the University of Houston, ran the Ministry of Public Works in 1967. Dr. Mohammad
245Interviews with various scholarship winners. For examples, see Ansary 2012, p. 139; Anwar 2004.
246L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995, p. 166.
247Giustozzi defines moderate meritocracy as a “system where appointments and promotions are done by taking
merit and capability into account, but in combination with other considerations, such as political loyalty. Typically
in moderate meritocracies the promotion or appointment system is open to political interference, but the latter is
constrained (for example by oversight of some kind) or self-constrained (for example by the awareness of the political
authority that too much is at stake for incompetent people to be staffing key.” Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2011.
248For example, Yahya Tarzi and Ahmad Ali Sulaiman. While both figures were experienced diplomats with general
educations from Kabul’s lycées, they did not have a background in education (Sulaiman became Minister of Education
in 1933) or in public health (Tarzi was appointed Minister of Public Health in 1934).
249World Bank, Records of the Office of the President, Records of President Robert S. McNamara, Travel Briefings:
Afghanistan, WB IBRD/IDA 03 EXC-10-4540S.
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Anas, an educated bureaucrat from a Mohammadzai family and a longtime education official and
Rector of Kabul University, was appointed Minister of Education in 1964.
Meritocratic practices could also be seen in the admission procedures for higher education
during this time. Until 1966, Kabul University operated on an open enrollment basis, in which
formal qualifications for admission were not required.250 In that year, the university instituted the
concours general entrance examination (or kankor in Farsi transliteration). The introduction of
standardized examination became an important component of university admission, and there-
fore had a significant effect on the composition and quality of the university student body. In
1966, when the first set of kankor exams were administered, both the son of Dr. Abdul Zahir,
then President of the Wolesi Jirgah, and the daughter of General Khan Mohammad Khan, the
Minister of Defense, failed the entrance examinations and were automatically denied admission
to Kabul University. Dr. Zahir inquired whether future opportunities for university entrance
were available, while the Minister of Defense “applied pressure” on the university, but both deci-
sions remained unchanged.251 By May 1968, at the height of leftist agitation, two thousand high
school students went on strike because they had failed the Kabul University entrance examina-
tions.252 The decisions were apparently not reversed, suggesting both state adherence to the use
of standardized examination along with the significance of university admission for urban youth.
Increasing meritocracy could be seen in studies of government bureaucrats selected to study
abroad. Drawing on application files from the United States Overseas Mission (USOM), Univer-
sity of California Berkeley sociologist Wolfram Eberhard documented the educational and social
backgrounds of 442 Afghan civil servants selected by the USOM to receive graduate training in
the US between 1952 and 1960.253 The resulting sample provided evidence of (1) the overrepre-
sentation of Kabul-born individuals in government recruitment and (2) upward mobility within
the government. Specifically, the results showed that almost 70% of the elite sample were born in
Kabul. Furthermore, a large proportion of the individuals in Eberhard’s elite sample came from
modest backgrounds. Of 230 students (a subsection of the sample for which such data was avail-
able), approximately 30%, 24%, and 18% were the sons of lower or medium government officials,
250See L. Dupree 1966; Williams 1981.
251L. Dupree 1966.
252L. Dupree [1973] 2002, p. 620.
253Eberhard 1962.
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farmers, and individuals involved in business, respectively. Only 12% of students in this sample
were the children of high government officials, who could be assumed to have close ties to the
royal clan. In the sample, almost half of the scholarship recipients (45%) had received their high-
est degree at a vocational school—a marker of an urban middle-class background. Hans-Henning
Sawitzki finds a similar pattern of merit orientation in a survey of students at Kabul University,
the majority of whom pursued careers in the government or in government-sponsored com-
merce. He finds that over half of the sample deemed “objective performance” to be a positive
professional characteristic, while a quarter of the surveyed students considered it to be a nega-
tive criterion.254 Conversely, “traditional values” were seen as a positive quality by 6.5% of the
sample, while a quarter of respondents characterized it as negative characteristic.
The increasing prevalence of merit can also be seen at the highest levels of the government.
Figure 3.8 shows an annual time series of the aggregate number of ties between government
leaders (ministers and deputy ministers) that were patrimonial and non-patrimonial, where a pat-
rimonial tie is defined as the presence of a kinship or marriage tie between two individuals. With
few exceptions, leaders with patrimonial ties to one another are directly or indirectly connected
to the leading Mohammadzai families that descended from Sardar Painda Khan (father of Amir
Dost Mohammad Khan). These families are shown in Table 3.2.
The resulting time series shows that the early monarchical period had a slightly higher num-
ber of patrimonial ties than non-patrimonial ties, where patrimonial relationships were con-
centrated in the most important government portfolios: head of government, foreign affairs,
defense, and interior. During the 1930 and 1940s, both patrimonial and non-patrimonial ties
increase modestly as commoners are gradually incorporated into the senior leadership. But the
growth rate in non-patrimonial relationships picks up in the mid-1950s, when the first cohort
of graduates from the Kabul high schools, university faculties, and foreign universities comes
of age. Interestingly, there is a sharp increase in Mohammadzai ties during the latter years of
the Daoud prime ministry—primarily attributable to the elevation of close Daoud associates of
Mohammadzai descent to the cabinet, including Sayyid Abdullah, Abdullah Malikyar, and Ghu-
lam Mohammad Sherzad, as well as Daoud’s assumption of multiple cabinet portfolios as head
of government. But non-patrimonial ties, and in particular ties between figures who had risen
254Sawitzki 1972.
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Sultan Mohammad “Telai” Yahya Khel
Sultan Mohammad “Telai” Yunusi
Sultan Mohammad “Telai” Zikria
Sultan Mohammad “Telai” Etemadi
Amir Mohammad Rafiq
Amir Dost Mohammad Ziai
Amir Dost Mohammad Seraj-Enayat
Amir Dost Mohammad Naser-Zia
Rahm Dil Tarzi
Note: Royal family in bold.
in government based on educational achievement, previous experience, and raw ability began to
increase rapidly during the New Democracy period and into the republican government. While
certain years show sharp changes in the number of patrimonial and non-patrimonial ties, a lo-
cal regression line shows a long run trend toward non-patrimonial relationships in government,
particularly after 1950. Nevertheless, members of the royal family ultimately remained in charge
of the direction of the country even after the middle 1950s. This disjunction between increasing
meritocracy in government and monarchical rule, as discussed in greater detail below, provided
the conditions for institutional dysfunction in subsequent years.
By the mid-1950s, a relatively small but diverse class of educated figures in Kabul and other
cities also began to politically organize. Like much of the educated class, these figures were a
product of government-sponsored institutions and consequently possessed direct or indirect ties
to elite circles—through professional contacts, schooling networks, the parliament, and kin or
friendship ties to prominent political families. At the same time, the educated class developed dif-
fering preferences about the role of government in society and the means of realizing them. Most,
but not all, members of the intelligentsia held in common a preference for a transition toward
a more broadly participatory political system.255 One section of the educated class supported
255One notable exception was the National Democratic Party (Hezb-e Demokrat-e Melli), sometimes known as the
National Club (Klup-e Melli), which was established by Daoud and Zabuli to mobilize support for the Naderi regime.
While this group did not succeed in building up substantial popular support, critics of the monarchy argue that it was
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Figure 3.8. Patrimonial and Non-Patrimonial Ties, 1929–1978

















Source: Adamec 1975, 2008; interviews with former monarchical government officials; author’s calculations.
Note: Smoothed lines plotted using a LOWESS function with a smoother span of 0.5.
a “quiet revolution” that emphasized a smooth transition to a multi-party democracy that em-
phasized Islamic values and retained a symbolic role for the monarchy.256 Established by Prime
Minister Hashem Maiwandwal as Progressive Democracy (Demokrat-e Mutaraqi), this group drew
on political elites that had occupied the highest echelons of monarchical government.257
Other platforms emphasized a somewhat more rapid and significant break from monarchical
rule. One of these platforms was articulated by the social democratic Hezb-e Watan (Fatherland
Party),258 which included figures as diverse as Mir Mohammad Siddiq Farhang, Abdul Hai Aziz,
and Faruq Etemadi and was led by the historian and activist Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar.259
effective in dividing the educated class of Kabul.
256Saikal 2006, p. 158.
257Partly for this reason, it was criticized by more left-leaning intellectuals as a “government” party. Magnus 1969,
p. 62.
258Not to be confused with the Hezb-e Watan party name adopted in place of the PDPA by Dr. Najibullah in 1990.
259Farhang was an official of the Bank-e Milli and Ministry of Mines and Industries who was indirectly related to
the royal Enayat-Seraj family. Aziz was a member of a prominent Mohammadzai family and married to another
Mohammadzai. Became Minister of Planning in 1963. Etemadi was a member of the Mohammadzai clan and married
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Another was Hezb-e Khalq (People’s Party),260 a somewhat more left-leaning party that was led
by Abdul Rahman Mahmudi and included Abdul Hamid Mobarez and Abdul Ahad Rashidi as
members.261 Other members of the educated class took a more radical path despite emerging
out of elite schools and organizations. Babrak Karmal and Hasan Sharq, both future leaders
of the Parcham faction of the PDPA, were students of law and medicine at Kabul University,
respectively. During their university years, they participated in the leftist agitation emerging out
of the KSU. Nur Taraki, the future Khalq leader, and Abdul Rauf Benawa, an independent who
would later cooperate with the PDPA, were founders of the Wekh Zalmayan.
Increasing differences in the political programs of the intelligentsia and educated were com-
pounded by demands from rural interests within the parliament. The legislature was tradition-
ally a body without any real power. Of the thirteen parliaments that existed between 1931 and
1973, the “first 11. . .were simply appointive and rubber-stamp, with the exception of the so-
called ‘Liberal 7th.”’262 The period of New Democracy, however, provided both greater formal
and informal power to parliamentary members in the authorization legislation and cabinet po-
sitions.263 This development was important because it accentuated the institutional dysfunction
of the New Democracy period. The 1964 Constitution had called for the legalization of po-
litical parties and the establishment legislative bodies at the provincial and municipal levels in
during Dr. Yusuf’s interim administration (1963-1965), but legislation was not drafted until sev-
eral years later. When a law establishing political parties was passed by both houses of parliament
in 1970, King Zaher Shah declined to sign it (along with laws establishing provincial councils and
municipal councils). As a consequence, members of parliament were elected on the basis of their
personal characteristics—they did not (and could not) possess a party or organizational affiliation.
A World Bank report noted that:
to a well-known champion of women’s rights, Saleha. Ghobar was an ardent opponent of the Naderi dynasty, but was
nonetheless a well established member of Kabuli society. He had served in a number of administrative and diplomatic
posts throughout his early career and was elected to parliament as an activist member in 1950. Within two years, he
had run afoul of the government and spent the remainder of his life under house arrest or in internal exile.
260Not to be confused with the Khalq splinter group that emerged from the PDPA, founded in 1965.
261Mahmudi belonged to a Kabuli family that had been exiled by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan and invited back to
the capital city by Amir Habibullah. Mahmudi attended Habibia high school and enrolled in Kabul University as one
of the first students of the medical faculty. Mobarez was a member of the Kandahari branch of the extended royal
family and a future provincial governor and Ministry of Information and Culture official during the monarchical and
post-2001 periods. Rashidi was a director in the Ministry of Planning.
262L. Dupree 1974, p. 8.
263Weinbaum 1977.
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Cooperation between the legislative and executive branches of the government is still
partial, and the King retains de facto a great deal of power. The failure to permit the
organization of political parties has meant that the legislature has functioned without
a genuine national focus. Representatives have tended to react to proposals in terms
of the narrowest interests of their districts and their personal followers.264
In the words of one contemporary Afghan analyst, the absence of political parties meant that
“[d]uring elections, campaigns centered around personalities rather than political party plat-
forms.”265 As a body without any formal political ties to the executive, the parliament spent
much of its time debating and ultimately obstructing legislation unless they served the parochial
interests of most of its members.
While the moderate urban intelligentsia—including Demokrat-e Mutaraqi, Hezb-e Watan, and
even Hezb-e Khalq—exhibited differences in leadership and specific political agendas, it held in
common an orientation toward political reform, in which parties could mobilize and organize
interests in multiparty elections, and the enhancement of merit and accountability in govern-
ment institutions. Many of the leading government and opposition figures of the New Democ-
racy saw a gradual assumption of power by elected non-royal figures (and the withdrawal of the
royal family from political life) as a natural progression from the mixed system of patrimony and
meritocracy that characterized the political system at that time. Despite these commonalities,
however, elite cooperation rapidly declined during and after the New Democracy period. Under
the 1964 constitution, the king possessed the authority to appoint a prime minister as head of
government, and the prime minister had the power to form a cabinet. The cabinet, in turn, was
expected to work with the parliament and the King to pass legislation that it would ultimately
implement. While this arrangement placed greater power in the hands of educated common-
ers (who dominated the cabinet) than ever before, it systematically disabled the successive New
Democracy governments from making both small and large decisions. In effect, the government
faced vetoes from both the King and the parliament. A 1971 World Bank describes the gridlock
of the New Democracy period in greater detail:
The main product of the parliament was endless speeches and almost no decisions.
The King could have intervened legally but seemed reluctant to do so. Even such a
264International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1971, p. 2.
265Zekrya 1976, p. 37.
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relatively non-controversial issue as the bill to establish an Industrial Development
Bank took five years of procrastination and debate before it was approved. In 1969/70
for example, the only bill passed by the parliament was the acceptance of an interest
free loan.266
In this context of “vetocracy,”267 elite cooperation was almost impossible. Despite the common
objectives, substantial capabilities, and largely moderate orientation of the leading figures of the
educated classes, the New Democracy governments were unable to address key challenges, includ-
ing an ongoing drought, political agitation from the radical left and right, and the detrimental
impact of rigid bureaucratic salaries on promoting talent. Describing the efforts of the New
Democracy elites to meet these immediate challenges, contemporary observer Patrick Reardon
notes: “[T]he coalition of democratic forces under Kayeum and Yousuf was caught in a cross-
fire between the monarchy and the leftists led by Babrak. With the balance of power favoring
it, the monarchy was able to take the initiative in maneuvering designed to reassert its absolute
control.”268
The 1973 coup did not change this long-term problem of decreasing elite cooperation. Daoud’s
republican government dissolved the parliament and gradually established a coherent domestic
and foreign policy agenda, removing many of the day-to-day obstacles to policy formulation and
implementation that afflicted the New Democracy governments. Daoud sought to sideline much
of the political elite and build his own base of popular support in a single party system.269 This
strategy allowed the government to prioritize and implement key development objectives, no-
tably the improvement in the performance of state owned enterprises, agricultural productivity,
and revenue mobilization.
But the coup did not address the critical issue of absent institutional mechanisms for effi-
ciently rationalizing and regulating differences among political elites, particularly those of mod-
erate orientation—it was clearly not meant to cohere differences within the political elite. More-
over, instead of appointing more experienced, competent figures in key cabinet positions, Daoud
tended to place loyalists of questionable ability in positions of power. According to then Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs Samad Ghaus, “[t]here was considerable pressure on Daoud from
266Kavalsky et al. 1977, p. 22.
267Fukuyama 2014, pp. 488-505.
268Reardon 1969, p. 178.
269Daoud’s Party of National Revolution (Hezb-e Enqelab-e Melli), the only legal party in Afghanistan under the
republican government, was established in July 1977 and was underdeveloped at the time of the April 1978 coup.
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various quarters to drop [Minister of Finance] Abdullellah, [Minister of Interior] Kaddir, and
even [Minister of Defense] Rasooli” because of “the general view was that they were corrupt and
grossly mismanaged their ministries,” but Daoud “stood steadfast at their side.”270 Daoud could
count on the loyalty of Rasouli and Abdullellah, who were members of his NRP Central Com-
mittee, as well as former police commandant Qadir Nuristani—these three figures were part of
the “inner Cabinet” in the final year of the republican government.271 However, both Rasouli
and Nuristani clearly failed to anticipate the April 1978 coup, and were poorly organized once
the coup set into motion. Furthermore, despite having purged many Parchami officers from the
armed forces, Rasouli failed to detect Parcham and Khalq officers that remained in sensitive posi-
tions of the military. In fact, Rasouli mistakenly considered one of these (Khalq) officers, Aslam
Watanjar, to be a trusted confidant. Rasouli reportedly “considered [Watanjar] as a son and gave
him free access to his house.”272
Just as problematically, Daoud’s comeback had demonstrated that a military coup was a po-
tentially more reliable path to political power than merit. It convinced the political left that,
despite a popular base of probably no more than 12,000 members,273 it could impose its prefer-
ences through force. Having played a key role in the coup, Parcham members of the republican
government “openly boast[ed] of being ‘king makers’ and the ‘power behind the throne,’ capa-
ble of protecting and promoting their proteges,” according to then Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs Samad Ghaus.274
By 1978, Daoud’s growing reliance on “friends, sons of friends, sycophants, and even col-
lateral members of the deposed royal family” had generated tensions within his own cabinet.275
Alarmed by Daoud’s growing dependence on loyalists, six cabinet members “sent in letters of
resignation but withdrew them at the personal request of the President.276 Daoud’s brother and
closest advisor, Naim, also expressed his disagreement with Daoud’s elevation of loyalists within
270Ghaus 1988, p. 191.
271L. Dupree [1973] 2002, p. 770.
272Broxup 1983, p. 105.
273This figure includes both the Parcham and Khalq membership. Given that leftist participation in the 1973 coup
mainly came from the Parcham faction, the number of individuals that could be counted as active coup supporters was
certainly smaller.
274Ghaus 1988, p. 187.
275L. Dupree [1973] 2002, p. 770.
276These six figures included Wahid Abdullah (Minister of State for Foreign Affairs), Dr. Wafiullah Sami (Justice),
Ghausudin Faeq (Public Works), Azizullah Wasifi (Agriculture), Abdul Karim Attayee (Communications), and Dr.
Abdullah Omar (Public Health) ibid., p. 770.
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the cabinet. But by early 1978, Daoud had reconciled with Naim and the dissenting ministers.
He had also began to consider a series of political and administrative reforms:
President Daoud finally seemed to recognize the seriousness of the opposition by
early April 1978, and family members were able to effect a reconciliation between
Daoud and Naim. On 17 April the President told his family that he planned to an-
nounce new administrative reforms, broaden the base of power in the [NRP] Central
Committee, and establish a new Cabinet of technocrats that would include leftists.
Ten days later the concept of reforms became academic, and 150 years of Moham-
madzai domination (with few exceptions) of Afghan politics met a bloody end in a
military coup d’éat.
These potential changes were clearly too late, and they were probably too little. It was unlikely
that a long term increase in elite polarization in Afghanistan could be suddenly reversed by a
cabinet reshuffle or a change in party recruitment. It was also open to question whether Daoud
could have organized a more diverse political base (to the extent that was possible) around a
coherent domestic policy and independent foreign policy without triggering a coup event.
While it is impossible to observe the counterfactual outcome, it is much more clear that
elite polarization had provided the conditions for the events of 1978. Government institutions
in Afghanistan had made significant strides in capabilities and territorial reach throughout the
monarchical period, but the problem of elite polarization had exerted a lasting impact on the
functioning and organizational integrity of institutions by the 1970s.
Yet another important cause of institutional weakness in Afghanistan was the limited embed-
dedness of institutions in Afghanistan. Despite major changes in the composition of the political
elite during the Naderi monarchy, the relationship between government institutions and much
of rural Afghan remained limited. The upper and middle classes that staffed government insti-
tutions were almost exclusively urbanized. With few exceptions, government bureaucrats and
soldiers lived and worked in Kabul, major urban centers, or otherwise small towns for their en-
tire lives. The individuals that staffed the government had very different life experiences than
members of rural society: they had undergone formal schooling and had been exposed to ideas
and information that came from the Western world. They also did not interact intensively with
rural Afghanistan. Provincial personnel visited or interacted with rural communities in excep-
tional circumstances—community-level conflicts over land, major crimes, and rebellions—but
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otherwise refrained from getting involved in communal affairs.
The relationship between government institutions and society can, in part, be seen in the
geographic distribution of communication, automobile traffic, and infrastructure facilities in
Afghanistan. It is easy to see that substantially all postal and air service flowed through Kabul,
and these services were exclusively based in cities or towns. Automobile traffic in 1968 was
concentrated on the ring road that connected Kabul to the regional centers and border towns,
particularly Hairatan (bordering the Uzbek SSR) and Torkham (bordering British India, later
Pakistan). This traffic became more evenly distributed by 1973, in part because of the construc-
tion of feeder roads and improvement of major highways, but the roadways connected to Kabul
continued to exhibit the heaviest traffic. The preeminence of Kabul, as the center of government
and the home of most of the country’s political elite, can also be seen in the geographic distri-
bution of various forms of infrastructure. The vast majority of the country’s hospital beds were
located in Kabul. Telephones, most of which were owned by government agencies in Kabul,
connected the capital city with regional centers and security posts throughout the country.
The limited interaction between institutions and society meant that government personnel
did not need to expend substantial effort in regulating rural areas. But it also substantially re-
duced the revenue raising and development planning capabilities of the government. Despite
significant foreign assistance, Kabul was unable to develop provincial administrative capabilities
and pave the political foundations for greater revenue collection in the provinces. It was also
clearly unable to identify and carry out small-scale rural development. Even large-scale rural de-
velopment programming, notably the irrigation and electrification efforts implemented by the
Helmand and Arghandab Valley Authority (HAVA) and US-based Morrison-Knudsen company,
did not initially take into account the physical and social constraints to the project’s potential
effectiveness. The HAVA project almost immediately experienced schedule delays and cost over-
runs while ultimately achieving modest results because government planners failed to take into
account the heavy salt deposits underneath the project land and the waterlogging that often re-
sulted from irrigation of this land, salinizing the land tracts. Government planners also failed
to properly understand the social complications that came with settling several hundred kochi
families on land reclaimed by the government.277 The “The kochis were not trained irrigation
277The kochi are Pashtun nomad shepherds, and therefore do not generally have a great deal of experience in irrigation
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Figure 3.9. Flow of Communication and Traffic Toward Kabul, 1968 and 1973
Source: De Planhol 1993, p. 665.
A. Postal service, ca. 1968 (less than 10,000 letters and parcels not shown): 1. 10,000 letters and parcels. 2.
20,000 letters and parcels. 3. 30,000 letters and parcels.
B. Domestic air travel, ca. 1968: 1. 5,000 passengers. 2. 1,000 passengers.
C. Road travel, ca. 1968: 1. 50,000 vehicles per yeai 2. 10,000 vehicles per year.
D. Road travel, ca. 1973-74. 1. more than 1,000 vehicles per day. 2. 500-1,000 vehicles per day. 3. 200-499
vehicles per day. 4. 100-199 vehicles per day. 5. 50-99 vehicles per day. 6. 20-49 vehicles per day. 7. fewer
than 20 vehicles per day.
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Figure 3.10. Afghanistan, Distribution of Urban Infrastructure in 1968
Source: De Planhol 1993.
A. Hospital beds. 1. 10 hospital beds. 2. 50 hospital beds. 3. 100 hospital beds.
B. Telephone networks. 1. 100 telephones. 2. 200 telephones. 3. 100 telephones. 4. Less than 100
telephones. 5. Telephone lines in 1967.
C. Air traffic in 1967. 1. Less than 2,000 passengers on domestic flights. 1. 2,000 passengers on domestic
flights. 3. 5,000 passengers on domestic flights. 4. 10,000 passengers on domestic flights. 5. 100 international
flights. 6. 500 international flights. 7. 1,000 international flights.
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farmers, and bad farm practices on marginal lands only aggravated the salt problem. The Gov-
ernment further augmented the problem by forcing different tribal groups to live in the same
village.”278 As a result, “within a few years 300 kochi families had departed.”279
Government officials, in general, had limited knowledge about the conditions of local com-
munities. The upper- and middle-level officials that staffed government institutions were usually
reasonably well informed about their home villages or districts, but they often lacked specific
insight into others. These officials had spent much of their careers in Kabul or other adminis-
trative centers, and as a consequence often did not possess the degree of information about local
conditions necessary to make frequent and complex interventions, particularly those that could
have increased agricultural productivity and revenue mobilization.
3.3.2 External Sponsorship
A second determinant of institutional development under the Afghan monarchy was the align-
ment and coordination of external aid. Prior to the 1950s, foreign assistance was largely de-
termined by the specific development needs identified by the government in cooperation with
Bank-e Melli. Despite enormous deficits in human and material capital, the government and
private industrialists sought foreign assistance to fill technical and capital gaps in completing key
projects or development priorities. Beginning with the Daoud government (1953-1963), however,
foreign assistance became a largely political activity. Geopolitical competition between the US
and USSR generated large sums of foreign assistance that enhanced the capabilities of government
institutions in some areas, notably in road building and military modernization, but either failed
to develop or even undermined capabilities in other areas. After the 1950s, increasing geopolitical
competition meant that political considerations often outweighed economic criteria in aid pro-
gramming. This compounded the absence of coherent development planning within the Afghan
government and contributed to the polarization of the political elite. While the Afghan gov-
ernment had certainly made poor programming decisions before the 1950s—notably, decisions
relating to the Helmand and Arghandab Valley Authority project—geopolitical competition in





As described in Section 3.2, government institutions underwent important gains during the
early Naderi period. This period saw the development of key export industries and the upgrading
of the army. It also saw very limited foreign assistance. In the economic sphere, almost all
foreign aid came in the form of advice provided by technicians from the mid-European countries,
primarily France and Germany—in the words of the British Ambassador to Afghanistan in 1950,
this pattern followed the “general rule that in order to avoid compromising themselves with
one or other of their powerful neighbours the Afghans employed mid-European, and mainly
German, experts.”280 Small-scale industries used locally available resources, capital, and labor, and
the Afghan government sourced foreign machinery and advisors to address physical and human
capital constraints, respectively. These ventures, by all accounts, generated high economic and
social rates of return. They generated foreign currency earnings, some of which were reinvested
into new enterprises and allocated to the government. They also produced a small but growing
entrepreneurial class that could operate in extremely uncertain circumstances.
Majid made the Banki Milli into more than a banking institution. It served as a
focal point for investing available private and government capital in joint holding
companies called sherkats. The government often granted these sherkats monopolies
in such commodities as matches, motor vehicles, petroleum products, and export
monopolies in karakul (erroneously called “Persian lamb” in the West), sugar, etc.
These measures assured their profitability and their capacity to generate more capital
to reinvest in growth or new ventures. The Banki Milli opened branches in foreign
trading centers abroad such as London, Berlin, Bombay, and later in New York, in
order to avoid using foreign agents through whom Afghanistan had been purchasing
its imports and selling its exports.281
Bank-e Melli and other business houses were critically dependent on access to world markets,
so the onset of World War II had a sizable negative impact on their commercial operations. Trade
contracted dramatically, and with it much of the business income of small-scale industry. Here,
the government and Bank-e Melli cooperated effectively to consolidate and rationalize the small-
scale industrial sector, as illustrated by longtime observer of the Afghan economy Peter Franck:
The capital accumulation process, well launched by 1939, was set back by the war
and the attendant uncertainty in world markets, the cutting off of capital equipment
deliveries from Central Europe, and a severe business dislocation. Some shirkats
280ASI Volume IV, p. 296.
281L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995, p. 164.
120
fell apart, others became mere facades for proprietary business activities, promotion
schemes, and outright profiteering. Government control over prices and essential
supplies of food and cloth were not effective enough to curb black markets. To
halt the growing disintegration of the country’s business organization and the ensu-
ing inflation, Banke Millie curtailed business newcomers, induced traders with idle
funds to invest them in sound projects, and assumed more control over the remaining
shirkats through amalgamation and joint management boards. By the end of 1947 the
new policy had largely succeeded, and today most industrial, utility and service en-
terprises, as well as the bulk of foreign trade, are again in the hands of well organized
shirkats.282
In the military realm, the Afghan government pursued a similar strategy of allocating as-
sistance to needs. In order to build up an officer corps, the new administration initially sent
military students to France and Germany for instruction. In subsequent years, officers were also
sent to India, the USSR, Italy, Japan, and Turkey for further training. And to exercise greater
control over and continuity of military education after the start of World War II, the Naderi
administration re-established the prior practice of placing Turkish officers in charge of military
training. The United Kingdom, which had assisted Nader Khan conquest of Kabul, provided
an interest-free loan of 175,000 pounds, 10,000 rifles, and 500,000 cartridges. Germany provided
another 5,000 rifles and half a million cartridges as part of a leftover credit to Afghanistan during
the Amani period. Kabul later purchased another 5,000 rifles from the UK and 16,000 rifles and
1.8 million cartridges from France.283
These early military investments were modest, but they provided the inputs necessary to re-
constitute the regular armed forces. They also occurred in an international environment with
compatible interests in Afghanistan. Although the early Naderi administration faced a series of
imminent and developing challenges with major and regional powers—wary governments in the
USSR, Iran, and Turkey (which had enjoyed close relations with Amanullah) and deepening divi-
sions within Europe—donor countries had limited and largely consonant interests in Afghanistan.
Most external powers were content with a government in Afghanistan that could guarantee in-
ternal stability and adhere to a policy of neutrality.
The stakes in Afghanistan, however, rapidly increased with the development of the Cold
War. The increase in US-Soviet competition in Afghanistan during the 1950s contributed to
282Franck 1949, p. 432.
283Gregorian 1969, p. 297.
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poor and redundant development planning in Afghanistan. US-Soviet competition, for example,
led to the construction of the Kandahar International Airport, a project that was not justified on
economic grounds. USAID had designed the airport at Kandahar for use by piston engine planes
at great expense, but by the time the airport had been completed in 1963, long distance jets
had come into use. As a consequence, the Kandahar airport failed to “ attract any international
airlines for stopover,”284 especially when the international airport Karachi offered a more modern
and centrally located alternative. Poullada illustrates how the specter of Russian influence in
Afghanistan figured into the decision to construct the Kandahar airport:
From the beginning many difficulties plagued the American aid program. In order
to preempt the civil aviation field from the Russians, American negotiators had to
agree to subsidize the purchase of 49 per cent of the stock of the Afghan airline by
Pan American Airways and to construct a major international airport in Kandahar
against the advice of aviation experts. Later the rationale was forgotten by Afghans
and Americans and this cold war “white elephant” was criticized by both. It is now
an excellent base for projecting Soviet air power into the Persian Gulf-perhaps a fair
trade for Berbera?285
By 1961, Afghanistan had become an “economic Korea,” in the words of US Ambassador
Henry A. Byroade (see Figure 3.11).286 Byroade recognized that this model of joint Soviet and
American resourcing carried its own risks—detecting changes in the policy preferences of the
Afghan leadership would be difficult because of the “slow and nondramatic nature” of incremen-
tal institutional development—but he largely discounted the impact that joint economic resourc-
ing could have on the quality of institutions themselves.287 Both the US and USSR had come to
view the other’s foreign assistance program in highly political and threatening terms. From the
perspective of both superpowers, a small foreign assistance program with few large-scale, physi-
cally impressive projects would inevitably provide a political opportunity for one’s rival. Herbert
Hoover Jr., then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, noted in June 1955 that in “Afghan
situation most important single present consideration is need for preventing Afghans falling un-
der Soviet control.”288 This political consideration came to dominate American aid decisions.
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When the HAVA project was running into technical difficulties, the United States sought to in-
crease its involvement in the project without closely examining its merits. To justify the increased
commitment, a joint US-Afghan committee produced a report that “projected income from the
Helmand and Arghandab areas to the year 2050. . .but any substantive analysis was egregiously
lacking.”289 A primary American consideration in increasing the American commitment with-
out further study was its political standing in Afghanistan. As US Ambassador Byroade stated
in a March 1962 cable to Washington,“[w]ith this [HAVA] project, the American reputation in
Afghanistan is completely linked.”290
The Soviet Union was also primarily concerned with denying American influence rather
than the content of its aid program. In a revealing comment in 1956, Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev underscored that he viewed American assistance to Afghanistan as an essentially po-
litical program that required Soviet aid to counter it: “It was clear to us that the Americans were
penetrating Afghanistan with the obvious purpose of setting up a military base. . . The amount
of money we spent in gratuitous assistance to Afghanistan is a drop in the ocean compared to the
price we would have had to pay in order to counter the threat of an American military base on
Afghan territory.”291 Soviet economic advisor Valerii Ivanov also highlighted the political nature
of Moscow’s assistance to Afghanistan:
[W]e never approached the issue from crudely commercial positions, we acted on
the basis that this was a neighboring country with which we had had very long
relations. . . And naturally, as I understand it, from a political point of view we
wanted Afghanistan to be closer to us than to anyone else. . . The only strategy was
to have friendly relations with this country, because they were our neighbors. And
God forbid that there should be some crisis or war there.292
The Soviet preference for Afghanistan to be closer to the USSR than any other country in
part motivated it to select projects not entirely on economic criteria. Beginning in 1960, the
ton: Government Printing Office, 1987), Document 92. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1955-57v08/d92 [accessed October 7, 2015].
289The committee was chaired by an official from the US International Cooperation Administration and included
officials from the Helmand Valley Authority (then the Afghan government organization responsible for the project),
the Export-Import Bank, and Morrison-Knudsen representatives. It also included participation from the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the US embassy in Kabul. Baron 1972, p. 21.
290Department of State, "Elements of U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan," March 27, 1962, p. 17, Declassified Documents
Reference System.
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Source: Franck 1960; Horvath 1970; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) n.d.; author’s
calculations.
Notes: Aid allocations only include amounts that were ultimately disbursed. The timing of aid allocations
is based on the year in which the allocation was committed, not received by the Afghan government.
Soviet Union began construction on a large power and irrigation project in Kabul and Nan-
garhar provinces. The Nangarhar Valley Authority (NVA) project, as it became known, included
the construction of dams and hydroelectric power stations on the Kabul River at Naghlo (east-
ern Kabul province) and Darunta (western Nangarhar). While Moscow had developed a record
of efficient and pragmatic project implementation,293 like the United States it occasionally de-
signed projects that were politically promising but were not, at the outset, justified on purely
economic grounds. Dupree notes that the NVA project was “plagued with as many problems as
the H.A.V.A.” because of a lack of initial planning. Moscow, for example, did not thoroughly
inspect the Darunta dam site prior to construction: “the dam site at Darunta, selected by the
Russians, had unstable strata and had to be grouted. Russian engineers still keep their technical
293Horvath 1970.
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fingers crossed.”294 Afghan planners, who were responsible for selecting and vetting development
projects in the first place, did little to scrutinize or amend project plans designed by Soviet and
American administrators. And planners in Kabul were easily impressed by the size of such large
infrastructure projects. In the observation of one contemporary scholar, Afghan government
officials were “mainly concerned with the size of the development projects and programs and
did not pay enough attention to the viability or the management of these programs so as to
optimize their impact on production, income, and employment. Few examples of these type
of projects. . .[include the] Helmand and Nangarhar Valleys projects and Kandahar International
Airport.”295
Geopolitical competition did not always result in poor aid outcomes, particularly when de-
velopment projects were carefully programmed and sustained by Afghan planners. The Afghan
leadership, for example, successfully integrated the Soviet and American construction plans of
the Kabul International Airport, a flagship project that it had developed, prioritized, and fol-
lowed across time. Kabul appointed General Khwazak Zalmai, a military engineer and com-
manding officer in the Labor Corps (quwa-ye kar),296 to plan, coordinate, and oversee the Soviet
technicians that constructed the runways and terminal building by April 1963 and the Amer-
ican engineers that installed the electronic equipment by February 1966.297 The construction
of the ring road linking Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif, was another
joint Soviet-American development project that was prioritized by Kabul. With unanimous and
sustained support from Kabul, the Soviet Union (from the north) and United States (from the
south) jointly photographed construction areas, established common benchmarks, and coordi-
nated project development at a level of detail that specified where Soviet and American engineers
would meet. Dupree described this process in greater detail:
In addition, the Soviets and Americans complemented each other in the areas of de-
velopment. The Soviets aerially photographed the northern one-third of Afghanistan,
and the Americans (under a Fairchild contract) did the same for the southern two-
thirds. Common bench marks had to be established so the maps could overlap. Joint
US-USSR-Afghan teams established the appropriate bench marks. The Soviets built
294L. Dupree [1973] 2002, p. 640.
295Zekrya 1976, p. 213.
296The Labor Corps was a section of the Afghan Army responsible for constructing large-scale infrastructure projects
and providing support services for combat units.
297Ruiz 2013, p. 209.
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roads from the Soviet border, the Americans built roads from the Pakistan border,
and these two segments had to meet somewhere. Again, joint teams oversaw the
meeting points.298
Nonetheless, Soviet and American resourcing during the 1960s often resulted in dysfunc-
tional development planning. By this time, both superpowers had their own teams present in
the Ministry of Planning, where they selected projects on the basis of potential political impact—
“relatively large projects in the public sector”299—not economic promise. A World Bank study
reports, “Afghanistan received relatively large amounts of foreign assistance during the 60s and
there can be little doubt that this was in part motivated by the cold war rivalries between the
USA and the USSR, the two major donors. The rivalry extended even to technical assistance and
for much of the period both countries had teams in the Planning Ministry. Inevitably in these
circumstances, the selection of projects often bore little relation to their economic viability.”300
The Afghan government, in turn, was eager to take advantage of US-Soviet competition in pro-
gramming aid for Afghanistan, but given its own inability to prioritize and plan development
needs, was not particularly concerned with the quality and feasibility of aid projects proposed by
either superpower.
Both Cold War camps virtually forced loans and grants on the Afghans, who, it must
be stated, accepted them with alacrity and without apprehending the end results.
But neither the Afghans nor the donor nations understood the implications of the
massive influx of foreign assistance. The Cold War adversaries merely wanted to gain
friends and influence people (if we accept some altruism for one side, we must also
for the other); some Afghans genuinely saw foreign aid as a means of rapid, relatively
painless development; other Afghans simply wanted to benefit in one way or another
from the aid.L. Dupree [1973] 2002
By the 1970s, US-Soviet détente was exerting an adverse effect on the operations of large-scale
development projects planned in Afghanistan during the prior decade. These projects had “been
dictated as much by strategic or ideological considerations as economic ones, and most projects
[had] needed heavy ongoing commitments of finance and manpower both for capital and current
expenditures to realize even their modest returns.”301 American interest in Afghanistan, and to
298L. Dupree 1988, p. 148.
299International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1969, p. 11.
300Kavalsky et al. 1977.
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lesser extent that of the Soviet Union, had declined considerably. This was a problematic develop-
ment for large, long-dated projects that needed ongoing technical assistance and financing to cover
operations and maintenance. In the words of longtime Afghanistan observer Leon Poullada, the
American assistance program “lacked steadfastness. As the global Soviet threat shaded off into
detente, the program lost momentum and received declining appropriations.”302 Projects like
HAVA that experienced costly technical and administrative problems in their early years were
beginning to generate noticeable returns in human capital and production, but by the 1970s such
projects experienced funding shortfalls in meeting maintenance costs and supporting the rapid
agricultural growth in adjoining areas. The World Bank, a critic of the HAVA project, noted
that “[w]hatever the past failings, the Helmand Valley now makes an important contribution
to the national economy, notably in supporting a rapidly growing cotton/textile complex and
providing a substantial surplus of wheat.”303 Even relatively successful economic interventions
like road construction experienced funding shortfalls in the 1970s. The highway system required
follow-on maintenance and improvements as automobile traffic increased, but assistance was not
forthcoming despite the promise of outsized economic returns to upgrading these roads.304 With
a comparatively low ratio of road to cultivated land of 0.354 km/km2, Afghanistan needed a
higher number of rural roads if it was to develop its agricultural economy. The World Bank
reported that the “principal need is to improve certain existing sections and to upgrade their
maintenance. The secondary and tertiary roads linking the rural provinces, small towns, villages
and farms with the major highways, are generally substandard to handle traffic at reasonable
cost. In many cases, they constitute real bottlenecks to the economic development of their hin-
terlands.”305 Instead of pursuing relatively promising projects such as rural road infrastructure,
donors instead proposed “low priority projects” for the government’s 1976 development strategy
that would take a relatively long time to complete—a copper smelter, a steelmaking factory, and
302L. B. Poullada 1981, p. 186.
303Kavalsky et al. 1977, p. 66.
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a fertilizer plant—and would require substantial upkeep once constructed.306
3.4 Alternative Explanations
The rise and fall of government institutions during the monarchical period in Afghanistan could
be explained by other factors. This period saw different types of threats become more salient
across time—notably an external conflict with Pakistan over the status of the Pashtun and Baluch
areas of western Pakistan, and an increasingly active internal threat from the political left. It
was also characterized by increasing ethnic and class diversity in government institutions: the
predominantly Mohammadzai-led monarchy of the 1930s (even then, most of the government
apparatus was staffed by ethnic Tajiks and Persian-speaking figures of non-Tajik descent) had
become much more ethnically and economically diverse by the 1960s. Can these alternative
factors of external threats, internal conflict, and ethnicity explain the trajectory of government
institutions during the Naderi monarchy and the successive republican government? This section
evaluates these explanations in turn.
3.4.1 External Threats
External threat explanations usually make the argument that outside threats or rivals motivate
governments to develop more capable government institutions. These approaches, however,
make little sense of the trajectory of institutions in prewar Afghanistan. Early Afghan gov-
ernments sought to expand the reach of military institutions into Herat, Afghan Turkestan, and
other regional areas governed by pre-1929 administrations in order to reintegrate them into the
national territory. These areas were historically under the sovereignty of the Afghan monarchy,
and the Naderi government sought to preserve the territory that previous Afghan governments
had directly ruled. As a result, the Naderi monarchy were much more concerned with preserving
the existing national territory than confronting neighboring powers. For example, the June 1930
incursion of Soviet forces into Afghanistan led the nascent Naderi government to take control
over the northern provinces, paving the way for a long-term military presence in Mazar-e Sharif,
Nahrin (a central-north district of Baghlan province), Maimana (Faryab province) and Faizabad
306Kavalsky et al. 1977, p. viii.
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(Badakhshan province).
Furthermore, the external rivalry with Pakistan over the Pashtunistan issue made government
institutions in Afghanistan worse off as a result, and in three separate ways.307 First, the military
rivalry with Pakistan, which became most intense during Daoud’s tenure as Prime Minister and
as President of the post-coup Republic, served to exacerbate political divisions within Kabul.
The demand for Pashtunistan increased the divide between Daoud loyalists and emerging PDPA
figures, who sought to coerce Pakistan into recognizing Pashtunistan as an autonomous entity or
as a part of Afghanistan, and Zahir supporters and most of the bureaucracy, which preferred a
more pragmatic, diplomatic approach toward Pakistan. The latter group had become increasingly
alienated from Daoud and his leftist allies after observing the consequences of his confrontational
strategy toward Pakistan during his tenure as Prime Minister.
Second, military rivalry generated substantial economic costs for Afghanistan by leading to
four distinct episodes of closure or semi-closure of the Torkham and Chaman transit points of en-
try into Pakistan.308 In 1948, when Afghanistan voted against the admission of Pakistan into the
United Nations, Islamabad responded with a partial blockade of goods in transit to Afghanistan,
negatively affecting both small-scale farmers and large government projects.309 In 1950, amid a
growing propaganda war between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Pakistani government block-
aded the import of petroleum products and other goods in transit. The trade blockade remained
in place for approximately three months, effectively immobilizing the Afghan Army.310 Cross-
border conflict emerged again in 1953, resulting in another informal Pakistani blockade of Afghan
trade.311 And on March 27, 1955, when Pakistan controversially announced that it would central-
ize the administration of its western provinces (then West Pakistan), the two countries came close
to war and the Afghan economy disproportionately suffered as a consequence.312 Pakistan’s “One
Unit” policy prompted a strong denouncement from Daoud and mob incursions of the Pakistan
307This rivalry was centered on the status of the Pashtun and Baluch areas of western Pakistan, which Afghanistan
claimed as its own, or otherwise an independent political entity.
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missions in Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. Encouraged by the Afghan government, the Kabul
mob ransacked the embassy premises and burned the Pakistani flag. The Pakistan government re-
sponded in kind with mob attacks on Afghan consulates in Quetta and Peshawar,313 leading both
countries to close their respective embassies and consulates, and begin to mobilize the armed
forces for a military confrontation.314 Aiming to topple Daoud, Pakistan unsuccessfully sought
US support to pressure Zahir into dismissing Daoud or to raise a rebellion against him. The crisis
was eventually resolved in September 1955, only after informal diplomatic efforts by the US and
formal mediation efforts by Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The five-month crisis was
over, but with little closure for either Afghanistan or Pakistan.
A fourth, much larger and longer confrontation between the two countries developed in late
1960. In Pakistani-administered Dir, a territorial dispute between the Nawab of Dir (together
with his son the Khan of Jandol) and the Khan of Khar had attracted the interest of Kabul and Is-
lamabad. Prompted by the political unrest, Daoud dispatched several thousand Afghan irregulars
and Afghan Army soldiers dressed as tribesmen to the neighboring Bajaur area in September 1960
to support the Nawab and his son against the Pakistan-sponsored Khan of Khar. The Afghan con-
tingent were repulsed by forces supporting the Khan of Khar, but the dispute did not end there. In
the months that followed, Radio Kabul and Radio Peshawar exchanged barbs over the affair, and
in May 1961, a second round of violence in Bajaur had begun. A larger contingent of civilian-
clothed Afghan troops entered Bajaur, but were met by the Bajaur Scouts, a locally-recruited
paramilitary unit, the First Punjab Regiment, and Pakistani air support.315 By August 1961, Pak-
istan had closed its consular offices in Afghanistan and demanded that Afghanistan close down
313Pakistan also sought the removal of Daoud from the prime ministry. In a meeting with US Ambassador to
Pakistan Horace Hildreth on May 6, 1955, the Pakistani civilian leadership stated that it was “cabinet policy” to pursue
the “removal of GOA Prime Minister Daud.” Hildreth’s reporting is worth quoting at length: “I got five-minute
separate talks with Foreign Office Secretary Baig, Finance Minister Chaundhri Mohamad Ali, Minister Interior Mirza
and Prime Minister. Asked each what real crux of problem with Afghanistan was and each gave same firm reply,
essence of which was ‘removal of GOA Prime Minister Daud’. I asked each Minister separately if this was Cabinet
policy or their personal opinion and each answered ‘cabinet policy’. Each also said with varying degree of emphasis,
however, that if Daud removed as GOA Prime Minister GOP would back down fast on its demands and start a
new chapter in the book of GOP/GOA relations. Mirza and Baig said I was welcome to tell Ward they hoped
he would make this reasonably clear to King and Royal family.” FRUS, 1955-1957, South Asia, Volume VIII, eds.
Robert J . McMahon and Stanley Shaloff (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987), Document 89. https:
//history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d89 [accessed October 7, 2015].
314L. B. Poullada 1982, pp. 104-105; L. Dupree [1973] 2002, pp. 538-539.
315The First Punjab Regiment was quickly withdrawn from the area after the Bajauris “violently objected to the
presence of the regular Pakistan army. See L. Dupree [1973] 2002, p. 540; For an account of Pakistani decision-making
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its Pakistan-based consular posts and trade agencies—shutting down much of the transit trade to
and from Afghanistan via the Pakistan border. Kabul responded with an ultimatum in September
1961 demanding that Pakistan reverse its decision or else Afghanistan would recall its diplomatic
mission in Islamabad. When Pakistan refused, both countries cut off diplomatic relations and
activity across the border came to a virtual standstill. After repeated American diplomatic efforts
failed to resolve the dispute, it took the intervention of US President Kennedy and the Shah of
Iran, along with major changes in Afghan and Pakistani domestic politics (including the resigna-
tion of Daoud and the replacement of Ayub’s hard-line Foreign Minister, Manzur Qader) to end
the conflict in 1963.
Finally, the rivalry with Pakistan exposed Afghanistan to Soviet influence in ways that ulti-
mately worked against the autonomy of Afghan institutions.316 The rivalry with Pakistan, com-
bined with American reluctance to provide military assistance to Afghanistan, led Kabul to de-
velop closer military links with Moscow in the middle 1950s. By 1950, Pakistani border closures
had already led Kabul to develop a commercial corridor through its northern border with the
Soviet Union, which was followed by an Afghan-Soviet transit treaty and $100 million Soviet
aid package in 1955.317 And after Afghan requests for military assistance from the United States
were repeatedly rejected,318 Kabul began to develop closer military links with Moscow. In Au-
gust 1956, Daoud announced the signing of an eight-year $25 million credit of military aid from
the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and East Ger-
many). The Soviet Union also used the Pashtunistan dispute to differentiate itself from the United
States in the diplomatic arena. While Soviet support for Pashtunistan was largely superficial,319
it appealed to sections of the army and bureaucracy that were stridently opposed to Pakistan or
supportive of Pashtunistan.
The growing military relationship with Moscow arrangement clearly enhanced the military
capabilities of the Afghan government—it provided the fledgling Afghan Army access to jet air-
craft, Soviet Ilyushin-14 planes, helicopters, and other military hardware that allowed the force
316L. Dupree 1960.
317L. B. Poullada and L. D. J. Poullada 1995, pp. 106-108.
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to defeat a variety of internal threats—but it also created patterns of long-term military depen-
dence on Moscow. As Louis Dupree observed, “[m]ilitary arms and equipment are followed by
instructors and spare parts. Pilots and mechanics must be trained to fly and maintain aircraft; in-
fantrymen must learn the intricacies of their new equipment.” Soon the Turkish military officers
that had trained or advised the Afghan army since 1907 were replaced with Soviet advisers.320 By
the 1970s, the Afghan leadership had become extremely concerned with Soviet involvement in
the Afghan military. In a meeting with US President Ford, Daoud’s brother and special envoy,
Naim, stated that “a number of our military people [sent to the Soviet Union for training] have
not only been trained in arms but have received political indoctrination. Numerically they don’t
represent a significant percent, but they are mostly in jobs which are critical.”321
In a revealing meeting one day earlier with Secretary of State Kissinger, Naim laid out how
the rivalry with Pakistan and the subsequent US refusal to provide arms had led Kabul into
Moscow’s embrace. Naim’s remarks are worth quoting at length:
There was a time in the recent history of world politics when emphasis was placed on
the formation of military alliances. At that time, there were tensions with Pakistan.
During that period, I was Ambassador to the U.S. In view of the tensions between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, we thought that our defenses had to be improved. We
presented a request to the State Department for very limited arms. This request
was refused by the U.S. Afghanistan was cornered in a situation where the people
expected the government to do something and the question of Afghanistan’s security
was widely discussed. A decision was finally made to seek help from whatever source
to ease the country’s security problems. That is why Afghanistan began contacts
with the Soviet Union. The Soviets were prepared to give Afghanistan arms. This
then led to economic cooperation which brought with it people and technicians from
the Soviet Union. I remember well my first visit with the Soviet Ambassador in
Kabul many years ago. I told him that we wanted to be good neighbors but that
we have a different ideological outlook from that of the Soviet Union. I said that if
the Soviet Union intended to have a continuing good relationship with Afghanistan
aid and ideology must be separated. I was, of course, expressing views of only one
Afghan. In the first few years they tried to control the ideological and political side
of our relationship. The situation, however, changed afterwards. The former regime
in Afghanistan brought about an anarchical situation with a new constitution. The
Soviet Union then found it easy to forget what had been said before.322
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Naim, who had long been seen an advocate of Pashtunistan (although less so than Daoud),
concluded that the territorial dispute had contributed to the politicization of institutions in
Afghanistan. While the Pashtunistan issue enjoyed support from many sections of Afghan so-
ciety, the antagonistic approach taken by Afghan governments in earlier years, notably during
the Daoud prime ministry, had come to threaten the survival of government institutions several
decades later.
3.4.2 Internal Conflict
Yet another potential explanation for the record of institutional development in monarchical
Afghanistan could be the type and intensity of internal conflicts that developed within the coun-
try. According to this explanation, internal conflicts that are intense, and urban are expected to
produce more effective and durable institutions, particularly “under relatively pluralistic political
forms – i.e., weak states and unstable democratic regimes.”323 Yet this argument does not clarify
the Afghanistan case. The New Democracy period, for example, contradicts the expectations of
the internal conflict arguments: severe and persistent urban conflict under pluralism produced
decidedly weaker institutions. As Section 3.2.3 shows, urban, class-oriented protests paralyzed
the government and made national planning more difficult. This was because the political elite,
including the king, Daoud, and the successive governments during the New Democracy period
had different threat perceptions of leftist agitation and divergent responses to it. In general, King
Zahir generally adopted a more circumspect approach toward the leftist groups, and likely for
this reason attempted to block these parties from gaining an ultimately negligible number of
seats in the 1965 parliamentary elections—including an attempt “to block the campaign activi-
ties of Dr. Anahita [Ratebzad], a woman candidate from Kabul and a Marxist.”324 Daoud, on
the other hand, quietly but actively cooperated with the leftist groups during this time as a way
of indirectly influencing Afghan politics. And the non-royal elite that participated in the New
Democracy governments was “caught in a crossfire between the monarchy and the leftists led
by Babrak [Karmal].”325 Leftist agitation, then, failed to create a “protection pact” among politi-
frus1969-76ve08/d24 [accessed November 8, 2014]]
323Slater 2010, p. 14.
324Reardon 1969, p. 175.
325Ibid., p. 178.
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cal elites during the New Democracy period, contradicting the expectations of internal conflict
arguments.
3.4.3 Ethnicity
Institutional development in Afghanistan is often examined in terms of ethnic difference. Given
the well established cross-national correlation between ethnic diversity and institutional weak-
ness, Afghanistan’s multiethnicity is often thought to be a explanation for the eventual downfall
of the Naderi state. It has been established here and elsewhere that ethnicity clearly did play a
role in Afghan politics during the Naderi era. Nader Khan and his family were members of the
Pashtun Mohammadzai clan, and the vast majority of appointees to senior political and security
positions descended from the Mohammadzai lineage during the early Naderi period. However,
a closer examination reveals a series of cross-cutting linkages and cleavages that made ethnicity
of increasingly limited relevance during the Naderi period. First, the Mohammadzai families of
Kabul shared much in common with prominent Kabuli familes of different ethnic backgrounds.
Having settled in Kabul in the late 18th century, the Mohammadzai lineages had been socialized
into the unique culture and language of the capital city. Members of the Mohammadzai lineages
went to the same lycées, participated in similar occupations, and shared the same cultural markers
as a wide range of prominent Kabuli families of different ethnic backgrounds. As a consequence,
allies and opponents of the Mohammadzai dynasty tended to view it through the prism of class
and ideology, not ethnicity. Second, a substantial number of cabinet positions (almost 50%)
and a majority of central sub-cabinet positions were occupied by non-Pashtuns (primarily ethnic
Tajiks) native to the Kabul area. While certain monarchical elites—notably, Hashem Khan326—
had explicitly articulated the view that the Pashto language and other elements of Pashtun culture
should be promoted within the government, these efforts were quickly abandoned because the
vast majority of government officials, including ethnic Pashtuns, were native Kabulis and were
therefore unwilling to adopt a different regional identity. Finally, many of the prominent Mo-
hammadzai families had married into other non-Pashtun families, diminishing the salience of
ethnic and regional origin in the capital city.327
326Maillart 1940.
327For more general description of this process, see Nadiri and Hakimyar 2017.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter showed that the traditional conflict in Afghanistan between center and periphery
was largely resolved during the middle 20th century. The period of the Naderi monarchy saw
the rise of a military and bureaucracy that had defeated rural rebellions, undertook complex
economic and development projects, some of them highly successful, and had developed channels
of training and recruiting talent for the government. However, the struggle between center
and periphery that traditionally characterized state-society relations in Afghanistan increasingly
became replaced by conflicts within the political elite over the composition and objectives of
government institutions. This chapter showed that the consolidation and then polarization of
the political elite in Afghanistan along with the rise US-USSR competition over resourcing help
to explain this outcome.
In the next chapter, we will examine how the April 1978 coup dramatically changed the course
of government institutions in Afghanistan and how the Soviet Union sought to salvage the PDPA
regime. We will also see that organizational dysfunction, albeit in much more intensified form
than during the monarchical period, would once again erode the military and bureaucracy in
Afghanistan in spite of Soviet military intervention and increased foreign assistance to the PDPA
regime.
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4 Revolution and Institutional Breakdown,
1978-1992
Lenin emphasized that a revolution could be worth anything [only] if it knew how
to protect itself. This great mission can be fulfilled only if the PDPA acts as a united
and closely-knit political organization held together by one will and a common goal.
Advice from USSR Central Committee to Hafizullah Amin328
The coup d’etat carried out by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) on
April 27 and 28, 1978 abruptly altered the relationship between government and society in
Afghanistan. Celebrated as a revolution by pro-coup partisans, the PDPA takeover of the govern-
ment apparatus drew on an ideology, Marxism-Leninism, that had very limited roots in Afghan
society and would also require an unprecedented level of government control over society if it
was to be realized. The PDPA government expanded the surveillance and detention of urban-
ites directly or indirectly connected to the ancien régime or opposition groups, while seeking to
rapidly expand the limited physical infrastructure and industrial capacity of the country. It also
sought to reorganize economic and social relations in the countryside through land redistribu-
tion and the formation of village cooperatives. The largely unfamiliar ideology and policies of
the PDPA would almost immediately become an obstacle to the stability of the political system
in Afghanistan.329 Large numbers of educated professionals fled or defected against what was
perceived to be an unworkable form of government in Afghanistan, greatly reducing the stock
328Morozov, A. “Between Amin and Karmal.” New Times, no. 38 (1991): 36-39.
329It should be noted that the actions of the Afghan Marxists were not entirely unprecedented. Senzil Nawid draws
parallels between the policies of the PDPA and Amir Amanullah Khan, but also highlights fundamental differences in
ideology and foreign relations. See Nawid 1993.
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of human capital in and outside of the government. Meanwhile, the Marxist character of the
regime leadership and policies gave rise to violent opposition fronts across Afghanistan, gener-
ating persistently high costs of insecurity and agricultural dislocation in the rural areas of the
country.
But while the ideas and objectives of the PDPA regime were self-defeating, other factors
played a role in the initial destabilization, subsequent survival, and ultimate fall of the PDPA sys-
tem. This chapter makes the argument that organizational dysfunction within the PDPA played
the leading role in the rapid deterioration of Afghan government authority prior to the Soviet
invasion, and that Soviet economic and military support provided a concentrated but largely
directionless meanss of managing conflict within the PDPA. More specifically, it argues that
conflicts within the PDPA consumed a substantial level of regime resources, while also creating
incentives for factional leaders to award patronage on the basis of loyalty instead of competency.
It also makes the argument that Soviet support, in the form of military equipment, economic
aid, technical assistance, and direct firepower, largely kept the regime together by providing a
direct and concentrated flow of economic and military assistance to Kabul. However, Soviet
support did not by itself address the organizational organizational dysfunction within the PDPA
regime. This conundrum was never fully resolved. By the late 1980s, Moscow had effectively
abandoned efforts to build up institutions in Afghanistan, instead seeking to use patronage to
keep the PDPA-led government in power long enough to outlive the insurgency. Soviet assis-
tance became indispensable to the day-to-day survival of the PDPA regime. As a consequence,
when the Soviet Union itself disintegrated, the PDPA government fell apart with it.
In the following sections, I first describe and then attempt to explain the institutional de-
velopment of the PDPA regime. In the next section, I briefly describe the composition of the
PDPA and its rise to power. In Section 4.2.1, I outline the development of the security sector and
economy in Afghanistan under PDPA rule. In Section 4.2.2, I evaluate the organizational and
resourcing explanations for these outcomes. In Section 4.4, I briefly assess alternative arguments.
I conclude in Section 4.5.
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4.1 New Leadership
The April 1978 coup was ostensibly carried out by a single organization—the People’s Demo-
cratic Party of Afghanistan—but in fact it was a cooperative effort between military officers and
political leaders affiliated with the Parcham and Khalq factions of the Afghan Marxist-Leninist
movement.330 The coup drew primarily on the military leadership of Abdul Qader (Parcham-
affiliated Chief of Staff of the Air Force), Mohammad Rafi (Parcham-affiliated tank officer and
Lieutenant Colonel in the army), Mohammad Aslam Watanjar (Chief of Staff of the 4th Ar-
mored Brigade and a Khalq follower), and Sayyed Mohammad Gulabzoy (a Khalq-affiliated Air
Force officer). With approximately 600 military personnel, 50 to 60 tanks, and 20 warplanes, a
relatively small group of Parcham- and Khalq-affiliated military officers carried out the coup in
less than 24 hours, from 6 a.m. on April 27 until the following morning.331
Internal PDPA cooperation, however, had been a recent phenomenon at the time of the coup.
The PDPA had split in 1967, only two years after its formation,332 into a group that followed Nur
Mohammad Taraki, founder of the Khalq (“Masses” in Pashto and Persian) newspaper, and one
that followed Babrak Karmal, who was editor of the Parcham (“Flag”) periodical. These two
groups remained rival claimants to the PDPA for much of the decade prior to the April 1978
coup, in part because their respective leaderships represented different strands of urban society
330While there is a substantial body of scholarship on the causes and consequences of the April 1978 coup, there
remains a number of outstanding questions as to its precise mechanics. First, we do not fully know the extent to which
the civilian PDPA leadership (particularly Hafizullah Amin, who was deeply involved in cultivating Khalq affiliates
in the Afghan army prior to the coup) was involved in directing the Parcham- and Khalq-aligned military officers
that executed the coup. Former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin claims that a deputy of Amin, “Figir,” was involved
in organizing the military formations that participated in the coup. Bradsher, however, suggests that the military
officers that carried out the coup were acting on their own. These officers announced a “revolutionary council of the
armed forces” on the evening of April 27, but this council was replaced by a civilian-led Revolutionary Council of the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on April 30. In the following months, a regular cabinet took over governance of
the country. Bradsher 1985, pp. 76-84; Second, the precise role of the Soviet Union in the coup remains unclear. The
USSR was intimately involved in the formation and development of the PDPA and had received advance warning of
the plot against Daoud from (Khalqi) Sayyed Mohammad Gulabzoy and (Parchami) Mohammad Rafi. Furthermore,
some of the 350 Soviet military advisors in Afghanistan during the coup were observed as having participated in its
execution. However, Moscow may not have been involved in directly planning and coordinating the coup. According
to former KGB archivist Mitrokhin, “had little knowledge of the situation in the country, misinterpreted the situation
and were hedging against the possibility that the attempted coup would not succeed.” What is clear is that the Soviet
Union had prepared the way for a possible coup in Afghanistan throughout the middle 20th century, and aided the
coup once it was set into motion. For more information on Soviet participation, see Bradsher 1985, pp. 82-84; Broxup
1983; Mitrokhin 2002, p. 26.
331Hyman 1992, p. 75.
332The PDPA was officially founded on January 1, 1965, but the organizational work that led to its formation
began in mid-1963. These organizational activities in turn, grew out of regularly held discussion groups among urban
intellectuals beginning in 1956. See Arnold 1983, p. 25.
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in Afghanistan in terms of class, personality, ethnicity, and strategy. The principal figures of the
Parcham faction were largely comprised of upper-class professionals from educated commoner
families that had resided in Kabul or other urban centers for several generations. Parchami leaders
attended the same schools and participated in many of the same social functions as the royal clan
and other leading families of Kabul. Perhaps as a result, the leadership of Parcham favored a
more incremental path toward achieving socialism, based on the belief that class consciousness,
industrialization, and urbanization would need to be developed before a socialist revolution could
be realized. Until the conditions for revolution were in place, cooperation with non-socialist
groups would be possible so long as it served the long-term objective of achieving socialism in
Afghanistan.333
In contrast to Parcham, the Khalq faction had deeper roots in rural Afghanistan. The leading
figures in the Khalq group had resettled from their native villages to Kabul and other urban
centers during their formative years to pursue high school education and employment. It was
in the cities that they first encountered the machinery of government, which they (mistakenly)
saw as an exceptionally powerful but under-employed instrument of social change. In the eyes
of the Khalqis, who primarily occupied the junior ranks of the civil service and military, the
royal family and other upper classes obstructed the urban middle classes and peasantry from
actively pursuing social and economic development in Afghanistan. It was also in the cities that
the would-be Khalqis developed an especially strong sense of class consciousness. Among the
rural-origin recruits of the Khalq faction, the message of revolution resonated because they were
on the margins of the political elite, which was dominated by educated commoners and and
Mohammadzai families that had lived in Kabul for generations.
In part because of the differing class basis of the Parcham and Khalq factions, the division
between the two groups took on an ethnic dimension. The upper classes from which Parcham re-
cruited were primarily composed of Persian speaking Tajiks or “Persianized” non-Tajiks—mainly
Pashtuns who had adopted Persian as their primary language. By contrast, the Khalq faction
333Parcham’s urban composition, establishment connections, and evolutionary political strategy left it open to crit-
icism from the more zealous Khalqis, especially after Parcham elected to participate in Daoud’s coup and subsequent
republican government. Dupree noted that “many urban Afghans believed that a connection existed between the
ruling ‘establishment’ and Parcham, which they jokingly, but pointedly, called the ‘Royal Communist Party.”’ See
L. Dupree 1979, Parcham’s heterodox approach to achieving socialism were viewed favorably by the Soviet Union,
which saw the revolutionary policies of the Taraki and Amin period as poorly suited for the conditions of Afghan
society.
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primarily drew on the growing rural-to-urban population of Pashtuns and other ethnic commu-
nities in Kabul patronized under the Mohammadzai monarchy. Like most political groups in
Afghanistan, Parcham and Khalq recruited through preexisting social networks. Babrak Karmal
and other leading Parchamis identified potential recruits through the elite Kabul lycées—Habibia,
Esteqlal, Ghazi, Nejat—which they had attended and the upscale neighborhoods in which they
lived. The Khalqis selected recruits through the Pashto language boarding schools of Kabul—
Rahman Baba, Khushhal Khan, and Ibn-e-Sena—where a number of Khalqi leaders either taught
or attended school.334
Soviet planners clearly saw these divisions as counterproductive. Moscow sought to influence
government policy in Afghanistan in the years leading up to the April 1978 coup, and divisions
within the Afghan communist movement were clearly an obstacle to this objective. By the middle
of the 1970s, moreover, Soviet influence over the republican Daoud government was rapidly in
decline. Daoud had dismissed several senior Parcham members from his cabinet, and had initiated
a rapprochment with the American regional allies Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Henry Brad-
sher argues that, by 1976, the Soviet Union had initiated efforts through the Communist Party
of India (CPI) to restore the organizational unity of the PDPA. In May 1976, an article appeared
in the CPI journal Party Life appealing for PDPA unity. The author, CPI Secretary-General
N.K. Krishnan, sent copies of the article to Taraki and Karmal, and both leaders sent their rep-
resentatives to New Delhi for consultations. The CPI subsequently invited Khalq and Parcham
representatives to India in 1977 for a “detailed discussion of their internal dissensions.”335 The
talks in India gave way to a March 1977 agreement that reunified the Khalq and Parcham factions
into a single PDPA organization.
Reunited, the PDPA was still a very small organization. The party was likely comprised of
approximately 12,000 members in 1978, although some analysts estimate a membership base as
low as 4,000 and as high as 18,000.336 This party base included approximately 2,000 members of
334Hassan Kakar describes how Hafizullah Amin was responsible for recruiting nearly the entirety of the Pashtun
Sangokhel lineage, a section of the Shinwari tribe, through some of his Sangokhel students when he was the principal
of Ibn-e Sena school. M. H. Kakar 1997, p. 178.
335As recounted to Henry Brasher by a senior CPI figure who declined to be identified. See Bradsher 1985, p. 70.
336Halliday and Tanin 1998, p. 1360; For a low estimate, see Bradsher 1985, p. 71; Citing on English- and Russian-
language sources, Giustozzi reports a higher estimate Giustozzi 2000, p. 253.
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the military.337 Compared to a Kabul and national population of approximately 675 thousand
and 13 million,338 respectively, the party constituted a tiny section of Afghan society almost
exclusively concentrated in the capital city. Notwithstanding the small size of the PDPA, the
party was able to mobilize young and extremely vocal crowds of supporters in the streets of
Kabul, lending it greater weight than its relative size would indicate.
The Khalq and Parcham factions soon went public with their reunification. In a joint confer-
ence in July 1977, the organizationally restored PDPA “adopted a decision on the organizational
reunification of the factions and on the development of a program of joint action...[and] consid-
ered the question of the removal of the dictatorial regime of M. Daoud.”339 Less than one year
later, this question would be answered when Khalq and Parcham conducted a successful, if tech-
nically flawed,340 military takeover of the capital and the elimination or detention of most senior
officials in the ancien régime. The leadership and followership of both PDPA factions publicly cel-
ebrated the April 1978 coup as a joint effort and the beginning of a revolution that would spread
from Kabul to Afghanistan’s rural areas. However, as the following sections demonstrate, the
PDPA was unable to carry out a revolution from above. In government, the PDPA neither oper-
ated as a cohesive organization nor was able to provide basic security and economic development
beyond the major urban centers and without extraordinary Soviet involvement and assistance.
4.2 Revolution From Above
The PDPA regime had inherited a government army and bureaucracy that, while constrained by
limited human and material capital, had nonetheless become the dominant military force within
the country and was capable of carrying out successful, if selective, development interventions.
However, as this section shows, the revolutionary government would see these capabilities de-
cline almost immediately after the April 1978 coup. Skilled professionals in the bureaucracy and
military fled in large numbers, while increasing violence against the new regime severed lines
of internal trade and attenuated the security forces. This section documents the trajectory of
security and development planning institutions during the PDPA period.
337Sarin and Dvoretsky 1993.
338Nadiri and Hakimyar 2017.
339Rostislav A. Ulyanovskiy in Bradsher 1985, p. 69.
340For a discussion of the role of chance in the success of the coup, see ibid., pp. 76-77.
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4.2.1 Security after Saur
This section traces the development of the security forces in Afghanistan after the April 1978
coup. Drawing on both primary and secondary sources, I show that the capabilities of the armed
forces under PDPA rule deteriorated almost immediately after the Saur Revolution. Soon after
April 1978, the army and other security institutions had become politically divided organizations
afflicted by high levels of desertion. At the same time, the armed forces rapidly became faced with
multiple, small scale opposition fronts across all parts of the country. Under the ancien régime,
the armed forces had been capable of defeating sizable but territorially concentrated rebellions.
However, the introduction of numerous contemporaneous rebellions across large sections of ter-
ritory during the PDPA period was a relatively new phenomenon.341 The dispersed nature of
these opposition fronts gradually wore down the morale and territorial control of the armed
forces.
For much of predominantly rural Afghanistan, the coup of April 1978 was not initially seen
as a watershed event. In Nazif Shahrani’s words, the initial reaction to the government takeover
comprised of “jubilation on the part of the leftists, dismay on the part of the Islamic activists,
and little reaction from the majority.”342 But the takeover in Kabul began to generate tremors
throughout Afghanistan. Within a few months of the coup, a series of uncoordinated uprisings
began to emerge, along with a number of mutinies among army garrisons in both remote and core
areas of the country. Together with other factors, the deterioration of the security in Afghanistan
provided the basis for the Soviet invasion in December 1979.
While most areas of Afghanistan reacted with indifference to the events of April 1978, in
subsequent months a small but growing number of communities took up arms against the new
PDPA regime.343 In June 1978, the arrest of two elders in the town of Ningalam set off one of the
first incidents of antigovernment violence against the PDPA regime; this episode escalated into
a sustained, more generalized uprising by Safi and Nuristani villagers against the PDPA regime
341The closest comparison to this situation occurred during the rule of Amir Amanullah, who faced simultaneously
faced rebellions from Shinwari tribesman of the eastern region and the forces of Habibullah Kalakani north of Kabul.
342Shahrani and Canfield 1984, p. 159.
343The causes of rebellion against the PDPA government varied from one community to another, and depended on
differing local (proximity to urban centers, economic and social structure) and international (proximity to neighboring
countries) circumstances.
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in Kunar province.344 In the following months, uprisings emerged in Hazarajat (October 1978,
spring 1979), northern Badakhshan (winter 1978), Baghlan (early 1979), Kabul city (June 1979),
Paktia (summer 1979), and Darra-e Nur of Nangarhar (winter 1979). While small in scale, the
geographic scope of these uprisings rapidly began to overwhelm the predominantly urban and
peri-urban government apparatus, especially in the more remote areas of resistance.
An ill-timed national census conducted in June and July of 1979 reflected how quickly the
PDPA government had lost ground (Figure 4.1).345 While the geographical coverage of the north-
ern and southern provinces was relatively good, much of the northwest, central, and eastern
provinces were inaccessible because of insecurity. Geographer Daniel Balland noted various prob-
lems encountered during the administration of the census:
Of 10,000 census takers—all teachers specially trained for the project—about eighty
were killed by rebels. There were reported instances in which the filled-out question-
naires were destroyed before they reached Kabul; most notable was the destruction
of the entire set of data sheets for Bādḡ̄ıs province. It is estimated that the census was
almost complete in urban areas but only 40 percent complete for the settled rural
population and 15 percent for the nomads.346
The administration of the 1979 census marked a significant change from that of demographic
efforts that had taken place not long before the Saur coup. In 1972 and 1973, the Ministry of
Health and the Afghan Family-Guidance Association had conducted a national survey of more
than 20,000 households covered 34 urban centers and 352 villages across Afghanistan in every
province of the country. Notwithstanding significant limitations in the demographic capabilities
of the Afghan government, the 1972/73 survey was conducted without incident.
The April 1978 coup in Afghanistan also set off a crisis within the Afghan armed forces. By
early 1979, low morale and (in some instances) ideological opposition to the PDPA regime in
the Afghan army produced a series of individual- or unit-level desertions across the country (see
Figure 4.2).347 In March 1979, the entire 17th Infantry Division stationed in the Herat garrison
344Edwards 2002, p. 128.
345This was the first national census ever to be conducted in Afghanistan, and had been in preparation since 1975.
See Daniel Balland, “CENSUS ii. In Afghanistan,” Encyclopaedia Iranica.
346This was the first national census ever to be conducted in Afghanistan, and had been in preparation since 1975.
See Daniel Balland, “CENSUS ii. In Afghanistan,” Encyclopaedia Iranica.
347Giustozzi suggests that fighting and other material conditions played a larger role in motivating desertion than
ideology. See Giustozzi 2000, pp. 84-86.
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Figure 4.1. Reliability of the First National Demographic Census of Afghanistan.
Source: Daniel Balland, “CENSUS ii. In Afghanistan,” Encyclopaedia Iranica.
Note: Enumeration reliability colored by district.
1. Fully enumerated district. 2. Partly enumerated district. 3. District not enumerated.
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defected from the PDPA government. Soon after, a number of garrisons mutinied in the Jalalabad
area, in Kunar province, and in the Khost region of Paktia province.348 Five months later, in
August 1979, a mutineering group of soldiers sought to take over the Bala Hissar, the symbolically
and strategically important fortress overlooking Kabul city.349 A mutiny by the 7th Infantry
Division, located on the outskirts of Kabul city, in the summer and fall of 1979 was one of the
last major incidents of antigovernment activity before the Soviet invasion in December 1979.
By the end of 1979, the manpower of the Afghan army had contracted from a pre-coup level
of between 100,000 to 120,000 soldiers to approximately 40,000 men,350 while the sarandoy351
amounted to 50% of its prewar level of 16,000 men.352
As a result of desertion within the armed forces and the rise of opposition groups, Kabul
lost control over a majority of the rural areas of the country by the end 1979, and would not
regain authority over these areas throughout the course of the PDPA regime. In the provinces
of Kunar, Nangarhar, and Laghman, eighteen districts and sub-districts were no longer under
government control; much of the Hazarajat was entirely independent of Kabul. The centers
of several geographically remote but strategically significant areas, including Kunar, Khost, and
Uruzgan, were effectively surrounded by opposition forces. By the end of 1979, 17 out of 28
provinces, half of the district centers, and a majority of villages were out of government control.
An internal report by the Soviet Embassy painted a grim portrait of the security environment in
Afghanistan in the final months of 1979:
The Afghan opposition has considerably expanded its social base, strengthened its
ranks, and created a base of operations on Pakistani territory. Anti-government up-
risings have taken place as a result of the counterrevolution’s influence on the per-
sonnel of a number of garrisons, predominantly those far from headquarters. For
example, mutinies occurred in the 30th Mountain Infantry Regiment (Asmar), the
36th Infantry [Regiment] (Naray), the 18th Infantry [Regiment] (Khowst), and other
units which were isolated from their superior headquarters and which have received
no support for a long time. . . The appearance of new IOA and IPA formations has
348See Gibbs 1987; Lyakhovskiy 2007.
349U.S. diplomat Bruce Amstutz reported that some Afghan observers believed that a “Bala Hissar unit launched the
mutiny, but that the backup forces the mutineers had depended upon subsequently chickened out.” The mutiny was
reportedly suppressed only with extensive tank and helicopter gunship fire. An Initial Evaluation of the Bala Hissar
Mutiny, August 6, 1979.
350Notably, opposition forces commanded, in aggregate, a comparable number of men.
351Sarandoy (scout in Pashto) had become the designated name for the gendarmerie during the Daoud republic, and
remained in use during the PDPA period.
352See Fukuyama 1980; Giustozzi 2000, p. 67.
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been noted in the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Paktia, Kapisa, Ghazni,
Zabol, Kandahar, Ghowr, Badghis, Bamian, and Herat. About 70% of Afghan ter-
ritory in which more than 10 million people live is under opposition control (or
outside government control), practically the entire rural population. . . 353
Conflict within the PDPA had also become increasingly contentious throughout 1979. A
personal and political rivalry between Khalqi leaders Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah
Amin had become uncontainable, as did Soviet differences with Amin’s reputed contacts with
the United States, the increasing personalism of his rule, and his perceived preference for a less
Soviet-dependent foreign policy. With Soviet support, Taraki planned to remove Amin from
his position as Prime Minister and replace him with Parcham leader Babrak Karmal in a unity
government.354 After three days of political intrigue and violence between the two Khalqi camps,
353The acronym IOA stands for Islamskoe Obshchestvo Afganistana (The Islamic Society of Afghanistan or Jamiat-e
Islami. The acronym IPA stands for Islamskaya partaya-krylo Khalesa (The Islamic Party - Khales Wing or Hezb-e
Islami-Khales Lyakhovskiy 2007.
354It remains unclear whether or not Taraki had planned to remove Amin by force or non-violent pressure. The
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Amin’s forces detained and eventually executed Taraki.355
Fearing a consolidation of power by an increasingly mercurial Amin or a precipitous collapse
of the PDPA regime and takeover by opposition forces, the Soviet Union deployed combat forces
in the final days of 1979 to replace Amin and his followers and reinforce the PDPA regime.
During the first week of December, two Soviet battalions were quietly flown into Bagram air
base, laying the groundwork for the larger Soviet intervention two weeks later. In the early
hours of December 25, 1979, a Soviet airborne division landed in Kabul and Soviet ground forces
crossed into Afghanistan via Termez (then in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic) and Kushka
(Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic), from where they proceeded to take control over all major
urban and military centers (See Figure 4.3). On the evening of December 27, Soviet regular
and special forces seized all major party, military, and communication centers.356 The primary
Soviet mission, named “Operation Shtorm-333,” was the capture of the Tajbeg palace (then the
presidential office building and residence) and the assassination of Amin.357 Under the command
of the KGB, three units of special forces (drawn from the KGB and Soviet Ministry of Defense)
stormed Tajbeg and assassinated Hafizullah Amin.
Shortly after Amin’s assassination, the Soviet Union installed a joint government comprised
of Parcham figures that had been jailed or sent into exile, and Khalqis who had actively cooperated
with Taraki against Amin or remained relatively neutral in the intra-Khalq split.358 Under this
dominant theory is that Taraki, along with Sarwari, Gulabzoy, Watanjar, and Mazdooryar, arranged to have Amin
assassinated. According to this explanation, Amin was set to receive Taraki at the airport upon the latter’s return
from a state visit to Havana and stopover in Moscow. Sarwari, who was chief of the intelligence service (AGSA) at the
time, had directed his operatives to eliminate Amin when he arrived at the Kabul International Airport, but Amin
learned of the plot through Daoud Tarun (an Amin partisan and Taraki’s aide de camp) and possibly an Amin loyalist
in AGSA. According to Hassan Kakar, Amin reportedly took “control of the airport, replacing its personnel with
persons loyal to him. He himself wore an armored shield under his clothes. On that occasion no incident occurred.”
For more information, see M. H. Kakar 1997, p. 38; Arnold 1983, p. 90; Lyakhovskiy 2007.
355Like the plan to remove Amin from his position as Prime Minister, this event is also subject to dispute. The
dominant account is that Taraki, with Soviet support, had arranged to assassinate Amin but the plot had backfired.
According to this view, Amin had accepted an invitation by Taraki to the presidential palace, having received assur-
ances of his safety from Soviet Ambassador Puzanov and possibly other Soviet officials. This was reputedly a ruse.
Upon his arrival at the palace, the presidential guards fired on Amin, who managed to escape the attack. In the
subsequent confusion, Amin was able take control of the Ministry of Defense and organize a successful siege on the
presidential palace. Taraki was detained. By Amin’s order, Taraki was suffocated to death two weeks later, against the
wishes of the Soviets. Arnold 1983, p. 90.
356Specifically, Tajbeg palace, the PDPA Central Committee building, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the
Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Communications, the General Staff, the headquarters of
the Central Army Corps, the military counterintelligence building, the Pul-e Charki prison, the radio and television
center, the central post office, and central telegraph office.
357Lyakhovskiy 2007, p. 41.
358These and other key post-invasion PDPA figures were smuggled into Kabul by Soviet forces prior to the Soviet in-
tervention. On December 7, Group “A” of the USSR KGB 7th Directorate smuggled Babrak Karmal and Dr. Anahita
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Figure 4.3. Soviet Invasion Routes and Territorial Occupation
Source: The Russian General Staff 2002.
new dispensation, the Parcham enjoyed a numerical advantage over Khalq in the PDPA Central
Committee, with 55 and and 16 members, respectively. Parcham also held some of the most im-
portant positions in the government, with Babrak Karmal as President and a number of Parchami
leaders appointed to the Politburo and the cabinet.359 The new dispensation also included a num-
ber of pro-Taraki Khalqi leaders in key positions, most notably the “Gang of Four”—Asadullah
Sarwari, Mohammad Gulabzoy, Aslam Watanjar, and Sherjan Mazdooryar.360 While the Par-
chamis held the balance of power in the Politburo and cabinet, Khalqi figures occupied especially
important cabinet positions. Gulabzoy was appointed as the head of the powerful Ministry of
Ratebzad into Afghanistan via Tashkent on a Tu-134 aircraft. Another group of special forces unit was responsible
for safely transporting several other PDPA leaders—Nur Ahmad Nur, Aslan Mohammad Watanjar, Said Mohammad
Gulabzoy, and Asadulah Sarwari (all pro-Taraki Khalqis)—into Afghanistan in preparation for the installment of a
new government dispensation in Kabul. Lyakhovskiy 2007, p. 30; Some of these political figures participated, in some
form or another, in the intervention itself. The Khalqi leaders Gulabzoy, Sarwari, and Watanjar assisted Soviet military
forces in the execution of the invasion. Lyakhovskiy 2007, pp. 52, 56, 68-69.
359Several Karmal allies were appointed to the Politburo, including Nur Ahmad Nur, Shah Mohammad Dost, Sultan
Ali Keshtmand, and Zahoor Razmjo. Key Parchami cabinet appointments included Shah Mohammad Dost to Foreign
Affairs, Major General Mohammad Rafi to Defense, and Abdul Wakil to Finance.
360This was a group of Khalqi leaders of varying influence, all with military backgrounds, that allied themselves with
Taraki and Moscow in their opposition to Amin. All of these figures were appointed to the Politburo under Karmal.
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Interior Affairs, which controlled the sarandoy and was responsible for appointing all provincial
and district governors. Watanjar, meanwhile, was assigned to the Ministry of Communications,
a post that was usually considered to be a key mechanism of regime control and maintenance in
Marxist-Leninist settings.
While the invasion of the Soviet Union produced tolerable, if uneasy, alliance between the Par-
chamis and pro-Taraki Khalqis, it also dramatically altered the security situation in Afghanistan.
The Soviet intervention initially increased the rate of desertion within the armed forces and ex-
panded the scale of opposition violence against government forces, even as it stabilized the PDPA
regime in Kabul. During the first half of 1980, three regiments of the Bagram-based 20th Infantry
Division disintegrated. The 11th Infantry Division ceased operating during the same year, and
was not able to resume activities until 1982. Antonio Giustozzi estimates that the annual rate of
desertion reached a high of 21.9% in 1981, a development that was exacerbated by an especially
low level of recruitment in the years immediately following the Soviet invasion.361
The installation of the Karmal-led government in December 1979 did not yield immediate
gains in the capabilities of the PDPA armed forces and government. Karmal had sought to build
a “new model army” staffed by a larger proportion of officers from the lower classes, presum-
ably more capable of working cooperatively with the rank and file. But the Soviet intervention
yielded only incremental gains in the capabilities of the armed forces, and this occurred after
1983, when Soviet military support and a reinvigorated focus on the Afghan army and sarandoy
began to have a positive effect on the performance of the Afghan security forces. Successful joint
Soviet-Afghan military offensives (primarily Soviet-led until 1986) and the attrition that resulted
from it had a positive effect on the morale of the Afghan armed forces. The responsibilities of the
armed forces became more rationalized after 1985, when the sarandoy became primarily respon-
sible for the protection of economic assets, freeing up the Afghan army to conduct large-scale
offensive operations, particularly in the areas around Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, and Farah. But the
improved performance of the Afghan armed forces relied critically on Soviet firepower. Inde-
pendent Afghan offensives and counter-offensives began in earnest in 1986, and these operations
either required Soviet backup or were not sustained over the long-term—allowing re-infiltration
by mujahideen forces.
361Giustozzi 2000, p. 260.
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While the Afghan armed forces recovered incrementally through the middle 1980s, the PDPA
regime was increasingly confronted with the specter of a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
after the inauguration of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985.
Gorbachev desired a prompt withdrawal of Soviet combat forces and a political resolution to the
Afghan conflict that kept the PDPA regime in power. Within one month of his inauguration,
Gorbachev informed the Soviet military leadership and the Afghan government that they had one
year to change the course of the war.362 By October 1985, Gorbachev explicitly communicated to
the PDPA regime that the Soviet Union was preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan.363 Anatoly
Sergeevich Chernyaev, foreign policy advisor to General Secretary, recorded Gorbachev’s account
of his remarks to Karmal:
That is why I had to express myself with the utmost clarity: by the summer of 1986
you will have to learn how to defend your revolution yourselves. We will help you
for the time being, though not with soldiers but with aviation, artillery, equipment.
If you want to survive you have to broaden the regime’s social base, forget about
socialism, share real power with the people who have real authority, including the
leaders of bands and organizations that are now hostile towards you. Restore Islam
to its rights, [restore] the people’s customs, lean on the traditional authorities, find a
way to make the people see what they are getting from the revolution. And turn the
army into an army, stop with the Parchamist and Khalqist scuffle, raise the salaries
of officers, mullahs, etc. Take care of private trade, you will not be able to establish
a different economy for a long time yet. And so on in this vein.364
At the same time, Soviet confidence in Karmal’s ability to improve the effectiveness of the mili-
tary and civilian agencies was flagging. In May 1986, Moscow replaced Karmal with Dr. Najibul-
lah, a longtime Parchami and head of the Ministry of State Security.365 Najibullah entered office
acutely aware of the impending withdrawal of Soviet combat forces and of the need to fill the
void with pro-government forces that could mobilize local populations and contest mujahideen
forces in Afghan villages. Despite an extraordinary allocation of manpower, weaponry, and aid
to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had reached a military stalemate with the various mujahideen
362Cordovez and Harrison 1995, pp. 187, 245.
363The Soviet Union had been exploring the possibility of a diplomatic settlement to the Afghanistan conflict as a
precursor for withdrawal by early 1981. It was not until October 1985 that the Politburo voted to support efforts to
stabilize the PDPA regime before withdrawing Soviet combat forces from Afghanistan. See Kalinovsky 2009.
364Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev, October 17th, 1985, National Security Archive, available at http://nsarchive.
gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB192/Chernyaev_Diary_translation_1985.pdf, accessed July 13, 2015.
365In January 1986, the intelligence service KHAD was upgraded to ministry status and renamed the Ministry of
State Security (Wizarat-e Amniyat-e Dawlati or WAD).
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fronts located distributed throughout the country. Dr. Najibullah sought to address this strategic
problem in January 1987 by launching a National Reconciliation policy, with Moscow’s encour-
agement, that would share power with the armed opposition groups.366 Both Soviet and Afghan
figures criticized the policy on the grounds that it would empower counter-revolutionary groups
and would accelerate, not slow, the demise of the PDPA-led central state by signaling defeat. It
soon became clear, however, that Dr. Najibullah’s National Reconciliation policy was intended
to share provincial offices and resources, not central power. By sharing power with amenable mu-
jahideen forces at the local level, Dr. Najibullah sought to both maintain the survival of the state
and further consolidate his authority over the central government—reconciled mujahideen fronts
came under the direct purview of Dr. Najibullah’s office. In this way, the government could re-
duce the threat posed by amenable mujahideen fronts while also freeing up time and resources to
improve the performance of the military and central ministries. Seeking to improve the morale
of the Afghan Army, the government doubled the salaries of junior officers and increased the pay
for ordinary soldiers by seven to eight-fold, but military units continued to surrender and desert
in large numbers.367
Dr. Najibullah also took a series of steps, albeit largely superficial in nature, to demonstrate
greater political inclusion on the part of the PDPA regime. In June 1987, the “Democratic” de-
nomination was dropped from the official name of the republic. The Revolutionary Council, the
appointed legislative and representative branch of the PDPA-led political system, was replaced by
an elected National Assembly (Jirgah-e Melli). By June 1990, at the Second PDPA Congress, the
Najibullah government formally renamed the PDPA as the Homeland Party (Hezb-e Watan). Na-
jibullah’s government also reduced the prevalence of Soviet ideology in the universities, removed
government monopolies in selected sectors, appointed non-party members to senior positions,368
and approved the participation of opposition parties, albeit under extremely restrictive circum-
366See Mohammad Najibullah 1988; National Reconciliation was not an entirely new idea. As early as 1980, Soviet
specialists had sought to develop contacts with some of the mujahideen groups. Giustozzi 2000, pp. 120-121; In
November 1985, Babrak Karmal announced a “ten point thesis” that explicitly advocated the incorporation of non-
PDPA forces into the government and the resolution of conflicts through political means. Babrak Karmal’s Theses,
Declaration of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Revolutionary Council 1985.
367Giustozzi 2000, p. 107.
368For example, Haji Mohammad Chamkani, a former member of parliament during the monarchical period, was
promoted from Vice President to President of the DRA Revolutionary Council in November 1986. Fazel Haq Khale-
qyar, a notable during the monarchical period, was appointed Prime Minister in May 1990 after serving as a PDPA-
appointed governor. While Chamkani, Khaleqyar, and other senior non-party officials maintained contacts with
non-PDPA circles, they had nonetheless long served in PDPA governments and were sympathetic to PDPA ideas.
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stances. Under Najibullah, nearly half of the senior positions in the government were occupied
by non-PDPA members, and a majority of the Revolutionary Council was comprised of inde-
pendents.369 Core state positions, however, were primarily occupied by senior members of the
PDPA.
As part of National Reconciliation, the PDPA government also sought to enlist both unaffili-
ated communities and amenable opposition groups as pro-government militias. Militias had been
a component of the PDPA security apparatus since the earliest months of the PDPA regime,370
but the scale of recruitment and local authority accorded to them increased substantially under
Dr. Najibullah’s rule.371 Militia recruitment during the Najibullah era centered on two sets of
irregular forces: first, the Border Militia (Milishia-ye Sahard), an irregular force established in
1980 that recruited from the eastern tribes and was tasked with closing the mujahideen infiltra-
tion routes; and, more significantly, a Tribal Regiment or Regional Forces (known variously as
Ghund-e Qaumi or Kandak-e Qaumi), a force created as early as 1980 responsible for establishing
control over local areas, securing the highways, disrupting the movement of armed opposition
groups, and recruiting new members. According to data collected by Giustozzi, government ef-
forts to recruit militia forces, particularly Tribal Regiment forces, were quite successful. Between
1986 and 1988, the Regional Forces nearly tripled in size from 17,000 to 42,000 men.372
The Najibullah government was particularly successful in recruiting militia commanders that
could secure large expanses of territory abutting the major highways that connected the Soviet
Union to the cities of Afghanistan. From the Soviet border crossings at Termez and Kushka,
convoys of trucks—protected by tanks, armored personnel carriers and helicopter gunships—
carried food aid, economic assistance, and military equipment to Kabul and other major urban
369Rubin 2002, p. 129.
370During the pre-coup period, irregular forces constituted a state-sanctioned but negligible component of the secu-
rity apparatus. Many, if not most, of these irregular forces demobilized or disbanded after the coup.
371Earlier militia groups were either small in size or could not scale up because of their composition or role. The
Soldiers of the Revolution (Sepayan-e Enqelab), established in 1980, were comprised of young and urban PDPA and
Democratic Youth of Afghanistan (DYOA) members recruited from Kabul who had limited roots in the provincial
towns and rural areas in which they served. The Revolution Defense Groups (Gruha-ye az Defa-ye Enqelab or GDR),
also formed in 1980, had more than 30,000 members at the time of National Reconciliation. While GDR cadres
(comprised of middle class youth in the towns and cooperative members in the rural areas) were somewhat effective in
the countryside, they were limited in scale because they were primarily motivated by compensation and rarely strayed
away from static positions. Yet another militia force known as the Self-Defence Groups (Gruha-ye Defa-ye Khodi) were
non-ideological and part-time formations restricted to protecting fixed assets.
372Giustozzi 2000, p. 285.
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centers.373 These critical ingredients of regime survival made their way along expanses of terri-
tory controlled by influential pro-regime military commanders including Abdul Rashid Dostum
(northern zone and other areas),374 Sayyid Mansur Naderi (in the strategically important areas
immediately north of the Salang Pass),375 Esmat Muslim (in the southern province of Kanda-
har),376 Jabar Qahraman (in the southwestern area of Helmand),377 and Juma Khan Andarabi (in
the areas abutting the Jamiat stronghold of Panjsher).378
Despite the departure of the Soviet Union between May 1988 and August 1989, Dr. Na-
jibullah’s policy of National Reconciliation appeared to be somewhat effective, at least more so
than many had expected.379 The militias were able to secure the highways, providing a trans-
port lifeline for the regime and freeing up the army and other formal security forces to hold the
cities. While the day-to-day level of threat from mujahideen forces had not declined as a result
of National Reconciliation, the government was able to to more effectively secure the major ur-
ban centers. Beginning in the summer of 1988, a number of provincial towns and garrisons had
been lost to mujahideen forces, although many of them were either retaken by the government
or were not critical to regime survival.380 Notably, when several mujahideen parties, under the
373See, for example, Jonathan S. Landay, “Government convoy trucks arrives in Kabul,” UPI, April 18, 1989.
374Dostum was a Parcham military officer who began his career in the Afghan army. He subsequently joined a self-
defense unit for the state natural gas company, eventually commanding a large mobile force primarily responsible for
guarding the gas fields in his home province of Jowzjan and other areas of northern Afghanistan. Dostum’s Jowzjan
militia rapidly expanded to a whole division (53rd division) in 1988 with small but functional air and armored forces.
By 1991, Dostum led 40,000 men in operations both inside the northern region and farther afield, notably in 1998
when his forces deployed to Kandahar “to replace the departing Soviet garrison and thwart coup plans involving
Durrani mujahidin and army officers.”[160]
375Naderi was born in Kayan, Baghlan province in 1936 into a leading Ismaili family led by Sayyid Nader Shah. The
Naderi family played a prominent role in private and public life during the monarchical period: the family owned a
joint stock company, and the Naderi’s elder brother Nasir served as a member of parliament. Naderi was jailed for
some time during the republican and the Khalqi periods. During Najibullah’s rule, he commanded a force of between
13,000 and 18,000 men.
376Muslim had been a Major in the Afghan army at the time of the 1978 coup. He subsequently led a mujahideen
front primarily comprised of fellow Achakzai Pashtun men in the Kandahar area, before defecting to the government
in 1984. By 1988, he was fielding at least 4,000 men, with some sources estimating a force of 10,000 men.
377A Khalqi supporter, Qahraman was a Major General in the Afghan army who led a small but cohesive militia
based out of Lashkargah, Helmand province.
378Andarabi was a local notable who joined Hezb-e Islami in 1979, in part because of his rivalry with Ahmad Shah
Massoud, the Jamiat-e Islami commander based in the neighboring Panjsher valley. He later defected to the government
in April 1984, prompted by a large-scale Soviet offensive against Panjsher.
379It was widely believed in the United States and allied countries that, absent the support of Soviet combat forces,
the Najibullah government would fall in a matter of months. Barnett Rubin, for example, observed in 1989 that
“Washington, Islamabad and the [Peshawar] Alliance . . . confidently expected that the Kabul regime would soon fall
[after the withdrawal of Soviet combat forces in early 1989]. They were supported in this expectation by nearly all
Western academic and government specialists on the region (including this author). Some Soviet analysts, including a
prominent general who had served as a military adviser in Kabul, shared this view.” Rubin 1989, p. 424.
380Notable exceptions include the eastern town of Khost (taken in March 1991) and the military garrison of Khoja
Ghar in Takhar (overran in June 1991).
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advice of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), initiated a major offensive against the eastern
city of Jalalabad in March 1989, they were decisively defeated (despite initial signs of success) by
government airpower and an influx of army and militia forces.381
While National Reconciliation provided the Najibullah government with the tactical benefit
of much diminished opposition violence, it did little to address Kabul’s near exclusive dependence
on Soviet economic and military aid. Soviet assistance was being distributed as patronage to pow-
erful militia commanders in exchange for regime support. But it also provided the commanders
with large areas of exclusive territorial control, degrading government influence. As Giustozzi
notes, “some commanders of these units were in the process of becoming de facto rulers of
large portions of Afghanistan. Abdul Rashid Dostum, for example, controlled the provinces of
Jowzyan, Balkh, Samangan and Sar-i Pul, Sayyed Naderi controlled the province of Baghlan, Ra-
sul Pahlawan ruled over the province of Faryab, Abdul Samad controlled the northern part of
the province of Takhar and Jabar Khan controlled the central part of Helmand.”382
National Reconciliation also did not deter regime insiders from aligning with opposition
forces to overthrow the government, which could no longer rely on the day-to-day political and
military support of the Soviet Union. Throughout 1989 and early 1990, there had reportedly
been five separate coup attempts against the Najibullah government.383 In March 1990, a sixth
and much more serious coup d’etat attempt developed. Minister of Defense Shahnawaz Tanai,
a hardliner Khalqi, along with 127 regime military officers (including the Parcham-affiliated Ab-
dul Qader) attempted to overthrow Dr. Najibullah’s government, allegedly with the support of
Hezb-e Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. When the coup failed, Tanai and many of the other
participants fled to Pakistan and announced an alliance with Hekmatyar. Other alliances between
regime military officials and opposition fronts took shape in a much less conspicuous fashion. In
an interview with journalist Sandy Gall, the Jamiat-e Islami commander Ahmad Shah Massoud
381The Jalalabad offensive was nominally undertaken by the Afghan Interim Government (AIG), a coalition of the
various exile mujahideen parties formed in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. On February 10, 1989, a shura of at least
420 figures (estimates range from 420 and 439 individuals) selected an AIG “cabinet” led by Sebghatullah Mojaddidi
as President and Abdul Rab Sayyaf as Prime Minister. The shura (and therefore AIG) was dominated by party leaders
and officials living in exile, with limited representation of field commanders based in Afghanistan. There was also
minimal or non-existent representation from the Tehran-based Shia parties or the prominent families associated with
the ancien régime. The Jalalabad offensive was primarily carried out by Hezb-e Islami Khales and Mahaz-e Melli. See
Khalilzad 1991.
382Giustozzi 2003.
383M. H. Kakar 1997, p. 271.
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stated that his organization had “penetrated the [PDPA] regime very deeply” in the aftermath of
the Soviet withdrawal.384 Massoud’s Shura-ye Nazar had developed links with senior army offi-
cers in key border garrisons, most notably General Abdul Rashid Dostum and General Momin
Andarabi,385 and in the Kabul area, including General Essa,386 General Baba Jan,387 and General
Abdul Razaq.388
These regime-opposition relationships intensified in early 1992 when the post-Soviet govern-
ment of the Russian Federation, led by Boris Yeltsin, withdrew all support for the Najibullah
regime. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 had effectively ended the contrac-
tual bargain that had supported the Najibullah regime in the years after the Soviet withdrawal,
while also activating the regime-opposition connections that had developed in previous years. As
it became clear that the Najibullah government could not count on support from Moscow, Dr.
Najibullah sought to retain control over the government by heading off a formal break with the
militias, which were particularly strong in the north. This meant exploiting a growing ethnic
rift within the PDPA faction between Pashtun military officers, on the one hand, and northern
military leaders of Tajik or Uzbek descent. In January 1992, Dr. Najibullah directed Juma Atsak,
the commander of the Northern Zone389 and an Achakzai Pashtun “known for his Pashtun chau-
vinist views” to replace Momin with General Rasul, a Pashtun Khalqi with a particularly brutal
reputation as commander of Pul-e Charkhi prison under Taraki’s rule.390 The personnel move
prompted Dostum, Momin, and other northern military officers to break from the Najibullah
regime and establish a council of former pro-government military leaders and opposition forces
named the Movement of the North (Harakat-e Shamal)391 These former regime officers, along
with the Ismaili militias under the control of the Naderi family, entered into a temporary al-
liance with their former mujahideen opponents present in the north—Jamiat-e Islami and Hezb-e
384Gall 1994.
385Dostum led the 53rd division out of his base in Shiberghan. Andarabi was the commander of the 70th Division at
Hairatan, a garrison located on the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border, but also commanded troops in Kabul. According
to Rubin, Momin had “long been diverting aid to Dostum and passing intelligence to Massoud.” Rubin 2002, p. 269;
Dostum and Momin later became leading figures in the formation of the Junbesh party in 1992. Giustozzi 2005.
386Commander of the 10th army division based in Qargha.
387Commander of the Kabul garrison.
388National Guard officer in charge of security at the Kabul airport.
389In 1988, the Najibullah government had established a region-wide political and military administration for the
northern provinces, governed by a regional Deputy Prime Minister and military supervisor.
390Rubin 2002, pp. 269-270.
391This multi-ethnic, regional council later evolved into the predominantly Uzbek party Junbesh-e Melli led by
Dostum. Giustozzi 2005, pp. 1-2.
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Wahdat. Within weeks, Dr. Najibullah announced his resignation and allied forces of former
Parchami officers and mujahideen groups took Mazar-e Sharif and, subsequently, the capital city,
with opposition primarily coming from Khalqi forces and pro-Najibullah military units.
4.2.2 From Reform to Patronage
The April 1978 coup was seen by the PDPA leadership as an opportunity to rapidly reorganize
economic relations in the industrial and agricultural sectors. The new government took office
seeking to expand the role of the state in industrialization and redistribution, but soon found
that its expectations about the state of the economy were either incorrect or its objectives were
unworkable for the society and economy of Afghanistan. In the urban centers, the new govern-
ment sought to take majority ownership of the extremely small industrial and service sectors.
However, it quickly discovered that much of the secondary and tertiary economies were already
wholly owned by the government. State-owned enterprises operated substantially all formal eco-
nomic activity in the banking,392 mining, large manufacturing (cement plants and textile mills),
power generation, and aviation sectors.393 As a consequence, when the PDPA took control in
1978 there were no large private enterprises left to be nationalized.
The capabilities of the bureaucracy had declined dramatically within the early months of the
PDPA regime. Much of the upper- and middle-level cadres of the bureaucracy had been dismissed
or executed, and many others had fled abroad. The remaining staff members of the civilian in-
stitutions were either inexperienced or otherwise did not dare to make decisions that would lead
to demotion, dismissal, or capital punishment. As Amstutz describes, the “machinery of gov-
ernment was nearly at a standstill. During the Taraki-Amin period several thousand government
officials had been executed. Many more bureaucrats, along with many members of the educated
and professional classes, had fled abroad.”394
The PDPA government also aimed to reorganize social and economic relations in the ru-
ral areas through a series of sweeping marriage and land reforms promulgated throughout 1978.
392In 1975, the republican government of Mohammad Daoud had nationalized the two remaining semi-private
banks, National Bank (Bank-e Melli) and the Industrial Development Bank of Afghanistan (Bank-e Sanati-e
Afghanistan), bringing the entire banking sector under government control.
393Private ownership was more common in agriculture, retailing, basic services, small hotels (large hotels were
mostly state owned), and small industry
394Amstutz 1986, p. 52.
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These reforms established a minimum age for marriage, mandated the free consent of both mat-
rimonial parties, and abolished the customary matrimonial practice of bridewealth. The PDPA
reforms also aimed to restructure land rights and ownership. The government proclaimed the
prohibition of all private loans and mortgages, and established agricultural cooperatives managed
by elected officers that would govern collective affairs at the local level. In perhaps its most con-
sequential decree, the PDPA-led government mandated the redistribution of land plots greater
than 30 hectares (jeribs) without compensation to peasant households. Taken together, the PDPA
marriage and land reforms were been radical in scope. If implemented, the reforms would have
transformed state-society relations by making the government, instead of traditional sources of
authority, as the primary arbiter of social and economic relations at the local level.
The reforms, however, were an unqualified failure. The marriage reform had little impact
on matrimonial practices in rural Afghanistan. And the land reforms, which began to be imple-
mented in January 1979, effectively reduced access to capital, seeds, and draft animals for most
farming communities. The land reforms prohibited private credit and removed access to seeds
and draft animals, typically provided by landowners, without offering alternative sources of agri-
cultural inputs. As a consequence, the reforms not only failed to alleviate problems of inequality
and poverty in the rural sector, but it generated opposition from those who stood to potentially
benefit from land reform. Amin Saikal describes the consequences of the land reform for the
peasantry:
The poorest elements were given allotments which could not be sold, divided, be-
queathed, mortgaged or otherwise alienated, and, moreover, water supply arrange-
ments were not changed; eventually they began refusing to accept allotments and
even returning them to their previous owners. The middle strata suffered from a
lack of capital in the wake of the moneylenders’ expulsion and the state’s failure to
provide credits, seeds and machinery. Large landowners, amongst whom were higher
ranking members of the officer corps, state bureaucracy, and religious establishment,
received no compensation for the lost land.”395
By the spring of 1979, smallholder and landless peasants had joined more natural opponents of
redistribution—large landowners and the ulama—in opposing the land reforms.396 The PDPA
395Saikal 2006, p. 191.
396Many members of the ulama had declared land redistribution and the prohibition of private loans to be contrary
to Islamic law, much as they had during Amir Amanullah’s efforts to abolish private agricultural loans in Afghanistan.
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regime declared the reform to be a success, reportedly redistributing reclaimed land to 329,767
families by 1986. In reality, the reform was barely implemented. In a 1987 party conference, then
Prime Minister Sultan Ali Keshtmand reported that substantially none of these households had
taken up the reform.397
The deteriorating security environment after the Saur Revolution and the policies of the new
regime had an extremely negative impact on human capital and labor supply in Afghanistan. Be-
tween 1978 and 1984, the number of primary schools, middle schools, and high schools declined
by 82%, 78% and 73%, respectively, because of destruction or discontinued operation.398 The
quality and quantity of the faculty at Kabul University also languished, not only because many
of the brightest academics in Kabul were either imprisoned or had fled Afghanistan, but also be-
cause the PDPA-era faculty were under “constant observation” and “intense pressure to join the
Communist Party,” such that party membership “replaced academic qualification as the requi-
site for appointment to the teaching faculty.”399 Hundreds of thousands of villagers also escaped
growing instability in rural Afghanistan by migrating to Kabul and other urban centers or fleeing
the country altogether. By the end of 1979, 400,000 Afghans had fled to Pakistan and another
200,000 had escaped to Iran. One year later, the total number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and
Iran had risen to 1.9 million, and by 1990, the refugee population had reached a maximum of 6.2
million people—nearly half of the estimated prewar population of 13 million.400 Light industry,
a small but important source of export and commercial knowledge, contracted dramatically as a
consequence. The flight of skilled professionals and workers from Afghanistan, combined with
the disruption in internal trade resulting from rebel attacks, brought almost all new industrial
projects to a halt. In March 1982, PDPA General Secretary Babrak Karmal offered a sampling of
industrial operations that had come to a stop: “the cement factory in Herat, the textile mills in
Herat and Kandahar, sugar factories, and irrigation establishments.”401
Increasing opposition violence also destroyed much of the country’s physical infrastructure.





401U.S. Department of State. Afghanistan: Three Years of Occupation, Special Report No. 106, December 1982, p.
3-4.
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generation. Rebel groups controlled most of the much-degraded road infrastructure and attacked
government-contracted trucks at a pace that exceeded Soviet replacement efforts. Up until 1989,
an average of 45 trucks were destroyed by rebel forces per month, a trend that further intensified
in the final years of the Dr. Najibullah government.402 Almost all of the 17,000 kilometers of
wire communications which existed in Afghanistan prior to the revolution were destroyed, very
little of which was replaced because of ongoing insecurity.403 Between 1978 and 1982, customs
revenue—one of the primary sources of prewar government income—had declined by 95%, and
government efforts to finance the budget deficit by issuing money had increased inflation dramat-
ically in urban centers.404 Mujahideen forces also targeted the electrical transmission towers and
lines that powered the capital city and other urban centers, or otherwise prevented them from be-
ing repaired. In September 1984, the capital city experienced a particularly long six-week power
shortage after rebel forces, previously bribed not to attack the electrical infrastructure in nearby
Sarobi, destroyed some 40 to 80 pylons.405 Meanwhile, in the southern urban center of Kandahar,
power became increasingly scarce because one of the two turbines the the Kajaki hydroelectric
power station had ceased to function, and could not be repaired because of insecurity.406 In 1983,
Afghan Prime Minister Sultan Ali Keshtmand underscored the severity of Afghanistan’s infras-
tructural decline when he stated that “the counterrevolutionary bands sent from abroad have
destroyed 50 percent of the country’s schools, more than 50 percent of our hospitals, 14 percent
of the state’s transportation vehicles, 75 percent of all communications lines, and a number of
hydroelectric and thermal electric stations.”407
As a consequence of these developments, household incomes declined dramatically through-
out much of Afghanistan’s communities. In most of Afghanistan’s fertile areas, heavy fighting
caused agricultural cultivation to contract rapidly. The war between the Soviet Army and the mu-
jahideen fronts destroyed successive harvests and depleted cropland as well as the labor needed to
keep them up. Land area under cereal cultivation and production of cereals were contracting at
an annual average rate of nearly 3%.408 Fiber crop land and production contracted by more than
402Giustozzi 2000, p. 105.
403Soviet author G.P. Ezhov cited in Paul Robinson and Dixon 2013, p. 110.
404L. Dupree 1983, p. 134.
405Coldren 1985, p. 172.
406Amstutz 1986, p. 245.
407Bakhtar, April 12, 1983
408FAOSTAT, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, http://faostat.fao.org.
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6% per annum.409 The decline in agricultural production, in turn, had a profound effect on the
urban economy. In the first year of PDPA rule, per capita real income declined by approximately
3%, and after 5 years of government administration by the PDPA, per capita production had
contracted by more than 10% (see Figure 4.4).410
A Defense Intelligence Agency report published in May 1983 provided a representative pic-
ture of the rural and urban economies after multiple years of internal dislocation. It reports that
the “harvest was especially poor in 1982 with only one-fourth of the 1978 yield and only one-half
of the 1981 figure. . .[I]ncreasing wartime shortages of critical energy supplies have resulted in the
stoppage of industries with a marked decline in processed goods. . .The average increase in prices
of essential commodities (foodstuffs and wood) between September 1981 and September 1982 was
95 percent.”411
By the second half of the decade, the Afghan economy had become exclusively distributive.
As the CPSU official newspaper Pravda observed in 1988, the Afghan economy “has been de-
stroyed by the war and cannot meet the basic needs of its population.”412 Furthermore, while
mujahideen fronts had put pressure on road transportation throughout the conflict, opposition
forces were now interrupting food shipments from the Soviet and Pakistani borders for weeks at
a time. The resulting food shortages generated monthly price inflation as high as 20% in Kabul
city, raising fears of urban unrest and threatening the survival of the PDPA regime. With the ru-
ral and urban economies at a virtual standstill, the government’s economic strategy had become
almost entirely centered around distributing Soviet sponsored food aid and other commodities
to its urban constituencies, while allocating patronage to pro-government militias and the vil-
lages that supported them. The Najibullah government resorted to rationing food in Kabul, as
illustrated by a contemporary news report: “thousands had to line up for hours daily to get a
ration of nan, the flat, oval-shaped bread that is traditional in Afghanistan. The bread price rose
409FAOSTAT, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, http://faostat.fao.org.
410Changes in real per capita GDP clearly do not take into account the emigration or elimination of large numbers
of skilled and unskilled people from Afghanistan that took place in the early years of PDPA rule.
411Defense Intelligence Agency, The Economic Impact of Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan (U), DDB-1900-32-83, May
1983.
412Bradsher 1999, p. 167.
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by 600 percent, and the cost of other essentials - edible oil, sugar, fuel for cooking - climbed
along with it.”413 Increasing economic hardship and the declining territorial control of the cen-
tral government gave rise to opportunities for rent extraction by both government officials and
militias. At highway check points and in food storage centers, Soviet aid was “not being justly
distributed. . . hoarding and bribery have been transformed into a source of wealth for individ-
uals.”414 And at border crossings such as Hairatan, “many of the vehicles that do survive rebel
ambushes - most of them after paying heavy tolls to rebel groups - arrive here carrying high-value
413Burns, John F., “Rebels Plan Next Hardship for Kabul: Winter Without Food Trucks,” New York Times, July 27,
1989.
414Bradsher 1999, p. 199.
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goods like Mercedes-Benz cars and Japanese television sets.415
In the final years of the Najibullah regime, the economy was barely able to generate food sup-
plies and other staples necessary to keep the cities running. Even natural gas, a resource that was
located near the Soviet border and had been exchanged for hard currency and goods since 1967,
exhibited slower production and eventually ceased altogether. Economic planning under the Na-
jibullah government was almost exclusively oriented toward distributing commodities necessary
for feeding the cities and paying the wages of militia forces. Distribution became more chal-
lenging as domestic production and external resources declined. Kabul and other urban centers
experienced a wheat shortage in 1989. The crisis was resolved after Moscow promptly airlifted
food to Kabul. A subsequent wheat shortage developed in 1991, but this time Kabul’s urgent
requests for food supplies from the Soviet Union and India were met with delays, creating a “cli-
mate of scarcity” that had “already negatively influenced the credibility of the regime.”416 In the
final years of the Najibullah government, the Kabul administration resorted to printing currency,
more than doubling the money supply between 1987 and 1989 and generating inflationary pres-
sure on the prices of food items and key commodities. Another consequence of resource scarcity
was increasing government corruption. Although embezzlement of food and commodity aid
had occurred in prior years, it became more acute in the final years of the PDPA-led government.
In party plenums, Najibullah lamented the embezzlement of food and commodity supplies by
government officials, which, according to the Soviet newspaper Pravda, amounted to one third
of all goods supplied by the USSR. Other Soviet analysts claimed that “only 10-15% of Soviet aid
actually reached the population, the rest being absorbed by the bureaucracy.”417
4.3 Organizational Capital and Aid in the PDPA Regime
As Section 4.2 showed, PDPA-led institutions went into rapid decline almost immediately af-
ter the April 1978 coup. The new regime had inherited a government army and bureaucracy
that, while afflicted by problems of petty corruption and limited budgetary resources typical of
relatively poor countries, had nonetheless developed greater capabilities and reach than previ-
415Burns, John F., “Rebels Plan Next Hardship for Kabul: Winter Without Food Trucks,” New York Times, July 27,
1989.
416Giustozzi 2000, p. 234.
417Ibid., p. 233.
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ous administrations in Afghanistan. To explain this institutional decline, this section attributes
decline primarily to the critical problem of divisions within the PDPA regime, and to Soviet un-
willingness and incapacity to decisively address the organizational dysfunction within the PDPA
government. Instead, by the late 1980s Moscow increasingly began to use patronage and the po-
litical acumen of its primary beneficiary, Dr. Najibullah, to keep the PDPA-led government in
power.
4.3.1 PDPA Dysfunction
This section traces the decline in the strength of the PDPA government to its increasing divisions
over time. Divisions between and within the Parcham and Khalq factions impaired the govern-
ment institutions inherited by the PDPA government in April 1978. Key security ministries
developed multiple lines of command and control, or otherwise became the exclusive domain of
the Parcham or Khalq factions. At the same time, the civilian and development ministries became
staffed by junior bureaucrats that had very limited roots in society, constraining their ability to
gather information from and negotiate with the communities with which they interacted.
These organizational problems could be seen at the outset of the PDPA regime. Notwith-
standing the nominal reunification of the PDPA, the Parcham and Khalq factions remained ef-
fectively divided. In discussions with Boris Ponomarev, Secretary of the CPSU and a candidate
member of the Politburo, Nur Mohammad Taraki underscored the effective divide between the
two factions in the immediate pre-coup years, a period of relative convergence. As recounted by
Ponomarev,
We – said Taraki – had no confidence in Parcham even before the revolution, the
union with them was only formalistic. In reality they did not participate in the
armed uprising. But after the revolution, the leader of the Parchamists, B. Karmal
demanded that the leading posts in ministries and other organizations should be
divided equally. He strove to assume a leading role in party-building. He stated,
‘The army is in your hands, give us the party matters’. Besides – when we rejected
his demands –, he threatened us with breaking out an uprising. We had only one
alternative in this situation: either them or us.418
418“Soviet communication to the Hungarian leadership on the situation in Afghanistan,” October 17, 1978, His-
tory and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives of Hungary (MOL) M-KS 288 f. 11/4377.o.e.
Translated for CWIHP by Attila Kolontari and Zsofia Zelnik. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/113147
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The events of the coup laid bare the discord between the Parcham and Khalq factions. The
Parcham and Khalq factions nominally held an equal share of authority in the PDPA regime, but
in reality Parcham was a junior partner in the post-coup government and, in particular, the army.
As Taraki’s account shows, the latent rivalry between Parcham and Khalq had boiled down to an
open contest for greater power in the PDPA government.419 The Khalqi faction, under Taraki’s
leadership, sought to prevent prominent Parchamis from occupying positions of power by as-
signing them to diplomatic posts abroad or domestic posits of limited strategic significance. The
Khalqis also dominated the army and police, operating as a de facto separate chain of command
within both security bodies. This development had the effect of politicizing the security forces
such that “[d]iscipline in the army had collapsed by the end of July and only Khalqi officers could
be relied upon to carry out orders.”420
Personal competition between the two leading Khalqi personalities, President Nur Moham-
mad Taraki and Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin, added to the decay of the bureaucracy and
security forces. In Amin Saikal’s words, “the PDPA leadership continued to be plagued by in-
ternecine struggles, with Parchamis trying to stage a comeback, while Taraki and Amin played
a deadly game of political musical chairs. The Afghan Army was in disarray and could only
conduct defensive operations.”421 By the fall of 1978, the Khalqi chain of command had broken
down within the army as a direct consequence of the rift between the Taraki and Amin factions.
As Mari Broxup observed, “[b]etween September and the Soviet invasion in December discipline
was only enforced by pro-Amin Khalqis.”422 Kakar also observers a decline in the integrity of the
armed forces as a result of the Khalqi split:
When the Khalqis came to power, they tried to make the army a “Khalqi army,”
that is, the army of the people. They purged the army of the non-Khalqi officers
and promoted their own officers. This was the biggest source of tension, which,
along with other problems, led to major abortive uprisings, all of which weakened
the army. Added to this was the alienation of many officers, particularly in Division
Seven of Rishkhor, who were loyal to President Taraki, replaced by Amin after their
differences had led to a confrontation that will be detailed in the next chapter. The
pro-Taraki officers rebelled after Taraki was suffocated on 9 October 1979.423
419Also see M. H. Kakar 1997, pp. 29-31,58-64.
420Broxup 1983, p. 94.
421Saikal 2006, p. 193.
422Broxup 1983, p. 94.
423M. H. Kakar 1997, pp. 29-30.
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If the PDPA’s internal divisions made it unable to carry out a coherent strategy in Afghanistan,
its absence of organizational roots in rural Afghanistan inhibited the regime’s ability to imple-
ment programs in a majority of the national territory. The PDPA was dominated by members of
the urban intelligentsia—teachers, journalists, government administrators—who had very limited
contact with the rural areas. It was also comprised of young people without substantial pro-
fessional experience: in the early communist period, nearly 65% of party members were under
30 years old. As a consequence, the policy objectives and implementation of the PDPA were
poorly suited for the vast majority of the Afghan citizenry. The party leadership and functionar-
ies lacked an adequate empirical understanding of local conditions, did not possess deep personal
linkages with local areas, and often showed an unwillingness to accommodate what were some-
times perceived to be “backwards” communities that would only change by force.424 This absence
of organizational roots had disastrous effects. The government had sought to hastily implement
a land reform that aimed reorganize economic and social relations in much of Afghanistan—a
preference that in and of itself reflected a poor understanding of the possibilities of change in
Afghanistan. The land reform did not in fact address the most important impediments to agricul-
tural development. Water, not land, was the primary constraint on the agricultural economy, but
the PDPA government had not made plans to improve irrigation in conjunction with the land
reform. Large landholdings were relatively uncommon in Afghanistan, so “there was not enough
surplus land to distribute to all of the intended beneficiaries.”425 And the reforms abolished im-
portant (if exploitative) sources of agricultural factors—moneylenders for credit, landowners for
seeds and draft animals—without providing alternative resources. It also chose to do so through
party functionaries who had very limited knowledge and experience in carrying out an extremely
contentious redistributive program such as land reform. To carry out the reforms, “groups of
armed Khalqi activists were dispatched to the villages, most of them schoolteachers and army
officers with no connection to the community.”426 As a result, the content and implementation
of the land reforms were not only ignored by large sections of the rural population, they con-
tributed to the dislocation of the agricultural economy and generated violent opposition to the
424In a comment that was typical of the early communist period, Hafizullah Amin stated that “[w]e have 10,000
feudals. We shall destroy them, and the question [of carrying out revolution] will be resolved. The Afghans recognize
only crude force.” Liakhovskii and Zabrodin, Tainy afganskoi voiny, p. 42.




The Soviet invasion effectively suppressed open and violent competition between Khalq and
Parcham. Moscow had removed Amin and his supporters from the government, installing a
joint coalition of Parchamis and pro-Taraki Khalqis, most prominently including the “Gang of
Four” (Gulabzoy, Sarwari, Watanjar, and Mazdooryar). However, the personal and political
differences between the Parcham and Khalq factions remained effectively unresolved. The Khalqis
had sought to purge the Parcham faction from the government and security forces during the
Taraki and Amin years. Now, with Karmal and his allies controlling the majority of senior
government posts, the Parchamis reciprocated. Karmal sought to remove the Khalqis from the
central ministries, the army leadership, and provincial offices, replacing them with Parchamis
whom he could trust. In 1980, “fifteen leading Khalqis had been executed for criminal behavior,
according to a public announcement. Perhaps a dozen other Khalqi leaders simply disappeared
after the Soviet invasion, undoubtedly secretly executed.427 The Ministry of Education, an almost
exclusively Khalqi domain prior to the Soviet invasion, became a Parchami organization during
Karmal’s tenure.428
Karmal’s personnel changes were often met with varying forms of opposition from the
Khalqis, especially when they concerned the military. “The Parchamis could not resist launching
a wide purge of Khalqi officers in the army. This was what the Khalqis had been expecting and
many had already abandoned their units, further jeopardizing whatever battle readiness the army
still possessed.”429 In May 1980, when Karmal attempted to replace seven Khalqi army comman-
ders with Parchami officers, “the Khalqis simply refused to acknowledge the orders and sent the
Parchami officers back lo Kabul.”430 The Khalqi commander of the the 14th Division in Ghazni
“led a mutiny against the new Parchami general Karmal sent to relieve him. Karmal’s appointee
backtracked to Kabul.”431 In Kandahar, the Khalqi governor “refused to turn over his office to
Karmal’s Parchami appointees when he arrived.”432
Many leading figures in the Khalq faction either discounted the authority of newly installed
427Amstutz 1986, p. 78.
428Ibid., p. 78.
429Giustozzi 2000, p. 81.
430Amstutz 1986, p. 78.
431Tomsen 2011, p. 210.
432Ibid., p. 210.
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President Karmal or actively tried to remove him from power. Hassan Kakar describes how
the Khalqi leader Assadullah Sarwari, then the vice president of the Revolutionary Council and
deputy premier, had developed a plan to “to dispose of the Parchami leaders in their offices by
a synchronized action,” but was exiled as ambassador to Mongolia in June 1980 when the plan
was discovered by the Soviets.433 The Soviet-installed Minister of Interior Sayyid Mohammad
Gulabzoy, a pro-Taraki Khalqi, “acted as if he were the head of a state within a state,”434 reasoning
that he had been selected by the Soviets as a key figure in the PDPA government and therefore
was Karmal’s equal. At the helm of the Interior Ministry, Gulabzoy “made the ministry more a
stronghold of his own than a coordinated department of the Parchami government.”435
Karmal was eager to remove Gulabzoy, Watanjar, and Mazdooryar from the cabinet, but
Moscow vetoed such a move. Moscow needed both sides to cooperate in order to keep the
PDPA regime in power, but its efforts to engineer collaboration were usually unsuccessful. Khalq
leaders cited the numerical majority of Khalqi officers in the army officer corps,436 and claimed
to also have a larger overall membership than Parcham. Eventually, the Soviets intervened in
the Parchami purge of the army because of its “destructive effects” on the overwhelmingly Khalqi
dominated organization.437 By 1983, Khalqis continued to make up 65% to 70% of party members
in the army, a diminished but nonetheless dominant position in the army leadership.
The Soviet Union could not afford to exclusively side with Parcham or Khalq during the
Karmal years. Moscow’s immediate objective was to end the mujahideen insurgency against
Kabul, initially through military operations led by the 40th Army and backed by the Afghan
armed forces. Moscow had assumed control over all major strategic, economic, and diplomatic
affairs in Afghanistan, and was less concerned with the policy formulation capabilities of the
Afghan government than in Kabul’s ability to implement Soviet guidelines. The Soviet response
to the intra-PDPA conflict was to tolerate the sorting of the Khalq and Parcham factions into
separate ministries. The intelligence service, Khidmat-e Aetela’at-e Dawlati (KHAD), became a
Parcham domain, while the sarandoy became a predominantly Khalq organization. The army,
meanwhile, continued to function as a Khalqi-majority institution, although with intermittent
433M. H. Kakar 1997, p. 67.
434Ibid., p. 67.
435Ibid., p. 185.
436In 1979, 90% of army officers were affiliated with Khalqi in 1979. See Giustozzi 2000, p. 82.
437Ibid., p. 82.
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clashes between the two factions.
While the Soviet intervention contained open confrontation between the two sections of the
Marxist movement in Afghanistan, Moscow was still not able to unify the PDPA around a com-
mon strategy of regaining government authority prior to its withdrawal. By the late 1980s, the
PDPA was undergoing greater polarization between the Khalq and Parcham factions, and among
smaller splinter groups that had emerged and receded in the late 1960s but now came into fuller
form, including one faction under the influence of Zahir Ofuq, a former Khalqi supporter, and
a group of particularly extreme Khalqis from Paktia province who were followers of Dr. Abdul
Karim Zarghun, a Khalqi leader who had been killed in 1979. Perhaps more problematically, en-
tirely new factions were emerging within and across the Khalq and Parcham camps. “As soon as
1987, according to one of the Khalq leaders, Panjsheri, there were 200 groups and factions within
the party, including the emergence of at least one faction of Karmalites.”438
This trend toward institutional disintegration became acute in the latter years of the Najibul-
lah administration. The formation and expansion of pro-government militias provided authority
and resources to militia leaders who, in turn, could independently shape security and develop-
ment outcomes in their home areas. In some instances, the militia commanders were able to
establish basic order. For example, the militia forces led by Sayyid Mansur Naderi had largely
secured the Pul-e Khumri, the provincial capital of Baghlan, by the late 1980s, making it one
of the more “normal” towns in Afghanistan, with a functional health system and other public
services.439 But the militia strategy also relied critically on the availability of patronage resources,
which were increasingly scarce after the Soviet withdrawal. Moreover, it created strong incentives
for regime officials to cooperate with the militias in an environment of increasing unpredictability
and resource scarcity. Senior Parcham- and Khalq-affiliated security officials who had once identi-
fied with the improbable objectives of rapid social and economic modernization in Afghanistan
had become more concerned with parochial objectives of surviving the possible collapse of the
PDPA regime. By 1990, for example, Khalqi Minister of Defense had aligned with Hekmatyar,
while Parcham-affiliated officers Momin and Dostum had developed ties with Ahmad Shah Mas-
soud. These relationships were a reflection, not a cause, of institutional decay during the PDPA
438Giustozzi 2000, p. 84.
439Ibid., p. 224.
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period, but they hastened the unraveling of the regime once the Soviet Union, and the patronage
it had provided, came to an end.
4.3.2 Soviet Aid During Wartime
This section evaluates the ways in which Soviet aid was used in Afghanistan and the impact of
this assistance on government capabilities. Soviet support, in the form of military equipment,
economic aid, technical assistance, and direct firepower was indispensable to the survival of the
PDPA regime in the increasingly chaotic final months of 1979, although it did not by itself address
the organizational origins of institutional decay in Afghanistan. This conundrum was never fully
resolved. By the late 1980s, Moscow had effectively abandoned efforts to build up institutions in
Afghanistan, instead seeking to use patronage to keep the PDPA-led government in power long
enough to outlive the insurgency.
The Soviet Union was particularly well suited to support Afghanistan. It shared a border
and decades of experience working with Afghan institutions and the PDPA officials that staffed
them. Its interests were also clearly and powerfully aligned with the new PDPA regime, as
was its paradigm of economic and political development.440 Nevertheless, Soviet assistance to
Kabul was predicated on the expectation of a relatively short and inexpensive intervention in
Afghanistan and was therefore divorced from the increasingly unstable politics of the PDPA. As
Artemy Kalinovsky observed, “Soviet leaders did not expect a protracted and costly involvement
in Afghanistan when they approved the Soviet military intervention in December 1979.”441
As a consequence, Soviet development planning largely proceeded as it had prior to the coup.
Moscow continued to sponsor potentially productive projects that could expand small-scale in-
dustry, improve physical infrastructure, and generally increase the authority of the government.
Moscow’s development strategy, however, did not, in practice, take into account the collapse of
the agricultural economy and the decline in the territorial control of the government. Soviet aid
activities included projects that could produced targeted benefits for urban dwellers—a bread fac-
tory in Kabul (1981), a flour mill in Pul-e Khumri (1982), a flour mill (1982), bakery plant (1982),
440This does not mean that the Soviet Union was the only entity that sponsored the Afghan government. Indeed,
the Warsaw Pact states and, to a lesser extent, the international financial institutions, provided various forms of
development assistance to the DRA.
441Kalinovsky 2009, p. 51.
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and grain elevator (1985) in Mazar-e Sharif, an olive processing plant in Jalalabad (1984). Moscow
also sought to develop energy and transportation links along the northern Afghan provinces
abutting its southern border, including the construction or improvement of a gas drilling facility
in northern Sherberghan (1980), oil reservoirs at Hairatan (1981), Mazar-e Sharif (1982), and Pul-
e Khumri (1983), and the first stage of 220 KW electric power transmission line from the Soviet
border in the area of Sherkhan to Kunduz (1986).
However, the deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan made many completed projects
extremely unproductive, while making other, prospective plans infeasible. Soviet development
programming depended critically on internal order to be successful. These were long-dated,
highly visible projects that required high levels of operation and maintenance and skilled- or
semi-skilled labor. They were also exposed to attacks by mujahideen forces and the gradual de-
cline in skilled workers. These problems also afflicted facilities developed prior to the April 1978
coup. In Kandahar, two textile factories were not fully functioning because the power line from
the HAVA-constructed dam to the city was repeatedly sabotaged.442 The power lines connecting
the NVA-constructed Naghlo dam to Kabul city were also frequently destroyed.443 In an account
from a former chief administrator of Afghanistan’s largest textile mill in Bagram (north of Kabul),
only 1,800 of the prewar workforce of 4,000 remained, and production had declined to 15,000
meters of fabric per day from 80,000 meters. Of the factory’s original fleet of 33 trucks, nine
were destroyed by the resistance and two captured.444
As early as 1980, Moscow began to cancel several planned projects primarily because of in-
security. In the summer of 1980, Moscow scrapped several projects in the unstable province of
Herat. It also cancelled the construction of cotton factories in Baghlan, Balkh, and Takhar be-
cause the cotton-growing areas of these provinces had become too insecure. A project that would
extend power lines from the Naghlo hydroelectric station to Jalalabad was cancelled because these
lines had already been sabotaged multiple times. In 1983, a prospective multichannel phone line
from Mazar-e-Sharif to Hairatan was cancelled for the same reason. Of 75 major prospective de-
velopment projects budgeted between 1979 and the end of 1985, 36 were cancelled. As a result of
these initial disruptions, Soviet assistance became more discriminating over time, with projects
442Paul Robinson and Dixon 2013, p. 123.
443Dorronsoro and Lobato 1989, p. 104.
444Amstutz 1986, p. 245.
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increasingly centered in defensible urban centers and northern border areas. However, Soviet
aid remained heavily weighted toward industrial development throughout the Karmal period, a
strategy that rested critically on a stable security environment—a precondition that was clearly
lacking. Soviet development planners recognized the importance of agricultural development in
enhancing rural livelihoods and improving the image of the PDPA regime. But Soviet agricul-
tural programming either focused on mechanized equipment that most ordinary farmers could
not afford, such as tractors, or was obstructed by insecurity. Moscow, for example, sought to
develop a large-scale irrigation system using water from the Kochba River, but this project never
advanced because of insecurity.445
Beginning in 1986, the Soviet Union began to shift its aid activities from one of developing
government capacity to one of distributing increasingly large levels of fungible assistance to the
central government as well as non-governmental organizations (see Figure 4.5). Moscow had
445Paul Robinson and Dixon 2013, p. 102.
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long recognized that its industrial assistance was poorly suited for the security environment in
Afghanistan, but the ascent of Gorbachev as CPSU General Secretary and his commitment to
withdraw Soviet combat forces prompted Soviet planners to abandon the project of improving
the productive potential of the economy or the institutional capabilities of the regime. Under
Najibullah’s regime and in particular after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal in February
1989, Moscow started to increase its transfers of food, fuel, weaponry, hard currency, and other
forms of fungible assistance for purposes of patronage. This was a logistically difficult under-
taking. Kabul and other cities were increasingly cut off from the Soviet Union by mujahideen
forces,446 which controlled much of the northern road network, prompting a humanitarian crisis
in Kabul through the winter of 1988 and 1989. During this time, the Soviet Union “shipped
an average of 250,000 tons of wheat per year. . . and also furnished other essential commodities,
including kerosene for cooking and heating, tea, sugar, oil, soap, and footwear”447—a resourcing
strategy that former ambassador to Afghanistan Theodore Eliot recognized as “an essential ele-
ment in the regime’s survival.”448 At the height of the Soviet post-withdrawal resourcing, Kabul
was “receiving weapons, foodstuffs, and fuel from the Soviet Union worth between $250 and
$300 million a month, an assistance that helped it remain in place.”449 To move these supplies,
Moscow chartered between 25 and 40 Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft, each carrying up to 45 metric tons of
supplies, to Kabul city every day.450 It also dispatched thousands of trucks each month through
the Kushka and Termez border crossings. From mid-February to the end of December 1989, over
48,000 vehicles transported 340,000 tons on the Termez-Kabul highway alone, and 5,280 air sor-
ties delivered another 71,000 tons of aggregate cargo into Afghanistan.451 Moscow began to hand
over its infantry fighting vehicles, personnel carriers, MiG fighter aircraft, and other military
equipment to Kabul. Between 1988 and 1990, more than 8 billion rubles of military equipment
and other forms of assistance had been delivered to PDPA regime.
446While estimates of manpower on both sides of the Afghan conflict were clearly imprecise, the aggregate number
of anti-government fighters either rivaled or exceed that of government forces in the post-withdrawal period. See
Giustozzi 2000, pp. 266,279.
447Rubin 2002, p. 170.
448Eliot 1990, p. 160.
449M. H. Kakar 1997, 272. See also Al Kamen, “Afghan Aid Questioned in Congress,” Washington Post, March 12,
1990.
450Burns, John F., “In Kabul, Huge Soviet Airlift Brings Everything From Bread to Weapons,” New York Times, May
24, 1989
451Giustozzi 2000, p. 104.
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Soviet planners continued to design development programs for Afghanistan in the final years
of the Soviet occupation, but these plans were clearly divorced from the political situation in
Afghanistan or the Soviet Union. In a series of agreements between Moscow and Kabul through-
out 1988, the Soviet Union pledged assistance to the Najibullah regime in areas of agriculture,
geology, energy, communications, and the training of government bureaucrats. But the 1988 de-
velopment plans barely got off the ground. Soviet development planning had clearly not taken
into account the problems of security, logistics, and economic viability in programming aid for
an unstable security environment where Soviet forces no longer had a substantial presence. Soviet
planners also ignored the inability of Afghan government institutions to effectively coordinate
aid. By the end of 1988, even relatively straightforward shipments of food and fuel had become
a challenge. In November 1988, “1,000 wagonloads of goods donated by Soviet republics and
oblasts were sitting at Termez rail junction,” some “as long as eighteen months,”452 This was
both because of the inability of the PDPA government to organize transportation resources to
move Soviet assistance from the border to Kabul, and because of a lack of security for transport
columns.453
By the time of the Soviet withdrawal in April 1988, the Najibullah government had become
a patronage machine. The PDPA regime had become almost exclusively dependent on Moscow
for meeting its short-term resource needs. Afghan trade and aid almost entirely originated in
the Soviet Union, and both of these economic flows had begun to rapidly decline. When Soviet
assistance came to an end, the Najibullah government ended with it.
4.4 Alternative Explanations
How else can we make sense of the collapse of institutional capabilities in Afghanistan under
successive PDPA governments? It is clear that the revolt against the PDPA did not motivate a
more capable set of government institutions. The army and bureaucracy, throughout the con-
flict, remained afflicted by incompetence and politicization stemming from the factional conflict
between Parcham and Khalq. While conflict clearly did not generate institutional consolidation in
Afghanistan, two more plausible alternative explanations could help to account for institutional
452Paul Robinson and Dixon 2013, p. 146.
453Ibid., p. 147.
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outcomes during the PDPA period: foreign occupation, ideology, and state policy.
4.4.1 Foreign Occupation
The decay of government institutions during the PDPA period is often explained in terms of
foreign occupation. According to this account, the PDPA-led government unraveled because the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan generated a mass insurgency that it could ultimately not overcome
without external support. This argument, however, does not make sense of the sequence of
events that led to the Soviet invasion. The army and bureaucracy had reached a crisis stage before,
not after the Soviet invasion. The bureaucracy had lost most of its talented staff in the purges,
executions, and exodus of the educated classes that immediately followed the April 1978 coup.
The civilian institutions had become staffed by young, inexperienced ideologues with limited
knowledge about the conditions of the rural communities under their remit. The army was faced
with large-scale defections in key garrisons, most notably in Herat, and very few military officers
remained that could manage military operations and specialized weaponry. While the situation in
Herat and other regional centers had stabilized somewhat by the end of 1979, the PDPA regime
had lost control over the vast majority of the national territory, failed to build up a wider base
of support for the regime, and faced major deficits in human capital in the military because of
purges, defections, and distrust within the military. These problems led both Taraki and Amin
to repeatedly request the introduction of Soviet forces into Afghanistan to stabilize the regime
during 1979. In March 1979, Taraki reported to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin that the situation
in Herat was “bad and getting worse” and requested tanks and aircraft along with Soviet “Uzbeks,
Tajiks, and Turkmens in civilian clothing” to defeat the rebellion in Herat. When Kosygin asked
Taraki to locate the hundreds of Afghan officers that had received training in the Soviet Union to
operate tanks and mortars, Taraki responded: “Most of them are Moslem reactionaries. We are
unable to rely on them, we have no confidence in them.”454 In July 1979 Amin requested “8-10
helicopters with Soviet crews,”455 and made a subsequent request for a Soviet military presence
in August 1979, stating that “the arrival of Soviet troops will significantly raise our moral spirit,
454Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur
Mohammed Taraki, March 17, 1979. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113262.
455Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M. Puzanov and H. Amin, July 21, 1979.
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113275.
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will inspire even greater confidence and calm.”456
While the Soviet invasion increased the scope and intensity of the insurgency against the
PDPA-led government, the crisis of government in Afghanistan had emerged well before the
introduction of large numbers of Soviet forces in December 1979. The army did not appear
to be independently capable of regaining the territory it had rapidly lost since April 1978. The
bureaucracy had been hollowed out, and incapable of functioning autonomously. And the PDPA
political leadership was divided along personal and political lines, and did not show interest in
substantially broadening the base of the regime. The Soviet intervention did not durably improve
the performance of the army and bureaucracy, but this was largely because of the organizational
weaknesses of the PDPA regime prior to and during its occupation.
4.4.2 Ideology and State Policy
Another plausible set of alternative explanations for political decay under successive PDPA gov-
ernments center on ideology and state policy. First, there is the argument that the ideology of the
PDPA regime was so alien to much of Afghan society that it generated an insurmountable back-
lash against the regime. A second argument is that state policy, particularly the marriage and land
reforms of 1978, were so unappealing to most sections of Afghan society that it increased popular
support for the insurgency against the government. Both of these explanations are clearly related
to one another. State policy was, in part, an outcome of the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the
PDPA, and the (largely negative) results of these policies subsequently influenced the beliefs of
PDPA leaders.
It is probably impossible to disentangle the ideas and policies of successive PDPA govern-
ments, and it is clear that some combination of these factors was at work in generating the insur-
gency against Kabul. However, while ideology and policy have some explanatory power in the
decline of the PDPA system, both of these factors in part stem from the limited organizational
capital of the PDPA. The party’s ideology and policy were alienating in large part because the
PDPA had very limited roots in Afghan society. The Khalq and Parcham factions developed in
the fringes of the educated classes of Kabul and other urban centers, and had drawn on other
456Conversation of the chief of the Soviet military advisory group in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Gorelov, with H. Amin,
August 11, 1979. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110028.
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Marxist parties throughout the region for inspiration, political support, and knowledge. It is
therefore not surprising that the first major set of policies carried out by the Khalqi government
led by Taraki was rejected by most of the rural areas. The policy, and the Marxist ideology be-
hind it, were informed by assumptions about the agricultural economy (that land inequality was
the primary cause of rural inequality and poverty, and that peasant households would accept un-
compensated reclamations of land) and customary practice (that customs could be dictated away)
that were widely off the mark. The successive Parchami governments of Karmal and Najibullah
refrained from carrying out these relatively intrusive, unfamiliar policies, and even watered down
the Marxist character of the PDPA regime. But the PDPA-led government continued to exhibit
very limited organizational capital, which was the primary constraint to minimal institutional
enhanced during this period. The army and bureaucracy remained largely urban institutions
staffed by party members at the upper and middle ranks. And the party itself began to fracture
along new lines of division, making the regime increasingly dependent on Soviet patronage that
abruptly came to a halt in December 1991.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter aimed to demonstrate and explain the rapid decline of the quality of the bureaucracy
and army under the PDPA rule. Specifically, it showed that in spite of inheriting a standing army
of more than 100,000 soldiers and an intact bureaucratic structure, the PDPA regime underwent
a dramatic contraction in institutional competencies, presence, and effects during the 1970s. This
was in large part because of the internal characteristics of the new regime. Polarization between
the Parcham and Khalq factions, and the remote relationship between the revolutionary govern-
ment and society, played a critical role in the loss of human capital, institutional dysfunction,
and spread of violent insurgency prior to the Soviet invasion. It also demonstrates that the sub-
stantial Soviet economic and military assistance kept the PDPA regime in power, but did not
effectively improve or sustain the capabilities of the government because it did not address the
conflict within the regime. Organizational dysfunction within the PDPA increasingly led the
Soviet planner and the Najibullah government to abandon efforts to build capable government
institutions and to use patronage to establish control over key regional centers and transporta-
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tion routes. While Soviet support largely kept the regime together by providing a direct flow
of economic and military assistance to Kabul, it became indispensable to the day-to-day survival
of the PDPA regime. As a consequence, when the Soviet Union itself disintegrated, the PDPA
government fell apart with it.
In the next chapter, we will examine a successive period of intervention: the international in-
tervention in Afghanistan after 2001. The post-2001 experience, however, was different in many
ways from the PDPA period. Much of the government apparatus had collapsed in the interven-
ing years of civil war, and institutions would need to be reconstructed on top of a large refugee
population, a broken economy, and the political overhang of successive internal wars. The inter-
vention would look different, too. The intervention was led by the United States, but involved a
large coalition of military and economic donor countries operating under a UN Security Coun-
cil mandate. We will investigate how government institutions fared under inauspicious initial
conditions and a diverse international intervention.
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5 Reconstructing Government Institutions,
2001-2014
“[The Afghanistan intervention is] a double decker bus. The internal parties on the
upper deck. The external parties on the lower deck. And a UN driver with American
gasoline. And that is maybe one bright metaphor to bring an internal and external
settlement to light.”
- David Miliband457
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks brought Afghanistan from a position of obscurity
to widespread recognition. Much had happened during the twelve years that followed the with-
drawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan—the collapse of the state apparatus, the emergence of a
multi-party, internationalized civil war, the rise of the Taliban movement and inflow of numer-
ous extremist groups—with major power attention restricted to the threat of terrorism posed by
Al Qaeda’s presence in the country. By December 2001, however, intervention in Afghanistan
had become the leading item on the international agenda. The United States was leading a multi-
national military campaign in Afghanistan to defeat Al Qaeda and overthrow the Taliban gov-
ernment, which had refused to hand over the Al Qaeda leadership to the United States. The
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had authorized the establishment of an international
peacekeeping force charged with maintaining security in the capital city and its environs. Aid,
technical specialists, and diplomatic staff began to flow into Afghanistan, reversing the trend of
international indifference that had characterized much of the prior decade.
Renewed international engagement with Afghanistan gave rise to new domestic and external
457David Miliband, “Afghanistan: Mending it Not Just Ending It,” MIT: Starr Forum, April 13, 2011.
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relationships. The intervention brought together a diverse group of Afghan elites, many of whom
had known one another for decades, into a governing coalition. While not representative of all
sections of Afghan society,458 this coalition constituted perhaps the most varied group of inter-
ests to have ever collectively participated in Afghan politics in modern history. The intervention
also brought together a diverse constellation of external powers, international organizations (IOs)
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in support of the stabilization and development of
Afghanistan. Thousands of foreign personnel from a wide array of organizations would eventu-
ally descend on the capital city and major provincial centers, producing an elaborate international
presence throughout the country.
These domestic and international coalitions presented potential benefits for the intervention
in Afghanistan. The diverse composition of the post-Bonn Afghan government marked a more
inclusive form of Afghan politics than had existed in prior decades, which could exert a stabilizing
effect on the country. Moreover, the wide array of external organizations backing the post-2001
order brought with it the promise of extensive development assistance and technical expertise,
the legitimacy that came with a coalition constituting the vast majority of world economic and
political power, and the hopeful expectation that regional countries would not engage in the
forms of violent proxy competition that had characterized the preceding two decades, when great
power involvement in Afghanistan was either conflictual or absent.459 These favorable prospects
notwithstanding, intervention also risked the possibility of falling into endemic collective action
problems. While the Afghan political networks and donor countries that participated in the post-
2001 order shared the same general preference for stability in Afghanistan, each of these groups
also possessed their own parochial goals that, if activated, could undermine the development of
capable government institutions in Afghanistan.
This chapter examines these conditions of diverse domestic and external participation in the
Afghanistan intervention after 2001. Since the Bonn settlement, government institutions have
made little progress despite the allocation of substantial levels of material and human assistance
to Afghanistan. In many areas of government activity, notably security provision and devel-
opment planning, state structures have grown in size and reach while exhibiting very limited
458Ruttig 2006.
459One nominal affiliate of the international intervention that, in practice, accommodated the subsequent Afghan
Taliban insurgency against ISAF and the post-2001 Afghan system was Pakistan. For more detail, see Nadiri 2014.
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autonomy and effectiveness. How can one make sense of this pattern, given the high levels of
external involvement and resourcing in nominal support of political stability and economic de-
velopment in Afghanistan? Answering this question is important because existing accounts of
intervention have offered differing explanations for the limited progress of security and devel-
opment in Afghanistan after 2001. In particular, four sets of explanations emerge from existing
studies of post-2001 Afghanistan. One set of explanations emphasize the absence of information
by Western countries, particularly the United States, about the conditions of Afghan society and
politics in the early years of the intervention.460 Other explanations highlight resistance to foreign
occupation as the principal cause of the limited development of Afghan political institutions.461
And yet other arguments suggest that Afghan society is not capable of producing or tolerating
functioning state institutions because of a domestic culture that emphasizes local autonomy over
central rule and coercion over deliberation as a means of resolving conflict. A final explanation
is that exclusion of politically dislocated groups from civilian and military institutions caused
growing instability in Afghanistan.
I find that each of these alternative explanations—foreign ignorance, foreign occupation, do-
mestic culture, and political exclusion—do not make sense of the trajectory of government in-
stitutions in post-Bonn Afghanistan. Instead, this chapter shows that the development of the
Afghan government after 2001 was impeded by the increasing practice of personalist governance,
the absence of coordination among international donors, and divergent international security
and development objectives in Afghanistan. Personalist governance was, in part, a legacy of
the successive wars that had emerged and evolved in Afghanistan since 1979. But it was also
the result of an electoral system that systematically obstructed the emergence of cross-cutting,
interest-aggregating political parties, and a strategy of patronage adopted by President Karzai to
acquire greater influence within it. Personalist governance, in turn, gave way to a political sys-
tem in which offices, contracts, and other resources were distributed in exchange for political
support. The disorganized ways in which external resources were allocated to Afghanistan accen-
tuated the prevalence of patronage. Poor donor coordination and incompatible short-term secu-
rity objectives and long-term development goals increased the costs of monitoring and evaluating
460Stewart and Knaus 2011, p. 71.
461Collard-Wexler 2013; Ferwerda and Miller 2014.
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aid expenditure. These problems remained unresolved despite increased US and international
resources and attention devoted to Afghanistan as part of the “surge” of military and civilian
assistance starting in 2009.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes the parties and pre-
cursors to the December 2001 political settlement in Bonn, Germany. Section 5.2 documents
the changes in civilian and military institutions after Bonn, and Section 5.3 examines whether
and how organizational capital and external coherence influenced these developments. Section
5.4 evaluates the domestic culture, foreign ignorance, foreign occupation, and political exclusion
explanations for post-Bonn institutional outcomes. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.1 The Bonn Agreement
This section briefly describes the historical antecedents to the United Nations-sponsored meet-
ings held in Bonn, Germany in December 2001 to negotiate the institutional setup in post-Taliban
Afghanistan. The Bonn process has often often been described as a negotiated settlement between
internally homogenous blocs with unitary and fixed interests, but as this section shows, the ne-
gotiations in Bonn were comprised of a diverse collection of individuals loosely connected to one
another and negotiating in an environment of uncertainty about the political future of Afgan-
istan. The Bonn negotiations therefore marked the beginning of an ongoing process of domestic
and external alliance-making that prevailed throughout the post-2001 period and that did not
neatly align with the group boundaries observed during the civil war.
Completed in December 2001, the Bonn Agreement outlined a sequence of steps toward the
establishment of permanent government institutions in Afghanistan. The first, and immediate,
phase was the formation of an Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) that would govern the coun-
try for a period of six months. This period of administration was to be followed by the convening
of an Emergency Loya Jirga, which was to elect an Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA)
that would remain in place for two years. Within one year after the formation of the ATA, a
new constitution was to be prepared and presented to a Constitutional Loya Jirga for ratification.
And in the months leading up to the dissolution of the ATA, national elections would be held
to select a government in accordance with the constitution. The Bonn Agreement also provided
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for the establishment of an international security force for Afghanistan authorized by the United
Nations Security Council. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as it would later
be called, was to be responsible for maintaining security in Kabul and its surrounding areas after
the withdrawal of Afghan forces from the capital city.
The discussions at Bonn established a coalition between four loosely constituted delega-
tions,462 each comprised of a set of heterogeneous figures and groups. The bloc that emerged
with the most significant proportion of national power, Jabha-ye Muttahed-e Islami-ye Melli bara-
ye Nejat-e Afghanistan (United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan or UF) had taken
control over much of the country, including the capital, and key areas of the north, west, and
east. Commonly known as the Northern Alliance, this was a loosely-organized confederation
of different politico-military fronts. Many of these groups had previously fought one another
during the civil war of the middle 1990s, but formed an alliance in collective opposition to the
Taliban. While most of the UF parties were primarily rooted in the Persian-speaking areas of
the country, the UF also included commanders originating in the predominantly Pashtun areas
of Afghanistan, including Mullah Naqibullah, a leading Jamiat-e Islami (Jamiat for short) com-
mander based in Kandahar, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the political leader of Ittehad-e Islami (Ittehad),
Abdullah Laghmani,463 a former Jamiat intelligence operative from the predominantly Pashtun
province of Laghman, and Haji Abdul Qadir of the Jalalabad-based Arsala clan, formerly allied
with Yunus Khales. Differences, moreover, existed among and between the Persian-speaking
groups within the UF. The predominantly Hazara Shia Hezb-e Wahdat (Wahdat), for example,
was divided into competing factions associated with different territorial areas and orientations
toward political Islam.464 The Wahdat factions shared a particularly contentious wartime history
with the predominantly Sunni cadres of Jamiat and Ittehad. The primarily Uzbek Junbesh-e Melli
(Junbesh), led by Abdul Rashid Dostum,465 had not yet overcome a split between Dostum and
462A fifth delegation had been formed to represent a number of secular democratic groups that had previously been
in contact with the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA), the primary UN liaison to the various Afghan
political groupings until its closure in May 2001. The official status of this secular democratic delegation was, however,
rescinded at the last moment following the change in UN leadership from Personal Representative of the Secretary
General Francesc Vendrell to Special Representative of the Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi. See Ruttig 2006,
pp. 15-16.
463It should be noted that Laghmani, despite originating in the predominantly Pashtun Laghman province, was an
ethnic Tajik. He was killed in a suicide bombing in September 2009.
464Ibrahimi 2009.
465Former military commander in the PDPA government of Dr. Najibullah.
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a set of former Junbesh military commanders, most notably Malik Pahlwan, during the Taliban
siege of the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif.
The other blocs present at Bonn—the Rome group, the Cyprus group, and the Peshawar
group—were also, to varying degrees, heterogeneous in composition. These groups represented
distinct, preexisting peace initiatives that brought together a diverse cross-section of figures from
the Afghan diaspora. The Rome group descended from a political process initiated by former
king Zahir Shah in 1993 to end the conflict in Afghanistan. Headquartered in Rome, where Zahir
Shah resided in exile, this initiative sought to organize support in Afghanistan and abroad for an
emergency Loya Jirga that would negotiate a ceasefire among the various civil war participants
and determine the contours of a postwar political system. The Rome process drew on the support
of intellectuals, religious figures, patrimonial elites, and former military officers with ties to the
Mohammadzai monarchy, cutting across all of the major ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The
Cyprus group stemmed from a separate peace process organized by Homayun Jarir, reportedly
a relative of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and an inactive member of Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami, and
Dr. Jalil Shams, a Herat-born former Kabul University economics professor and Bank-e Melli
representative, that was reportedly backed by the Khatami government in Iran. This initiative
was based in Nicosia and supported by a group that included constitutionalists, members of
sayyid lineages (including the Sunni Gailani family and Shia Balkhi family), and associates of
Hezb-e Islami, and was believed to be a competing process because of its emergence after the Rome
initiative. And the Peshawar Group originated out of an August 2001 initiative by the patriarch
of the Gailani family, Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, and other, predominantly Pakistan-based exiles
under the banner of the Mahaz-e Melli Islami Afghanistan party to oversee peace negotiations in
Afghanistan. Because the Peshawar process was established by the Gailani family, a constituency
that had been associated with King Zahir Shah in the past, this initiative was interpreted by
some observers to have a diminishing effect on the longer-lived Rome process. The background
and territorial base of the Peshawar process also suggested that it was primarily oriented toward
mobilizing the support of eastern Afghanistan, which possessed close links with the Peshawar
community, and that it was more accommodating toward the Pakistani political establishment.
Despite the predominantly Sunni sayyid and Pashtun composition of the Peshawar group, the
delegation also included Hafizullah Mohseni, the son of the Kandahari Shia cleric and leader
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of Harakat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan Asef Mohseni.466 Yet another offshoot of the Rome process
was an initiative known as the Bonn process, organized by Dr. Abdul Sattar Sirat beginning in
2001.467
Personal ties also connected figures across blocs at Bonn. Dr. Abdullah and Massoud Khalili,
members of the Jamiat party and confidantes of Ahmad Shah Massoud, belonged to families that
were closely connected to leading figures from the Afghanistan’s ancien régime. Dr. Abdullah’s
step-father, Ghulam Muhiuddin Zimaryani, a member of the upper house in the 1969 parliament,
was a personal friend of former King Zahir Shah. And Massoud Khalili’s father, the renowned
poet Khalilullah Khalili, was a longstanding confidante of the former king. Familial ties also cut
across the negotiating parties at Bonn. Members of the Arsala family could be found in the UF
and the Rome group. Some Gailani family members participated in the Peshawar process, while
others, notably Ishaq Gailani, supported the Cyprus process. The head of the Rome delegation
and an ultimately unsuccessful contender for the chairmanship of the Afghan Interim Adminis-
tration (AIA), Abdul Sattar Sirat, was the brother in-law of Yunus Qanuni, a political officer in
the UF-allied Shura-ye Nazar.468 And Rome delegate Hamid Karzai, the future chairman of the
AIA and, later, president of the first post-Taliban government, had working relationships with
many of the prominent figures in the UF, Cyprus, and Peshawar groups. Karzai was a member of
a prominent Kandahari family with personal ties to the royal family; he had subsequently served
as an official of Sebghatullah Mojadidi’s Jabha-ye Nejat-e Melli, a mujahideen party allied with the
UF, and later the mujahideen government led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, where he worked under
Pir Sayyid Gailani in the foreign ministry; and as a member of the Rome process during the
late 1990s, he had maintained contact with UF commanders in Afghanistan and the exile com-
munities in Pakistan and the United States.469 As a result, the groups participating in the Bonn
negotiations were less cohesive and mutually exclusive than their nominal distinctions might
466Like many of the Kandahari Shia, Mohseni belongs to the Qizilbash ethnic group, a community that descended
from Turkic soldiers that conquered much of present day Afghanistan on behalf of Safavid king Nader Shah during
the middle 18th century.
467See Omar Samad, “Meeting Between Loya Jirga and ‘Cyprus’ Processes Yields no Results Discord Centers on
Political Objective and Mechanism,” Azadi Afghan Radio News, April 2001. Sitar’s Bonn process was apparently
unrelated to the negotiations that took place in Bonn after the ouster of the Taliban government.
468Sirat had strong royalist connections. He is of mixed Uzbek and Mohammadzai descent, and was a Minister of
Justice during the New Democracy period.
469This flexibility on the part of Karzai in part explains his ability to preside over diverse coalitions of political
figures in subsequent years.
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have suggested. At the same time, they had many more areas of commonality across negotiating
groups than the bloc distinctions ostensibly indicated. In reality, politics during and immediately
after Bonn consisted of a much more fluid set of bargains about the composition and behavior of
future Afghan governments.
But the outcome of the Bonn negotiations were shaped by more immediate military devel-
opments in Afghanistan and US interests in the post-Taliban political system. By the end of
November 2001, UF-allied forces had taken control over a majority of the country, and the late
Ahmad Shah Massoud’s predominantly Panjsheri Shura-ye Nazar forces,470 led by Qasim Fahim,
had occupied Kabul along with Sayyaf’s Ittehad after the city was abandoned by the Taliban. The
decision to move into Kabul clearly went against Fahim’s earlier commitments to Washington,
but also reflected the reality that Shura-ye Nazar was more organized and proximate to Kabul than
other Afghan political forces. Shura-ye Nazar’s dominant military position in Kabul meant that it
possessed a particularly strong hand in the Bonn negotiations. After ten days of demanding nego-
tiations,471 the Bonn talks produced an interim administration in which many of the prominent
portfolios were allocated to Shura-ye Nazar. The defense portfolio went to Qasim Fahim, Shura-
ye Nazar’s military leader, while foreign and interior affairs went to the organization’s political
officers Dr. Abdullah and Yunus Qanuni, respectively. Most of the other key portfolios were
allocated to members of the Rome Group. The chairmanship of the interim government was
allotted to Hamid Karzai and the finance portfolio to Hedayat Arsala, both Rome group mem-
bers. The assignment of the “power” portfolios—defense, foreign affairs, and interior affairs—to
Shura-ye Nazar led some UF delegates, notably Haji Qadir and Karim Khalili, to walk out of the
Bonn discussions before the signing of the resulting agreement took place. Other leaders affiliated
with the UF, notably the Uzbek commander Adbul Rashid Dostum, took issue with the limited
representation of ethnic Uzbeks at Bonn.472 Moreover, Abdul Sattar Sirat was disappointed in
the absence of adequate representation by the Rome group, a position that was reinforced by his
unsuccessful candidacy for the chairmanship of the Afghan Interim Administration.
With support from a plurality of the Afghan participants in the Bonn process and the backing
470Established in 1984, Shura-ye Nazar (Supervisory Council) was a network of military commanders with close ties
to Massoud, many with familial origins in the Persian-speaking areas north of Kabul.
471Dobbins 2008.
472Sharan 2011, p. 116.
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of key regional and international powers, particularly the United States, Hamid Karzai was se-
lected as the chairman of the AIA.473 Karzai did not enjoy the unanimous support of the Afghan
delegates at Bonn—notably, Rome delegates Abdul Sattar Sirat and Azizullah Wasefi did not
believe that was Karzai had the personal capabilities necessary to lead the first post-Bonn admin-
istration. The selection of Karzai, who would subsequently head the ATA and two government
administrations, had an important, idiosyncratic impact on the trajectory of government insti-
tutions after Bonn. But, as shown in greater detail below, a series of domestic and international
factors would subsequently influence the behavior of Karzai and other political elites in ways that
increased the prevalence of patronage in post-Bonn institutions.
5.2 Reconstructing Institutional Capabilities After 2001
By 2002, Afghanistan was the poorest country in Asia and the fifth most impoverished place in
the world in terms of real per capita income. Its physical infrastructure was either destroyed or
severely degraded. Almost all of the country’s practicing doctors, engineers, economists, agri-
culturalists, and military officers had fled or been killed over the course of successive wars, and
millions of refugees living in Iran and Pakistan were expected to return to the country with-
out guarantee of obtaining housing or employment. Large numbers of small arms and power-
ful weaponry were in the hands of military commanders who had fought on different sides of
Afghanistan’s conflicts. These commanders had regained influence over substantial sections of
rural Afghanistan, presenting a challenge to the establishment of an integrated national army and
government. This section documents the trajectory of post-Bonn government capabilities from
these inauspicious initial conditions. Specifically, it examines two critical areas of government
activity: the provision of security and the development of the domestic economy.
5.2.1 Security Sector Formation and Development
In the years immediately following the Bonn agreement, the formation and training of govern-
ment security forces proceeded slowly and with great difficulty. The first battalions of the Afghan
473A large majority of the delegates from the Rome group, of which Karzai was a member, had voted for Abdul
Sattar Sirat to lead the AIA. However, a plurality of the delegates at Bonn ultimately voted for Karzai, based in part
on the understanding “that the Americans wanted Mr. Karzai.” See Onishi, Norimitsu, “A Nation Challenged: War
in South; G.I.’s Had Crucial Role In Battle for Kandahar,” New York Times, December 15, 2001.
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National Army (ANA) were formed and trained beginning in 2002, largely drawing on men re-
cruited through Afghan military commanders allied with the United States. These initial bat-
talion groups were generally of low quality and held in common a highly localist orientation
that became problematic prior to and during deployment.474 A ten-week instruction program
and poor compensation,475 moreover, did little to ameliorate these problems. Desertion, limited
motivation, and indiscipline were prevalent among the initial ANA battalions, prolonging the
security vacuum that existed throughout the country, particularly in the southern and eastern
areas most vulnerable to Taliban infiltration. By the end of 2002, approximately 2,000 ANA sol-
diers had received training from US and British forces.476 And at end of 2003, between 6,000 and
9,000 soldiers had undergone training from international forces, out of whom no less than 2,000
had reportedly deserted.477 Desertion was a continual problem, with estimates of desertion rates
ranging at various points in time from 20%478 to as much as 50%.479 James Dobbins, then the
US special envoy for Afghanistan, reported that, “American soldiers trained then tens of thou-
sands of recruits [Shura-ye Nazar commander] Fahim and other warlords supplied, but nearly all
of these deserted as soon as they finished their course of instruction.”480 In subsequent years,
desertion rates continued to be high among former militiamen recruited into the ANA. In late
2004, when the newly formed 205th ANA corps deployed to the increasingly unstable province
of Kandahar—this was the first unit of the army to be deployed outside Kabul—approximately
half of the force deserted. Between September 2004 and June 2005, between 1,200 and 1,500
soldiers quit the force in the face of poor material conditions and growing Taliban violence.
The ANA also performed poorly in the years that immediately followed the intervention.
When deployed into combat, ANA units often exhibited poor discipline and quality,481 and were
not able to operate independently from international military forces. Even among relatively ca-
474See Elliot Blair Smith, “US helping create an army in Afghanistan,” USA Today, November 27, 2002. The article
notes that “One batch of recruits offered by Herat warlord Ismael Khan was deemed so unfit that base commander
Gen. Ghulam Sakhi Asifi says he returned the men and demanded 12 new men in their place.”
475Paul Watson, “Losing Its Few Good Men,” Los Angeles Times, November 27, 2003.
476Jeff Sallot, “Canada offers $11.3-million to rebuild Afghanistan; Promised money will go toward funding; a new
national army and legal system,” The Globe and Mail, December 3, 2002.
477Watson, “Losing Its Few Good Men,” Los Angeles Times.
478Pamela Constable, “An Army in Progress; Building of Afghan Force Proves Difficult,” The Washington Post,
October 7, 2003.
479Dobbins, McGinn, et al. 2003, p. 137.
480Dobbins 2008.
481For example, the ANA reportedly performed poorly US led Operation Warrior Sweep in July 2003
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pable ANA units, attrition remained a significant problem, in part a reflection of the minimal
resources that the international community had allocated toward the army. Poor compensation,
housing, and equipment, and the need for soldiers to physically transport their wages back to
their home villages all contributed to temporary and permanent desertion.482 In some areas of
operations, however, the ANA performed more effectively. The ANA’s performance in station-
ary security operations and regional forward deployments was comparatively strong. Particularly
notable was Kabul’s use of the ANA against regional commanders Ismael Khan in Herat, Abdul
Rashid Dostum in Mazar-e Sharif, and Pacha Khan Zadran in Gardez.483
The early cadres of the police force were also characterized by problems of desertion and
underperformance. In 2002, the Ministry of Interior was formally staffed by thousands of police
officers who had been recruited during the prewar and civil war eras and claimed to be in em-
ployment of the Ministry of Interior Affairs. In practice, however, it was a poorly functioning
amalgamate of wartime networks with overlapping areas of territorial authority and differing
educational backgrounds. In early 2003, at least five senior officials in the Ministry of Interior
Affairs held positions with overlapping responsibilities for policing of the capital city and the
provinces.484 The Kabul police force comprised of older cohorts who had received training in
civilian policing during the Daoud presidency and PDPA period, police officers recruited under
the mujahideen government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, and a large influx of fighters allied with
different UF constituencies, particularly Jamiat. Illiteracy, poor discipline, cross-cutting lines of
authority, and an absence of prior policing training and experience characterized large sections
of the beginning police force. In 2003, only 120 out of 3,000 officers in Kandahar province had
previously received training, which had occurred one decade earlier. In Bamiyan, half of the
700-strong police force had previously attended a training program, and in Karukh district of
Herat province, only six of the 120 policeman were educated in policing, have received training
before the Taliban government.485 Military commanders with ties to the anti-Taliban parties had
assumed province- and district- level leadership positions in the police force, which produced
a patchwork system of internal security. The problem of “ghost” police, where commanding
482D. P. Wright 2010, p. 300.
483Carlotta Gall, “Threats and Responses: Warlord Is Said to Be Ready to End Standoff With Kabul,” New York
Times, January 19, 2003.
484International 2003, p. 8; Giustozzi and Reuter 2011, p. 2.
485International 2003, p. 9.
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officers reported fictions personnel in order to pocket their salaries, was “widespread.”486 And
command and control within the MOI was extremely weak. As Giustozzi explains,
Even at the national level, personal relations – usually along factional lines – de-
termined the responsiveness of the system to orders coming from the top. At the
provincial level, command and control depended on the personal status of the chief
of police; in areas where he had full control because he had staffed the police with
his own men, he could issue orders and expect obedience in the districts (that is as-
suming he was able to communicate, given that in 2002 the police was not equipped
with UHF radios and phones did not work). But if the police force at the provincial
level had been divided among factions and strongmen as part of the division of the
spoils following the collapse of the Taleban, then even the provincial chief of police
would not be able to exercise much control and friction often occurred.487
Recently trained police officers, moreover, were not entirely reliable. According to a German
police official, “a lot of [patrol officers] left the police shortly after completing their training to
work for security companies, private persons and in the worst case for the Taliban because all of
them pay much better wages. Unfortunately most of them take along their equipment including
the weapons.”488 In Balkh, ordinary citizens as well as government officials, including governor
Atta Mohammad Noor,489 recognized that high-level and petty corruption remained a problem
in the police force, and contributed toward insecurity within the provincial capital Mazar-e Sharif
and surrounding areas.490 In southeastern Afghanistan, American officials reported survey find-
ings of “only 1,200 officers at work in an area where Afghan commanders claimed 3,300 officers
were serving,”491 allowing commanders to collect the salaries of nonexistent “ghost” officers for
their personal benefit. In Uruzgan province, truancy within the ANP remained a persistent
problem.492 In Panjwai district of Kandahar province, auxiliary police units recruited through
the United States exhibited poor discipline and limited competence, including inadequate gun
handling and inconsistent lines of authority.493 In Kabul, ten high-ranking police officials in the
counter-narcotics police unit were alleged to have embezzled funds from salaries, stipends and
486Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2011, p. 12.
487Ibid., p. 13.
488Feilke 2010, p. 8.
489Former commander of the Jamiat-e Islami party based in the northern areas. In 2003, the commander of the 7th
Army Corps in Mazar-e Sharif.
490Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi, “Afghan Police Part of the Problem,” Institute of War and Peace Reporting, June 6 2006.
491David Rohde, “Overhaul of Afghan Police Is Expensive New Priority,” The New York Times, October 18, 2007.
492See Carlotta Gall, “Taliban Threat Is Said to Grow in Afghan South,” New York Times, May 3, 2006.
493Canadian Press, “Afghan police training frustrating and slow,” October 13, 2006.
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logistical expenses.”494
The security forces commanded by Kabul also faced challenges from within the political
system. The political equilibrium that had incrementally and tenuously formed in Kabul had
not taken place in much of Afghanistan’s provinces. Regional elites violently contested territory
in the north, west, and south of the country, employing both formal offices and and informal
political alliances with elites in the center. A growing conflict in the north set into motion
between Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Mohammad Noor escalated into large-scale violence
in 2003 and 2004. By April 2004, the provincial capital and multiple districts of the northern
province of Faryab were seized by ANA personnel loyal to Abdul Rashid Dostum. In response,
Kabul deployed ANA forces based in the capital city into Faryab. Soldiers from Atta Mohammad
Noor’s 7th Army Corps were also dispatched to Faryab from Mazar-e Sharif, underscoring the
extent to which informal turf battles and formal structures have overlapped in the post-2001
period. In the western provinces, the governor of Herat and powerful regional commander Ismael
Khan came into increasing confrontation with more junior military commanders reportedly
sponsored by Kabul. In April 2004, Kabul-allied military commander Zahir Nayebzada killed
Mirwais Sadiq, Ismael Khan’s son and a cabinet member, prompting heavy fighting between the
two sides and the deployment of the Afghan National Army from the capital to Herat. Several
months later, clashes broke out between men loyal to Ismael Khan and troops commanded by
Nayebzada and other pro-Kabul commanders Amanullah Khan and Dr. Ibrahim. The ANA
subsequently intervened, effectively suspending further violence but also freezing the gains made
by the forces opposed to Ismael Khan. In November of that year, the Afghan army moved to
disarm the police force in Qalat, the capital of Zabul province, leading to clashes between the
two forces.495
Moreover, the limited level of peacekeeping forces and committed Afghan army and police
personnel created a security vacuum throughout much of the country. This was a serious and
immediate problem because key leaders of the Taliban movement had located or relocated them-
selves in Pakistan’s sparsely populated border geographies and urban areas, where they began to
raise recruits and finance for a war against the newly established Kabul administration and its
494Pajhwok Afghan News, “Afghan police detain 10 officers on embezzlement charges,” November 26, 2007.
495Morning Star, “Afghan army takes on police force,” November 2, 2004.
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international sponsors.496 Together, the deficit of international and domestic forces and Taliban
sanctuaries in Pakistan provided advantageous conditions for the expansion of a violent insur-
gency against the newly formed administration in Kabul, especially in the border provinces of
the south and southeast. In these areas, there were between two and six international expedi-
tionary combat battalions in the first four years of the intervention, although these forces were
primarily oriented toward locating and engaging Al Qaeda forces remaining in Afghanistan under
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), not establishing local security or preventing Taliban infil-
tration.497 In this context, the primary providers of day-to-day security in the southern provinces
were a series of poorly paid and equipped police units outnumbered by Afghan Taliban forces.
In Uruzgan, the 347-strong police force, comprised of 45 men deployed in each of five districts,
faced an estimated 300 to 1,000 armed members of the Taliban. Uruzgan governor Abdul Hakim
Munib estimated an average of 300 armed insurgents in each district.498
These initial difficulties prompted the US to allocate more resources and training effort to the
ANA in 2005. Improved equipment, an increased number of trainers, and a slower rate of training
produced incremental gains in military capabilities. In Kabul, the National Military Academy
(established in 2005) recruited and trained relatively capable officers in military and non-military
subjects over the course of four years.499 At the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) and
seven newly developed regional military centers (established in 2007) located throughout the
country,500 enlisted soldiers developed individualized and platoon-level infantry skills. Improved
oversight and the introduction of an electronic payment system within the MOI and MOD
reduced the prevalence of “ghost” policeman and soldiers, as did the establishment of the donor-
controlled Law and Order Trust for Afghanistan (LOTFA) to distribute salaries, but inspections
still took place within the chain of command, “leaving room for manipulation.”501 Still, the
ANA frequently lacked the tangible and intangible capabilities necessary to perform effectively
and independently. Even as the ANA gradually became a larger fighting force with basic skills,
496Giustozzi 2008c; Nadiri 2014.
497In the months immediately following the intervention, much of the Al Qaeda leadership and rank and file had
either fled to northwest Pakistan, or otherwise been captured or killed. See Krause 2008.
498Carlotta Gall, “Taliban Threat Is Said to Grow in Afghan South,” New York Times, May 3, 2006.
499Hopkins, Nick“Afghanistan: Bin Laden is gone, but will the west now stay the course in Kabul?: Security will be
handed to the Afghans in 2014, but it will take years and billions more dollars before they can stand alone, generals
and senior diplomats tell Nick Hopkins,” The Guardian, May 11, 2011
500These training centers are located in Kandahar, Herat, Gardez, Mazar-e-Sharif, Konduz, Bamyan and Jalalabad.
501Giustozzi 2015, p. 158.
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it remained critically dependent on the support capabilities of international forces. In particular,
the logistics of the force—including close-air support, artillery support, and medical evacuation
flights—remained a key vulnerability.502
While training efforts improved basic competencies in the security forces, especially the army,
they did not improve the effectiveness of government forces in proportion to the growing Tal-
iban insurgency in the southern and eastern provinces. This development prompted the United
States and allied countries to expand the size of the ANA and, in particular, the ANP. In April
2007, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), an international commission of
comprised of the Afghan government and donor organizations to address collective interests in
Afghanistan, authorized a large increase in the ANP force, expanding the force from 49,700 to
75,000 men on duty. The 50% increase in ANP manpower, which was implemented in less than
one year, took place after two years of very limited efforts to alter the strength and operations
of the police. While the ANP expansion meant that the Ministry of Interior could field a larger
number of police officers in the insecure provinces of the south and east, the quality of the ex-
panded force remained inadequate. Most of the new ANP cadres were recruited on the basis of
personal ties to wartime networks and offered very little monetary compensation, which meant
that the least skilled and disciplined men selected into the police force. “Little or no effort went
into improving meritocracy within the MoI” and, as a consequence, patronage provided the most
efficient way of rapidly expanding the ANP force given the heightened priority of policing after
2006.503 And monthly wages of $70, barely covering living expenses in the urban and peri-urban
areas of the country, attracted poor and illiterate men with few job prospects and limited com-
mitment to participating in a full-fledged insurgency. As a result, new ANP cadres lacked either
the social or economic motivation to participate in the everyday forms of “high-risk” action that
came with policing on behalf of the central government, and absenteeism and underperformance
remained serious problems in the ANP. In Uruzgan, for example, a joint Dutch and Afghan pa-
trol discovered police officers cultivating poppy within their compound.504 Less than two years
later, Minister of Interior nominee Hanif Atmar reported that the annual absentee rate for the
502Eric Schmitt, “Where Armies Must Be Built, It’s Slow (Iraq) and Even Slower (Afghanistan),” New York Times,
September 25, 2005.
503Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2011, p. 3.
504C.J. Chivers, “US Taking Long View on Afghan Police and Army,” New York Times, May 3, 2007.
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ANP was approximately 20 percent.505
Under these conditions, the expansion of the security forces, especially the police, corre-
sponded with greater corruption. Between 2002 and 2009, more than 18,000 police personnel or
20% of the regular police force were accused of abuse of power or corruption in approximately
10,500 cases of misbehavior recorded by the Attorney General’s Office. Thirty of these cases in-
volved generals.506 Although these figures were not validated by an external organization, given
the political incentives of the government leadership to keep this information private, there is
good reason to believe that it is representative of the general scale of corruption in the police
force. A survey carried out by UNAMA in 2007 found “negative information—including asser-
tions of involvement in drug trafficking, corruption and assaults—on 939 (38 percent) of 2,464
officers it reviewed.”507
The American drive to expand the police force also consisted of efforts to supplement Afghan
policing capabilities through irregular forces. Beginning in 2006, the United States and Afghan
authorities initiated the first of several large-scale programs to establish irregular forces that could
supplement the efforts of the regular police.508 The first of these more formal initiatives, the
Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), was established in late 2006 to recruit village-level
forces that could provide community policing for their home areas. The ANAP program, which
was first established in Zabul and other provinces in the south and southeast, quickly ran into
problems. In these pilot provinces, government officials used the ANAP program to “regularize”
armed groups that had previously worked as unofficial guard forces for the ANP by providing
them with force-specific uniforms, arms, and salaries. Many of these men did not come from
the provinces to which they were assigned and did not actively interact with local communities
(would-be ANAP forces were mainly engaged in the protection of highways, road construction
projects, and mobile phone towers). More problematically, these forces were often an extension
of commanders with long histories of participation in Afghanistan’s wars and parochial interests
in acquiring greater political influence and wealth—interests well-served by participation in the
505Group 2008, p. 3.
506“Crime by Afghan Police Rises ‘Ten-Fold’ since 2002,” Kabul Weekly, July 1, 2009.
507Pratap Chatterjee, “Policing Afghanistan: Obama’s New Strategy,” CorpWatch, March 23, 2009.
508Prior to 2006, the US military had recruited a series of ad hoc irregular Afghan forces, known variously as the
Afghan Guard Forces, the Afghan Security Guards, and the Afghan Security Forces, to support military campaigns in
the southern and eastern border areas.
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ANAP program. Training was limited to an 80-day program on subjects in human rights and
the rule of law but not the practical elements of community policing. And the MOI and NDS
officials responsible for vetting recruits were either unable or unwilling to verify the backgrounds
of prospective recruits in the remote and dangerous provinces of the south and southeast. As a
result, ANAP forces immediately exhibited poor motivation and discipline, leading to the quiet
closure of the program in 2008. The next iterations of irregular policing began in 2009 with the
Afghanistan Public Protection Program (informally known as “AP3”) and a series of other pro-
grams developed in conjunction with the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy emerging within
the Obama administration.509 Sponsored directly by US special forces, the AP3 was developed
in March 2009 to induce the support, through official uniforms, arms, and salaries, of commu-
nities that had either sided against the Afghan government or declined to actively support it.510
However, the program exhibited similar problems to that of ANAP. Inadequate vetting, politi-
cal capture by controversial commanders, and personal and organizational conflicts between the
formal and informal branches of the police quickly undermined the effectiveness of the AP3
program. Similar problems emerged with many other irregular forces hastily organized by US
special forces throughout 2009. While these forces were charged with defending the areas from
which they were recruited, they frequently engaged in various abuses of rival communities and
interests.511 President Karzai sought to bring these various independent programs under a new
national program managed by the MOI, the Afghan Local Police (ALP), in 2010. However, even
under the direct supervision of Kabul, the ALP soon became a mechanism for patronizing allies
of the central government. Nor was the MOI capable of effectively monitoring the behavior of
the ALP in all areas of its presence, or resolving conflicts between irregular forces of the ALP and
the regular security forces.
The counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the Obama Administration in 2009 gave new im-
petus to security sector development in Afghanistan. For US planners, the Afghan security forces
509Other irregular forces included the Local Defense Initiative (previously known as the Community Defense Ini-
tiative), the Critical Infrastructure Police in the north, the Community Based Security Solutions in the east, and the
Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure in the south west.
510The AP3 program was funded and organized through the Department of Defense Afghanistan Security Forces
Fund, not the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) that sponsored most of the regular Afghan national security
forces.
511See, for example, Matthew Rosenberg and Alissa J. Rubin, “Afghanistan to Disband Irregular Police Force Set Up
Under NATO” New York Times, December 26, 2011.
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served two distinct purposes: first, they acted as a junior partner in the American counterinsur-
gency campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban; second, they were a crucial component of the
announced US exit from Afghanistan. The resulting training effort significantly expanded the
presence and manpower of the ANA and ANP. Between March 2009 and December 2011, the
ANA and other forces controlled by the Ministry of Defense increased in manpower from ap-
proximately 83,000 to 180,000, an increase of 117%; Ministry of Interior forces (including regular
and irregular forces) increased from 80,000 to 144,000, constituting a change of 80%. While the
new training effort greatly expanded the quantitative strength of both forces, it did not address
the deep-seated problems of patronage, attrition, and corruption present in the security forces,
particularly the ANP. New developments in police training efforts, notably the integration of
US-led OEF training mission (CSTC-A) into the NATO-led ISAF training effort (NTM-A), pro-
vided for more consistent forms of training across army and police units, but largely ignored the
prevalence of patronage occurring in the upper echelons of the police or alter incentives of police
officers to underperform or break the law. Two close observers of past and contemporary forms
of paramilitary policing in Afghanistan noted that “no system of meritocratic promotion from
the ranks of a new generation of senior police officers was in place or being effectively devel-
oped.”512 Despite growing evidence of police abuse, both MOI officials and international donors
were not primarily focused on developing internal control over corruption and other forms of
police misbehavior. This was both because the main objective of donors and much of the MOI
was the quantitative expansion of the size and technical capabilities of the ANP. Moreover, the
COIN strategy placed police officers on the front lines of the insurgency, exacerbating preex-
isting problems of desertion and creating new ones. The ANP were increasingly trained as a
paramilitary force based in garrisons located throughout the country, obstructing the develop-
ment of closer ties with communities in the insecure provinces of the south and east. Heavily
armed and stationary, the ANP was poorly prepared to develop interpersonal connections with
the communities they were charged with policing while also vulnerable to Taliban sieges in par-
ticularly insecure provinces. In areas bordering major roads, for example the highway stretches
between Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat, ANP regularly extorted money from commercial trucks
and ordinary citizens. ANP commanders also frequently used their subordinates to intimidate
512Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2011, p. 2.
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political rivals.
By the end of 2014, the Afghan national security forces were more technically skilled, equipped,
and quantitatively numerous than a decade prior. But the selection and promotion of security
force personnel, particularly the ANP, remained motivated by political connections, undermin-
ing the quality and autonomy of the security sector. At the same time, the expedient rush to grow
the security forces in response to Taliban gains meant that donors were reluctant to monitor and
disrupt the patronage process that enabled corruption in the army and police.
5.2.2 Reconstruction and Development Planning
Economic reconstruction took an imbalanced and fitful path in post-2001 Afghanistan. In the
years immediately following the fall of the Taliban government, reconstruction assistance was
comparatively limited. Much of the economic aid that began to flow into Afghanistan was allo-
cated toward humanitarian relief and “quick impact” projects targeting vulnerable communities,
but was not embedded in a larger effort to address the rehabilitation of the relatively productive
sectors of the economy. In 2002 and 2003, approximately $210 million or only 25% of Amer-
ican assistance was allocated toward longer-term reconstruction efforts. It was not until 2005
that efforts to identify and plan the prospective development of the Afghan economy began with
the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Initiated as an effort to address the prob-
lem of widespread poverty in Afghanistan, the ANDS process was based on the premise that
Afghanistan’s underdevelopment was attributable to a set of social, political, and economic prob-
lems that were invariably connected with one another. The ANDS process therefore drew on
consultations with a variety of Afghan domestic constituencies, including businessmen, clergy,
and community representatives in all areas of the country, as well as donor country officials.
The resulting product outlined a strategy for improving security, governance, and economic and
social progress and identified a wide range of benchmarks—comprising substantially all areas of
government activity—that Kabul sought to fulfill over the next two decades.
The ANDS process was also designed to organize the international community around a
common set of objectives and raise financing for their attainment. By 2006, 64 countries, 10
international organizations, and multiple NGOs had made commitments to advance stability and
development in Afghanistan, presenting both a potentially significant development opportunity
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and and a monitoring and coordination challenge. In order to meet this challenge, the Afghan
government along with the United Kingdom arranged the London Conference on Afghanistan
in January 2006, which produced a series of benchmarks based on the ANDS process in areas
as diverse as transportation, health, agriculture, counter-narcotics, banking, and gender. The
Afghanistan Compact, as this set of benchmarks was called, won the support of a wide variety
of donor countries and international organizations that participated in the London Conference.
It also established a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), a committee chaired
by both representatives of the Afghan government and the international community, to oversee
and coordinate the implementation of the benchmarks outlined in the Afghanistan Compact.
While extremely ambitious and silent on questions of development and political strategy, the
Afghanistan Compact was intended to demonstrate Kabul’s commitment to development and its
fear of abandonment.
In part because of Kabul’s efforts to engage international donors on the economy, the Afghan
economy expanded rapidly in the post-2001 era. Between 2002 and 2008, Afghanistan recorded
an average real growth rate of 7.3%, and a per capita growth rate of 3.8%. Driving this growth
were both consumption and high levels of fixed investment in physical infrastructure and real
estate. Refugees residing in Pakistan and Iran had begun to return to Afghanistan in the millions,
and large numbers of foreign diplomats, aid workers, and military personnel had established
operations in the capital city, greatly increasing demand for a wide range of largely imported
products. Textiles, generators, automobiles, construction materials, household products, and
other goods flowed into Kabul and other cities, supplying both household and business demand.
Meanwhile, donor governments and international organizations increasingly began to address
Afghanistan’s physical infrastructure, which had been almost entirely destroyed during the Soviet
occupation and subsequent civil war.513 The construction of highways, bridges, and hospitals
became a significant contributor to the expansion of the Afghan economy, making up nearly
20% of national income throughout the post-intervention period.
Notwithstanding this expansion in physical infrastructure and consumption demand, severe
513USAID estimated that, as of 2001, only 50 kilometers of paved roads covered Afghanistan’s land area of more than
650,000 square kilometers. See US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs, USAID Accomplishments in Afghanistan, 109th
Cong., 1st sess., September 11, 2006. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACH904.pdf.
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imbalances developed early on it in the post-2001 period. Investment expenditure in key pro-
duction areas also consistently fell short of their long-term productive potential. In general,
agriculture did not become substantially more productive in the years following the interna-
tional intervention because of insignificant investments in human capital, production, storage,
and transport, and the return of large numbers of unskilled refugees to Afghanistan’s rural areas.
Despite widespread recognition of the importance of agriculture to Afghanistan’s recovery, real
agricultural value added per worker, as estimated by the World Bank, declined by nearly 30%
between 2002 and 2008, recovering to its initial level in 2013.
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The agribusiness and light industry sectors, which had generated substantial domestic revenue
and foreign exchange reserves during much of the 20th century, also performed relatively poorly
during much of the post-2001 period. Dried fruit, carpets, cotton, and karakul wool were prod-
uct groups for which Afghanistan possessed the raw inputs and basic skills to produce in small
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numbers, but lacked the financing, physical infrastructure, and institutional support necessary to
develop in greater scale. Yet these potential export opportunities were largely ignored for nearly
a decade after the international intervention, and inadequately supported when they eventually
became recipients of foreign assistance. Accounting for approximately 2.5% of GDP as of 2002,
exports became a more prominent driver of economic growth between 2002 and 2008. But the
export contribution to the expansion of the Afghan economy declined in subsequent years, ulti-
mately reverting back to its 2002 level. Dried fruits, which accounted for a substantial share of the
world market as of the 1970s, declined in relation to national GDP after 2002. Exports of wool
products, which had historically constituted a large share of world consumption,514 increased in
the years immediately following the international intervention, but became a less consequential
and predictable export product after 2006. And carpet exports, as a share of GDP, increased by
ten-fold between 2002 and 2005, but declined in relative importance by the end of the decade.
But much of the post-2001 economic expansion became increasingly concentrated in invest-
ments in security-related services and construction, especially after the increase in the American
and international military presence in 2009. Between 2009 and 2013, the real economy expanded
by a growth rate of 10.4% in aggregate and 7.7% in per capita terms, to a significant degree be-
cause of the growth in transportation, security, and construction services. These were areas of
expenditure that were generally not sustainable. They also did little to improve the productive
capacity of the economy. Moreover, the contracts upon which this sector was based were clearly
contingent on the transitory presence of international military forces. As soon as these forces
reduced in size, so would demand for the security personnel, transportation convoys, storage
services, and housing that these contracts generated. Perhaps most significantly, businesses in se-
curity and construction services became deeply enmeshed in domestic and donor politics. In one
well-known example, a consortium of politically connected contractors in Afghanistan won large
parts of the $2.16 billion Host Nation Trucking (HNT) contract (one of the largest US-sponsored
contracts in Afghanistan), which they used to pay protection money to local commanders and
“monthly bribes to nearly every Afghan governor, police chief, and local military unit whose
territory the company passed.”515 HNT contractors also bribed US military personnel in return
514Between 1932 and 1963, the relative share of karakul wool exports from Afghanistan in world consumption was,
on average, more than 30%. Kayoumy 1969, p. 222.
515Majority Staff 2010, p. 41.
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for “steering contracts to the company and for creating fake missions.”516
The transportation services sector (and the political side effects it generated) expanded rapidly
in the post-2001 period. This was especially the case after 2006, when international combat forces
began to increase in size. As seen in Figure 5.3, growth in transportation services took off in 2007,
increasing from approximately 130% (of its 2002 base) in 2006 to 300% in one year alone. Real
growth in this sector was not a significant driver of the aggregate economy between 2002 and
2006, but strongly correlated with income growth after 2007. By 2007, transportation, logistics,
and security services alone made up about one-third of agricultural output, and by the end of
2012, almost three quarters.
Tax revenue grew in ways that were consistent with the imbalanced development of the econ-
omy. Domestic revenue increased rapidly in the years following the international intervention,
growing from only 3% of national income in 2002 to approximately 11% by 2014. But the tax
516See Matthieu Aikins, “The Bidding War” The New Yorker, March 7, 2016.
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effort was concentrated in the least demanding areas of revenue raising. Taxation of rural house-
holds made up an extremely small section of domestic revenue. Within the urban sector, much
of the growth in domestic revenue was attributable to taxes on income as well as goods and ser-
vices in the urban sector. The expansion of consumption expenditure and company earnings,
both tied to the international presence, provided the basis for the growth in government revenue.
Increasing income from urban households and foreign citizens and, in particular, the growing
volume of construction, security, and transportation contracts (through the Business Receipts
Tax) increased the size of taxable activity in the cities. Income taxation, for example, grew from
a non-existent base in 2002 to almost 4% of GDP in 2014, generated from a small group of large
individuals and corporate taxpayers. By contrast, the more corruption-prone activity of customs
administration did not experience substantial growth during the post-2001 period. Although in-
ternational trade provided a relatively accessible source of government finance, customs revenue
did not change substantially during the post-2001 period. By 2004, customs revenue had grown
to approximately 3.5% of national income, but increased little thereafter despite the increased
volume of trade. Tax efficiency was not a high priority of the Karzai administration from the
perspective of the Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, corruption had become a problem in the
senior ranks of the revenue directorate of the MOF. Several staff members in the customs and
revenue department were involved in embezzlement of customs revenue, as evidenced by the dis-
missal of 40 senior MOF staff members for corruption or inefficiency in 2015.517 Furthermore,
the police force charged with monitoring the customs effort remained under the control of the
MOI, a particularly corrupt government agency, despite repeated calls to move the jurisdiction
of the customs police to the relatively capable MOF.
Similar to the security sector, efforts to rebuild the educational system focused much more on
quantity instead of quality. In 2001, the need for schooling was enormous. Out of an estimated
school-age population of 5 million, less than one million children, almost all of them boys, were
enrolled in general schools, and a very small proportion of the population was literate.518 The
21,000 teachers that had remained in their positions during the Taliban government were largely
517Byrd and Payenda 2016.
518According to the 2003 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 37% of males and 10% of females of age 6
or older were reported as literate (reading and writing capabilities). World Food Programme and Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development 2004.
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Figure 5.4. Domestic Revenue Raising, 2002–2014
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under-educated. And most rural schools did not have elemental school supplies, and in many
instances, even a school building. Efforts to improve the educational system, mainly financed by
the multi-donor Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) administered by the World Bank,
made significant gains in the quantity and, to a lesser extent, quality of schooling in Afghanistan.
By 2013, primary and secondary school enrollment had increased to 8.7 million, of which 36%
were girls. A system of 16,000 schools had developed, staffed by 187,000 teachers, many of
them trained in education.519 Net attendance rates increased by 20 percentage points among
primary school aged children between 2005 and 2012 (from 43% to 64% for males, and from 29%
to 48% for females), and by 17 percentage points among secondary school aged children (from
22% to 42% for males, and from 10% to 23% for females).520 Amongst youth (15-24 years of
age), female literacy increased from 20% in 2005 to 32% in 2012, and male literacy from 40%
to 62% over the same period.521 Nevertheless, many dimensions of educational quality did not
show substantial improvement, especially in provincial areas where security, governance, and the
supply of capable teachers were more limited. Approximately one half of all schools did not
have intact buildings, and more than one half of all school teachers had not graduated from high
school.522 Low salaries and difficult working conditions continued to make teacher absenteeism
a problem. In 2012, an government-sponsored study estimated that approximately 68% of school
teachers (117,000 teachers) did not meet the minimum qualifications for professional teachers (a
high school education plus two years in a teacher training college), varying from 30% in Kabul
City to 99% in Daikondi province.523 In the provinces, headmaster and teacher appointments
quickly became employed as patronage in the post-2001 period. By 2011, the MOE had sent
staff to the provinces because of concerns that less qualified individuals were hired over new
graduates or more qualified people in provincial schools.524 In the rural areas, qualified teachers
and textbooks were in short supply because of insecurity. Around 500 schools in 10 insecure
provinces (equivalent to 15% of all schools in the provinces where school closures occurred) were









shut down because of insecurity by 2011.525 Non-attendance, absenteeism, and dropout rates
were especially high in these areas.
Other areas of development activity, notably health, were relatively successful in the post-
2001 era. In 2002, none of Afghanistan’s provinces met the minimal WHO standard of 1 bed
for every 1,000 people, and almost all of the large health facilities with specialized services were
located in Kabul and other major urban centers (especially Jalalabad, Herat, Kandahar). While
most health facilities were in acceptable physical condition, nearly half of facilities had poor or
nonexistent access to electricity and water. The maternal mortality ratio, estimated at 1,600 per
100,000 live births, was the highest ever recorded.526 The average person lived until 55 years,
according to United Nations estimates. The infant and child mortality rates of 165 and 257 per
1000 live births, respectively, were some of the highest in the world. And access to health services,
defined as living within one hour walking of a health facility, in 2001 was limited to less than 10%
of the population.527 To address these deficiencies, the Ministry of Public Health developed a Ba-
sic Package for Health Services (BPHS) in 2003 that established the administrative architecture to
contract with a growing system of public, private, and NGO-run health facilities. The BPHS set
up an organizational system that effectively coordinated donors (primarily the European Com-
munity, USAID, and World Bank), MOPH staff, and health NGOs in service of a series of geo-
graphic targets (mainly underserved communities) and health objectives across a small number of
basic services (e.g., maternal and newborn health, child health and immunization, communica-
ble diseases, etc.). By 2015, average life expectancy had increased to approximately 60.5 years.528
Maternal mortality had declined by almost 80% to 327 per 100,000 live births in 2010. Infant and
child mortality rates had both declined by more than 50% to 77 and 97, respectively, per 1000
live births.529 On a range of other indicators, the health system improved dramatically during the
post-2001 period, not only because of donor resources and technical advice, but also because the
MOPH was not a polarized agency like much of the security institutions; because it had devised
a means of coordinating donor resources and reaching local communities through the BPHS; and
identified discrete and achievable targets early on in the intervention.
525Bethke 2012.
526Bartlett et al. 2005.
527Newbrander et al. 2014.
528World Health Organization, Global Health Observatory (GHO) data.
529Newbrander et al. 2014.
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5.3 Explaining Institutional Outcomes in Post-2001 Afghanistan
How does one account for the uneven pattern of institutional documented in the previous sec-
tion? This section argues that limited organizational capital arising from personalist governance
as well as incoherent external resourcing obstructed the development of capable government in-
stitutions. Personalist politics were, in part, a legacy of the successive wars that had emerged
and evolved in Afghanistan since 1979. But they were also an extension of a postwar electoral
system that obstructed the emergence of cross-cutting, interest-aggregating political parties and a
strategy of patronage adopted by President Karzai to consolidate influence within it. Personalist
governance, in turn, gave way to a distributional political system in which offices, contracts, and
other resources were dispense in exchange for political support.
Incoherent donor objectives and poor coordination accentuated this distributional equilib-
rium in Afghanistan. The primary sponsors of the international intervention, most prominently
the United States, failed to identify a coherent set of end-state objectives for national institutions
and a strategy for achieving them in Afghanistan. At the same time, donors did not coordinate
their various aid and training activities in Afghanistan, making it difficult to monitor and eval-
uate the effectiveness of aid programming. This problem persisted throughout the US military
and civilian “surge” into Afghanistan beginning in late 2009, when the Obama administration an-
nounced a counterinsurgency strategy to defeat the Taliban. Despite widespread recognition that
the war Afghanistan required a new strategy, the surge did not by itself reconcile international
objectives in Afghanistan or fully address problems of poor donor coordination.
This combination of limited organizational capital and incoherent external resourcing, in
turn, generated a distributional equilibrium that rewarded individuals directly and indirectly
connected to factions operating within the central ministries. In this environment, connections
(rawabit or personal relations) usually trumped merit (zawabit or principles) in processes of re-
cruitment and retention, and development projects were programmed in Afghanistan without
identifying how they complemented existing or ongoing development projects, who would op-
erate and maintain these projects after completion, and how these projects would be overseen. In
this section, I show the processes by which each of these factors, limited organizational capital
and external incoherence, impeded the development of government institutions after Bonn.
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5.3.1 Limited Organizational Capital
The Bonn Agreement marked both a continuation and change in the wartime politics of Afghanistan.
On the one hand, the distribution of political power continued to reflect patterns of military con-
trol. Shura-ye Nazar forces under the command of Qasim Fahim were deployed throughout the
Kabul area but especially concentrated in the city center and the largely Tajik northern neighbor-
hoods of Kabul. The predominantly Hazara neighborhoods of Afshar, Kart-e Sakhi, and Pol-e
Sokhta were under the control of Hezb-e Wahdat cadres loyal to Karim Khalili. In Paghman,
Qargha, Maidan Shahr, and other areas west and southwest of Kabul, forces loyal to Sayyaf, a
close Fahim ally, had taken control. Farther afield, other UF-allied commanders had taken con-
trol of different regional centers. Ismael Khan had returned to his political base of Herat; Haji
Qadir, the leader of the Arsala clan, contended with Pashai commander Hazrat Ali for control
over Jalalabad; and Mazar-e Sharif quickly became an object of contention amongst forces under
the control of the Ustad Atta, Dostum, Mohammad Mohaqqeq,530 and others.
At the same time, the Bonn Agreement marked a departure from Afghanistan’s wartime past.
The settlement at Bonn paved the way for more plural politics that included Mohammadzai-
era technocrats and patrimonial elites, former members of the Parcham and Khalq factions of
the PDPA, the Maoist Shola-ye Jawed (Eternal Flame) organization, social democrats and con-
stitutionalists, educated youth, and women’s rights activists.531 These diverse political networks
formed old and new connections with one another in the years immediately following the Bonn
Agreement, including several unsuccessful efforts to establish a programmatic and moderate polit-
ical organization in Afghanistan. AIA chairman Karzai (through his brother Qayyum Karzai) ex-
plored efforts to establish a “moderate and reformist” political force in Afghanistan that included
members of the National Front for Democracy in Afghanistan (Jabha-ye Melli bara-ye Demokrasi-
ye Afghanistan), a coalition of democratic activists, Hazara intellectuals, Rome group members,
youth groups, and former leftists Rangin Dadfar Spanta, Najib Roshan, and Azam Dadfar. Dr.
Abdullah and Yunus Qanuni of Shura-ye Nazar sought to establish a reformist political party with
530Mohaqqeq is a Hazara political leader and former military commander in the Khomeinist Nasr organization who
became a senior member of Wahdat after its formation in 1990.
531While secular and democratic forces did not initially hold any direct influence in the political system, individual
members of these groups became more powerful in subsequent years. For insightful detail, see Ruttig 2006.
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Hamid Karzai that could transcend ethnic lines.532 This prospect gained momentum in late 2003,
when a number of Karzai-affiliated technocrats, Shura-ye Nazar leaders, and Karim Khalili’s sec-
tion of Wahdat discussed the establishment of Nohzat-e Melli as a reform-oriented umbrella party.
Karzai ultimately declined to pursue opportunities to build platform-based party coalitions with
other political forces, opting instead for a more fluid, opportunistic form of alliance-making after
the 2004 presidential elections that, in many ways, his opponents emulated. Karzai justified his
opposition to new political parties by arguing that the (armed) parties of the past were directly
implicated in the civil war violence of the 1990s—a common view in Afghanistan.533
While the early years of the intervention (2002-2005) were characterized by platform and
coalition building, the following years became politically polarized and personalist. Two factors
contributed to this development. First, the adoption of the single nontransferable vote (SNTV)
electoral system in February 2005 systematically obstructed the development of political parties
that could aggregate interests and elicit participation in Afghan politics, reinforcing the chilling
effect of Karzai’s categorical and early opposition to political parties on the possibility of pro-
grammatic politics. Although the electoral system was initially designed to follow a proportional
representation (PR) format, President Karzai reportedly directed that it be changed to an SNTV
format during an early 2004 cabinet meeting.534 Despite opposition from UNAMA, the SNTV
design became law in May 2004 and was confirmed by the cabinet in February 2005.
The consequences of the SNTV were far-reaching. Because the SNTV format rewards individ-
ual candidates, not party lists, with the greatest number of votes in each constituency, it provided
strong disincentives to cooperate with politicians who share similar interests or ideas. Further-
more, by frequently resulting in small margins between winners and losers, the SNTV system
presented particularly strong incentives for vote-buying and corruption. Candidates were also
restricted from displaying any party affiliation on the ballot during the 2005 parliamentary elec-
532Dobbins 2008.
533In an interview, Karzai stated that “Afghanistan was destroyed, tormented, put through lots of suffering because
of the bickering, because of the in-fighting, because of the political agendas of the parties that were not national.
Afghanistan needs to have a day off on that. . .I don’t know if I will lead a political party, but definitely a movement
amongst the people.” BBC, Hamid Karzai: Talking Point Special, May 10, 2002. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/talking_point/1940038.stm
534The SNTV electoral system is uncommon. It had previously been used for parliamentary elections in Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan, but was subsequently abrogated. At present, it is used in Jordan, the Pitcairn Islands, and
Vanuatu.
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tions, further discouraging party development.535 As a consequence, the SNTV system has served
to “retard the development of a stable party system, accentuate the fragmentation of politics in
Afghanistan, and leave national legislation dependent on a parliament characterised by unstable,
unaccountable factions and personality politics.”536 In the 2005 parliamentary elections, only
sixteen percent of the approximate 2,800 candidates were registered with political parties, and
these party candidates (most of whom were only loosely integrated into party structures) won
less than a third of the seats in the lower house.537 In the next round of parliamentary elections
in 2010, more than two thirds of the parliamentary seats were allocated to candidates without
any party affiliation.538 The weakness of the party system, in turn, meant that both parliament
and executive institutions have had very limited lines of accountability to the electorate. In place
of disciplining mechanisms within the electorate and parties themselves, the central government
and legislature became increasingly corrupt and clientelistic.
A second, and more complicated, determinant of the personalized trajectory of Afghan pol-
itics centered on the related strategies of political consolidation and institution building adopted
by AIA chairman Hamid Karzai. In 2002, Karzai lacked a strong political base as well as capa-
ble institutions of government. Almost all of the key cabinet portfolios and much of emerging
security structure were controlled by wartime networks affiliated with the UF, especially the
Shura-ye Nazar forces that had taken control over the capital city after the fall of the Taliban
government. The AIA chairman had developed a working relationship with Qasim Fahim,539
who presided over a core group of Shura-ye Nazar commanders as well as secondary networks of
other Jamiat (of which Shura-ye Nazar was a part) and Ittehad commanders. Karzai also formed
a strong working relationship with the Wahdat leader Karim Khalili, who held influence over
the central Hazara territories. Together, Fahim, Khalili, and other military commanders lent
political support to the fledgling administration in Kabul, while also deriving significant benefits
from joining the post-2001 state. The resulting cabinet, as shown in Table 5.1, was a coalition
535This problem was partially addressed in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Candidates were permitted to display




539Curiously, Karzai and Fahim had a complicated past. As deputy foreign minister in 1994, Karzai was detained
and arrested by men under the command of Qasim Fahim, who was then the security chief for Ahmad Shah Massoud.
Coll 2004.
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of wartime networks in which most members had high patronage demands and limited prior
specialization. One glaring exception to this rule were the security portfolios held by Shura-ye
Nazar figures Fahim, Abdullah, and Qanuni, who had informally performed similar roles in
wartime, but nonetheless had very high patronage demands. Another exception was the small
number of émigré specialists without a political base (Fayez, Farhang, Arsala, Sediqi, and Amin)
who occupied portfolios that were technical in nature and involved a high degree of international
exposure.
Karzai clearly needed the support of the UF groups to stay in office, and these groups were
willing to work with Karzai because he enjoyed strong international support, and therefore could
influence access to government offices and external resources. But he was also confronted with rel-
atively strong political allies and weak institutions of government. The AIA chairman sought to
simultaneously address these distinct challenges by increasingly co-opting potential rivals while
bringing educated émigrés and youth into the government. Beginning in 2003, Hamid Karzai
began to develop a coalition of both mujahideen and reform-oriented figures, simultaneously
breaking up the political networks formed during the Soviet conflict and incorporating the pre-
war elite and youth educated in neighboring countries. Karzai had developed a more prominent
political profile within Afghanistan and, critically, retained the near unanimous backing of the
international community. With the quiet support of the UN, European donors, and to some
extent the US, Karzai dropped several major commanders from the ATA cabinet—Qasim Fahim,
Mustafa Kazemi, Mohammad Mohaqqeq, Hussein Anwari,540 Gul Agha Sherzai, and Dostum’s
representatives.541 Many of these military commanders retained significant formal or informal
authority in the Afghan government: some were transferred to governorships (Sherzai, Anwari)
or maintained an extensive number of allies or clients in the central and line ministries (Fahim,
Dostum, Mohaqqeq, Kazemi). However, the moves appeared to signal the beginning of a con-
certed institution building effort by newly elected President Karzai. As shown in Table 5.3, many
of the figures that joined the government possessed educational or professional backgrounds in
their area of responsibility and did not have their own political bases in Afghanistan, reducing
the scope for patronage.
540Anwari was a military commander aligned with Asef Mohseni’s Harakat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan.
541In this respect, Karzai was aided by the newly established constitutional stipulation that cabinet ministers must
have higher education, which many of the wartime commanders clearly did not have.
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Karzai had also begun to bring into the government émigré specialists with strong interna-
tional reputations and limited political bases, including Ashraf Ghani in the MOF and Ali Jalali
in the MOI. Ghani, an anthropologist who had worked in academia and the World Bank for
many years, was well versed in the technical and political aspects of institution building in the
MOF—during his tenure, he issued a new currency and established a single treasury account, and
undertook more political tasks such as the centralization of customs revenue.542 And Jalali, who
had served in the prewar military and closely followed military developments in Afghanistan
during the Soviet war, was well positioned to reform the police force, which was emerging as
the weakest section of the Afghan national security forces. Amrullah Saleh, the newly appointed
chief of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and former protégé of Ahmad Shah Massoud,
was appointed to improve the intelligence service’s capacity to counter the growing Taliban insur-
gency based in Pakistan. Amin Fatemi, the newly appointed health minister, and Amirzai Sangin,
the new communication minister, brought with them decades of experience in their respective
portfolios.
While President Karzai supported the UN led disarmament, demobilization, and reintegra-
tion process and the removal of the least competent and reputable officers in the security forces,
he was not willing to fully support the removal of corrupt or incompetent but politically con-
nected officers that could be found throughout the army and police force, effectively blocking the
development of a merit-based security force. This included Karzai’s political base of Kandahar,
where President Karzai’s brother Ahmad Wali and other political allies Abdul Raziq (Achakzai),
Abdul Raziq Sherzai (brother of Gul Agha Sherzai), and Haji Gulalai (a childhood classmate of
Sherzai) controlled most of the security forces and development resources in the province and
surrounding areas. In Kandahar, the security forces and political establishment had developed an
especially pronounced reputation for corruption involving resources gained from opium traffick-
ing, customs embezzlement, and development assistance, and the selling of offices and positions
for bribes. Indeed, by 2005 the momentum for political reform in the Afghan government had
begun to peter out. President Karzai opted to split the difference between merit and patronage,
appointing reform-oriented figures to key cabinet positions while continuing to countenance
542Most notably, Ghani travelled to Herat in May 2004 to obtain unsettled customs revenues raised from the customs
house, then under the control of Ismael Khan. See Carlotta Gall, “Kabul Announces Push to Gain Revenue and
Combat Corruption,” New York Times, May 24, 2003.
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problematic patronage appointments to upper- and middle-level civilian and military offices. Pa-
tronage appointees in Takhar were discovered to be moving large quantities of heroin through
northern Afghanistan.543 In Helmand, ANP commanders were known to confiscate substantial
shares of subordinates’ wages and take bribes in exchange for prematurely releasing accused crim-
inals.544. By the end of 2005, Jalali had left the government unable to carry out merit reform at
the upper echelons of the interior ministry. Dr. Abdullah, who as Foreign Minister had sought
to rationalize a bloated ministry and enlist international support for reform and reconstruction,
was dropped from the cabinet in favor of Rangin Dadfar Spanta, a more ideological figure who
would need to depend heavily on Karzai’s patronage to stay in office.
Karzai also sought to simultaneously break up the patronage networks and extend his per-
sonal influence in the army officer corps. In 2004, he had appointed political ally Rahim Wardak,
a former military officer and mujahideen commander, in place of Qasim Fahim as Minister of De-
fense with the objective of balancing the extensive network of Jamiat commanders in the army.
Although Wardak was perhaps more oriented toward reforming the army in favor of merit, he
lacked significant influence within the military. This was partly because Wardak did not possess
the military record and charisma required to win the support of senior officers more amenable
to reform; it was also because Fahim’s network was deeply embedded in the army. Of a total 100
generals appointed by Qasim Fahim in 2002, 90 reportedly belonged to Shura-ye Nazar.545 By the
end of 2005, Wardak had overseen more than 4,000 new officer appointments, “but the patron-
age networks were far from crushed.”546 Moreover, Wardak’s efforts to reform the ministry were
impeded by his poor personal relationship with the Chief of Army Staff and former Jamiat com-
mander Bismillah Khan Mohammadi. Wardak did not get along with Mohammadi, which meant
that his efforts to improve the quality of the officer corps were seen as inherently conflictual. The
ANA soon became divided into competing networks, with Mohammadi retaining the loyalty of
a large majority of the officer corps—in 2008, a reported “6 out of 11 brigade commanders and
12 battalion commanders of 46.”547
543Scott Baldauf, “Inside the Afghan drug trade,” Christian Science Monitor, June 13, 2006.
544For example, see David Rohde, “Afghan Symbol for Change Becomes a Symbol of Failure,” New York Times,
September 5, 2006.




By 2006, Karzai had primarily incorporated into his government either (1) loyalists who were
dependent on his patronage, (2) relatively apolitical figures with specialized, usually technical
skills and relatively strong international reputations, and (3) influential mujahideen figures who
could provide significant political support in exchange for autonomy in government. Karzai
was now coming into his own as a leading figure within Afghan politics. He had cultivated
a political base in Kandahar through his extended family, skillfully enlisted major donors in
support of his government, and built a carefully calibrated coalition of mujahideen and reform-
oriented figures that resulted in the decisive electoral defeat of Yunus Qanuni in the 2004 election.
However, it soon became clear that Karzai was not willing to put his own political standing at
risk through sustained reforms of the Afghan government, particularly in the security forces.
Karzai was not prepared to endanger his domestic position by disrupting the patronage networks
in the government ministries and contractor economy, especially when much of his family and
political base in Kandahar were becoming deeply involved in these networks. This calculation
was reinforced by developments in the Middle East. By 2004, the US intervention in Iraq had
begun to spin out of control, and as a consequence American and international attention to
Afghanistan had rapidly declined. With US resources and attention tied up in Iraq, Karzai was less
sanguine about the prospects of cracking down on corruption within the Afghan government. In
2004, for example, donor countries had contributed only $11.2 million of $65 million requested
by the Afghan government to fund police salaries. As a result, the police units based in Kabul
“went unpaid for months, a situation that resulted in petty corruption that undermined public
confidence.”548 In this context of limited resources, Karzai was reluctant to enforce a crackdown
on the police, which would have disproportionately affected the lower echelons of the force while
endangering his political standing in Kabul.
If President Karzai had already adopted a “mixed” form of governance that combined merit
and patronage in the government, the run-up to the 2009 presidential elections would swing
Karzai’s politics more decisively toward personalist politics. By the spring of 2009, Karzai had
sought to co-opt mujahideen and religious personalities that could produce votes for his election
campaign, at the same time weakening the capacity of political rivals to mobilize votes along
ethnic lines. By May 2009, Karzai dropped Ahmad Zia Massoud in favor of Marshal Fahim,
548Perito 2009, p. 5.
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who could more effectively generate votes among the northeastern Tajik communities on behalf
of the presidential ticket.549 Karzai’s electoral ticket, along with the financial contributions his
campaign reportedly received from Kabul Bank (described below), represented an acceleration in
the use of patronage in the Afghan government. President Karzai’s increasing employment of
patronage, which had begun to develop by the end of the first Karzai government, was beginning
to accelerate.
Changes in the American posture toward Afghanistan tended to accentuate Karzai’s political
strategy. US foreign policy toward Afghanistan had not fundamentally changed—the Obama ad-
ministration sought to support the functioning and durability of the post-Bonn political system,
even if Karzai was unwilling or unable to crack down on patronage appointments to the extent
that most donors desired. But the tenor of American support had, unsurprisingly, become more
business-like. The Obama administration had indicated that its working relationship with the
Afghan government would be more contractual than it had been in previous years. The newly
inaugurated administration was much less willing to accommodate corruption in the Afghan gov-
ernment than had been the case during the Bush years, and its dealings with Kabul would begin
to reflect this expectation.
Whereas Washington had offered unqualified support for Karzai in the 2004 presidential elec-
tion, it had now adopted a much more circumspect line toward his candidacy in 2009—as had
the UN and other international partners. But the actions of key American officials dealing
with Kabul had begun to suggest, from Karzai’s perspective, that the Obama administration
was not simply neutral—that it was collectively aligned against his candidacy. The newly ap-
pointed Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Richard Holbrooke, as well
as US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, had independently initiated discussions with Karzai’s rivals
in which he had encouraged them to run for the presidency.550 In Kabul, “rumors circulated
about politicians that had been encouraged by Holbrooke to challenge Karzai. The rumors in-
cluded ministers as well as prominent politicians in the opposition.”551 US Ambassador Karl
Eikenberry, barely a month into his term, “made a point of showing up at news conferences with
549The reunification of Karzai and Fahim was reportedly facilitated by their respective brother and half-brother,
Mahmoud and Hasin. See Adam B. Ellick and Dexter Filkins, “Political Ties Shielded Bank in Afghanistan,” New
York Times, September 7, 2010.
550Eide 2012, p. 127; Gates 2014, p. 358.
551Eide 2012, p. 127.
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other presidential candidates, including Ghani and Abdullah.”552 The newly appointed Deputy
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Afghanistan, Peter Galbraith, who
also frequently met with opposition candidates, sought to restrict the number of polling centers
in the upcoming presidential election to relatively secure areas, a move that would hurt Karzai’s
candidacy.553 While some of the actions taken by Holbrooke, Eikenberry, and Galbraith were
not by themselves unusual—it was common practice for foreign government officials to engage
with all of the presidential candidates—their frequency and publicity was interpreted by Karzai
and other Afghan political elites as a US move to unseat him.
In reality, there was confusion in the Obama administration about how to approach Karzai,
and Holbrooke’s maneuvering was in part reflection of this confusion.554 The politics of Washing-
ton and Kabul were rapidly changing, and Holbrooke likely saw an entrepeneurial opportunity
to shape US and Afghan government policy at the same time. In any case, Holbrooke’s actions
further pushed Karzai in favor of patronage politics. Karzai would ultimately prevail over his
primary opponent, Dr. Abdullah, in a electoral contest characterized by extensive fraud, inse-
curity, and uncertainty. But, perhaps more importantly, it decisively reversed Karzai’s already
flagging willingness to reform government processes of appointments and procurement at the
heart of corruption in the government. The problem of patronage was compounded by what
many described as President Karzai’s hands-off leadership style. While Karzai kept a close eye on
the political dimensions of the coalition he had assembled, he took a much less active interest in
management and human resources problems so critical to day-to-day governance.
The post-election bargain involved a hands-off posture toward corruption within central and
line ministries. Karzai’s strategy of personalist government had placed allied political networks
in high- and middle-level positions throughout the government agencies and security forces. As
part of this exchange, President Karzai and his senior allies would not actively pursue one an-
other’s subordinates for corrupt behavior or other forms of malfeasance. By 2009, corruption
had become firmly entrenched in the Afghan political system. It was the price of a political strat-
egy that simultaneously shattered the opposition and stabilized national politics, accruing power
to President Karzai. The security ministries, in particular the Ministry of Interior, were at the
552Elizabeth Rubin, “Karzai in His Labyrinth,” New York Times, August 4,2009
553Karzai drew support from many of the relatively insecure areas in Kandahar and southern Afghanistan.
554On American confusion toward Afghanistan, see M. Yusuf, H. Yusuf, and Zaidi 2011.
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center of the distributional equilibrium in Afghanistan. One MOI official described the appoint-
ments process in transactional terms. “Karzai has to bribe these power brokers. . .otherwise he
will not survive. It is not only in the Interior ministry, it is everywhere. It is in the Defense min-
istry, it is in the [Afghan National] Army.” Patronage appointments were especially prevalent in
the Ministry of Interior. Ghulam Ali Wahdat, a Khalili client, was appointed in the key position
of Deputy Minister of Interior for Administrative Affairs, which he used to distribute positions
to Wahdat loyalists. Lieutenant General Yunus Noorzai, the uncle of Kandahari commander
Aref Noorzai (a brother-in-law of President Karzai), was appointed as head of the Afghan Border
Police (ABP). Yunus Noorzai, along with Aref Noorzai, were reportedly implicated or directly
involved in poppy smuggling and customs embezzlement at the Spin Boldak border crossing in
Kandahar province, which they used to maintain control over the southern region.555
Personalist governance, and the absence of organizational capital that it represented, was
problematic because it undermined the cohesion of the security services at the center and, at
times, at the local level. Within the MOI and, to a lesser extent, the MOD, factionalism at times
obstructed officials from reporting organizational problems to peers or immediate superiors. In
Herat, for example, “[f]actionalism reinforced conflict and rivalry within the police force and
undermined its cohesion. Since the survival of police officers depended on the strength of the po-
litical factions they belonged to, officers tried to strengthen the position of their faction within
the police and MoI while undermining other factions. This factional competition exacerbated
mistrust and undermined cohesion and cooperation. For instance, in many cases a district police
chief and his deputy belonged to different factions and, instead of working as a team, they re-
frained from supporting and cooperating with each other.556 Limited organizational capital was
also problematic because it provided incentives for factional leaders to promote loyalist junior
officers at faster rates than relatively capable but unconnected officers. Incompetent commanders
were often retained because they enjoyed the support of political allies or familial relatives in the
senior ranks of the police or the army. Despite emerging a problem in the early years of the inter-
vention, by 2014 no procedure had been put in place to objectively evaluate and reward officers
on the basis of merit.
555Peter Graff, “US troops leave border to Afghan boss accused of graft.” Reuters, March 17, 2010.
556Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2011, p. 32.
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Patronage was also prevalent in ministries that provided basic services—including the min-
istries of education, agriculture, water and energy, as well as the court system. These government
agencies had a relatively large number of provincial staff and frequent contacts with ordinary cit-
izens. And with limited donor visibility over provincial appointments in these areas, patronage
appointments were very common, as was corruption. In the Ministry of Education, the largest
employer in the Afghan government, not just provincial and district heads of education but also
legislators routinely promoted relatives and political allies in the school system instead of more
qualified teachers and principals. According to reported findings by the Independent Joint Anti-
Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, a government watchdog, education officials,
provincial council members, and parliamentarians, colluded together in allocating patronage ap-
pointments. The committee’s executive director reported that “[i]n some cases, there appears
to be quota or everybody has got a share in the appointment.”557 Yet another problem was that
patronage appointments tended to favor their own home districts. When provincial education of-
ficials were situated in their home province, they at times directed the preponderance of resources
to their home district, ignoring other districts in the province.558
The post-Bonn distributional equilibrium was also based on access to government contracts
and property. Family members and associates of the government leadership, and sometimes se-
nior officials themselves, traded their political connections for lucrative construction or security
contracts and access to land. Hasin Fahim, a half-brother of Qasim Fahim, was an early benefi-
ciary of the emerging security economy. Fahim was a shareholder in Strategic Security Services
International (SSSI), which had won contracts to provide security for the Afghanistan Interna-
tional Bank (2004),559 Fluor Corporation (2004),560 and USAID (2009),561 as well as the Serena
Hotel. Fahim also owned the Zahid Walid company, which expanded by winning high-profile
international and domestic contracts.562 In the central province of Bamiyan, Nabi Khalili, owner
5571TV, “Over half of teachers in Afghanistan unfit for position: anti-corruption watchdog,” August 23, 2015.
558Giustozzi 2010, p. 23.
559Business Wire, “ING Bank Group Selects Secure Risks’ Strategic Security Solutions to Provide Security for
Afghanistan International Bank,” July 14, 2004.
560PR Newswire, “Fluor Selects Secure Risks’ Strategic Security Solutions to Provide Security for Afghanistan Re-
construction Projects,” November 3, 2004.
561See http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacw231.pdf.
562Zahid Walid won international contracts to pour concrete for a NATO base and rebuild portions of the American
embassy. Domestic projects included the reconstruction of the Kabul airport, and several projects sponsored by the
Ministry of Water and Energy to supply diesel fuel.
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of the Gholghola Group and brother of Second Vice President Karim Khalili, was awarded with a
contract to build a 20 kilometer section of the road connecting Bamiyan to Kabul—using asphalt
materials that “won’t last much beyond three or four years at the most.”563 Hamed Wardak, the
owner of security company NCL Holdings and the son of Minister of Defense Rahim Wardak,
won an award under the DOD-sponsored Host Nation Trucking (HNT) contract, despite pos-
sessing no direct experience in managing transportation services before this contract.564 Ahmad
Rateb Popal and Ahmad Rashid Popal, cousins of Hamid Karzai and principals of Watan Risk
Management, were awarded with contracts to provide convoy security for seven out of the eight
prime contractors under the HNT contract, covering approximately 3,500 US supply trucks
every month. Watan’s contract was, in turn, sub-contracted to a private Kandahar-based mili-
tia controlled by a distant relative, Rohullah. After a US investigation found that militia men
controlled by Watan had frequently bribed Afghan government officials, used heavy weapons
prohibited under their contract, and reportedly made protection payments to the Taliban,565
US Army officials unsuccessfully sought to ban Watan (and another company, Compass Secu-
rity, that also provided transportation security services) from doing business with the American
government. The Army opted “instead for an administrative agreement that says the [Watan]
company may not bid on any convoy security contracts paid for with U.S. tax dollars for the
next three years.”566 Other politically connected security firms were owned by Sadiq Mojadidi
(son of Sebghatullah Mojadidi), Jalaluddin Rabbani (son of Burhanuddin Rabbani), Lotfullah (a
former commander under Sayyaf), and Wahidullah Frozi (brother of Khalillulah Frozi, the Chief
Executive Officer of Kabul Bank).567
Perhaps the most prominent example of economic patronage in the post-2001 period was
Kabul Bank and its principal beneficiary, the Afghan Investment Company, ventures that brought
together members of the Karzai and Fahim families and several politically connected business
563Jochen-Martin Gutsch, “The Road to Bamiyan: A Public Works Debacle that Defines Afghanistan,” Der Spiegel,
September 30, 2014.
564Majority Staff 2010, p. 13.
565Reportedly, Watan denied making payments to the Taliban, but it did not deny the use of bribery or heavy
weapons. See Associated Press, “US officials to face questions about decision not to ban corrupt Afghan company,”
September 15, 2011. Also see Dexter Filkins, “Convoy Guards in Afghanistan Face an Inquiry,” New York Times, June
6, 2010.




groups: the Dawi Oil Group, the Azizi Group, the Ghazanfar Group, the Gulbahar Group,
the Afghan Wireless Communication Company, and former Minister of Agriculture Obaidul-
lah Ramin, together with Kabul Bank Chairman Sherkhan Farnood and CEO Khalilullah Fer-
ozi. Capitalized in 2004, Kabul Bank expanded on the basis of winning a $1.5 billion annual
contract to administer the ARTF-financed salaries of approximately 80% of government employ-
ees. With an increasingly large deposit base, Kabul Bank shareholders made undocumented,
interest-free “loans” without repayment schedules to fund their own personal and commercial
expenses. Farnood purchased Pamir Airways and more than a dozen villas on or near Dubai’s
Palm Jumeirah on behalf of a range of political and economic elites.568 Hasin Fahim borrowed at
least $121 million for a house in the Palm Jumeirah and a bottled gas venture by the name of the
Gas Group, while Mahmoud Karzai borrowed money for a Palm Jumeirah home as well.569 All
told, almost $1 billion in loans went to 16 shareholders, making up the vast majority of Kabul
Bank’s loan book.570 After many of the Dubai property investments soured and news of Kabul
Bank’s financial troubles came out, prompting a bank run, the Afghan government was com-
pelled to provide $825 million to bail out the bank—more than 5% of GDP and approximately
equal in size to total reserves.
By the end of the second term of the Karzai administration, political patronage through the
distribution of offices, and economic patronage, through the award of contracts and concessions
to allies, had become widespread. The consequence of this was uncontrolled corruption, in
which a wide variety of political elites and government functionaries were able to accept bribes
or commit fraud with little repercussion. It also meant that critical areas of government activity,
security provision and the welfare of the economy, were critically dependent on the sustained
flow of international assistance, both because of the costs growing insecurity and the limited
investment in revenue generating sectors of the economy.
568See Molly Hennessy-Fiske, “Relatives of 2010 Afghan Air Crash Victims Lobby for Redress,” Los Angeles Times,
April 29, 2011. See also Matthew Rosenberg and Maria Abi-Habib, “Afghan Officials Probed Over Bank,” Wall
Street Journal, February 1, 2011; Dexter Filkins, “The Afghan Bank Heist,” New Yorker, February 14, 2011; Andrew
Higgins, “Banker feeds crony capitalism in Afghanistan,” Financial Times, February 22, 2010.
569Andrew Higgins, “Banker feeds crony capitalism in Afghanistan,” Financial Times, February 22, 2010.
570See Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, “Unfinished Business: The
Follow-Up Report on Kabul Bank,” October 2, 2014.
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Table 5.1. Afghan Interim Administration, December 2001-July 2002
Position Name Bonn Affiliation Political Base Specialized
Background
Chairman Hamid Karzai Rome South (limited) –
Defense (+ Vice Chair) Qasim Fahim UF Jamiat Yes
Foreign Affairs Abdullah Abdullah UF Jamiat Yes
Interior Affairs Yunus Qanuni UF Jamiat Yes
Finance (+ Vice Chair) Hedayat Amin Arsala Rome – Yes
Justice Abdul Rahim Karimi UF Jamiat Yes
NDS Aref Sarwari UF Jamiat Yes
Education Abdul Rasul Amin Rome East (limited) Yes
Higher Education Sharif Fayez UF – Yes
Public Health Sohaila Seddiqi Rome – Yes
Communications Abdul Rahim UF Jamiat No
Reconstruction Amin Farhang Rome – Yes
Transport Sultan Hamid Sultan UF Wahdat No
Water & Electricity (+ Vice Chair) Shaker Kargar UF Junbesh No
Information & Culture Raheen Makhdoom Rome – Yes
Commerce Sayyid Mustafa Kazemi UF Wahdat Melli No
Planning (+ Vice Chair) Mohammad Mohaqeq UF Wahdat No
Public Works Abdul Khaleq Fazal Rome – No
Agriculture Sayyid Hussein Anwari UF Harakat No
Rural Development Abdul Malik Anwar UF Jamiat No
Urban Development Abdul Qadir UF East No
Mines & Industries Mohammad Alem Razm UF Junbesh No
Small Industries Aref Noorzai UF South No
Labour & Social Affairs Mirwais Sadeq UF West No
Air Transport & Tourism Abdul Rahman Rome (ex Jamiat) – No
Zalmai Rassoul Rome – No
Hajj and Awqaf Mohammad Hanif Balkhi – – Yes
Martyrs & Disabled Abdullah Wardak UF Ittehad No
Refugees Enayatullah Nazeri UF Jamiat No
Irrigation Mangal Hussain Peshawar Hezb-e Islami No
Border Affairs Amanullah Zadran Rome East (limited) Yes
Women’s Affairs (+ Vice Chair) Sima Samar Rome – Yes
Sources: Government press releases; news reports; interviews; author’s assessments.
Note: “Political base” indicates whether an officeholder belongs to a political organization (e.g., Wahdat) or otherwise a regional political network (e.g., southern Afghanistan).
“Specialized background” has a narrow interpretation here. It indicates whether or not an officeholder possesses sustained educational or informal/formal professional experience
in a given issue area. Because the chairman/president and vice-chairman/vice-president positions are not specific to a portfolio, specialized background is blank for these leadership
positions.
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Table 5.2. Afghan Transitional Administration, July 2002-December 2004
Position Name Bonn Affiliation Political Base Specialized
Background
President Hamid Karzai Rome South –
Vice President Abdul Karim Khalili UF Wahdat –
Vice President Hedayat Amin Arsala Rome – –
Vice President Nematullah Shahrani – – –
Defense (+ Vice President) Qasim Fahim UF Jamiat Yes
Foreign Affairs Abdullah Abdullah UF Jamiat Yes
Finance Ashraf Ghani – – Yes
Interior Affairs Ali Ahmad Jalali – – Yes
Justice Abdul Rahim Karimi UF Jamiat Yes
National Security Advisor Zalmai Rassoul Rome – No
NDS Aref Sarwari UF Jamiat Yes
Education Yunus Qanuni UF Jamiat No
Higher Education Sharif Fayez UF – Yes
Public Health Sohaila Seddiqi Rome – Yes
Communications Masoom Stanekzai – – No
Reconstruction Amin Farhang Rome – Yes
Transport Said Mohammad Ali Jawid Harakat No
Water and Electricity Shaker Kargar UF Junbesh No
Information and Culture Raheen Makhdoom Rome – Yes
Commerce Sayyid Mustafa Kazemi UF Wahdat Melli No
Planning Mohammad Mohaqeq UF Wahdat No
Public Works Abdul Ali UF Wahdat ?
Agriculture Sayyid Hussain Anwari UF Harakat No
Rural Development Hanif Atmar UF – Yes
Urban Development Yusuf Pashtun – South Yes
Gul Agha Sherzai – South No
Mines and Industries Juma Mohammad Mohammadi – – Yes
Small Industries Mohammad Alem Razm UF Junbesh No
Labour and Social Affairs Noor Mohammad Qarqin – Junbesh No
Air Transport and Tourism Mirwais Sadeq UF West No
Hajj and Awqaf Mohammed Amin Naziryar – – Yes
Martyrs and Disabled Abdullah Wardak UF Ittehad No
Refugees Enayatullah Nazeri UF Jamiat No
Irrigation Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani Rome – No
Border Affairs Aref Noorzai UF South Yes
Women’s Affairs Habiba Sarabi Rome – Yes
Sources: Government press releases; news reports; interviews; author’s assessments.
Note: “Political base” indicates whether an officeholder belongs to a political organization (e.g., Wahdat) or otherwise a regional political network (e.g., southern Afghanistan).
“Specialized background” has a narrow interpretation here. It indicates whether or not an officeholder possesses sustained educational or informal/formal professional experience
in a given issue area. Because the chairman/president and vice-chairman/vice-president positions are not specific to a portfolio, specialized background is blank for these leadership
positions.
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Table 5.3. Government of Afghanistan, End of 2004
Position Name Political Base Specialized Background
President Hamid Karzai South –
First Vice President Ahmad Zia Massoud Jamiat –
Second Vice President Abdul Karim Khalili Wahdat –
Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak Mahaz Yes
Foreign Affairs Abdullah Abdullah Jamiat Yes
Finance Anwar ul-Haq Ahady – Yes
Interior Affairs Ali Ahmad Jalali – Yes
Justice Sarwar Danish Wahdat Yes
National Security Advisor Zalmai Rassoul – No
NDS Amrullah Saleh Jamiat Yes
Education Noor Mohammad Qarqin Junbesh No
Higher Education Amir Shah Hasanyar – Yes
Public Health Mohammad Amin Fatemi Jabha-ye Nejat Yes
Communications Amirzai Sangin – Yes
Economy Amin Farhang – Yes
Transport Enayatullah Qasimi – No
Water and Electricity Ismael Khan West No
Information and Culture Raheen Makhdoom – Yes
Commerce Hedayat Amin Arsala – Yes
Public Works Sohrab Ali Safari – Yes
Agriculture Obaidullah Ramin – Yes
Rural Development Hanif Atmar – Yes
Urban Development Yusuf Pashtun South Yes
Mines and Industries Mir Mohammad Sediq – Yes
Labour and Social Affairs Sayyid Ekramuddin Masoomi Jamiat? No
Hajj and Awqaf Nematullah Shahrani – Yes
Martyrs and Disabled Sediqa Balkhi – Yes
Refugees Azam Dadfar – Yes
Border Affairs Abdul Karim Barahui Jamiat Yes
Women’s Affairs Masouda Jalal – Yes
Youth Amina Afzali Jamiat (Afzali) No
Sources: Government press releases; news reports; interviews; author’s assessments.
Note: “Political base” indicates whether an officeholder belongs to a political organization (e.g., Wahdat) or otherwise a regional political network
(e.g., southern Afghanistan). “Specialized background” has a narrow interpretation here. It indicates whether or not an officeholder possesses
sustained educational or informal/formal professional experience in a given issue area. Because the chairman/president and vice-chairman/vice-
president positions are not specific to a portfolio, specialized background is blank for these leadership positions.
222
Table 5.4. Government of Afghanistan, Early 2010
Position Name Political Base Specialized Background
President Hamid Karzai South –
First Vice President Qasim Fahim Jamiat –
Second Vice President Abdul Karim Khalili Wahdat –
Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak Mahaz Yes
Foreign Affairs Zalmai Rassoul – No
Finance Omar Zakhilwal – Yes
Interior Affairs Hanif Atmar – Yes
Justice Habibullah Ghaleb Jabha-ye Nejat Yes
National Security Advisor Rangin Dadfar Spanta – Yes
NDS Ibrahim Spinzada – ?
Education Ghulam Farooq Wardak Hezb-e Islami No
Higher Education Sarwar Danish Wahdat Yes
Public Health Soraya Dalil – Yes
Communications Amirzai Sangin – Yes
Economy Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal Hezb-e Islami No
Transport Daoud Ali Najafi Wahdat No
Water and Electricity Ismael Khan West No
Information and Culture Raheen Makhdoom – Yes
Commerce Anwar ul-Haq Ahady – Yes
Public Works Abdul Qudus Hamidi Junbesh Yes
Agriculture Obaidullah Ramin – Yes
Rural Development Hanif Atmar – Yes
Urban Development Sultan Hussain Yes
Mines and Industries Wahidullah Shahrani – Yes
Labour and Social Affairs Amina Afzali Jamiat (Afzali Front) No
Hajj and Awqaf Mohammad Yusuf Niazi Ittehad Yes
Refugees Abdul Rahim Jamiat No
Border Affairs Assadullah Khalid – ?
Women’s Affairs Husn Banu Ghazanfar Junbesh No
Counter Narcotics Zarar Ahmad Moqbel Osmani Jamiat No
Sources: Government press releases; news reports; interviews; author’s assessments.
Note: “Political base” indicates whether an officeholder belongs to a political organization (e.g., Wahdat) or otherwise a regional political network
(e.g., southern Afghanistan). “Specialized background” has a narrow interpretation here. It indicates whether or not an officeholder possesses
sustained educational or informal/formal professional experience in a given issue area. Because the chairman/president and vice-chairman/vice-
president positions are not specific to a portfolio, specialized background is blank for these leadership positions.
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5.3.2 External Incoherence
While elite factionalism provided the basis for patronage politics in Afghanistan after 2001, ex-
ternal assistance accentuated its depth and prevalence in the Afghan system. Despite sharing
the same general objectives of stability and the defeat of Al Qaeda, the US and other major
donors never reconciled the security and development dimensions of the international effort in
Afghanistan. Nor did donors coordinate their efforts until many of the major sources of insti-
tutional weakness—most notably, the development of patronage politics—had set into motion.
These early problems led donor countries, IGOs, and NGOs to take an improvisational and dis-
organized approach to the Afghanistan intervention that limited the effectiveness of assistance to
Afghanistan and at times resulted in conflicting forms of international engagement.
The leading external actor in Afghanistan, the United States, was reluctant to become actively
involved in the development of Afghanistan’s nascent government institutions. Washington’s
strategy of employing the anti-Taliban political factions to unseat Mullah Omar’s government
had been quite effective. But this initial military success led the US to take a much more passive
political and development role in the months that followed the fall of the Taliban government—a
development that compounded the Bush administration’s initial skepticism of building institu-
tions abroad. Moreover, as the Special Envoy for Afghanistan James Dobbins recalled, very few
domestic constituencies in the US were concerned with the postwar US strategy in Afghanistan:
In 2002, President Bush was not under any pressure. He had just won the most
popular war in American history. The military campaign in Afghanistan had gone
unbelievably well, as had the diplomatic effort to install its successor government.
His administration faced no demands to show results on Afghan reconstruction.
Instead the public was supportive, the press was laudatory, and Congress was docile.
The president and his closest advisers felt they were at the top of their game. Insofar
as Afghanistan was concerned, they believed that the hard part was over. They were
moving on to other issues and planning the next [military campaign] in the war on
terror.571
This absence of American attention and resources to Afghanistan had a lasting effect on the ends
and means of external assistance in the years that followed. Despite early indications that the US
intended to undertake an ambitious reconstruction program in Afghanistan,572 the Bush Admin-
571Dobbins 2008.
572In an April 17, 2002 speech at the Virginia Military Institute, President George W. Bush compared the US role in
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istration committed very limited high-level attention and reconstruction funds to Afghanistan
after Bonn. Reflecting the limited US interest in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, the Office
of Management and Budget allocated only $40 million to aiding Afghanistan in the 2002 fiscal
year. It was in this context of limited American engagement that the so-called “lead nation” sys-
tem of assisting Afghanistan developed. This arrangement divided security sector reform into five
components, with a different lead nation responsible for overseeing each area. Under the lead-
nation system, the United States was responsible for overseeing the development of the army;
Germany, the police; Italy, the justice system; Japan, the disarmament, demobilization, and rein-
tegration of non-state armed groups; and the United Kingdom, anti-narcotics efforts. The Bonn
process also resulted in a territorial division of labor. Each of Afghanistan’s provinces would
come under the responsibility of a ISAF member state, and each of six territorial zones would be
coordinated by a lead nation. Turkey was to oversee Kabul; the United States, the east, the south,
and the southwest; Germany, the north; and Italy, the west.
Each donor brought its own political orientation and interests to its respective area of over-
sight. Germany established a training program in civilian policing methods (for example, crimi-
nal investigation, patrolling, traffic management) that, drawing on its own bureaucratic tradition,
was technical in orientation but that did not address the deficit of domestic or international se-
curity forces in the years immediately following 2001. The United States, by contrast, pursued
a largely ad hoc police training mission that sought to rapidly build up the Afghan National
Police with little attention paid to the selection and the professional development of recruits.
Developed in response to growing insecurity, the US effort was oriented toward functions that
departed from the German civilian policing model—initially, the protection of buildings and
other fixed structures, and later paramilitary operations.
The international approach toward poppy cultivation was equally incoherent. The United
States and the United Kingdom sponsored an eradication campaign that destroyed poppy cul-
tivation through manual eradication by Afghan security forces,573 after initial plans for aerial
and ground spraying were rejected by the Afghan government. Other efforts led by the UK
Afghanistan to the $13 billion, multi-year American reconstruction effort in Western Europe after World War II. The
comparison of the American reconstruction effort in Afghanistan to the Marshall Plan, as the US economic program
in postwar Europe was known, nonetheless rested on a poor understanding of the American role in postwar Europe.
See De Long and Eichengreen 1991.
573Manual eradication involves slashing or knocking over poppy stalks.
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provided cash compensation to Afghan farmers to destroy their poppy crops, often without sub-
sequently evaluating whether the crops had indeed been destroyed. The Alternative Livelihoods
program, sponsored by USAID, the UK’s Department for International Development, and the
European Commission, approached the poppy problem by compensating farmers for cultivating
legal crops. At the same time, the World Food Program took an approach that distributed wheat
cultivated outside of Afghanistan to farming communities throughout the country, effectively
decreasing the incentive to grow legal crops.
International efforts to build Afghanistan’s justice sector were equally incoherent. Italy, the
designated lead nation for the justice sector, drew on its own civil code system in designing its
various legal training programs in Afghanistan. The United States, which had become the largest
donor to the Afghan justice sector by 2006, simultaneously applied its own common law tradition
in training seminars for judges, prosecutors, and other Afghan justice personnel. Differences
also emerged between the Afghan government and justice sector donors over the design of legal
training programs in Afghanistan. Kabul believed that Washington did not draw on the input of
Afghan authorities and did not systematically evaluate for effectiveness.
Attempts to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (DDR) Afghanistan’s various civil war par-
ties were equally incoherent. The leading external actors in the DDR process, the United States
and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), were in practice less than willing to
fulfill their mandate of demilitarizing post-Bonn politics. The Bush Administration, and in par-
ticular the Department of Defense, did not see security sector reform in Afghanistan as a vital
American interest. At the same time, Washington was concerned that an intensive demobiliza-
tion process would alienate its erstwhile allies in the UF, who continued to provide security in
the absence of a countrywide international peacekeeping force and to assist the US campaign
to kill or capture members of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. While UNAMA preferred a more ac-
tivist DDR process,574 the absence of US interest in security sector reform effectively precluded
such a process from gaining momentum. The resulting DDR process exempted most of the UF
groups from demobilization by directly transferring wartime commanders and militiamen into
the reconstituted national police force without significant vetting or subsequent training. It also
allowed Minister of Defense Marshal Fahim and other senior security officials discretion over
574Sedra 2003, p. 44.
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whom would be directly absorbed into the police force, a key means of patronage in the early
post-Bonn period. In Antonio Giustozzi’s words, the DDR process in Afghanistan constituted a
“bureaucratic façade” that formally demilitarized the leading UF organizations while informally
preserving and, to some extent, augmenting their control over military resources. The DDR
process in Afghanistan was also characterized by unpreparedness and poor inter-organizational
coordination, particularly in its reintegration component. A variety of external sponsors par-
ticipated in the DDR process without an overarching set of objectives for the reintegration of
demobilized fighters back into Afghan society, and therefore a coordinated strategy of how to
get there. The UNDP and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) carried out parallel
demobilization programs that focused on adults and children, respectively, while the Japan In-
ternational Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japanese Embassy in Kabul developed different
approaches to the design and implementation of the DDR process.
Even greater differences emerged between the approximately 30 implementing partners con-
tracted to carry out the reintegration component of the DDR process. The reintegration of ex-
combatants was organized along sectoral lines and carried out by a diverse cross-section of organi-
zations, including government institutions (Afghanistan’s Ministry of Education), international
agencies (the International Organization for Migration, the UN Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation, the World Food Program, the UN Office for Project Services, the Mine Action Program
for Afghanistan), domestic and international NGOs (Association of Experts in the Fields of Mi-
gration and Development Cooperation), and private firms (Roshan). Demobilized fighters, in
consultation with the UNDP, would select a sector of economic specialization among several
pre-defined options (including, for example, agriculture, small business operations, professional
services, de-mining, education). Reintegration implementing partners, in turn, contracted with
the UNDP to train and prepare demobilized fighters in different sectors and geographical regions.
While specialization was expected to minimize overlap, in practice the reintegration process re-
sulted in duplicate and often incoherent efforts. Multiple implementing partners, each with dif-
ferently conceived objectives and protocols,575 were active in the same communities, effectively
wasting resources and inhibiting the development of more systematic information gathering and
development planning. As Giustozzi has observed,
575See Rossi and Giustozzi 2006, fn43, fn47.
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[t]he lack of coordination among the different agencies and organisations involved
in the reintegration programme hindered any systematic planning for the activation
of local development strategies. Insufficient preparation, logistical capacity and bu-
reaucratic flexibility led to long gaps between the demobilisation and reintegration
phases. The absence of technical studies, of market analysis, of feasibility studies
and indeed understanding of the complexity of rural livelihoods meant that the ad-
vice given by the agencies to the reintegrating ex-combatants was often largely arbi-
trary.576
The deep roots of this economic disorganization was an insufficient degree of international
attention to an end state in Afghanistan. Donor countries and development organizations en-
tered Afghanistan without precise medium- or long-term political and economic objectives and a
general strategy of achieving them. The disorganized character of the intervention was, in large
part, due to the ambivalence of the largest coalition partner, the United States, toward the nature
and scope of its involvement in Afghanistan, and how US interests diverged from its allies. For
the United States, intervention in Afghanistan was a predominantly military concern centered
on defeating Al Qaeda, with less priority devoted to addressing the post-intervention fate of the
Taliban or the political and economic conditions in which the Taliban had emerged in the first
place. Moreover, the US military campaign in Afghanistan was to some extent incompatible
with the development objectives it was increasingly pursuing. USAID broadly sought to build
the capabilities of civilian institutions of government in Afghanistan, even as the US military
and intelligence organizations sought to maintain good relations with the political factions that
underlaid the post-2001 administration—a deeply political decision that meant preserving sig-
nificant military autonomy and patronage decisions to the UF groups. Other leading military
coalition partners and donor countries, primarily in Europe, took a different approach to the
Afghanistan intervention. For these governments, the Afghanistan intervention represented a
largely technical stabilization and development mission that centered on the implementation of
government tasks without interceding in post-Bonn politics. Moreover, most of the European
countries sought to limit the presence of their military forces participating in the UN-mandated
ISAF mission, initially declining to deploy soldiers outside of the capital city and subsequently
garrisoning military and civilian personnel to provincial reconstruction teams based in provincial
capitals throughout Afghanistan.
576Giustozzi 2008b, p. 71.
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The upstream absence of clear post-intervention objectives in Afghanistan had downstream
effects on the programming, coordination, and monitoring of resources. It also gave rise to a
proliferation of development programs that were based on short-term time horizons and that did
not cohere into a larger, collective whole. This was especially the case in the area of policing.
Lieutenant General Abdul Hadi Khalid, a former Deputy Minister of Interior for Security, de-
scribed how differing US and European approaches to policing led to confusion within the ANP
during his tenure as Deputy Minister of Interior for Security (2006-2008):
Another issue I had to deal with was the starkly differing approaches from within the
Western military alliance on how the ANP’s training should be conducted and how
an Afghan policeman’s job should be carried out. The EU member states believed
the ANP’s duties should be restricted to civilian policing like their counterparts in
Europe. Some Europeans even said the ANP men should not carry pistols! I told
the Europeans that if your police can go to Ghazni with no weapons and come back
alive then we would consider disarming our police. The Americans, for their part,
had completely the opposite idea. They saw the ANP as the lesser-armed and pre-
pared “step-brother” of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The Americans view the
ANP as a fellow frontline force in our counterinsurgency war while the Europeans
strongly proposed that the ANP be removed from the conflict altogether. The Amer-
icans are soldiers that do not understand the fundamentals of policing communities
and feel the ANP should be proper security forces. We had Germans who were
training our police (the German Police Project Office) at the Kabul Police Academy
several years ago but they did not do a good job because they put too many limita-
tions on their mandate. They could train police inside the police academy but not
outside of it in real situations.577
The Afghan government and major donors sought to address the absence of international
coordination, in part, by establishing the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and
the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), multi-donor trust funds in the devel-
opment and security spheres, respectively. The ARTF was established in 2002 as a World Bank
administered fund for pooling budget support and development assistance to Afghanistan.578 A
steering committee comprised of donor governments (as well as the World Bank and MOF) was
responsible for collectively setting ARTF policy and overseeing its operations, while a manage-
ment committee composed of the MOF and four multilateral bodies (World Bank, Asian De-
577At the Center of the Storm: An Interview with Afghanistan’s Lieutenant General Hadi Khalid - Part One, The
Jamestown Foundation, September 10, 2009.
578The ARTF built on the Afghan Interim Authority Fund established in early 2002 to administer the payment
of government salaries and training. See United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA Fact Sheet,
September 2002.
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velopment Bank, United Nations Development Program, and Islamic Development Bank) was
tasked with reviewing and selecting funding proposals, as well as managing fund finances. This
institutional setup was well designed to orchestrate planning, coordination and oversight of de-
velopment expenditure and provided a relatively clear mechanism of donor accountability and
leverage. Moreover, the ARTF provided for some national ownership, even if the development
projects that it funded were off-budget items implemented outside of government systems. The
ANDS office and MOF were both actively involved in identifying development priorities, select-
ing and designing project selecting projects (the MOF had the sole responsibility for proposing
projects), and managing ARTF finances. In its first six years, ARTF received cumulative contri-
butions of approximately $1.7 billion (and an approximate $4.4 billion in the following six years),
much of which was used to reimburse recurring operating budget expenses or to invest in rela-
tively successful programs in agriculture (such as the National Solidarity Program) and education
(such as the Education Quality Improvement Program). The LOTFA was established in 2002
by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) along with UNAMA and the German
government to oversee and pool budget support for the operations of the police forces. Similar
to the ARTF, the LOTFA was well positioned to enhance policing capabilities in Afghanistan be-
cause it concentrated donor attention on the functioning of the fledgling ANP. And in a selected
number of areas, LOTFA served as an effective mechanism of reform. Most notably, LOTFA
contributed to pay and rank reform within the MOI, in which the bloated ANP officer corps
was reduced from 17,796 to 9,018 officers, and the number of generals was reduced from 319 to
159 and colonels from 2,712 to 310. At the same time, salaries were increased across the board to
align with the cost of living and salaries paid to the Afghan military.579
However, both of these multi-donor trust funds were ultimately inadequate mechanisms of
addressing external incoherence in development and security planning. The ARTF was quite
successful in identifying, launching, and coordinating relatively successful development schemes
such as the NSP, but its impact was ultimately constrained by a limited time horizon and larger,
parallel bilateral programs in agriculture, health, and education. The LOTFA, meanwhile, was
not able to reconcile parallel and conflicting US training efforts. In both cases of the ARTF and
LOTFA, moreover, bilateral donors were either unwilling or unable to consistently use their
579Perito 2009, p. 12.
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leverage to actively intervene in personnel decisions. As shown above, Washington sought to ex-
pand the ANP and other, irregular forces as a stopgap measure against growing insecurity, and as
a result the quality of policing was not a priority for one of the LOTFA’s most important donors.
The quantitative strength of the police force, moreover, still remained a question: by November
2008, a UN validation team could not verify 30,000 personnel on the MOI payroll.580 The devel-
opment funds allocated to the ARTF (as distinct from the funds used to pay government salaries)
were never a large proportion of total development assistance to Afghanistan. Moreover, the
ARTF was initially set to expire within 4 years of its creation, setting an arbitrary and abbrevi-
ated time horizon on large-scale development projects. This had a negative impact on projects
such as the NSP that depended critically on engaged and resilient elected councils (or community
development councils). As Sultan Barakat describes, “a long-term, institution-building project
was collapsed into an abbreviated period of time, which often resulted in the need to compress
the most significant and time-intensive part of the process, facilitating and building the capacity
of CDCs.”581 The initial ARTF closing date of June 2006 was extended to June 2010, and then
rescheduled to 2020—in part a reflection that the short time horizons of earlier iterations of the
ARTF had been counter-productive.582
The US and allied countries also took steps to improve the security environment in Afghanistan
by reconfiguring the byzantine design of international military forces in Afghanistan. These steps
followed an earlier decision to provide an international institutional foundation, in the form of
NATO, for the reconstruction and stabilization efforts that were part of the ISAF mandate. Un-
der NATO command, ISAF was to expand beyond its initial presence in Kabul through a series
of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). Several US PRTs, established as part of OEF, were
already in existence. By the end of 2003, NATO member countries began to take over these posts
under the ISAF banner and develop new PRTs in other provinces. The expansion of the ISAF
presence began with Kunduz and other provinces falling under the regional command in charge
of the north (2004), before successively expanding to the western (2005), southern (July 2006),
and eastern provinces (October 2006), as shown in Table 5.5.
580Office 2009, p. 22.
581Barakat 2009, p. 119.
582Margesson 2010, p. 9.
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Table 5.5. PRT Expansion and ISAF Incorporation
PRT Location Opening Date Establishing Nation ISAF Transfer ISAF Lead Nation
Gardez February 2003 USA October 2006 USA
Bamyan March 2003 USA → New Zealand October 2006 New Zealand
Kunduz March 2003 USA December 2003 Germany
Mazar-e Sharif July 2003 UK July 2004 UK → Sweden
Bagram November 2003 USA October 2006 USA
Herat December 2003 USA April 2005 Italy
Jalalabad December 2003 USA October 2006 USA
Kandahar December 2003 USA → Canada July 2006 Canada
Asadabad February 2004 USA October 2006 USA
Ghazni March 2004 USA October 2006 USA
Khost March 2004 USA October 2006 USA
Qalat April 2004 USA July 2006 USA
Maimana July 2004 UK July 2004 UK → Norway
Faizabad September 2004 Germany September 2004 Germany
Farah September 2004 USA May 2005 USA
Lashkar Gah September 2004 USA July 2006 USA → UK
Sharan September 2004 USA October 2006 USA
Tarin Kot September 2004 USA July 2006 Netherlands
Pul-e Khomri October 2004 Netherlands October 2004 Netherlands → Hungary
Mehtarlam April 2005 USA October 2006 USA
Qala-e Naw May 2005 Spain May 2005 Spain
Chaghcharan June 2005 Lithuania June 2005 Lithuania
Panjshir October 2005 USA October 2006 USA
Maidan Shahr October 2006 Turkey October 2006 Turkey
Qala Gush November 2006 USA October 2006 USA
Mahmud-e Raqi December 2007 USA December 2007 USA
Pul-e Alam March 2008 Czech Republic October 2006 Czech Republic
Sheberghan July 2010 Turkey July 2010 Turkey
Charikar January 2011 South Korea January 2011 South Korea
Sources: ISAF press releases; news reports.
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It soon became clear that the territorial expansion of ISAF alongside a parallel, US-led OEF
mission required military coordination. In October 2005, Supreme Allied Commander for Eu-
rope (SACEUR) James Jones brokered an arrangement that partially integrated the (US led) OEF
mission into the (UN mandated) ISAF mission by placing an individual American officer within
both chains of command. This “dual-hatted” American officer would simultaneously carry out
OEF operations and serve as one of three deputies to the COMISAF exclusively in charge of
security. However, institutional redesign did not have a significant impact on security provision
or development because it did not address the incoherence of interests among leading external
actors in Afghanistan. Even as OEF and ISAF operations became more coordinated, the overar-
ching strategies of the two campaigns remained distinct from and incompatible with one another.
NATO remained committed to a training and stabilization mission in Afghanistan that included
building ANA and ANP capabilities and extending security, governance, and economic devel-
opment to the provinces through PRTs.583 By contrast, the US led OEF campaign remained
primarily centered on capturing or killing members of Al Qaeda and, later, Taliban cadres using
both American forces and allied Afghan militias. Moreover, while the expansion of ISAF was
a predetermined process intended to extend ISAF control over substantially all military and de-
velopment activities in the country, it was nonetheless fraught with differences over strategy and
burden sharing among NATO member countries. The American model of PRT management
located relatively small numbers of staff (50-100), primarily military personnel, with combat
units upon which they could rely for fire support. The American PRTs were primarily oriented
toward countering the growing Taliban insurgency by carrying out a range of security and stabil-
ity operations, including monitoring, influencing, and mediation efforts, in tandem with “quick
impact projects” in a wide range of sectors. As primarily military organizations, US PRTs did
not have the development personnel or capabilities necessary to program sophisticated devel-
opment projects. Even within American PRTs, commanders and civilians lacked a clear set of
interagency guidelines on individual roles, missions, and job descriptions. As a consequence, it
“took time and trial and error to achieve a common understanding of mission priorities.”584 In
the north and subsequently, the southern provinces, the British PRT model was characterized
583Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2005, pp. 2-5.
584Perito 2005, p. 11.
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by comparatively larger numbers of personnel and close civilian-military cooperation, and em-
phasized security sector reform and the resolution of conflict between rival militias. And in the
relatively secure northern provinces, Germany developed a PRT model that included large num-
bers of personnel, a rigid bifurcation of military and civilian activities, and a relative emphasis on
addressing problems of underdevelopment and weak government institutions—reflecting a belief
that criminality and poor governance were more significant drivers of instability in the north
than Taliban violence.
Beginning in late 2008, the US government would carry out a series of reviews of American
strategy in Afghanistan. Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led an as-
sessment of the security environment in the border areas between Afganistan and Pakistan.585 US
Central Command, led by General David Petraeus, would conduct its own review of American
military engagement in Afghanistan and its wider command area.586 And the National Security
Council, under the direction of Douglas Lute, completed an interagency study of the state of the
state of the Afghanistan war. While the emphases of the Mullen, Petraeus, and Lute reviews dif-
fered from one another, all of them arrived at the common conclusion that the Afghanistan war
lacked an identifiable strategy and sufficient diplomatic and material resources to achieve basic
security objectives in Afghanistan.
The incoming Obama administration would arrive at a similar conclusion. President Obama
and his national security advisors had argued during the 2008 presidential election process that
the Iraq war had diverted attention and resources away from Afghanistan, contributing to grow-
ing insecurity throughout the country.587 To identify a way forward, the new administration
would commission its own set of assessments of the Afghanistan war strategy. Bruce Riedel, a
former intelligence official, would begin a review on behalf of the White House, also drawing on
input from teams led by Holbrooke, Lute, Mullen, and Petraeus.588 This review produced a set
of prospective policy changes that largely accorded with the assessments conducted in the final
year of the Bush Administration: integrate US aid and military activities in Afghanistan and Pak-
istan into a single theatre, scale up the capabilities of the Afghan national security forces (ANSF),
585Robert Burns, “Bush Review Favors Bigger Afghan Army,” Associated Press, November 8, 2008.
586Karen DeYoung, “Obama Administration Faces Grim Specifics on Afghan Policy,” Washington Post, February 3,
2009.
587Broder, John M., “Obama and McCain Duel Over Iraq,” New York Times, July 16, 2008.
588Steve Coll, “The New Afghanistan Strategy,” New Yorker, March 29, 2009.
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actively engage Afghanistan’s near and far neighbors to support stabilization in Afghanistan,
and employ aid and diplomacy to influence Pakistan’s accommodation of the Afghan Taliban.
A second assessment would later be conducted by Stanley McChrystal, the newly appointed
COMISAF and Commander of US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A). The various Afghanistan re-
views ultimately culminated in the Obama Administration’s decision to authorize a surge in mil-
itary and civilian assistance to Afghanistan that would “deny al Qaeda a safe haven. . .reverse the
Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. . .” and “strengthen
the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they can take lead responsi-
bility for Afghanistan’s future.”589 The Obama Administration authorized an additional 30,000
troops to carry out a counterinsurgency (COIN) war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda—on top
of a 21,000 troop increase authorized prior to the completion of the Riedel review—and called
for more effective strategies of improving governance in Afghanistan and addressing Pakistani
support for the Afghan Taliban. Just as importantly, the White House announced the beginning
of a withdrawal of US forces in July 2011. The troop surge would nonetheless represent a major
expansion of the international military presence in Afghanistan, increasing the relative number
of foreign forces from one soldier for every 1,000 Afghan citizens in early 2009 to 5 at the height
of the international presence at the end of 2010 (see Figure 5.5).
However, while the much discussed Riedel or McChrystal assessments that guided the new
US strategy identified many of the drivers of instability in Afghanistan, they largely elided
the internal contradiction between American counter-terrorism and development activities in
Afghanistan, as well as the broader question of what kind of minimal political and economic en-
vironment should remain in Afghanistan to ensure stability after the US presence receded. More-
over, neither the Riedel or McChrystal reviews were mandated to address the incompatibility of
military and development activities across the many international actors involved in Afghanistan.
This meant that Washington would ignore the differences in strategy and implementation among
the more than 40 parties that then participated in the ISAF mission.
Even after international military operations were placed firmly within the NATO chain of
command, coordination between member states remained poor. This was, in part, because of
589The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way
Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” December 1, 2009.
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the problem of military caveats—“restrictions placed upon a contingent anticipating what they
will be asked to do and setting rules for those circumstances.”590 There were between 50 and 80
explicit national caveats on area of responsibility, the use of force, and operational size, in addition
to an unknown number of informal or unstated caveats, that restricted the command and control
of NATO operations in Afghanistan.591 As a consequence, while the size and territorial presence
of ISAF operations expanded between 2009 and 2010, the effectiveness of new forces did not
necessarily increase. For example, “some of the biggest additions [came] from countries with the
most significant restrictions (Germany and Italy),”592 limiting the strength of international forces
in areas in which Taliban infiltration was then growing.593
Just as importantly, development programming remained improvisational in nature even as
the US and allied countries increased their overall aid expenditure in Afghanistan—a problem
that was exacerbated by the Obama Administration announcement to begin withdrawing U.S.
combat forces in the summer of 2011. The ambiguity of medium- or long-term donor objectives
in Afghanistan resulted in limited oversight over the expenditure of aid. Bilateral and multilateral
donors did not systematically document their own aid disbursements, and therefore were unable
to systematically monitor the aid activities of their own agencies and other organizations, and
the results of various aid projects. According to Kai Eide, former United Nations Special Repre-
sentative to Afghanistan (March 2008-March 2010), this deficit of information further inhibited
the formation of a coordinated international development agenda in Afghanistan:
But we had not addressed the really important parts of the problem: What were we
going to coordinate? Nobody seemed to really know the amount of aid flowing into
Afghanistan, and nobody knew where it was spent and for what purposes. How were
we supposed to coordinate when such fundamental facts were missing? And how
could we coordinate when there were no agreed priorities for the entire development
effort and each donor was left to set its own? Several years had passed since the last
national programs594
As a consequence, even as the level of international assistance to Afghanistan expanded in
absolute and per capita terms between 2009 and 2011, the coordination of assistance did not
590Auerswald and Saideman 2014, p. 6.
591Saideman and Auerswald 2012.
592Ibid.
593Giustozzi and Reuter 2011.
594Eide 2012, pp. 42-43.
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change substantially (see Figures 5.6a and 5.6b). Aid fragmentation, measured as a Herfindahl
index of all donors (bilateral and multilateral) at the recipient- and sector-levels,595 did not decline
after 2008. Bilateral donors were not more likely to channel greater aid through multilateral
channels, as Figure 5.6a indicates. Furthermore, we do not see evidence of greater pooling aid
within sectors, as suggested by the trend of sectoral aid fragmentation.
Moreover, the increased international attention on Afghanistan that came with the surge did
not result in substantially longer project timelines, as Figures 5.7a and 5.7b show. The duration of
an average development project in Afghanistan (weighted by project commitment value), changed
from approximately one year in 2008 to a peak of 1.1 in 2011. This development followed sig-
nificant increases in project horizons in education and agriculture (which was more than offset
in other sectors) as major ARTF projects were renewed and expanded (for example, the National
Solidarity Program in agriculture and the Education Quality Improvement Project in education).
This variation in project timelines converged between 2008 and 2010 to a mean project period
of approximately one year. The mean project duration subsequently declined to approximately
0.7 years as the US withdrawal set into motion. A boxplot of average sectoral project periods, as
shown in Figure 5.7b, indicates that the median project increased in duration between 2008 and
2010, but here, too, we see a contraction of planned project periods in 2011.
External incoherence, along with patterns of organizational capital, can help to explain varia-
tion in development outcomes across issue areas. The health system made significant strides dur-
ing the post-Bonn period, despite modest amounts of assistance—approximately 5% of total devel-
opment aid between 2003 and 2012 (see Figure 5.8). First, as a relatively technical issue area, it was
less exposed to patronage politics than other areas of government activity. And second, the BPHS
architecture set up in 2003 provided an institutional foundation to orchestrate donor efforts in
achieving a discrete and observable set of health outcomes in the following years. Organizational
capital and aid also explain why the educational system did not fare as well, despite receiving
a similar level of resources than the health system. Development assistance for the educational
system, while initially a small share of total assistance, was relatively successful in expanding ac-
cess to primary education. However, donors were primarily concerned with expanding primary
school inputs (buildings, teachers, materials, and textbooks), and less so on educational quality.
595See 6 for a more specific definition.
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Figure 5.6. Development Aid and Donor Fragmentation in Afghanistan, 2002–2014



















































































































Notes: Vertical lines indicate approximate starting dates of international conferences on foreign
assistance to Afghanistan. These include the Tokyo I Conference (January 2002), the London I
Conference (January-February 2006), the Paris Conference (June 2008), the London II Conference
(January 2010), and the Tokyo II Conference (July 2012). Donor-sectoral fragmentation is an
average of sector-level fragmentation scores weighted by sector-level aid totals.
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Figure 5.7. Average Project Duration by Commitment Year, 2003–2012
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This left the educational system relatively exposed to patronage politics in the provinces, where
insecurity and inadequate monitoring of donor resources were recurring problems. In the agri-
cultural sector, organizational capital and external resources account for the under-productivity
and limited export of key cash crops. Subtle but significant differences in agricultural strategy
among donors emerged early on in the post-Bonn period. American aid programming took a
market-oriented approach to agriculture that emphasized commercial crop development for ex-
port (and an alternative livelihood program intended to incentivized the cultivation of licit crops
as an alternative to opium in poppy-growing areas, although often encouraging poppy cultivation
to move to adjoining areas), while European donors tended to take a more “developmental” ap-
proach that emphasized community-driven development and goods provision. Yet other, older
perspectives originated within the bureaucracy emphasized food self-sufficiency and security over
commercialization or rural development. These differing approaches manifested themselves in
programs that did not complement one another. The National Solidarity Program, developed
by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development in 2003, offered a relatively success-
ful community-driven development program that allocated block grants for projects selected by
elected village councils. By contrast, the USAID-funded Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Pro-
gram (RAMP) and follow-on programs (the Accelerated Sustainable Agriculture Program and
the Alternative Livelihood Program) worked directly with farming households to expand culti-
vation, quality, and packaging and transport operations of various (mainly cash) crops. While
the some of these programs, notably the NSP, were individually successful, and rural develop-
ment were allocated to the National Solidarity Program (NSP) “donor efforts [were] not well
coordinated” in “broader agricultural development,” precluding potential complementarities and
long-term planning in the agricultural sector.596
The problems of patronage and external incoherence were compounded by the fact that most
development and security assistance was implemented by private contractors, not US government
personnel. This was especially the case with regard to American aid. Within the US government,
oversight of American aid expenditure was extremely poor. As development assistance increased
during 2009 and 2010, it increasingly flowed through private and not-for-profit contractors. Ac-
cording to USAID, approximately 75% of all US American assistance to Afghanistan was carried
596Bank 2013, p. 7.
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out by non-government contractors between 2008 and 2011. At the end of March 2010, USAID
oversaw more than 32,000 contractors in Afghanistan, compared to a total number of employees
of direct hire employees of approximately 3,200—a 10 to 1 ratio (see Figure 5.6). In the context of
abundant aid, relatively short timelines, and poor independent monitoring of project outcomes,
development contractors could underperform without consequences.
Security assistance was also primarily carried out primarily by contractors. In the 2012 fiscal
year, contractors made up 49 percent of the DOD workforce in Afghanistan—101,789 DOD con-
tractors compared with approximately 104,900 U.S. military personnel.597 According to a 2011
Congressional Research Service report, there were not nearly enough DOD contracting person-
nel in Afghanistan to conduct adequate oversight.598 Moreover, contracting personnel frequently
had no specialized experience in the sectors to which they were assigned, a problem that was




Table 5.6. DOD, DOS, and USAID Contractors by Nationality as of March 31, 2010
Nationality United States Third Country Afghanistan Unknown Total
Defense 16,081 17,512 78,499 0 112,092
State 1,240 1,389 7,055 35 9,719
USAID 625 1,000 30,734 0 32,359
Total 17,946 19,901 116,288 35 154,170
Source: Office 2011
Table 5.7. Department of Defense Contractors by Nationality, 2008-2014
Time Period United States Third Country Afghanistan Total
August 2008 4,724 4,121 32,387 41,232
August 2009 10,036 11,806 51,126 73,968
September 2010 19,103 14,984 73,392 107,479
October 2011 23,190 27,912 50,687 101,789
October 2012 31,814 39,480 38,270 109,564
October 2013 27,188 28,677 29,663 85,528
October 2014 17,477 13,787 14,085 45,349
Sources: United States Central Command, Quarterly Contractor Census Reports, various years.
By the end of the surge, these problems of poor alignment between international political
and development objectives in Afghanistan had not been resolved. In particular, American secu-
rity objectives of rapidly expanding regular and irregular security forces with limited oversight
was inconsistent with its own development objectives (as well as the objectives of European
and multilateral donors) of controlling corruption, enhancing human capital, and expanding the
productivity of the agricultural sector. At the same time, the capacity of donor countries and
organizations to assess the effectiveness of assistance to Afghanistan at the sector level was lim-




In the previous section, I showed how elite divisions and external incoherence inhibited the de-
velopment of more capable government institutions in Afghanistan. It may be possible, however,
that both of these variables are confounded by alternative explanatory factors. To evaluate this
possibility, this section considers three leading alternative explanations for limited institutional
development in post-2001 Afghanistan: domestic culture, foreign ignorance, occupation, and
political exclusion as alternative explanations for the trajectory of government institutions in
Afghanistan after 2001.
5.4.1 Domestic Culture
One frequently cited explanation for the stunted development of Afghan political institutions
after 2001 is culture. According to the cultural argument, Afghanistan has always been a divided
society in which patronage and conflict are commonplace. Any attempt to rebuild the Afghan
economy and security sector would therefore tend to result in corruption and internal violence.
This explanation, however, does not agree with both the historical and contemporary record
of political development in Afghanistan. As shown in Chapter 3, while Afghanistan had many
problems during the middle 20th century, it was not a conflictual or highly corrupt society. Petty
bribery and small-scale conflicts occurred, but not nearly at the scale and frequency that cultural
arguments tend to suggest. Moreover, while this period saw several episodes of internal conflict,
these conflicts occurred for reasons that had little to do with specific aspects of culture: conflicts
typically developed along lines of urban and rural interests, and later along lines of class. Fur-
thermore, survey evidence from the post-2001 period show strong preferences for rule-bound
government and security in Afghanistan. National surveys conducted by the Asia Foundation
(AF), ABC News (WP), and Democracy International (DI) show that ordinary civilians have
routinely cited insecurity or poor governance as the most significant national problems or causes
of concern in Afghanistan since 2005. These data indicate that insecurity, the economy, and cor-
ruption have been consistently cited as major problems in Afghanistan. While there has been
some variation in perceptions of national problems across time—notably, corruption has become
a more commonly identified problem—these perceptions have been fairly stable.
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Table 5.8. Popular Perceptions of Major Problems in Afghanistan, National Surveys
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Survey AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF
Unemployment/Weak Economy 51 56 46 48 55 39 33 38 35 37
Insecurity/Taliban 43 27 46 36 36 37 38 28 30 34
Corruption/Weak Govt 13 19 16 14 17 27 21 25 26 28
Sample Size 804 6,226 6,263 6,593 6,406 6,467 6,348 6,290 9,260 9,271
Survey ABC ABC ABC* ABC
Unemployment/Weak Economy 42 33 67 58
Insecurity/Taliban 74 75 53 56
Corruption/Weak Govt 36 33 23 27
Sample Size 1,036 1,377 1,534 1,691
Survey DI DI
Unemployment/Weak Economy 36 37
Insecurity/Taliban 45 51
Corruption/Weak Govt 21 27
Sample Size 8,620 4,000
*Represents an average of surveys conducted on January 12, 2009 and December 23, 2009.
Note: Shares represent the percentage of respondents that identified a particular category as the biggest or second biggest problems in
Afghanistan. AF = Asia Foundation; ABC = ABC News; DI = Democracy International.
Source: Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, various years; ABC News/BBC/ARD/Washington Post Poll, Afghanistan:
Where Things Stand, various years; Democracy International, A Survey of Public Perception on Elections and Civic Education, April
2013; Democracy International, Survey on Political Institutions, Elections, and Democracy in Afghanistan, November 2012.
5.4.2 Foreign Ignorance
Another prominent explanation for institutional weakness in Afghanistan is the inability of for-
eign interveners, in particular the United States, to understand the country’s society and politics.
According to this line of reasoning, the US and other donor countries lacked the information
to devise appropriate policies for the Afghanistan intervention and were incapable of addressing
new problems as they arose.
This explanation is appealing because society and politics in Afghanistan had been com-
plicated prior to the Soviet invasion, and had become even more difficult to understand since
its descent into war. The relationship between various armed groups and civilians, the social
and political salience of tribe, ethnicity, and religion, popular preferences for the structure and
role of government, and other issues were largely unknown in late 2001. Moreover, the United
States, along with other international and regional powers, had not been actively engaged with
Afghanistan for many years. The US government had not maintained an official presence in
Afghanistan since 1989, and had not cultivated expertise in Afghan politics and languages for an
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even longer period of time. Very few Afghanistan area specialists were still active by 2001, and
almost all of them were employed outside of the government. As a result, US policymakers had
very limited analytical insight into social and political dynamics in Afghanistan when making
critical decisions
While intuitively attractive, this argument is not consistent with the intervention process as it
unfolded in the years following the fall of the Taliban government. As early as 2002, Washington
was informed of a series of key political issues that would persist throughout the international
intervention, but that it would choose not to effectively address. In particular, three endemic
problems were largely ignored by American decision makers throughout the intervention. First,
the US chose not to intervene in the DDR process and related recruitment efforts in Afghanistan,
despite knowledge that a partial DDR process would limit the development of formal security
structures and potentially other areas of political and economic development. Second, the US
and allied countries declined to address increasing evidence of Pakistani state support for the
Afghan Taliban, which was using sanctuaries in Pakistan to raise money and manpower to at-
tack both Afghan government and international forces. As early as 2002, US and other western
officials observed that the Pakistan Army had either acquiesced to or purposefully provided sanc-
tuaries to the Taliban insurgency in western Pakistan, but did not identify a strategy that would
address continued Pakistani accommodation of the Taliban.599 Finally, the international commu-
nity generally failed to address the problematic features of its economic assistance to Afghanistan.
As early as February 2002, the Bush Administration was aware of the potential limitations of its
light footprint strategy in Afghanistan during the initial years of the intervention. At that time,
Secretary of State Colin Powell argued that limited resourcing and, just as importantly, infre-
quent attention to Afghanistan would not be sufficient to stabilize the country. Powell developed
a proposal for American troops to “join the small international peacekeeping force patrolling
Kabul and help Mr. Karzai extend his influence beyond the capital,” echoing appeals by promi-
nent Afghan and European officials.600 In informal discussions with European capitals, Director
599See, for example, Dexter Filkins, “US Might Pursue Qaeda and Taliban to Pakistan Lairs,” New York Times, March
21, 2002; Steven R. Weisman, “Resurgent Taliban Threatens Afghan Stability, US Says,” New York Times, November
19, 2003. David Rohde, “Pakistan Vows to Stop Taliban; Westerners Just Scoff,” New York Times, August 24, 2004;
Nadiri 2014.
600David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” New York Times, August 12,
2007.
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of Policy Planning Richard Haass had concluded that a “force of 20,000 to 40,000 peacekeep-
ers could be recruited, half from Europe, half from the United States.”601 The Powell proposal
could have prospectively signaled to both Kabul and foreign capitals a strategic and long-term
interest in building basic institutions in Afghanistan, altering the incentives of Karzai and other
Afghan politicians to engage in distributive politics, and for Pakistan to accommodate the Tal-
iban leadership. The Powell proposal would face strong opposition from Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, effectively putting it to an end. Ultimately, the US would deploy a force of
8,000 troops in 2002 to conduct counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the Taliban, not to carry out peacekeeping and reconstruction activities as Powell’s proposal
envisioned.
Another key period in American decision-making on Afghanistan occurred during the Riedel,
McChrystal, and White House strategy reviews undertaken in the first year of the Obama admin-
istration. While these assessments differed from one another in many respects, they all readily
recognized that the Afghanistan intervention had been under-resourced during the Bush admin-
istration and that an absence of cooperation from regional countries, particularly Pakistan, had
contributed to growing instability in Afghanistan. The strategy reviews of 2009, and subsequent
assessments, consequently centered on the level of resourcing of military and civilian efforts in
Afghanistan and achieving greater cooperation from Islamabad in countering Afghan Taliban
cadres based in Pakistan.602 But they did not address how American resources were to be al-
located, channelled, and monitored to achieve greater stability in Afghanistan or cooperation
from Pakistan, effectively leaving important strategic decisions in the hands of US personnel
in Afghanistan; how the US would prospectively coordinate its activities with European capi-
tals that, despite operating under a common ISAF umbrella, retained autonomy over national
military and aid activities; or, more fundamentally, what kind of mutually acceptable end state
could be achieved for the institutions in Afghanistan that would remain after the intervention
had ended. Even as the US counterinsurgency strategy allocated greater manpower and resources
toward enhancing development and security during 2009 and 2010, it failed to identify their in-
601Rohde and Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad.”
602In the words of Jeff Eggers, former Senior Director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the National Security Council
and a participant in the McChrystal review, each of the seven strategy review processes on Afghanistan during the
Obama administration “have typically been almost entirely about specific US troop levels.” See Jeff Eggers, “More
Boots Isn’t Enough to Save Afghanistan,” Politico, October 16, 2015.
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stitutional objectives in Afghanistan, and specifically how these resources would be expended in
ways that meet these objectives.
5.4.3 Foreign Occupation
Yet another set of explanations for the development of brittle government institutions in post-
2001 Afghanistan center on the presence of international military forces. These explanations
make the argument that foreign occupation both precipitated the Taliban insurgency and un-
dermined the development of civilian and military capabilities in Afghanistan. Some evidence
suggests that the behavior of international military forces has shaped civilian support for the Tal-
iban and the level of Taliban violence. For example, ISAF tactics that result in civilian casualties
or property destruction have been found to reduce popular support for ISAF and increase civil-
ian support for the Taliban.603 There is also evidence indicating that airstrikes increase insurgent
attacks relative to non-bombed locations in Afghanistan whether or not such strikes result in
civilian casualties.604
Nonetheless, there is limited evidence that the presence of foreign forces was by itself a cause
of the Taliban insurgency or of limited government capacity to contain the insurgency. This is
because the introduction of large numbers of foreign military forces followed, not prided, the
expansion of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Beginning in 2002, Taliban cadres began to move from
Pakistan into the areas of Zabul, Kunar, and Paktika, circumventing the southern (Kandahar, Hel-
mand) and eastern locations (Paktika) where American forces were initially based. As shown in
Figure 5.9, the geographical bases of OEF battalions in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2005 were
limited to the Kabul and Kandahar areas.605 As Giustozzi has shown in detail, the insurgency
began as a strategy of infiltration by committed Taliban cadres against both the nascent Afghan
interim administration and its external supporters, not as a reactive and spontaneous uprising
against foreign forces. The Taliban leadership sought to “create in an organised way a rear support
area in the NWFP and in Baluchistan”606 in December 2001; by 2002, Mullah Omar “proceeded
to launch a recruitment drive among madras students in Baluchistan and in Karachi, dispatching
603Lyall, Imai, and Blair 2013.
604Lyall 2015.
605While there were clearly American and allied troops active in southeastern Afghanistan, these were temporary
missions largely in pursuit of Al Qaeda fighters.
606Giustozzi 2008c, p. 37.
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Mullah Dadullah and Mawlawi Dadiq Hameed to find fresh flesh for the battlefield.”607 Taliban
cadres, in turn, developed inroads into Afghanistan primarily through areas bordering Pakistan
where there was a limited Afghan government or international military presence. In southeastern
and eastern Afghanistan, “small teams of ten to twenty insurgents were already infiltrating the
Afghan countryside with the purpose of identifying villages that could provide hospitality and
support. . .These groups were able to cross the border undetected throughout 2002-6, although
they had to downsize from 60-100 members in 2003 to five or less in 2005 as interdiction efforts
by the Coalition strengthened.”608 While some degree of civilian support for (or acquiescence of)
the Taliban insurgency was necessary for the insurgency to expand within Afghanistan, it was
the absence of Afghan government or international military forces that allowed the insurgency to
expand in the first place, which in turn had a negative impact on the development of the econ-
omy and government institutions. And when the Afghan government began to rapidly deploy
the ANP in large numbers to the southern areas after 2006, incompetence, bribery demands, and
narrow recruitment on the part of the police force contributed to communal support for the
Taliban in these areas.
5.4.4 Political Exclusion
Yet another set of explanations for institutional outcomes in Afghanistan highlight the exclu-
sion of social or political groups from the government and armed forces. These explanations
have taken on two forms. First, there is the argument that ethnic Pashtuns (a diverse group in
and of itself) have been disproportionately excluded from holding positions in Afghan civilian
and military institutions at all levels, leading much of the Pashtun population in Afghanistan to
mistrust or resent the Afghan government. Because ethnic Pashtuns are widely believed to con-
stitute at least a plurality of the Afghan population,609 their purported exclusion from political
participation is thought to create a significant rift between much of Afghan society and governing
institutions.
As shown above, ethnicity was not a salient determinant of political behavior by Afghan
607Giustozzi 2008c, p. 37.
608Ibid., p. 100.
609Because a census has never been fully enumerated in Afghanistan, the ethnic distribution of the population, and
other demographic characteristics, are unknown.
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government officials. Before Bonn, personal relationships had often cut across ethnicity. And
after Bonn, political and economic patronage relationships regularly occurred between elites of
different ethnic backgrounds. Furthermore, popular support for the Taliban did not appear to
follow an ethnic motivation. Communities sympathetic to the Taliban were motivated not by
the ethnic composition of the government, but rather by problems of poor governance or polit-
ical rivalries.610 A closer look at the composition of the cabinet and security forces, moreover,
does not provide support for the argument of ethnic imbalance. Between 2002 and 2014, eth-
nic Pashtuns (a categorization that could be broken down into multiple dimensions of region
and class) consistently occupied a plurality of cabinet positions in the Afghan government and
in key security portfolios, as shown in Tables 5.9a and 5.9b, respectively. In both tables, the
ethnic distribution of government officeholding remained consistent across time despite signif-
icant changes in patterns of political alliance-making and in the domestic position of President
Karzai. Among all cabinet positions and key security portfolios, the share of offices held by eth-
nic Pashtuns never fell below 30%, and this share steadily increased throughout 2014. With the
exception of the Hazara share, moreover, patterns of officeholding are fairly stable across most
ethnic categories.611
In the security forces, ethnic Pashtuns were somewhat under-represented in the years that
immediately followed Bonn, but this began to change in later years. Between 2001 and 2004,
ethnic Pashtuns collectively occupied 37% and 39% of senior positions in the Ministry of Defense
and Ministry of Interior, respectively, shares that are either consistent with or below estimates
of the proportion of ethnic Pashtuns in the Afghan population (see Figure 5.11). It can also be
seen that ethnic Tajiks collectively occupied similar shares of 36% and 38% of senior MOD and
MOI positions, respectively, proportions that are likely greater than the proportion of the Tajik
population in Afghanistan.
However, the share of ethnic Pashtuns in the security forces, especially the ANA, began to
increase substantially over the post-Bonn period (see Figure 5.12a). The majority of the ANA
candidate officers that had begun training in 2003 were ethnic Pashtuns, and the first batch of
candidates selected for NCO training were predominantly Pashtun. As Giusttozi reports, “be-
610See, for example, Crews and Tarzi 2008; Giustozzi 2008c.
611The category “Herati Farsi Zaban” is distinguished from “Tajik” because this community from western
Afghanistan has long had its own regional identity and politics.
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Table 5.9. Ethnic Composition, Cabinet-Level Positions
(a) All Cabinet-Level Positions
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Pashtun 32.3 33.3 33.3 32.3 29.0 33.3 30.0 36.7 36.7 36.7 36.7 40.0 41.4 44.8
Tajik 22.6 21.2 21.2 25.8 29.0 16.7 20.0 13.3 13.3 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.7 17.2
Tajik-Pashtun 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.2 - - - - - - 3.3 3.4 3.4
Herati Farsi Zaban 6.5 6.1 6.1 3.2 3.2 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 6.9 6.9
Uzbek 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.2 10.0 10.0 13.3 13.3 10.0 10.0 6.7 6.9 6.9
Uzbek-Tajik - - - - - - - - - 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4
Turkmen 3.2 6.1 6.1 6.5 6.5 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4
Aimaq 3.2 3.0 3.0 - - - - - - - - - - -
Hazara 9.7 9.1 9.1 19.4 19.4 16.7 20.0 16.7 16.7 13.3 13.3 10.0 10.3 10.3
Qizilbash / Other Shia 9.7 9.1 9.1 - - 3.3 - - - - - - - -
Sayyed 3.2 3.0 3.0 6.5 6.5 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4
Nuristani 3.2 3.0 3.0 - - - - - - - - - - -
(b) Cabinet-Level “Power” Positions
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Pashtun 40.0 50.0 50.0 57.1 42.9 42.9 42.9 57.1 57.1 57.1 57.1 57.1 42.9 42.9
Tajik 40.0 33.3 33.3 14.3 28.6 28.6 28.6 14.3 14.3 28.6 28.6 28.6 42.9 42.9
Tajik / Pashtun 20.0 16.7 16.7 14.3 14.3 - - - - - - - - -
Herati Farsi Zaban - - - - - 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 - - - - -
Hazara - - - 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3
Sources: interviews; various news reports; author’s calculations.
Note: “power” positions portfolios include presidency, vice presidencies, foreign affairs, defense, interior, and finance.
tween 2004 and 2008 there was indeed a massive increase of Pashtun officers, at a time when the
number of Pashtuns among enlisted staffed declined considerably; such increase came mainly at
the expense of Tajiks.”612 Between 2007 and 2014, ethnic Pashtuns on average constituted 43%,
47%, and 43% of the officer, NCO, and enlisted ranks of the ANA, respectively, while ethnic
Tajiks were slightly less prevalent in each rank of the army.613 It should be noted that, within
the Pashtun category, recruitment from southern Afghanistan (as opposed to Pashtun-majority
east) was persistently low, and within this region there substantial variation in recruitment pat-
612Giustozzi 2009.
613Notably, ethnic Tajiks held, on average, a larger share of the officer corps than the NCO and enlisted ranks. This
top-heavy distribution is partly a reflection of the outsized influence of Marshal Fahim and subordinate commanders
in security affairs after 2002.
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terns.614 This suggests that local factors, including grievances, political rivalries, and the presence
of the Taliban were probably more salient than ethnicity. In the ANP, ethnic Tajiks appear to
be over-represented in the officer and, in particular, NCO corps, but even here the proportion
of ethnic Pashtuns is not greatly inconsistent with the ethnic distribution in the population at
large (see Figure 5.12b). While the demographic characteristics of the Afghan population are un-
known, it appears to be the case that ethnic Hazaras and Uzbeks—not Tajiks or Pashtuns—are
highly under-represented in the ANP.
A second argument makes the claim that the exclusion of the Taliban movement from the
Bonn negotiations and post-Bonn government institutions led the Taliban leadership to inaugu-
rate its insurgency against Kabul. Clearly, the political exclusion of the Taliban movement from
the Bonn negotiations and the immediate post-Bonn period was a necessary condition for the
Taliban insurgency,615 and therefore the incorporation of the Taliban could well have averted a
614Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, various years.
615Another necessary condition for the rise of the Taliban insurgency was clearly Pakistan’s accommodation of the
movement’s leadership after the fall of the Taliban government.
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Figure 5.12. Ethnic Composition of the Afghan National Security Forces, 2007–2014
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highly destructive war. However, political exclusion was by itself an insufficient condition for
instability. It remains unclear whether all or part of the Taliban movement would have partici-
pated in Bonn, and if Pakistan would have prevented dissenting Taliban figures from organizing
attacks in Afghanistan.616 Furthermore, the inclusion of the Taliban movement in the Bonn ne-
gotiations would not have addressed the problems of limited organizational capital and external
incoherence outlined in this chapter. The incorporation of the Taliban may well have reduced
the prospect of insurgency against the Afghan government, but it would not necessarily have
produced less corrupt and stable institutions of government.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter showed why and how post-Bonn institutions in Afghanistan began to decay shortly
after the international intervention in 2001. Decay was not inevitable. Initial coalition build-
ing efforts by Hamid Karzai’s government resulted in institutional gains in some areas, notably
health and the formation of the army, and to a lesser extent education and agriculture. But these
initial gains rapidly gave way to institutional decay in the form of widespread corruption, pa-
tronage appointments, and an imbalanced, narrow economy. This was in part attributable to
a political strategy employed by Hamid Karzai to simultaneously undercut his opposition and
stabilize national politics through patronage appointments of political rivals. It was also due to
the incoherence of international assistance for the Afghan government. Low levels of resources,
poor aid coordination, and limited alignment between donor political and economic objectives
undermined the early development of Afghan institutions. The increase in resources and man-
power that came with the surge of 2009 and 2010 did not address the problems of coordination
and misalignment—nor did it shape Karzai’s strategy to reverse the patronage coalition he had
put together—limiting its impact on institutional outcomes.
616Some senior figures in the Taliban, including Mullah Dadullah, had reportedly incorporated foreign fighters
affiliated with al-Qaeda and anti-Shia Pakistani groups, and were therefore not easily reconcilable. Dadullah, moreover,
had adopted particularly extreme positions of organizing mass killings of Hazara civilians in response to agitations
against Taliban rule in Bamiyan province in 2001. On both points, see Ahmed Rashid, “Taliban Destroy Town
that was Rebel Stronghold,” The Daily Telegraph, June 13, 2001. Other Taliban figures, notably Jalaluddin Haqqani,
maintained close links with Al Qaeda and the Pakistan Army, suggesting that a reconciliation between Haqqani and
moderate forces in Afghanistan would have been difficult, and that accommodation within Pakistan would have been
forthcoming. For more detail, see Brown and Rassler 2013.
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6 Beyond Afghanistan: Evidence from Cross-Country
Statistical Tests
In the preceding chapters, I closely examined the origins of institutional development and decline
in a single case—Afghanistan—across time. This empirical strategy was useful for generating and
carefully testing insights into “big, slow moving, and invisible” processes that often characterize
institutional change. But sampling several episodes in one case clearly has its limitations. It
restricts the external validity of any resulting conclusions to a single country. And perhaps more
importantly, the criteria by which cases are selected may limit the internal validity of any insights
it generates. The characteristics of institutions in selected cases may differ from unselected cases
in ways that are not observed, generating unreliable inferences about the relationships that are
observable—a problem known as endogenous sample selection or, more commonly, selection
bias.
A common strategy of generating external validity and potentially addressing selection bias
is to widen the scope of analysis to a small set of case studies.617 But this strategy is often limited
for a different, additional reason. In small-N research, it is relatively difficult to make Mill-based
“most similar” or “most different” comparisons between selected cases without making dubi-
ous assumptions about the similarity (or dissimilarity) of cases across multiple dimensions.618
Researchers commonly make comparisons of two cases based on the assumption that they are
relatively similar on every dimension except for some treatment variable, ignoring potentially
non-trivial differences between them. But as a large body of methodology literature has shown,
matching “control” and “treatment” cases is often unreliable or impossible in small-sample obser-
617Note that this strategy does not necessarily address selection bias. If additional cases are selected on the basis of
the dependent variable, selection bias will remain a potential threat.
618Mill [1843] 2002.
257
vational studies because cases differ substantially on matching variables, or because there are too
many matching variables to find substantially similar cases.
This chapter aims to address these real or potential problems of external validity, case selec-
tion, and conditions of comparability by drawing on a large cross-section of countries. Specifi-
cally, I conduct two sets of tests, each separately centered on the impact of organizational capital
and aid fragmentation on institutional performance. Because both of these explanatory factors
are highly endogenous, each set of tests attempts to identify the exogenous variation in the ex-
planatory factor. I first estimate the long run impact of organizational capital on institutions
drawing on a cross-section and a panel dataset of developing countries from 1975 to 2014. I then
attempt to identify the effect of aid fragmentation on institutional development conditional on
the preceding level of organizational capital, drawing on an instrumental variables two-stage least
squares (IV 2SLS) strategy.
In the next section, I introduce the data and the measures that will be used in both sets of
tests. In Section 6.2, I discuss and present the results of the tests examining the long run impact
of organizational capital on institutions. And In Section 6.3, I evaluate the conditional effect of
aid fragmentation on institutional development. I conclude in Section 6.3.
6.1 Measures and Data
The data studied in this chapter are principally organized around two sets of data, each corre-
sponding with a different explanatory variable. The data on institutional outcomes and organi-
zational characteristics come from the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) project, an international
and multi-institutional effort to generate new data on democracy and government institutions
for all countries since 1900.619 Data on aid fragmentation and other aid characteristics come from
the AidData database, a multi-institutional effort to collect project-level aid data from multiple
sources, including the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, official data from individual donor governments, and aid recipient
systems.620 The definitions and sources of these data and other covariates are presented in Table
6.1.
619See Coppedge et al. 2016.
620Tierney et al. 2011.
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Table 6.1. Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition Source
Public corruption Extent of institutional corruption VDEM
Organizational capital Mean score of elite consultation and local party presence VDEM
Aid fragmentation Herfindahl index of donors AidData
Government effectiveness Composite score of institutional quality and independence WGI621
Control over corruption Composite score of institutional corruption and capture WGI
Logged GDP Log of GDP per capita (constant 2005 international $) WDI622
Population density People per km2 of land area WDI
Trade Trade (% of GDP) WDI
Net oil + gas exports (Fuel exports - Fuel imports) / Total exports WDI
Democracy Mean score of civil liberty and political rights Freedom House623
Ethnic fractionalization Herfindahl index computed from Atlas Narodov Mira624 Fearon and Laitin625
Mountainous Terrain Log of % Land Area Mountainous Fearon and Laitin
6.1.1 Measures
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
To measure long-run institutional development, I primarily rely on an annual measure of public
corruption (v2x_pubcorr in the VDEM dataset). Corruption in the public sector characterizes
both how individuals are recruited and retained in government; it also describes the processes
by which government officials design and deliver public goods in central banking, regulation,
infrastructure, policing, and other areas of activity. Corruption is also prevalent in many con-
texts, including upper-income countries, and is a strong predictor of important cross-country
outcomes, including economic growth and political violence.626
The public corruption measure is constructed as the average of the point estimates from a
Bayesian factor analysis model where the factors are public sector bribery and embezzlement
(v2excrptps and v2exthftps, respectively, in the VDEM dataset). The public corruption index
answers the question:
To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kick-
backs, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or
621World Governance Indicators. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi.
622World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
world-development-indicators.
623House 2013
624Atlas Narodov Mira 1964.
625Fearon and Laitin 2003
626Mauro 1995; Walter 2014.
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misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?627
One shortcoming of the VDEM data is that many of its measures are derived from subjective
assessments by country experts. Such measures may be problematic if they are based on incon-
sistent coding across items or on biases specific to one or more coder. Perhaps more problematic
is the prevalence of measurement error in concepts that are intrinsically difficult to measure with
precision. The VDEM data directly address these measurement error problems of inconsistency,
bias, and mistaken enumeration by aggregating multiple (5 or more) expert assessments of the
same country using using a Bayesian item response theory (IRT), a class of latent variable mod-
els.628 These models use cross- and within-coder item scores to estimate levels of item consistency
for a given coder and levels of bias across coders for a particular item. They subsequently con-
struct estimates of the latent concept, in this case public corruption, adjusting for estimates of
consistency and bias.
Figure 6.1 plots the geographic distribution of the VDEM measure of public corruption using
the mean value across the entire time period of 1950 to 2014 (Figure 6.1a) and across the period of
2010 to 2014 (Figure 6.1b). Together, both maps suggest several different trends in the prevalence
of corruption. First, public corruption has increased across time in the majority of countries,
although several modest exceptions exist (for example, Brazil, Ethiopia, Namibia, South Korea,
Tanzania, Thailand). Second, there is a substantial degree of cross-sectional variation in corrup-
tion. As seen in Figure 6.1, we see especially high levels of public corruption in central Africa
and many of the Soviet successor states in Central Asia and Eastern Europe.
To account for possible measurement error specific to the public corruption measure, I draw
on other, non-VDEM measures of institutional performance. Specifically, I use two measures
from the World Governance Indicators: government effectiveness and control over corruption.
Both of these measures constructed using existing indicators that of the concepts they are meant
to measure.629
627Coppedge et al. 2016.
628Latent variable models are based on the concept that the observed (or “manifest”) response variable is actually
driven by a set of unobserved (or “latent” variables). While these latent variables are not observable, their influence
can be estimated using other variables that vary with them.
629Government effectiveness measures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation,
and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. Control over corruption measures “perceptions
of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption,
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Figure 6.1. Geographic Distribution of Public Corruption
(a) 1950-2014
(b) 2010-2014
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Source: Coppedge et al. 2016; author’s calculations.
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ORGANIZATIONAL CAPITAL
As discussed in Chapter 2, organizational capital is composed of two dimensions. The first
dimension, elite cooperation, measures the degree to which national political elites cooperate
with one another through party building, through shared social and political relationships, or
through other mechanisms of consultation. The second dimension, embeddedness, characterizes
the extent to which political interests are channeled through political parties or other grass-roots
organizations.
Data on both of these dimensions come from the VDEM dataset. Elite cooperation is mea-
sured by the range of consultation at elite levels when important policy changes are being consid-
ered (v2dlconslt in the VDEM dataset). The scores that underlie this measure follow an ordinal
scale that ranges between 0 and 5, where 0 indicates negligible consultation between a country
leadership and other elites, and 5 indicates extensive consultation between executive leaders and
elites from from all parts of the political spectrum. This measure adjusts for cross and within-
coder inconsistency and measurement error using a Bayesian item response theory model, pro-
ducing a relative indictor usually ranging between -5 and 5, with 0 approximately representing
the mean for all country-years in the sample.
Embeddedness is measured by the number of parties that have permanent local party branches,
adjusted for cross- and within-coder inconsistency and measurement error (v2prbrch in the VDEM
dataset). This indicator is a somewhat limited measure of institutional embeddedness. If some
or all parties have an extensive presence at the local level, this does not necessarily mean that
executive institutions are deeply rooted in society. However, local party presence is likely to be
correlated with institutional embeddedness. When local political organizing is possible, govern-
ment institutions are likely to be present, independent of other country characteristics such as
regime type or income. This means that local party presence can serve as a proxy for institutional
embedddedness, but it will likely be subject to (random) measurement error, biasing the OLS co-
efficients downwards. This measure of embeddedness is clearly inadequate for another reason,
but in a way that is not problematic for this analysis. Absolute monarchies and other systems in
which political parties are prohibited clearly do not have any party offices at any level. But the
as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.” For more detail, see http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi.
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exclusion of upper-middle and high-income economies discussed above already results in their re-
moval from the sample. It is worth noting that the measure of local party presence covers almost
all of the wider authoritarian world. Authoritarian governments have used political parties as a
key instrument of regime stability and power projection, some much more intensively than oth-
ers.630 The local party indicator captures a substantial range of variation on this dimension. The
Communist Party of China, for example, has maintained an elaborate party and administrative
presence throughout the coastal areas and expansive inland of mainland China. By contrast, the
Communist Party of Cuba has followed a relatively elitist path that has deemphasized extensive
dependence on public opinion.
Using these measures of elite cooperation and embeddeness, I construct a simple and com-
posite measure of organizational capital by taking their average:
ORGit = (CONSLTit +BRANCHit) ∗ 0.5 (6.1)
where i indexes for countries and t indexes for time periods. The components of the organiza-
tional capital measure vary considerably within and across countries, as shown in Figure 6.2. It
is easy to see that while elite cooperation and party branch presence are correlated, they do not
always go together. For example, Botswana exhibits a relatively high level of elite cooperation
but shows a limited degree of party presence throughout the country. By contrast, Uzbekistan
shows a comparatively low level of elite cooperation and high degree of political party penetra-
tion. One can also see that both dimensions of organizational capital vary substantially across
countries, even among countries with comparable regime types. In the democratic Dominican
Republic, cooperation between elites is much more limited than in similarly democratic Costa
Rica. Among autocracies, elite consultation is substantially higher in Vietnam than in the con-
tentious political system of Myanmar (Burma). Party presence also varies substantially. Political
parties have an extensive, deeply-rooted presence in India’s electoral democracy, whereas party
organizations are not especially embedded in democratic Serbia. The CPC has an extensive pres-
ence in Chinese society, whereas the New Azerbaijan Party has a comparatively limited presence
in Azerbaijan.






































































































































Figure 6.2. Heatmap of Organizational Capital
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Figure 6.3 plots the geographic distribution of organizational capital using the mean value
across the entire time period of 1950 to 2014 (Figure 6.3a) and across the period of 2010 to 2014
(Figure 6.3b). The composite measure of organizational capital, like public corruption, exhibits
trends across time and geography. In general, there is a greater tendency towards higher levels of
organizational capital across time, especially in Latin America. However, some regions, particu-
larly the Middle East, do not exhibit major temporal changes in organizational strength. We also
see substantial variation in organizational capital across regions and geographically proximate
countries. Unsurprisingly, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa show lower levels of orga-
nization than East Asia and South America. Within regions, proximate countries exhibit wide
variation in organizational capital. For example, India shows a generally higher level of organi-
zational capital than neighboring Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh, despite having in common
the historical legacy of British colonial rule. Likewise, South Africa and Botswana both record a
greater level of organizational capital than neighboring Zimbabwe or Mozambique.
AID FRAGMENTATION
Aid fragmentation is measured as a Herfindahl index of bilateral donors at the recipient-year level,
using official development assistance adjusted to exclude aid amounts that never leave the donor
country.631Three restrictions are placed on the Herfindahl index used here. First, it excludes
projects that cut across multiple sectors or that are vaguely classified (constituting less than 0.5%
of the total sample). Second, it draws on aid commitments instead of disbursements. Records
of aid disbursements are frequently characterized by greater data missingness and measurement
error because donor governments do not systematically track the flow of disbursed funds to
aid recipients, particularly those with multi-year projects or programs. Furthermore, there is
substantial variation in the quality of disbursement reporting relative to commitment reporting
across donors. Finally, the Herfindahl index only includes bilateral donors—government aid
agencies such as USAID, the Agence Francaise de Développement, and the Japan International
Cooperation Agency—and does not include multilateral organizations or funds. As discussed in
greater detail in Section 6.3, this measure more closely accords with the explanation developed
631Specifically, this adjustment excludes donor administrative costs, debt relief, imputed student costs, and assistance
toward refugees in donor countries.
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Figure 6.3. Geographic Distribution of Organizational Capital
(a) 1950-2014
(b) 2010-2014
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Source: Coppedge et al. 2016; author’s calculations.
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in Chatper 2 and is better suited for the instrumental variable strategy developed to estimate the
impact of aid fragmentation.
The Herfindahl index is computed, first, by obtaining observations of djit, the aid share of






Next, the Herfindahl index is transformed by subtracting it from 1 so that higher values of the
resulting index correspond with greater aid fragmentation.
AFit = (1− afit) (6.3)
Equation 6.3 forms a fragmentation index that varies between 0 and 1, where higher values indi-
cate greater fragmentation. Values for this index increase with the number of donors or with the
equality of aid shares, which would indicate the absence of a dominant donor country. Averaged
over 1990 and 2013, the fragmentation index ranges from 0.16 for Nauru to 0.88 for Mozambique.
CONTROL VARIABLES
The empirical tests also account for time-varying covariates endogenous to institutional perfor-
mance. The tests control for logged real per capita income, as higher income makes economic and
human resources available for institutional upgrading, and likely generates higher expectations
of government performance. They control for the level of democracy in the recipient country
because democracies are often associated with more accountable and predictable institutions than
autocratic countries. Moreover, democracy is an important control variable here because organi-
zational capital may be more of a proxy for democratic institutions than an independent source
of variation. The tests control for natural resource rents, measured as net oil and gas exports
relative to total exports.632 Oil and gas rents, in particular, have been identified with greater cor-
ruption, lower bureaucratic quality, and poor public revenue management.633 The estimations
632Ross and Voeten 2016.
633Ross 2015.
267
also control for trade as a share of GDP, based on the conjecture that trade-based exposure to
technology, skills, and taxable resources provides for more capable institutions. Finally, the em-
pirical tests control for population density because there may be economies or diseconomies of
scale to developing effective institutions. The sources of these covariates are described in Table
tab:sources.
6.1.2 Sample
The data studied in this chapter consist of one cross-sectional sample and one unbalanced panel
of aid-receiving countries. Several restrictions are made to the sample. First, the data exclude
economies that were classified as either upper-middle or high-income by the World Bank in the
first ten years in which the ratings are available. Second, the tests estimating the conditional
impact of aid fragmentation (Test 2) are restricted to the years of 1990 and beyond. This is because
the assistance data from AidData exhibits high levels of missingness in the period between 1973
and 1989, and the quality of this data subset is also open to question.634
In the panel data, the various measures of performance discussed above result in different
samples. Public corruption, the primary and most rich measure of institutional performance
covers the 1975 to 2014 period, whereas the auxiliary measures cover shorter periods of time.
The World Bank measures of government effectiveness and control over corruption, for example,
cover the 1995 to 2014 period.
634A substantial portion of the pre-1990 AidData comes from the OECD CRS data, which is likely subject to
substantial measurement error. As one OECD document reports, “
u
ntil the early 1990s, most data submissions were made on paper and reconciliation was a tedious task.” Economic
Cooperation and Development 2011.
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Table 6.2. Descriptive Statistics, Cross-Sectional and Panel Samples
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Cross-Sectional Sample
Public Corruption 107 0.57 0.20 0.11 0.96
Gov’t Effectiveness 107 -0.47 0.59 -1.71 1.21
Control Over Corruption 107 -0.52 0.52 -1.60 1.43
Organizational Capital 107 0.06 0.72 -1.82 2.02
Elite Consultation 107 -0.12 0.82 -1.54 2.88
Party Branches 107 0.23 0.98 -2.27 2.60
Aid Fragmentation 107 0.57 0.14 0.23 0.84
Log Per Capita Income 107 7.03 1.03 5.08 9.14
Pop. Density 107 72.97 102.69 1.25 774.95
Democracy 107 4.48 1.28 1.47 6.90
Trade / GDP 107 70.61 32.01 18.84 153.48
Net Oil + Gas Exports / Exports 107 -4.19 27.11 -64.95 101.71
Ethnic Fractionalization 107 0.53 0.24 0.04 0.95
Share Mountainous Terrain 107 19.91 23.93 0.00 94.30
Panel Sample
Public Corruption 644 0.59 0.23 0.04 0.97
Gov’t Effectiveness 365 -0.36 0.59 -1.72 1.23
Control Over Corruption 365 -0.44 0.55 -1.45 1.51
Organizational Capital 642 0.47 0.85 -2.13 2.74
Elite Consultation 642 0.39 1.13 -2.67 3.71
Party Branches 642 0.55 0.95 -2.80 2.72
Aid Fragmentation 569 0.61 0.19 0.00 0.90
Log Per Capita Income 583 7.25 1.03 4.97 9.60
Pop. Growth 584 95.46 149.02 1.37 1,268.33
Democracy 584 4.01 1.60 1.00 7.00
Trade / GDP 580 70.73 35.15 12.88 205.54
Net Oil + Gas Exports / Exports 547 -2.56 33.79 -114.57 187.79
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6.2 Estimating the Long-Run Effect of Organizational Capital
The first part of this chapter estimates the long-term effect of organizational capital on institu-
tional performance. Drawing on both cross-sectional and panel data, this set of tests attempt to
identify the impact of both the horizontal and vertical components of organizational capital on
various measures of institutional performance. The data studied in this section comprises of (1) a
cross-section and (2) an unbalanced panel covering the time period of 1975 to 2014, both covering
approximately 115 countries.
The first set of tests are applied to a cross-sectional sample of recipient countries using averages
of the 1975 to 2014 period. The main estimation equation is of the form:
INSTir = α+ λORGir + βXir + ηr + uir (6.4)
where i indexes for countries and r indexes for regions.635 The second set of tests are applied to
a panel data set covering the 1975 to 2014 period. The panel data set is constructed using time
period averages of 5-, 10- and 15-year windows that smooth out transitory changes in the data.
The main panel estimation equation is of the form:
INSTirt = α+ λORGirt−1 + βXirt−1 + ρi + ϕt + γrt + uirt (6.5)
where t indexes for time periods. The dependent variable, INSTirt, is a continuous variable that
measures the level of institutional quality in country i, region r, and time period t. The primary
explanatory variable of interest, ORGirt, measures the level of organizational capital in country
i, region r, and time period t. Equation 6.6 includes a vector of lagged covariates, denominated
by Xirt−1, that are introduced in Section 6.1. It also incorporates country fixed effects, indi-
cated by ρi, that control for time-invariant differences between recipient countries, period fixed
effects, denominated by ϕt, that control for common shocks to aid recipients, and region-period
effects that absorb region-specific shocks to aid recipients in each time period. Standard errors
are clustered at the region-period level.
635The region classification that I use is taken from the World Bank and consists of the following groups: East Asia




Before presenting the cross-sectional estimates, it is useful to observe the unconditional relation-
ship between organizational capital and institutional performance. Figure 7.2 shows the bivariate
distributions of the organizational capital variable and various measures of institutional strength.
It is easy to see that organizational capital shows a positive and substantively large relationship
with government effectiveness (Figure 7.2a) and the control over corruption (Figure 7.2b); it ex-
hibits a large, negative association with public corruption (Figure 7.2c) and positive relationship
with government authority over the surrounding population (Figure 7.2d).
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We can also see the relationship between the dimensions of organizational capital and the VDEM
measure of public corruption in Figure 7.1. Countries with higher (lower) levels of elite cooper-
ation are located in the right (left) hand side of the figure, and these cases tend to exhibit lower
(higher) levels of corruption. Moreover, countries with a higher number of party branches (par-
ticularly in combination with elite cooperation) show lower levels of corruption, although this
dimension does not appear to predict corruption to the same extent as elite cooperation.




























































































































































































































































Corruption (categorized) ● ● ● ●(0.104,0.318] (0.318,0.53] (0.53,0.743] (0.743,0.956]
Source: Coppedge et al. 2016; author’s calculations.
Notes: Countries with greater public corruption are (darker) red; countries with less public cor-
ruption are (darker) blue.
We can also see that organizational capital is a significant predictor of regime survival. A
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Kaplan-Meier survival analysis shows that countries below the median level of organizational
capital are significantly more likely to undergo institutional breakdown than those that are above
the median, especially after 30 years.
Figure 6.6. Kaplan-Meier Survival Plot of Regime Survival, by Level of Organizational Capital
OC <= 50th Percentile
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Years Elapsed Since Regime Start
Source: Geddes, J. Wright, and Frantz 2014; Coppedge et al. 2016; author’s calculations.
These cross-sectional relationships are examined in a regression framework in Table 6.3,
which shows the OLS estimates of Equation 6.4. Column 1 shows the association between the
composite measure of organizational capital and public corruption, controlling for a range of
country-level covariates of institutional quality. The estimate is statistically and substantively
significant: a one point increase in elite consultation is associated with a more than 12.5% decline
in corruption for the average country in the sample. The specification in Column 2 includes
the constituent components of the organizational capital measure as regressors instead of the
composite measure. The elite cooperation variable has a statistically and substantively signifi-
cant negative association with public corruption. It indicates that a one point increase in elite
consultation is associated with a more than 16% decline in corruption for the average country
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in the sample. By contrast, the embeddedness measure has a positive but imprecise and substan-
tively less significant point estimate. Column 3 adds the interaction between elite cooperation
and embeddedness, but its point estimate is neither statistically nor substantively significant. In
Columns 4 and 5, I estimate the specification from Column 1 but use government effectiveness
and control of corruption (both from the WGI), respectively, as the dependent variable. The
organizational capital variable is positively associated with government effectiveness and control
over corruption, although both point estimates are imprecise.
Table 6.3. OLS Cross-Sectional Estimates
Corruption Corruption Corruption Effectiveness Control Corruption
Organizational Capital -0.071* 0.112 0.115
(0.038) (0.082) (0.095)
Elite Consultation -0.101** -0.100**
(0.040) (0.041)
Party Branches -0.000 -0.001
(0.013) (0.015)
Elite Consultation * Party Branches 0.006
(0.014)
Log Per Capita Income -0.081** -0.072* -0.072* 0.357*** 0.331***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.085) (0.096)
Pop. Density 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Democracy -0.006 -0.024 -0.024 -0.149** -0.041
(0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.065) (0.081)
Trade/GDP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Net Oil + Gas Exports 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.175* 0.184* 0.185* -0.230 -0.274
(0.094) (0.099) (0.101) (0.317) (0.253)
Share Mountainous Terrain -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.004* 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 107 107 107 107 107
R2 0.536 0.578 0.578 0.721 0.583
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: All columns include region fixed effects and standard errors clustered by region.
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Panel Data Estimates
While the cross-sectional estimates presented in Table 6.3 provide evidence that is consistent with
the theory developed in this paper, these estimates were imprecise and possibly biased because
of measurement error or reverse causality. In order to address these threats to inference, I esti-
mate a difference-in-difference model drawing on panel data covering the 1975 to 2014 period.
By accounting for unobserved, time-invariant differences between countries, as well as country-
invariant differences across time periods, the difference-in-difference strategy offers a more credi-
ble estimate of the effect of organization on institutional quality.
Table 6.4. OLS Panel Data Estimates
Corruption Corruption Corruption Gov’t Effect Control Corruption
Organizational Capital -0.041*** 0.002 0.033
(0.015) (0.056) (0.055)
Elite Consultation -0.033*** -0.032***
(0.010) (0.012)
Party Branches -0.005 -0.007
(0.013) (0.014)
Elite Consultation * Party Branches -0.003
(0.008)
Log Per Capita Income -0.049 -0.045 -0.042 0.242** 0.271**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.109) (0.105)
Pop. Density 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Democracy 0.010 0.006 0.006 -0.057** -0.040*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.024) (0.023)
Trade/GDP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Net Oil + Gas Exports 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 644 644 644 365 365
R2 0.877 0.878 0.878 0.960 0.944
Clusters 87 87 87 59 59
Note: All columns include country, period, and region-period fixed effects and standard errors clustered by region-
period.
Table 6.4 shows the difference-in-difference estimates. The specification in column 1 shows
the association between the organizational capital variable and public corruption, controlling for
a vector of covariates and country, period, and region-period fixed effects. The point estimate for
organizational capital indicates a negative and statistically significant association between orga-
nization and public corruption: a one point increase in organizational capital is associated with
a 7% decline in corruption for the average country included in the sample. Column 2 includes
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the constituent components of organizational capital. The coefficient of elite cooperation is neg-
ative and statistically significant, but the coefficient of embeddedness is imprecise. Column 3
includes the interaction between elite cooperation and embeddedness, but the coefficients of the
embeddedness variable and the interaction are statistically insignificant. In Columns 4 and 5 the
dependent variable is government effectiveness and control over corruption, respectively, with
the same specification tested in Column 1. In each of these tests, the coefficient on organizational
capital has the expected positive sign but is statistically insignificant.
6.3 Estimating the Conditional Effect of Aid Fragmentation
Aid fragmentation has become an increasingly prominent feature of the international economic
system since the end of the Cold War, despite periodic efforts to harmonize the management
of development assistance,636 This development is in large part attributable to the expansion of
major donor organizations into countries and sectors to which they had not previously made
commitments of aid. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, real annual commitments of
ODA by advanced industrialized countries and multilateral organizations have trended upward,
increasing cyclically from a level of $100 billion to $150 billion (in constant U.S. dollars) between
1990 and 2013, as shown in Figure 6.10.
While many of the leading sponsors of development assistance at present, including the World
Bank, IMF, United States, Japan, and Germany, have remained the largest donors over time,
their respective aid activities have expanded to include new countries and new sectors over the
past twenty years, as Figure 6.8 indicates. The mean number of recipients to which donors have
extended aid has increased from approximately 30 in 1990 to 70 in 2013, as shown in Figure 6.9.
Donor countries and multilateral organizations, moreover, were present in an average of 2 sectors
per recipient country in 1990, whereas the average sectoral presence was 4 sectors in 2013. As a
consequence, as the aggregate level of ODA extended to the developing world has increased, so
636Advanced industrialized countries and multilateral organizations have increasingly called for greater harmoniza-
tion in the management of development aid. Since the 2003 conclusion of the High-Level Forum on Harmonization
in Rome, aid coordination has become a leading agenda item for the donor community. The declaration adopted in
Rome, and in subsequent conferences on aid effectiveness, have cited the multiplicity of donor objectives, procedures,
standards, and operations as a systematic obstacle to political and economic development in aid-receiving countries.
As plainly stated at the conclusion of the most recent successor to the Rome conference, the “excessive fragmentation
of aid at global, country or sector level impairs aid effectiveness.” See Economic Cooperation and Development 2008
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has the fragmentation of the aid system. Measured at both the level of the receiving country and
sector, aid fragmentation has increased by 25% and 65%, respectively, between 1990 and 2012.637






















































1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Annual Aggregate ODA
Average Annual Recipient-Level Fragmention
Average Annual Sector-Level Fragmention
Note: Aid fragmentation scores and aggregate annual ODA constructed using real aid commit-
ments by both bilateral and multilateral donors, and exclude commitments with vague sectoral
allocations.
637For a definition and measurement of aid fragmentation, see Chapter 2.
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Note: Cumulative ODA and average annual ODA growth constructed using real aid commit-
ments by both bilateral and multilateral donors, and exclude commitments with vague sectoral
allocations.
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1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Avg. Number of Aid-Receiving Countries per Donor
Avg. Number of Aid-Receiving Sectors per Donor-Recipient
Note: Average number of recipients and recipient-sectors per donor constructed using nominal aid
commitments by both bilateral and multilateral donors, and exclude aid commitments with vague
sectoral allocations.
In Chapter 2, I made the argument that the effect of two characteristics of foreign aid—
resource alignment and donor coordination—have an impact on institutional performance, de-
pending on the initial conditions of recipient countries. If recipients are characterized by highly
polarized elites and unembedded political organizations, then aid fragmentation is expected to
attenuate the quality of institutions. However, where political elites effectively cooperate and
preside over rooted political organizations, then institutions in aid-receiving countries can mit-
igate the potentially adverse consequences of aid fragmentation. The logic of this contingent
effect is rooted in the organizational ability of both donor and recipient governments to rec-
oncile, coordinate, and evaluate resources in service of a coherent set of interests. When aid is
characterized by poor resource alignment and coordination, donors cannot readily reconcile the
various objectives of their assistance programs, nor can they coordinate their various activities
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with one another. This tends to produce ambiguous donor objectives, extremely poor visibility
of resource flows, and a limited donor ability to evaluate the effectiveness of their assistance. It is
also especially likely to result in duplicative efforts and corruption in the aid receiving country,
especially for recipients with limited organizational capital.
This sets of tests uses aid fragmentation as a measure of both resource alignment and donor
coordination. It measures donor coordination because a less concentrated distribution of donors
implies multiple sets of donor objectives, procedures, and organizations, making donor coordi-
nation more costly. It can also serve as a somewhat imperfect indicator of resource alignment.
This is because countries with a greater share of bilateral aid tend to have a greater number of
bilateral donors, as shown in Figure 6.10. When a recipient country receives a greater share of
aid from bilateral donors, it tends to come from new or smaller donors. This is suggestive of a
competitive motivation to bilateral aid allocation, as bilateral donors have the alternative option
of channelling assistance through multilateral aid budgets or trust funds.
There is also a great deal of evidence that non-altruistic motivations—commercial, political,
security—continue to shape bilateral aid allocations in ways that decrease the alignment of de-
velopment and non-development objectives. Javed Younas, for example, shows that commercial
motivations tend to underlie aid decisions. Specifically, he finds that developing countries that
import capital goods (from donor countries) receive significantly greater assistance than countries
that do not, suggesting a commercial motivation to aid allocation.638 This motivation is especially
prevalent when multiple bilateral donors are active in a recipient country. Stephen Knack, for
example, estimates a negative relationship between aid concentration and aid tying, which oc-
curs when a donor conditions its aid on purchases from contractors based in the donor country.
Donors with a greater concentration of aid to a particular recipient tie a lower proportion of
this aid, suggesting that they have “a stronger incentive to maximize the development impact
of [their] aid instead of pursuing commercial or other non-development objectives.639 Political
motivations also underlie aid decisions and, when prevalent, tend to result in greater aid fragmen-
tation. For example, developing countries that assume non-permanent, rotating membership of
the UN Security Council receive an increase amount of aid from a greater number of bilateral
638Younas 2008.
639Knack and Smets 2012.
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donors than in prior or subsequent years.640 Other research has found that strategically impor-
tant countries have received greater donor interest than economic need would justify, suggesting
greater aid fragmentation than would otherwise be the case.641
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Source: Tierney et al. 2011; author’s calculations.
Aid fragmentation, then, can serve a measure for both the alignment and coordination di-
mensions of foreign aid. When aid is more fragmented, we can expect lower alignment between
donor political and development objectives, and lower coordination. The argument tested here,
then, is that the impact of aid fragmentation depends on the level of organizational capital in the
aid-receiving country. The structural equation that evaluates this expectation is therefore:
640Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009, Non-permanent members also receive a greater
number of World Bank projects, although they do not receive more aggregate World Bank aid.
641Fleck and Kilby 2010.
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INSTirt = α+ λORGirt−1 + θAFirt−1 + ψORG ∗AFirt−1
+ βXirt−1 + ρi + ϕt + γrt + uirt (6.6)
where i indexes countries, r indexes regions, and t indexes time periods. The outcome INSTirt
and key regressorORGirt−1 are the same variables that appear in Equation 6.5. AFirt−1 measures
the level of aid fragmentation in recipients with a level of organizational capital equal to 0, and
ORG∗AFirt−1 is an interaction between aid fragmentation and organizational capital. The time-
varying covariates Xirt−1 are the same as those included in Equation 6.6, but also include the
share of ODA in GDP to partial out the potential volume effect of aid from its composition.
Under the assumption of causal identification, θ̂ is the estimated unconditional effect of an
additional point in aid fragmentation (as measured by the Herfindahl index) on recipient in-
stitutional performance, and ψ̂ is the estimated differential effect of an additional point in aid
fragmentation conditional conditional on recipient organizational capital. Given that the depen-
dent variable is measured as public corruption, then if θ̂ is positive and ψ̂ is negative, this means
that aid fragmentation has a damaging effect on institutional quality, but this impact becomes less
pernicious with greater organizational capital in recipient countries.
Two primary empirical difficulties in estimating this relationship stem from reverse causality
and omitted variables. Specifically, it may be that recipient countries with limited organizational
capacity tend to receive aid from a wider universe of donors than more organizationally robust
countries. This would suggest that the OLS estimate of the impact of aid fragmentation on
institutional performance would be biased downwards. At the same time, it is also possible
that political, economic, or humanitarian crises can induce minor or uncommitted donors to
reduce their exposure to the aid recipient because they anticipate further political dislocation,
thereby decreasing aid fragmentation in the recipient country. Such a possibility would generate
an upward bias in the OLS estimation of interest. Yet another threat to identification is the
possibility of an omitted variable that exerts a causal impact on both aid fragmentation and
institutions, systematically biasing the OLS estimation.
In order to identify a consistent estimate of the impact of aid fragmentation on institutional
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performance conditional on recipient organizational capital, the tests below employ an Instru-
mental Variables Two Stage Least Squares (IV 2SLS) strategy. Specifically, the tests use donor
income fragmentation as an instrument for aid fragmentation. Since the end of the Cold War,
the secular de-concentration of incomes in the advanced industrialized world has corresponded
with a greater number of bilateral sponsors of official development assistance. But, as documented
below in the first stage regressions, this trend has correlated with differential changes in aid frag-
mentation at the recipient level. This is because fluctuations in donor GDP have correlated with
changes in aid allocations in pre-existing recipients, generating recipient-specific changes in the
distribution of aid receipts. Donor income fragmentation is also plausibly exogenous to recipient
institutional performance because differential patterns of growth in donor countries are unlikely
to have a direct impact on internal institutional changes in aid receiving countries, conditional on
other recipient characteristics. It follows that if donor income fragmentation is a robust predictor
of aid fragmentation and is orthogonal to changes in institutional performance in recipient coun-
tries, then the IV 2SLS estimates of θ̂ and ψ̂ provide consistent estimates of the unconditional
and conditional effect of aid fragmentation. The key counterfactual, here, is the difference in
institutional performance between extending aid through multiple donor channels instead of a
limited number of donors for countries of varying levels of organizational capital.
First Stages Estimates
The first stages of the IV 2SLS estimation separately regress the aid fragmentation and the inter-
action between organizational capital and aid fragmentation on the donor income fragmentation
instruments. The IV 2SLS first stage relationships are of the following form:
AFirt = α+ λORGirt + ψIFirt + ψORG ∗ IFirt
+ βXirt−1 + ρi + ϕt + γrt + uirt (6.7)
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ORG ∗AFirt = α+ λORGirt + ψIFirt + ψORG ∗ IFirt
+ βXirt−1 + ρi + ϕt + γrt + uirt (6.8)
Where IFirt is the level of donor income fragmentation for recipient i in region r and time
period t, and ORG ∗ IFirt is the interaction between donor income fragmentation and organi-
zational capital. The first stage estimates of Equations 6.7 and 6.8 are shown in Panels B and C,
respectively, of Table 6.5. In each of the unconditional and conditional first stage regressions, the
relevant instrument (IFirt in Panel B, and ORG ∗ IFirt in Panel C) has the expected positive
sign. In Panel B, income fragmentation is a strong positive predictor of aid fragmentation, and in
Panel C, the interaction of income fragmentation and organizational capital is a robust correlate
of the interacted aid fragmentation variable. Both panels have an R2 that exceed 0.85, suggesting
that the instruments are strong predictors of aid fragmentation.
OLS and IV 2SLS Panel Estimates
Table 6.5 presents the OLS and IV 2SLS estimates of the unconditional and conditional asso-
ciations between aid fragmentation and institutional performance. The first column shows the
unconditional association between aid fragmentation and public corruption, controlling for a
vector of covariates (including organizational capital) and country, period, and region-period
fixed effects.
The point estimate for aid fragmentation indicates a positive and statistically significant asso-
ciation between aid fragmentation and corruption. Column 2 includes both the unconditional
aid fragmentation variable and its interaction with organizational capital. The results indicate
that aid fragmentation is positively correlated with public corruption, but there is no differen-
tial effect at higher levels of organizational capital. The following two columns present the IV
2SLS estimates of the unconditional and interacted equations. In Column 3, the IV 2SLS point
estimate of aid fragmentation is positive, statistically significant, and larger in magnitude than
the analogous OLS estimate in Column 1. In Column 4, the unconditional and conditional es-
timates have the expected positive and negative signs, respectively. The unconditional estimate
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Table 6.5. OLS and IV 2SLS Panel Data Estimates
Corruption Corruption Corruption Corruption Effectiveness Control Corruption
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A: Structural Equation / Second Stage Estimates
Aid Fragmentation 0.074** 0.069* 0.116*** 0.122*** -0.248** -0.078
(0.029) (0.038) (0.043) (0.041) (0.116) (0.155)
Aid Fragmentation * Org Capital 0.007 -0.027 0.410** -0.090
(0.032) (0.037) (0.165) (0.110)
Organizational Capital -0.024 -0.028 -0.025 -0.009 -0.271** 0.081
(0.021) (0.025) (0.016) (0.028) (0.118) (0.082)
Aid / GDP 0.003* 0.003* 0.003** 0.003** 0.012*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Log Per Capita Income -0.044 -0.044 -0.040 -0.042 0.280*** 0.253***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.043) (0.043) (0.081) (0.074)
Pop. Density 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Democracy 0.013 0.013 0.014* 0.014* -0.042*** -0.029*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016)
Trade/GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001* -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Net Oil + Gas Exports 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 457 457 457 457 356 356
R2 0.930 0.930 0.929 0.929 0.957 0.944
Clusters 75 75 75 75 58 58
Panel B: First Stage Estimates, DV = Aid Fragmentation
Income Fragmentation 0.642*** 0.531*** 0.621*** 0.621***
(0.156) (0.147) (0.135) (0.135)
Income Fragmentation * Org Capital 0.168 0.112 0.112
(0.105) (0.143) (0.143)
First Stage R2 0.879 0.881 0.903 0.903
Panel C: First Stage Estimates, DV = Aid Fragmentation * Org Capital
Income Fragmentation -0.619*** -0.468*** -0.468***
(0.162) (0.153) (0.153)
Income Fragmentation * Org Capital 1.142*** 0.917*** 0.917***
(0.206) (0.191) (0.191)
First Stage R2 0.973 0.979 0.979
285
remains positive, statistically significant, and large in magnitude. The conditional estimate is sub-
stantively significant but somewhat imprecise. While the conditional estimate is not statistically
significant, the estimate is consistent with the expected relationship between aid fragmentation
and corruption for relatively low levels of organizational capital (at the lowest levels of organi-
zational capital the relationship is imprecise) as shown in Figure 6.11a. At relatively low levels
of organizational capital, aid fragmentation increases public corruption, and at a comparatively
high level it does not have a statistically significant impact. The last two columns estimate the
specification in Column 4 except the dependent variable is specified as government effectiveness
and control over corruption. In Column 5, the unconditional and conditional estimates have the
expected signs and are substantively and statistically significant. Aid fragmentation has a negative
relationship with government effectiveness at lower levels of organizational capital, and a positive
impact at higher levels of organizational capital. This conditional relationship is plotted in the
marginal effects plot in Figure 6.11b. The specification with in which the dependent variables is
measured as control over corruption is neither substantively nor statistically significant.
Conclusion
This chapter tested the impact of organizational capital and aid fragmentation on a wider universe
of cases. Specifically, it first estimated the long run impact of organizational capital on institu-
tional quality drawing on a cross-section and a panel dataset of developing countries from 1975
to 2014. It then aimed to identify the effect of aid fragmentation on institutional development
conditional on the level of recipient organizational capital, drawing on an instrumental variables
two-stage least squares (IV 2SLS) strategy.
The results of the first set of tests indicate that organizational capital, and in particular the
elite consultation component of organizational capital, is associated with lower levels of pub-
lic corruption, controlling for a range of country characteristics (income, population density,
level of democracy, trade/GDP, net oil and gas exports) and country, period, and region-period
fixed effects. This result is consistent with the explanation developed in Chapter 2. When elites
are divided, we expect to see relatively politicized institutions that tend to hire personnel based
on loyalty or factional identification and that do not coordinate information, providing ample
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Figure 6.11. Marginal Effect of Aid Fragmentation Conditional on Organizational Capital




























































































































































opportunity for corruption. This relationship between organizational capital and public corrup-
tion, however, does not carry over to other indicators of institutional quality.
The second set of tests estimate the effect of aid fragmentation on institutional outcomes
using donor income fragmentation as an instrument. The results of these tests indicate that aid
fragmentation has a positive impact on public corruption in countries with low levels of organiza-
tional capital, but either has a null or a positive effect on institutional quality in organizationally
robust countries. This can be seen in Figures 7.3a and 7.3b, which show the marginal effect of
aid fragmentation on public corruption and government effectiveness, respectively, conditional
on organizational capital. At relatively low levels of organizational capital, aid fragmentation
increases public corruption, while at higher levels of organization its impact is statistically indis-
tinguishable from a null effect. This differential impact of donor fragmentation is more precise
when the dependent variable is measured as government effectiveness. At relatively low levels of
organizational capital, the impact of aid fragmentation on government effectiveness is negative
and statistically significant, and at high levels of organizational capital its impact is positive.
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7 Conclusion
7.1 Summary and Main Findings
This dissertation was motivated by the puzzling record of contemporary institutional develop-
ment in countries with limited human and material resources, and the rule of law. In particular,
it examines Afghanistan, a country that has largely defied expectations of existing understandings
of institutional development. External or internal conflicts have clearly not motivated successive
Afghan governments to develop more robust institutional structures. Ethnic differences have of-
ten not given rise to institutional dysfunction or conflict. And government ideology and policies
have, in many instances, not influenced whether societal actors cooperate with or contest the
government. These observations motivated an explanation that centers on organizational capital
and features of external coherence. When institutions are insulated from elite polarization and
embedded in society, they are more likely to recruit and promote officials on the basis of merit,
to coordinate information more effectively, and to formulate and implement mutually agreeable
policies at the grass roots level. Moreover, when external support is aligned between political and
development objectives, and coordinated among donor organizations, institutional upgrading in
recipient countries is more likely to take place because the costs of programming, monitoring,
and objectively evaluating such assistance is lower.
Together, organizational capital and external support help to make sense of the haphazard
path of institutional development in Afghanistan. In general, when Afghan elites have been
cohesive, as was the case during the middle 20th century, they have been able to develop increas-
ingly merit-oriented and productive institutions of government. While the army and bureaucracy
have never been deeply embedded in the predominantly rural society of Afghanistan—these in-
stitutions were almost exclusively based in towns or cities and have drawn primarily on urban
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dwellers—they were capable of challenging significant military threats and carrying out concen-
trated infrastructure projects during the early monarchy. When elite cooperation began to break
down, as happened during the late monarchy, the communist period, and the post-Bonn govern-
ments, both the army and bureaucracy became vulnerable to politicization, setting the stage for
coups, insurgencies, and institutional dysfunction.
External donors have also contributed to institutional outcomes in Afghanistan through the
alignment and coordination of their assistance. Alignment between security and development
objectives and relative coordination of foreign aid provided for institutional upgrading of both
the army and bureaucracy during the early monarchical period. However, the rise of US-Soviet
geopolitical competition in Afghanistan decreased aid effectiveness and produced politicization
in government institutions in the final decades of the monarchy, providing the conditions for the
republican and communist coups d’état of 1973 and 1978, respectively. The subsequent Soviet
and post-2001 interventions in Afghanistan did not resolve this problem of divergent security and
development objectives, which impeded the development of government institutions over time.
The case-level findings are summarized in greater detail below.
7.1.1 Monarchical Rule
Chapter 3 shows that that the capabilities, reach, and effects of government institutions increased
substantially during the monarchical period. In order to explain this pattern of institutional
development, I demonstrate that the expansion of institutional strength under the monarchy
originated in (1) kinship and other personal ties centered around the royal court and (2) the
employment of external assistance by the government to enhance human capital and develop in-
tegrated lines of production in key export areas. Personal relationships grew dramatically around
the royal court over the course of early 20th century, extending to include increasingly distant
members of the royal clan and eventually, the urban intelligentsia and other social groups origi-
nating in communities outside of the royal lineages. The expansion of the monarchical network
provided the organizational basis for institutional upgrading by incrementally incorporating ca-
pable figures into senior administrative positions without threatening the familial cohesion that
underpinned monarchical rule. At the same time, monarchical governments increasingly drew
on foreign aid to enhance the capabilities of the bureaucracy and army. This allowed the govern-
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ment to extend its administrative reach to new territorial and functional areas in Afghanistan.
Together, the expansion of the monarchical network and foreign aid contributed significantly to
the increase in institutional capabilities.
However, even as the competencies and territorial presence of Afghan institutions expanded
over time, political control over institutions of government began to decline after the 1950s. The
growing number of commoner figures incorporated into government institutions—most with
meritocratic paths to higher government—and the expansion of the government’s presence and
basic capabilities made the patrimonial nature of the monarchy untenable. This contradiction
between familial rule and increasingly meritocratic government became acute by the 1960s and
1970s, resulting in persistent instability within the educated classes that constituted the political
elite. Geopolitical competition between the US and USSR in Afghanistan also contributed to
institutional decline by channelling aid to projects that offered the greatest political returns but
that did not always address the key constraints to economic and institutional development in
Afghanistan. The US and USSR contended for the support of different sections of the Afghan
elite—the latter providing a natural channel for the more disgruntled commoner figures that had
participated in the government—contributing to the instability that animated 1970s Afghanistan.
Together, declining organizational capital and resource competition established the conditions
for the coups of 1973 and 1978.
7.1.2 PDPA Rule
Chapter 4 demonstrates that the coup of April 1978 and subsequent inauguration of a PDPA gov-
ernment gave way to a rapid and immediate decline in the quality of the bureaucracy and army,
well before the Soviet intervention. Despite inheriting a standing army of more than 100,000 sol-
diers and an intact bureaucratic structure, the competencies, presence, and effects of the PDPA
government declined dramatically, in large part because of the internal characteristics of the new
regime. Specifically, this chapter shows that organizational dysfunction between the Parcham and
Khalq factions of the PDPA played a critical role in the rapid deterioration of Afghan government
authority prior to the Soviet invasion. It also demonstrates that Soviet support, in the form of
military equipment, economic aid, technical assistance, and direct firepower, largely kept the
regime together by providing a direct and concentrated flow of economic and military assistance
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to Kabul. However, Soviet assistance did not by itself address the organizational dysfunction
within the PDPA regime—this conundrum was never fully resolved. By the late 1980s, Moscow
had effectively abandoned efforts to build up institutions in Afghanistan, instead seeking to use
patronage to keep the PDPA-led government in power long enough to outlive the insurgency.
Soviet assistance became indispensable to the day-to-day survival of the PDPA regime. As a con-
sequence, when the Soviet Union itself disintegrated, the PDPA government fell apart with it.
7.1.3 Post-Bonn
Chapter 5 examines conditions of diverse domestic and external participation in the Afghanistan
intervention after 2001. After the Bonn settlement, government institutions made limited progress
despite the allocation of substantial levels of material and human assistance to Afghanistan. In
many areas of government activity, notably security provision and development planning, state
structures grew in size and reach while exhibiting limited autonomy and effectiveness. This chap-
ter makes sense of this puzzling set of developments by showing that the formation of Afghan
institutions was impeded by the increasing practice of personalist governance, the absence of co-
ordination among international donors, and divergent international security and development
objectives in Afghanistan. Personalist governance was, in part, a legacy of the successive wars
that had emerged and evolved in Afghanistan since 1979. But it was also the result of an electoral
system that systematically obstructed the emergence of cross-cutting, interest-aggregating politi-
cal parties, and a strategy of patronage adopted by President Karzai to acquire greater influence
within it. Personalist governance, in turn, gave way to a political system in which offices, con-
tracts, and other resources were distributed in exchange for political support. The disorganized
ways in which external resources were allocated to Afghanistan accentuated the prevalence of
patronage. Poor donor coordination and incompatible short-term security objectives and long-
term development goals increased the costs of monitoring and evaluating aid expenditure. These
problems remained unresolved despite increased US and international resources and attention
devoted to Afghanistan as part of the “surge” of military and civilian assistance starting in 2009.
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7.1.4 Cross Country Statistical Tests
Chapter 6 quantitatively evaluates the impact of organizational capital and donor fragmentation
in a wider universe of cases. Specifically, it first estimates the long run impact of organizational
capital on institutional quality drawing on a cross-section and a panel dataset of developing coun-
tries from 1975 to 2014. It then attempts to identify the effect of donor fragmentation on insti-
tutional development conditional on the preceding level of organizational capital, drawing on an
instrumental variables two-stage least squares (IV 2SLS) strategy.
The first set of tests evaluates the relationship between organizational capital and institu-
tional quality.642 Figure 7.1, which shows the distribution of elite cooperation, embeddedness,
and institutional quality, provides preliminary evidence for the positive relationship between or-
ganizational capital and institutional quality. A set of statistical tests provide more systematic
support. The results of these tests indicate that organizational capital, and in particular the elite
consultation component of organizational capital, is associated with lower levels of public cor-
ruption, controlling for a range of country characteristics (income, population growth, level of
democracy, trade/GDP, net oil and gas exports) and country, period, and region-period fixed
effects. This is partially consistent with the explanation developed in Chapter 2. When elites
are divided, we expect to see relatively politicized institutions that tend to hire personnel based
on loyalty or factional identification and that do not coordinate information, providing ample
opportunity for corruption. This relationship between organizational capital and public corrup-
tion does not carry over to other measures of institutional quality. As shown in Figure 7.2, while
organizational capital corresponds with greater government authority, government effectiveness,
and control over corruption, these relationships are imprecise.
The second set of tests estimate the effect of aid fragmentation on institutional outcomes
using donor income fragmentation as an instrument. The results of these tests indicate that aid
fragmentation has a positive impact on public corruption in countries with low levels of organiza-
tional capital, but either has a null or a positive effect on institutional quality in organizationally
642Organizational capital is measured as an index constructed from one indicator for elite cooperation and one for
institutional embeddedness. Both of these indicators are obtained from the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) project,
an expert survey that adjusts for cross-expert disagreement and measurement error. Elite cooperation is measured as
the range of consultation among political elites. Institutional embeddedness is measured as the number of political
parties that have permanent local branches. The primary measure of institutional quality is the level of corruption in
all government institutions and is collected from the VDEM dataset.
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robust countries. This can be seen in Figures 7.3a and 7.3b, which show the marginal effect of
aid fragmentation on public corruption and government effectiveness, respectively, conditional
on organizational capital. At relatively low levels of organizational capital, aid fragmentation
increases public corruption, while at higher levels of organization its impact is statistically indis-
tinguishable from a null effect. This differential impact of donor fragmentation is more precise
when the dependent variable is measured as government effectiveness. At relatively low levels of
organizational capital, the impact of aid fragmentation on government effectiveness is negative
and statistically significant, and at high levels of organizational capital its impact is positive.




























































































































































































































































Corruption (categorized) ● ● ● ●(0.104,0.318] (0.318,0.53] (0.53,0.743] (0.743,0.956]
Source: Coppedge et al. 2016; author’s calculations.
Notes: Countries with greater public corruption are (darker) red; countries with less public cor-
ruption are (darker) blue.
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Figure 7.3. Marginal Effect of Aid Fragmentation Conditional on Organizational Capital




























































































































































7.2 Shortcomings, New Questions, and Future Research
This dissertation developed an explanation of institutional consolidation and decay from a close
examination of case studies from Afghanistan before quantitatively evaluating the validity of
this explanation across a wider universe of cases. This empirical strategy provided for theoret-
ical depth and external validity, but it closely scrutinized only one country context. This is a
shortcoming because organizational capital and external support may work differently than ex-
pected in other country contexts when examined in close detail. It is also a shortcoming because
the Afghanistan cases do not exhibit any variation in social embeddedness, restricting inferences
about its potential effects. One line of future research, therefore, may include additional case
studies that “pair” with each of the monarchical, communist, and postwar cases studied in this
dissertation with relatively similar cases farther afield. Such a strategy could not only evaluate
the potential impact of institutional embeddedness across country contexts, but also test the
effects of the other arguments about organizational capital and aid developed in this disserta-
tion. For example, Botswana offers a potential comparison with monarchical Afghanistan. Ini-
tially a British protectorate and traditional monarchy, Botswana underwent rapid institutional
development as a republic after independence in 1966. Post-independence Tanzania can offer an
(imperfect) comparative case to the PDPA. Led by a dominant socialist political party Chama
Cha Mapinduzi (CCM),643 Tanzania has experienced incremental institutional gains in economic
planning and, more recently, in the provision of social services. And the experiences of El Sal-
vador, Mozambique, or Rwanda may provide useful comparisons to the experience of postwar
institution building in Afghanistan after 2001. Together, these cases can offer useful comparative
insights into the causal impact of different levels of organizational capital and foreign aid in struc-
turally similar (but not identical) circumstances. They can also provide insight into the potential
impact of institutional embeddedness, because some of these possible cases (notably Tanzania)
exhibit institutions that are actively involved in public matters at the local level.
There are a number of new comparative questions generated by this study. This research
examined the effect of organizational capital on institutional development, but it did not closely
643Following a 1977 merger between the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and the Zanzibar-based Afro-
Shirazi Party (ASP).
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study the origins of organizational capital. Organization can come in different forms—patrimonial
ties, social movements, anti-colonial campaigns, revolutions, for example—and each of these
sources of capital may have different effects. One of the findings from Chapter 3 was that fa-
milial ties fail to produce durable levels of organizational capital in the presence of increasing
meritocratization. Future research could investigate whether other forms of organization may
provide for institutional strengthening over extended periods of time. Another question gen-
erated by this research centers on whether different characteristics of foreign aid matter across
sectors. It might be the case, for example, that donor fragmentation may not have a detrimental
effect in sectors that require less hierarchy, for example the health and education sectors, relative
to those that involve coordinated planning, such as the rule of law or infrastructure development.
Future research can investigate where and when donor fragmentation matters.
There are also a number of Afghanistan-specific questions generated by this research. First,
this study raises the question of how durable forms of organizational capital can be generated
in Afghanistan, given the limited levels of elite cooperation and and the near absence of local
institutional embeddedness in much of the country. While Afghanistan has many characteris-
tics that work against its future development, one supporting set of features is (1) the prevalence
of reform-oriented tendencies across regions and constituencies, even among those who partic-
ipated in Afghanistan’s successive wars during the 1980s and 1990s, and (2) the experience of
elites and non-elites in areas outside of their home provinces. Together, these features make the
possibility of cross-cutting efforts to reform government institutions more likely than in areas
in which ethnic or regional divisions are much more entrenched and major political factions do
not show any reformist tendencies. Future research could explore whether the institutional rules
in Afghanistan can be amended or external conditions can be applied to support programmatic
policy coalitions in Afghanistan. With a more limited international footprint and discussions
about the constitutional design and implementation on the national agenda in Afghanistan, the
opportunities to generate elite cooperation around incremental reform and credibly support in-
stitutions of government are greater. Whether these opportunities can be realized and have an
effect on institutions in Afghanistan, however, remains open to question.
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7.3 Implications for Policy and Analysis
The findings of this research present a number of implications for practitioners interested in in-
stitution building, foreign aid, international intervention, and the future of Afghanistan. These
implications are important because many of the wrong lessons have been learned from interna-
tional interventions in recent years, including the experience of Afghanistan. There is little debate
that the intervention in Afghanistan has been extremely messy and costly. But the conventional
explanation for this outcome—that conscious external efforts to develop more capable, account-
able, and merit-oriented institutions are intrinsically unproductive—is the wrong lesson to be
learned from the Afghanistan case. As this dissertation has shown, the post-2001 Afghanistan
intervention was characterized by a series of largely predictable errors: excessive expenditure on
quick-impact development projects, poor monitoring of development and institutional outcomes,
underinvestment in the primary sector of the economy, half-hearted security sector reform, and
excessive cooperation with civil-war era commanders on security and economic matters.
As Chapter 5 of this dissertation shows, the post-2001 experience in Afghanistan was less a
crisis of ambition than one of expediency. While the initial years of the Afghanistan interven-
tion were framed in maximalist terms that emphasized security, governance, rule of law, human
rights, economic and social development, and even the invocation of the Marshall Plan as a model
for reconstruction in Afghanistan by US President Bush,644 the reality is that very little thought
and effort was dedicated to building up foundational institutions before the country had once
again descended into violence. In the initial years of the Afghanistan intervention, the US, as
the leading international actor in Afghanistan, was primarily oriented toward short-term, ad
hoc planning to address key security and development challenges. As these minimal initial ef-
forts proved to be insufficient, Washington and allied governments increased the level of resourc-
ing without identifying the objectives and strategy of the international presence in Afghanistan.
Even after the Obama administration’s efforts to turn around the course of the Afghanistan inter-
vention by through a resource-intensive counterinsurgency strategy, the US remained oriented
toward achieving relatively short-term security and economic returns, an objective it achieved by
644Speaking at the Virginia Military Institute on April 17, 2002, Bush would remark: “By helping to build an
Afghanistan that is free from this evil and is a better place in which to live, we are working in the best traditions of
George Marshall.” See James Dao, “Bush Sets Role for U.S. in Afghan Rebuilding,” New York Times, April 18, 2002.
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rapidly increasing allied manpower and expenditure in Afghanistan. However, the less tractable,
long-term problems of corruption, patrimonalism, and incompetence in sections of the Afghan
security forces and civilian institutions were largely seen as secondary, as were the potential con-
sequences of a rapid expansion in manpower and expenditure on institutional outcomes.
This experience is likely to hold lessons for other contexts. In Afghanistan and a range of
crisis countries in the Middle East (Iraq, Libya, Syria), Africa (Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia),
Asia (Burma, Cambodia), and Europe (Ukraine), addressing problems of institutions are essential
to the resolution of active or latent political conflicts. While the types of large-footprint mili-
tary interventions seen in Afghanistan and Iraq are likely to be a feature of the past, the United
States and other major powers will continue to face the types of institutional dysfunction and
breakdown seen in Afghanistan. This research offers ten distinct lessons for these kinds of cir-
cumstances.
Implications for the US and other major powers
1. Timing matters: early, targeted interventions have a higher return than late, inexact interven-
tions, even if these late interventions employ high levels of effort and assistance.
The Afghanistan case suggests that early investments in understanding and addressing in-
stitutional deficits in Afghanistan could have minimized subsequent material and human
costs expended by donor countries. This is especially prevalent in the post-2001 case, in
which the United States and other governments informally allied themselves with civil war
era military commanders while underinvesting in government institutions. By identify-
ing key institutional problems early on—including security sector patronage, government
manpower and human capital needs, underinvestment in the agricultural sector—and de-
veloping a realistic and resourced strategy to address and monitor these problems, the US
and its partners would likely have been able to weaken the growing Taliban insurgency and
minimize its economic and security commitments to Afghanistan in later years.
2. Consider multi-donor trust funds and other forms of pooling development assistance, despite
political incentives to maintain bilateral assistance programming.
This research has shown that coordinating donor resources can increase aid effectiveness,
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especially in countries least likely to become more institutionalized over time. In practice,
this can take many forms, including ad hoc arrangements such as multi-donor trust funds
or increased commitments to multilateral development institutions. These types of pooling
arrangements can serve as central repositories of information and decision-making bodies
that can hold aid-receiving institutions more accountable than individual bilateral donors.
3. Consider aid conditionality.
While this dissertation did not directly consider the question of aid conditionality, it does
suggest that aid recipients like Afghanistan have not faced significant incentives to per-
form because donors have not been particularly motivated to systematically understand
the outcomes of their assistance programs and unwilling to withhold aid based on out-
comes. In Afghanistan after 2001, the US and other major donors frequently declined to
make resourcing decisions on the basis of the dynamics and behavior of recipient country
institutions. As a consequence, the political leadership have had very limited incentives to
make appointments on the basis of merit and develop policies that are programmatic in
character.
4. Institutionalize efforts to reconcile potentially conflicting security and development objectives
in crisis countries.
Critics of military interventions rightly point out that these interventions result in “mis-
sion creep,” in which intervening countries are drawn into increasingly ambitious com-
mitments that cannot be fulfilled. While this general observation is borne out in the
Afghanistan case, it is incomplete and, by extension, misleading. The Soviet and US-led
military interventions in Afghanistan became unsustainably ambitious because they were
largely improvised. As a consequence, both interventions lacked an overarching strategy
of achieving stability in the medium- or long-run, instead pursuing a series of short-term
military-centric tactics that ultimately did not address the deeper sources of institutional
dysfunction. The US and other intervening countries ought to therefore first resolve the
potential contradictions of the security and development dimensions of its involvement
before intervention.
5. Invest in efforts to collect and disseminate data on institution building efforts.
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The post-2001 case study also shows that both donors and Afghan government officials
neglected to systematically measure institutional outcomes, limiting the recognition of in-
stitutional underperformance and its proximate causes until too late. Otherwise accessible
types of quantitative data—development expenditure and individual and institution-level
performance in key ministries, for example—were not obtained, undermining an objective
assessment of the development of the Afghan government. Where possible, donor gov-
ernments can and should partner more actively with aid recipients to collect data on not
just project performance, but also the the degree and quality of participation by recipient
institutions.
Implications for internal reform in Afghanistan and weakly institutionalized countries
6. Prioritize institutional rules that deter personalist politics and ad hoc electoral formation.
The post-Bonn experience showed that personalism (or, put differently, an absence of elite
cooperation) over a sustained period of time was a leading cause of institutional dysfunc-
tion in Afghanistan. Clearly, the leadership characteristics of President Karzai played a
part in the development of personalism in post-2001 Afghanistan. But a closer look at the
history of Afghanistan and other cases of personalist politics shows that personalist politics
thrives in the absence of institutional rules that provide for organization building. This was
clearly the case during the monarchy, during which time political parties were not legal.
It was also the case during the post-2001 period, when the SNTV electoral system sys-
tematically disincentivized organization building. Domestic policymakers (with assistance
from external organizations) need to design a set of institutional rules that incentivize long-
lived political organizations that represent and aggregate interests more effectively. While
Afghan political elites tend to emphasize the personal characteristics of this or that leader,
for any long-term progress in security and development matters to be made, leaders must
be embedded in stable political parties.
7. Privilege both meritocracy and inclusion in the government formation process, while recogniz-
ing that some degree of patronage provision is difficult to entirely avoid.
This research has shown that leaders in developing states face very strong incentives to pur-
sue patronage as an effective mechanism of political survival, even if this practice clearly
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corrodes government institutions over the long run. While this tradeoff is problematic,
it does not mean that political leaders must adhere to either unrestricted patronage or
meritocracy. External and domestic actors ought to focus their efforts on identifying on
merit-oriented coalitions that cut across ethnic and regional groups, while recognizing that
patronage appointments are a necessary practice of making coalitions work. While difficult
to pull off, this type of coalition making can incorporate capable individuals into govern-
ment institutions who are more likely to cooperate on substantive issues of security and
development. As a necessary part of the coalition making process, patronage appointments
ought to be concentrated in less significant government positions.
8. Processes of institutional reform are more likely to be successful if sustained over time; partial
reform can be destabilizing.
As seen in Chapter 3, partial reform can be destabilizing if not sustained. Without clear
rules and mechanisms for managing political competition among elites, partial institutional
reform can lead to unmanageable conflict over the type and pace of reform, as well as
who can most effectively govern. While disagreements over the “rules of the game” are
inevitable, for these disagreements to be manageable and for reform to ultimately be suc-
cessful it needs to be followed through.
Implications for US policy toward neighboring and regional powers
9. Neighboring and regional states stand to individually benefit more from cooperation than con-
flict in fault-line states.
As seen during the communist period in Afghanistan, neighboring and regional states can
increase the intensity and duration of conflict in institutionally weak countries, not only
destroying these countries’ social institutions, human capital, and physical infrastructure,
but also generating long-term costs for the international community—the expansion of ter-
rorist or militant groups, refugee flows, and foregone future economic and political possi-
bilities. Regional and international competitors can and should learn from the Afghanistan
experience and other recent crises in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen by engaging in early
diplomatic arrangements that may not result in an unambiguous military victory by pre-
ferred proxy groups, but that preserve government institutions that maintain basic order.
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These kinds of diplomatic efforts, for example, can specify a phased exit from political
power by the ruling family or faction and a transition to a mutually agreeable multi-party
electoral system. While difficult to implement in practice, the initiation of talks at an early
stage can reduce the possibility of deeply polarized conflicts and institutional breakdowns.
10. Recognize and address incompatibilities with neighboring countries as early as possible.
One of the primary reasons for the rise of the Taliban insurgency in post-2001 Afghanistan
was Pakistan’s accommodation of the Taliban leadership and followership in major Pak-
istani urban centers.645 Pakistan’s posture of accommodation provided the Taliban move-
ment critical access to funds, recruits, and safe territory, allowing the insurgency to endure
and expand in the face of American and allied firepower. While it is difficult to know
whether Islamabad would have adopted a less accommodative posture toward the Taliban
under different circumstances after 2001, the long period of time in which the US and
allied governments ignored the problem certainly did not benefit the international inter-
vention. As early as the Bonn conference, the US should have actively explored prospects
of engagement and coercion to influence Pakistani policy. At this time, Pakistan was both
internationally isolated and (perhaps) more motivated to achieve a diplomatic solution than
in subsequent years, when the conduct of the war in Afghanistan had convinced the Pak-
istani security establishment that a partial or full Taliban military conquest was possible.
The lesson here is that, in the resolution of internationalized civil wars, engaging neighbor-
ing countries early and actively can prevent them from becoming spoilers in subsequent
years. By employing both carrots and sticks toward neighboring countries, the US can
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